HON. MARTINIANO P.

VIVO, as Commissioner of Immigration, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the CFI of Manila, TSOI SAU CHUN, CHUA LE
GUAT and her minor children ANG KIE LIM AND FEI CHING and ANG CHAK CHI, LAM PEK
YUK, KWOK KAM LIEN and her minor children YU KIAN TIOK and YU LILY; SY SIOK HIAN
and her minor children ONG LAI YUEN, ONG ANG KIAM and WONG LAI SHU; and TSAI
BUN and her minor child NG KAM YUK, respondents. G.R. No. L-25442
June 29,
1968
This case is an offshoot of G.R. No. L-22354, decided by this Court on March 31, 1965.
It will be recalled that the herein private respondents are Chinese citizens who, on various dates,
arrived in the Philippines as temporary visitors, and succeeded in securing several extensions of
their stay in this country.
On or about February, 1962, allegedly upon solicitation of the then Macapagal administration for
foreign capital, five of these respondents requested the President of the Philippines to be allowed
to invest some money in the Philippines. The request was indorsed by the then Acting
Commissioner of Immigration who suggested favorable action thereon, in line with the socioeconomic policy of the Government. While their requests were pending, the said aliens sought
further extensions of their stay as temporary visitors but these were denied by the President;
portion of the letter of denial reads thus:
As to your request for presidential sanction on the desire of said aliens to make
investments in the Philippines and for guidance on the procedure to be followed in the
implementation of their investment projects, it is suggested that the matter be taken up
directly with the Chairman of the National Economic Council and the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry who may thereafter make the necessary recommendation to this
Office.
On August 29, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration issued Circular No. 101 providing that the
authorized stay of all "bonded alien temporary visitors who arrived in the Philippines in 1961 and
prior years are hereby terminated, and requests for extension of such periods will not be
entertained and that all said aliens should leave not later than September 19, 1962, if their prior
authorized stay expires later than September 19, 1962, and those having dates of expiry before
said date should leave on the corresponding expiry dates."
Alleging that the Commissioner of Immigration acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
and/or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the said circular, the aliens filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of said circular. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Commissioner and granted the prayer to allow the said aliens to deposit with the court their
extension fees.
After a protracted trial, the lower court rendered judgment, thus:
... This court is of the opinion that the public interest that is warranted in the exercise of
the provisions of this Section 47 (a) 2 is clearly the official government invitation of foreign
capital mentioned prominently in the said presidential directive of July 31st and August
17th as the basis of the authority granted the herein petitioners allowing them to invest in
the Philippines. And the covering law of their immigration status is Section 47 (a) 2 already
aforestated legally vesting the petitioners with the status of special non-immigrant under
the said covering law. The Immigration Circular No. V-101 is inapplicable to the instant case
of the petitioners inasmuch as said circular seeks application on temporary visitors and
aliens other than those covered by the exercise of the provisions of Section 47 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 and Petitioners are held by this Court to be under the
provisions of Section 47.
The Commissioner of Immigration was by that decision ordered to register the aliens as special
non-immigrants under Section 47(a) 2 of the Immigration Act of 1940, in lieu of their recorded
non-immigrant status; to authorize them to continue operating their business establishment until

