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409 F.2d 718
Webster BIVENS, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.SIX UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF the FEDERALBUREAU OF NARCOTICS, Defendants-Appellees.
 No. 328. Docket 32537.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
 Argued January 16, 1969. Decided April 10, 1969.
Stephen A. Grant, New York City, for appellant.Stephen R. Felson, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Edwin L. Weisl,Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert V. Zener, Dept. of Justice, Joseph P. Hoey,U. S. Atty. for Eastern Dist. of New York, on the brief), for appellees.Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and MEDINA and WATERMAN,Circuit Judges.LUMBARD, Chief Judge:1Plaintiff asks us to hold that the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees to the people the right to remain secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,creates a federal cause of action for damages against federal agents who haveviolated this right. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1331, and alternatively for failure to state a claim upon which relief can begranted.2We hold that the Fourth Amendment does not provide a basis for a federalcause of action for damages arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure.The order of the district court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.Plaintiff Webster Bivens in his complaint, filed
 pro se,
 alleges that six federal
 
agents entered his apartment on November 26, 1965 without a search or arrestwarrant. After conducting a search of the apartment the agents arrested plaintiff for a violation of the narcotics laws and placed him in manacles in the presenceof his wife and children. The search and the arrest are alleged to have beenconducted "in an unreasonable manner." Plaintiff was taken to the FederalCourt Building in Brooklyn, and then to the Federal Narcotic Bureau, where hewas interrogated, fingerprinted, photographed, subjected to search of his person, and booked. It appears that the complaint filed against plaintiff ultimately was dismissed by a United States Commissioner. The eventssurrounding the search and arrest are said by plaintiff to have caused him "greathumiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering," and will continue to do so.Plaintiff prays for a judgment of $15,000 against each of the agents as damagesfor their unlawful actions.4The district court dismissed the complaint partly upon the ground that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
1
 which grants to the district courts jurisdiction over actions which arise under "the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." But under Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90L.Ed. 939 (1946), it is clear that the district court had jurisdiction under § 1331to determine whether this complaint, unambiguously founded upon the FourthAmendment, states a good federal cause of action. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler,373 U.S. 647, 649, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963). The district court, inthe alternative, did validly rest its disposition on the merits for failure to state aclaim for which relief can be granted. It is on this ground that we affirm.5On July 12, 1968 we reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's motionfor leave to appeal
in forma pauperis,
 and we granted petitioner's motion for the assignment of counsel. Stephen A. Grant, Esq., has represented petitioner on this appeal. He has the thanks of this court for the conscientious andeffective manner in which he has discharged his duties as assigned counsel.6There are two distinct questions involved in this appeal. First, we mustdetermine whether the Fourth Amendment authorizes a private suit for damages, caused by an unreasonable search and seizure, which may be broughtunder the general federal question jurisdiction conferred by § 1331. If it does,the question arises whether federal agents acting in their official capacity, but inviolation of their lawful and constitutional authority, are immune from suit. SeeGregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied 
 339 U.S. 949, 70S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950); cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-557, 87S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Since we answer the first question in thenegative we have no occasion to address the immunity issue.
 
7The view that statutory authority is a prerequisite for a federal cause of actionfor damages, even though the wrong complained of is the violation of aconstitutional right, has been adopted by all of the courts which have examinedthis question recently. See United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir.1964),
cert. denied 
 380 U.S. 971, 85 S.Ct. 1327, 14 L.Ed.2d 268 (1965);Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793, 796-797 (9th Cir. 1957); Koch v. Zuieback,194 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D.Cal.1961),
aff'd 
 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963);Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F.Supp. 582, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1960),
aff'd per curiam,
290 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied 
 368 U.S. 827, 82 S.Ct. 46, 7 L.Ed.2d 30(1961); Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp. 813 (S.D.Cal.1947). It must be said that fewof these opinions have given extensive consideration to the problem, and thatonly the district court opinion in Bell v. Hood,
 supra,
 does so in the context of aclaim founded upon the Fourth Amendment. However, we do not agree withthe reasoning of this latter decision, which the district court below impliedlyadopted by quoting an extensive passage in its memorandum.8In Bell v. Hood the district court drew a distinction between the"governmental" action prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and the "private"nature of the unreasonable search and seizure committed by the defendantfederal law enforcement officers. The court reasoned that once the officersexceeded the limits imposed on the government by the Amendment they wereno longer acting with governmental authority but rather only as individuals, andthat therefore they could not be sued under the Amendment.9We cannot accept this rationale. The fact that the officers were acting inviolation of the Fourth Amendment's restraints upon governmental action doesnot belie the plain fact that they were acting as government officials, and not ina private capacity. It was from the federal government that they drew their apparent authority, such that reasonable citizens could not have been expectedto resist their unconstitutional intrusion. Action under color of law, whichutilizes the power of official position, must be deemed within the scope of theFourth Amendment.10If, then, we do not find the precedents against plaintiff conclusive, we also notethat there are no precedents at all directly in his favor. Plaintiff can cite no casesustaining a federal cause of action claiming a violation of the FourthAmendment which was not based upon a statute or upon some other basisindependent of the Amendment itself. The closest he can come is West v.Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 14 S.Ct. 752, 38 L.Ed. 643 (1894), but there the suit wasupon the statutory bond of the defendant, a United States marshal; the violationof the Fourth Amendment's requirement concerning the sufficiency of an arrest

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