Albores, et. Al. v. Sps.

Espina
Research on Jurisprudence as Defense for Theory
I.

Presence of Tolerance Warranting the Filing of an Unlawful Detainer Case

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible
entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).1 It is, nonetheless,
without issue that a forcible entry case is a summary action to recover material or
physical possession of real property when the person who originally held it was
deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. 2 An
action for unlawful detainer, on the other hand, is filed when possession by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. 3
The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is
which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of
the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.4
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff's
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy.5|||

Distinguishing Unlawful Detainer and Forcible Entry

The following elements differentiate forcible entry from unlawful detainer:
"a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant
is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth: while in unlawful detainer, the
possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by
reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property
under his contract with the plaintiff.6

1 Sps. Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, 4 May 2006.

2 Dela Paz v. Panis, G.R. No. 57023, 22 June 1995.
3 Ibid.
4 Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, 14 August 2001.
5 Sarona v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22984, 27 March 1968.

"b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the
defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff
must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.7
"c. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant;
in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession8
"d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date
of actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last
demand9 or last letter of demand10

Absence of Barring in the Entry and Occupation of the Premises and Agreement on
Gratuity Shows Tolerance and an Implied Contract of Lease
The Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court has consistently upheld
the fact that the plaintiffs were not barred by anyone when they entered and
occupied the parcels of land. Such finding of fact, not only by the MTC but also by the
RTC, must be upheld. Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that there was an attempt to
prevent plaintiffs from entering the subject property, hence excluding herein
defendants from their rightful possession of the property as to constitute force, the
agreement on gratuity takes the form of an implied contract. Consequently, the
failure to pay rent upon demand gives a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Hence, it is clear that the possession of the plaintiffs were out of tolerance. To
this wise, the Court in Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals11 shed light on the concept of
tolerance:
Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner,
like the Tan Te complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.
As early as 1913, case law introduced the concept of possession by tolerance in
ejectment cases as follows:

6 Dikit v. Icasiano, G.R. No. L-3621, 23 May 1951.

7 Medel v. Militante, G.R. No. 16096, 30 March 1921.
8 Maddamu v. Judge, G.R. No. 48940, 22 June 1943; Aguilar v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 49129, 30
June 1944; Banayos v. Susan Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 30336, 30 June 1976; Pharma Industries,
Inc. v. Pajarillaga, et. al., G.R. No. L-53788, 17 Oct. 1980.
9 Sarona, et. Al. v. Villegas, et. Al. G.R. No. L022984, 27 March 1968.
10 DBP v. Canonoy, G.R. No. L-29422, 30 September 1970; Calibayan v. Pascual, G.R. No. L22645, 18 September 1967; Racaza v. Susan Realty, Inc., G.R. No. L-20330, 22 December 1966.
11 G.R. No. 139442, 6 December 2006.

It is true that the landlord might, upon the failure of the tenant to pay the
stipulated rents, consider the contract broken and demand immediate possession
of the rented property, thus converting a legal possession into illegal possession.
Upon the other hand, however, the landlord might conclude to give the tenant
credit for the payment of the rents and allow him to continue indefinitely in the
possession of the property. In other words, the landlord might choose to give the
tenant credit from month to month or from year to year for the payment of their
rent, relying upon his honesty of his financial ability to pay the same. During such
period the tenant would not be in illegal possession of the property and the
landlord could not maintain an action of desahucio until after he had taken steps
to convert the legal possession into illegal possession. A mere failure to pay the
rent in accordance with the contract would justify the landlord, after the legal
notice, in bringing an action of desahucio. The landlord might, however, elect to
recognize the contract as still in force and sue for the sums due under it. It would
seem to be clear that the landlord might sue for the rents due and [unpaid,
without electing to terminate the contract of tenancy;] [w]hether he can declare
the contract of tenancy broken and sue in an action desahucio for the possession of
the property and in a separate actions for the rents due and damages, etc.
The concept of possession by tolerance in unlawful detainer cases was further
refined and applied in pertinent cases submitted for decision by 1966. The rule was
articulated as follows:
Where despite the lessees failure to pay rent after the first demand, the lessor did
not choose to bring an action in court but suffered the lessee to continue
occupying the land for nearly two years, after which the lessor made a second
demand, the one-year period for bringing the detainer case in the justice of the
peace court should be counted not from the day the lessee refused the first
demand for payment of rent but from the time the second demand for rents and
surrender of possession was not complied with.
In Calubayan v. Pascual, a case usually cited in subsequent decisions on
ejectment, the concept of possession by tolerance was further elucidated as follows:
In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the
premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to
defendants possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the defendant is
analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the
demand to vacate. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is unequivocal that plaintiffs possession after
they intruded into the lot after the fire was by tolerance or leniency of the defendants
and hence, the action is properly an unlawful detainer case.

I.

Notice on Representative as Notice to Others

Discussion

a. Preliminary Investigation as Substantive Right