December 31, 1967, and to liquidate their business investments, repatriate their capital and
depart for their country of origin on or before said date; and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction theretofore issued.
Upon appeal here (said G.R. No. L-22354) the CFI decision was reversed, this Court declaring:
... the appellees without right to stay in the Philippines and/or to be considered special nonimmigrants; the respondent Commissioner of Immigration with power and authority to
order their departure. It is further ordered that appellees return the amount of P1,700.00 to
the government and of P10.00 per month extension fees, from the time they began staying
in the Philippines, over and beyond the period authorized by the Commissioner of
Immigration until they leave. The injunction by the lower court having been issued illegally
and improvidently, should be as it is hereby, dissolved. Costs against appellees.
The aliens failed to leave the country upon finality of the decision. Instead, on October 11, 1965,
they wrote the Commissioner of Immigration requesting that they be allowed the "use and
enjoyment of their rights to a valid and lawful extended stay decreed in their favor by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines in its decision in Case No. G.R. L-22354, at least temporarily until
they leave and depart for their country of origin not earlier than the termination of President
Macapagal's Socio Economic Program."
This request was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration and so the aliens filed again with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction praying for
judgment ordering the respondent to accept and receipt for all monthly payments of P10.00 per
person extension fees; and ordering the respondent Commissioner to schedule the departure of
the aliens not earlier than the period contemplated in the socio-economic program of the
President (Civil Case No. 63135).
On October 29, 1965, the herein respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance gave due course
to the petition and issued an order directing the Commissioner of Immigration "to desist from
executing the acts complained of."
This petition seeks to annul the said order of October 29, 1965.
Requiring the herein respondents to answer the petition, this Court, at the commencement of
these proceedings on December 23, 1965, issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the
respondent Judge, in the meanwhile, from enforcing the order dated October 29, 1965, and from
otherwise taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 63135.
On January 3, 1966, counsel for herein private respondents filed with this Court a manifestation
praying that the case be dismissed for lack of cause of action, attaching thereto a true copy of a
"Motion to Withdraw Petition" in Civil Case No. 63135, filed by said respondents in the Court
below, pertinent portions of which read:
1) That by virtue of a Supreme Court resolution dated December 14, 1965, copy attached
as ANNEX "A" hereof received by petitioners on December 24, 1965, thru ordinary mail,
and issued in Case No. G. R. L-22354 (Kwok Kam Lien, et al. vs. The Hon. M. P. Vivo, etc.)
the Supreme Court has just remanded to this very court the said Case No. G. R. L-22354;
2) That meanwhile, when this case was filed with this Honorable Court on October 28,
1965; it was after respondent Commissioner of Immigration sought to arrest your
petitioners on October 22, 1965, two (2) days after the reglementary period expired since
petitioners received the denial of their last motion to reconsider the Supreme Court
decision in said Case No. L-22354 which denial was received by petitioners on September
25, 1965, such that the cause of action of your petitioners in this case was based primarily
on the Supreme court decision having become final and executory on October 20, 1965;
3) That the aforestated resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 14, 1965, was in
virtue of a separate motion for reconsideration NG HUI CHING, which in effect further
extended the reglementary period without the knowledge of herein petitioners;

4) That in view of the said resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 14, 1965, the
instant petition with this Honorable Court in the above-entitled case is now left without
support on its cause of action and therefore your petitioners has no other alternative than
to withdraw their petition in this case.
In the meanwhile, this Court denied the prayer for dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor General
then filed his memorandum for the petitioner. In their reply memorandum, respondents reiterate
their prayer for dismissal of the case, calling our attention to the fact that the Solicitor General,
while having discussed the issues raised, has forgotten to make mention of the above-quoted
manifestation filed by respondents.
The respondent judge was served with the writ of preliminary injunction, issued by this Court, a
day before respondents' withdrawal motion in Civil Case No. 63135. Said injunction having
restrained him from further taking cognizance of the case, the Judge could not issue any order of
dismissal pursuant to the motion, although from the facts above narrated, the discontinuance of
Civil Case No. 63135 will not possibly yield any disadvantage or prejudice upon the Government.
The respondent Judge should thus grant the respondent's motion to withdraw and thereby
dissolve the restraining order issued therein on October 29, 1965.
Upon the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the withdrawal of said Civil Case No. 63135 in
the court below, this case has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs, with the pronouncement, however,
that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-22354 be immediately and fully implemented. Costs
against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.

FRANCISCO T. KOH, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-40428 December 17,
1975
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction to review and reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals (Eighth Division) in CA-G.R. No. SP-03322, entitled "Francisco T. Koh, petitioner
vs. Jose P. Coloma and Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I,
respondents". The appellate Court found "no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue"; dismissed
the petition for injunction and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued against
the respondents.
The undisputed facts contained in petitioner's brief as adopted in respondents' brief are:
On February 21, 1974, private respondent (Jose Coloma) filed a Complaint for
damages against the herein petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte,
Branch I, the same being docketed as Civil Case No. 5011-1 (Annex A of Amended
Petition). On April 8, 1974, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on
the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue
has been improperly laid. (Annex B of Amended Petition) On May 8, 1974, petitioner
filed a Manifestation before the lower court apprising it that the copy of the Motion
To Dismiss sent to private respondent (counsel for private respondent did not
specify any address in the Complaint other than his alleged address in San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte) was returned unserved by the Bureau of Post for the reason that he
was unknown in the said address. (San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte) Annexes "C" and "D" of
Amended Petition.
On May 28, 1974, petitioner's counsel received a Notice from the lower court setting
the hearing of the Motion To Dismiss for June 4, 1974. In response to this notice,

petitioner on May 31, 1974 filed a Manifestation informing the lower court that he,
was submitting the motion without further arguments. Three (3) days before the
scheduled hearing of the Motion to Dismiss, specifically on June 11, 1974, counsel
for petitioner received a copy of private respondents' opposition to his Motion To
Dismiss. Finding that the private respondents pleading required comment, on June
18, 1974, petitioner herein filed a Reply thereto (Annex G of Amended Petition).
On July 9, 1974, petitioner, thru counsel, received a copy of the Order of the lower
court denying the Motion To Dismiss (Annex A of Amended Petition. However from
the registry return card of the corresponding pleadings, it was apparent that the
Order denying our Motion To Dismiss dated June 25, 1974 of the lower court
aforementioned did not consider the facts and exhibits reflected in petitioner's
Reply To Opposition To Motion To Dismiss inasmuch as the same was received by the
lower court on June 27, 1974 (2 days later) after the Order had been issued (the
petitionees pleadings in the said case were all filed with the court thru registered
mail special delivery due to the distance involved). For this reason, and within the
period authorized by law, on July 11, 1974 petitioner filed a Motion For
Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply
to Opposition which was not considered by the lower court (Annex I of Amended
Petition). This Motion for Reconsideration was opposed by private respondent.
In an Order dated July 19, 1974, the lower court issued an Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
From the Orders of the lower court dated June 25, 1974 and July 19, 1974, the
petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before
the Court of Appeal the same being docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-03322. For failure of
the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by
reason of their unavailability, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition.
However, on September 5, 1974, petitioner herein filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the resolution of the Court of Appeals and on September 24, 1974, the said
Motion was favorably acted upon and the petition was given due course. On
October 9, 1974, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction in the
said case enjoining the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte from further
proceeding thereon.
After the issues on the peticion were joined by the filing of the ANSWER for the
respondents dated October 15, 1974, the case was set for oral arguments after
which the parties were required to submit, simultaneously, their respective
memoranda. Only petitioner herein filed his Memorandum in support of his petition.
Private respondents did not submit their memorandum.
In a resolution dated March 19, 1975, the Court of Appeals dismiss the petition for
certiorari and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence this petition for review and reversal of said resolution of March 19, 1975.
The only issue raised before Us is whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
before it; in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court
recites a sufficient cause of action.
Respondent Appellate Court predicted its decision on the finding that despite the petitioner's
receipt of a copy of the opposition to the petitioner's motion to dismiss filed by private respondent
Coloma in the trial court, petitioner failed to appear during the healing of his notion to dismiss the
complaint on June 14, 1974; that "the parties were given the opportunity to adduce proofs and
advance arguments to support their respective sides and on the basis of whatever were adduced
during the hearing, it rendered a ruling in the exercise of its jurisdiction; "that" the lower court in
its ruling cited the evidence it relied upon and doctrines which supported and justified its findings

and conclusions;" that "considering that there is no showing of whimsical and capricious exercise
of discretion, it could be said that if ever there was an error committed by the respondent judge, it
was an error of judgment in the exercise of his discretion which is correctable by appeal;" and that
it concurred with the lower court's order denying the motion to dismiss which is anchored on the
argument that the question of residence of a person is one of intent. In the instant case, the trial
Court concluded that San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, is the residencia of plaintiff as contemplated in
paragraph (b) Section 2 of Rule 4.
Under ordinary circumstances the foregoing reasoning and findings of the trial court and the
respondent Appellate Court could be considered highly tenable and justifiably defensible, but We
simply cannot ignore petitioner's allegation in his motion to dismiss filed in the trial court that
"this clearly is a nuisance action brought before the Honorable Court to require the defendant
(petitioner) to travel and appear in Laoag, Ilocos Norte" as well as the background of the present
case and compels Us to delve deeper into the possible motives of private respondent in choosing
as situs for his claim for damages against petitioner the rather relatively far Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte.
It is clear that Civil Case No. 5011 (for Damages) (Annex "A" to this Petition) filed by private
respondent Coloma in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, wherein Coloma is asking for
damages to the tune of P173,000.00 from petitioner for alleged "malicious, baseless, and
unfounded criminal complaint" filed by petitioner against Coloma, arose from the following alleged
incidents, to wit:
That sometime on May 21, 1970, the defendant (petitioner) Francisco T. Koh filed
before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and
Detainer against the plaintiff (private respondent Coloma) for the possession of a
house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which plaintiff
(Coloma) and his family were all residing,
That to avert the ejectment of plaintiff (Coloma) and his family from the aforecited
house, plaintiff (Coloma) and defendant (petitioner) entered into a compromise
settlement in court whereby plaintiff (Coloma) will pay to defendant (petitioner) the
total amount of P3,125.00,
That to insure the payment of the aforecited obligation plaintiff (Coloma) issued to
defendant (petitioner) a Manila Banking Corporation check No. 17010812 postdated February 27, 1971;
That in post-dating the aforecited check, plaintiff (Coloma) explicitly explained to
defendant (petitioner) that there is not sufficient funds at the time in the Bank to
cover the amount the necessity to post- date it with the expectation that Plaintiff
(Coloma) will deposit the necessary amount on or before the due date;
That for certain beyond the control of plaintiff (Coloma), he failed to deposit the
required amount on the date due, so that defendant (petitioner) Francisco T. Koh
forcibly the plaintiff and his family from their aforecited residence the following day,
February 28, 1971;
That defendant (petitioner), still not contented in having successfully evicted
plaintiff (Coloma) mo his family from their residence, defendant (petitioner) filed a
criminal complaint against the plaintiff (Coloma) before the Fiscal's Office at Pasig,
Rizal, over the Manila Banking Corporation check in question, which complaint was
later filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal;
That defendant personally applied and actively participated in the criminal case as
a private prosecutor in collaboration with the prosecuting fiscal;
That the Court of First Instance of Rizal, upon motion of plaintiff (Coloma) dismissed
said criminal complaint in its order dated Sept. 26, 1972.

Private respondent Coloma convinced the trial court, although he admitted that he is presently
residing at No. 57 K-6th Street, Kamias, Quezon City, that he could be considered a legal resident
domiciled at San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, because he was born and he grew up there; that his
parents and his brothers and sisters still live there; that their ancestral home and lands are
situated there; that he studied in Ilocos Norte up to his graduation in the Ilocos Norte High School;
that if ever he came to Manila, it was for the purpose of pursuing a college carrer; that he goes
home time and again to oversee their properties' harvests as he is the oldest; that if he is staying
in Quezon City now, it is because his wife is a government employee as staff nurse in the
Philippine General Hospital; and after her retirement, he and his family intends to return to his
hometown of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and establish his permanent home there.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that on May 8, 1974, he filed a Manifestation before the
lower court apprising it that the copy of the motion to dismiss was sent to private respondent
Coloma (counsel for Coloma did not specify any address in the complaint) in his alleged address of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, but the same was returned unserved by the Bureau of Posts for the
reason that he (Coloma) was unknown in the said address of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Annex "C"
and "D" of Amended Petition); that in pleadings under oath filed in several judicial proceedings
involving petitioner and private respondent, the latter asserted his actual and present residence
as either 486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal or No. 57, K-6th Kamias, Quezon City, Rizal, to
wit:
1. Jose P. Coloma vs. Francisco T. Koh, Administrative Case No. 1060, Supreme
Court;
2. Jose P. Coloma vs. Francisco T. Koh, Civil Case No. 14067, C.F.I. Rizal, Branch XI;
3. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs. Francisco T. Koh, Civil Case No. 15450, C.F.I. Rizal,
Branch VI;
4. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs. Hon. Cesar C. Cruz, et al., C.F.I. Rizal, Civil Case No.
14687;
5. Jose P. Coloma, et al., vs. Hon. Presiding Justice Salvador V. Esguerra, et
al., Supreme Court, G.R. No. L-35945;
6. Jose P. Coloma vs. Hon. Cesar C. Cruz, et al., C.F.I. Rizal, Civil Case No. 14140;
7. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs Hon. V.M. Ruiz, et al., C.A.-G.R. No. SP-00329;
8. Francisco T. Koh vs. Hon. Guardson Lood, et al., C.A.-G.R. No.
00785-R;
9. Jose P. Coloma vs. Hon. Juan Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. L-36425;
that both private respondent Coloma and his wife Crisanta A. Coloma are registered voters in the
Greater Manila Area, it appearing in Jose P. Coloma's Voter's I.D. No. A- 4941010 and Mrs. Coloma's
Voter's I.D. No. A-4941009 that they are residents of No. 486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal;
that the complaint filed against petitioner for damages in the C. F. 1. of Ilocos Norte, was prepared
in Manila, signed by a Manila lawyer, verified in Manila by private respondent who showed his
Residence Certificate issued in Manila (R.C.A-324643, issued on March 8, 1973, in Manila); that the
filing of the complaint for damages before the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte was "purely for the purpose of
harrassment and that venue of the action was improperly laid".
It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs
for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest
convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum
accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not
exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is a established
principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a
person while residenceapplies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact this

distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
This Court held in the case of Uytengsu vs. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its
previous stand inLarena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36 and Nuval v. Guray 52 Phil. 645, that
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate
a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petition of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one
and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means,
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in
referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. (Emphasis
supplied)
Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private
respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos, Norte, based on his
manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to
justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is
entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or
where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the
requirements of Sec. 2 (b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions. The admission
of private respondent Coloma that when he brought the action for damages against petitioner in
the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, he was "residing at No. 57 K-6th Street, Kamias, Quezon City" is to Our
mind absolutely fatal to all his contentions of good faith in bringing that action in a distant place
and at the same time quite revealing of his motive for doing so, when We take into consideration
the basis of the action for damages against petitioner which is the criminal prosecution for estafa
against private respondent Coloma arising from a bank check he used to pay petitioner and was
dishonored for lack of funds; respondent Coloma's proven acts in having the civil complaint for
damages prepared in Manila by a Manila lawyer, verified in Manila and filed in Ilocos Norte C.F.I.
and the numerous cases between petitioner and respondent Coloma in this Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Rizal Courts of First Instance wherein respondent Coloma swore under oath that
he is a resident of 486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal and No. 57, K-6th Kamuning, Quezon
City.
An examination of the cause of action contained in the civil complaint for damages filed by
respondent Coloma against petitioner in Civil Case No. 5011 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte raises lingering doubts in Our mind as to the existence of a valid and justified cause of
action, for it prays for P173,000.00 worth of alleged damages (actual, moral exemplary and
attorney's fees) based on an alleged "malicious, baseless, and unfounded complaint" filed by
petitioner against respondent Coloma, when it could be seen from the civil complaint itself that
the basis of the action for damages is the criminal prosecution of respondent Coloma for the crime
of estafa in the C.F.I. of Rizal because of the complaint of petitioner arising from the post-dated
check admittedly issued by respondent Coloma which was dishonored for lack of funds. It can
readily be seen from the record that it was the Fiscal of Rizal who filed the criminal complaint for
estafa against respondent Coloma after preliminary investigation when the fiscal was convinced of
the existence of a prima facie case against Coloma. While it is true that petitioner was the
offended party because the dishonored check was issued in his favor and that he acted as private
prosecutor when the case was filed in the C.F.I. of Rizal because there was no separate civil action
filed against Coloma arising from the same cause of alleged estafa, it certainly cannot be said that
as offended party in the criminal case and by initiating the same criminal case against respondent

Coloma he (petitioner) was the one who filed the "malicious, baseless and unfounded complaint"
against private respondent Coloma. To establish the filing of the criminal case against Coloma by
the Fiscal of Rizal as "malicious" is highly problematical because the Fiscal of Rizal conducted a
preliminary investigation on the same and if he in the exercise of his quasi-judicial duty believed
there was a prima facie case against respondent Coloma that made him file the case, his act
cannot be called "malicious". We note here that the petitioner was not the one who filed the
criminal case against the respondent Coloma, the former being merely the offended party. The
criminal complaint against respondent Coloma could hardly be termed "baseless and unfounded"
because he himself admitted that he issued a post-dated check that was dishonored. If the
criminal complaint against him was dismiss by the C.F.I. of Rizal upon his own motion and
perchance by some reason of technicality or by reason of reasonable doubt, respondent Coloma is
by no means absolved from the civil liability of refunding the amount written in the dishonored
check to the petitioner. The logical conclusion that could be derived from all the foregoing is that
the criminal complaint filed against respondent Coloma for Estafa by the Fiscal of Rizal is by no
means "malicious", "baseless", and "unfounded" and, therefore, the action for damages is without
any basis and that respondent Coloma's civil complaint for damages filed in the C.F.I. of Ilocos
Norte was without sufficient cause of action.
We observe in the examination of the record of this case, that private respondent Coloma can go
to the extent of resorting to other means while this case pending in the respondent Court of
Appeals to find a solution to another aspect of the raging controversy between petitioner and
private respondent. As a result of respondent Coloma's filing of a complaint for damages (Civil
Case No. 5011) against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, wherein respondent Coloma alleged
that "he is a resident of the Municipality of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte," Petitioner filed in
the Fiscal's Office of Manila a case of perjury against respondent Coloma and the Investigating
Fiscal in his resolution believed in the existence of a prima facie case against him. Respondent
Coloma was able to get a directive from the Secretary of Justice, dated Sept. 3, 1974, reversing
the findings of the Investigating Fiscal and instructing the City Fiscal of Manila to have the case
"dismissed, immediately upon receipt hereof". At any rate, We are convinced that the
misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent
that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed
his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with
and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier
and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner
had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and
private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is hereby reversed; the Orders dated
June 25, 1974, and July 19, 1974, in Civil Case No. 5011-1 of the Court of the First Instance of
Ilocos Norte are set aside; the complaint in the aforementioned case is hereby dismissed for
improper venue and lack of sufficient cause of action, and the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte or his successor in office is restrained from further proceeding with
the hearing of said case.
With costs against private respondent Coloma. SO ORDERED.