C.

PRODUCTION AND PROBATE OF WILL (Rule 75)

1. NATURE OF PROBATE PROCEEDING:
a. In rem
b. Mandatory
c. Imprescriptible (Imbued with public policy) and doctrine of estoppel does not
apply.

General Rule: A probate proceeding only looks at extrinsic validity.

Extrinsic validity - due execution of the will (whether or not the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law)

Exception: Principle of Practical Consideration: The probate court may pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will because there is apparent defect in its face this is also
known as the principle of practical consideration [ Nepomuceno v CA (1985)] . (Ex.
When on the face of the will the petitioner appears to be preterited)

But the remedy of certiorari is available, where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable
(e.g. grave abuse of discretion of the judge when there is clearly preterition and the said
judge still continues the
probate proceedings)

2. WHO MAY PETITION FOR PROBATE; PERSONS ENTITLED TO NOTICE

PETITIONER FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WILL

(1) Executor
(2) Devisee
(3) Legatee
(4) Other person interested in the estate
(5) Testator himself, during his lifetime [ Sec. 1, Rule 76]

MEANING OF INTEREST IN ESTATE
An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has claim against the estate like a creditor. [Sumilang v. Ramagosa (1967)]

[G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. October 12, 1967.]

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA
DIMAGIBA, respondent;

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA
REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes.
Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court ruled in favor of probate.
Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary period. They argued that they
were entitled to await the other grounds for opposition before appealing.

ISSUE: Whether the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal

RULING: Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As such,
probate order is final and appealable. They do not have to await the resolution of its other
oppositions since the Rules of Court enumerates six different instances when appeal may be
taken in special proceedings.

[G.R. No. L-57848. June 19, 1982.]
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.

FACTS: Clementia Aseneta died at Manila Sanitarium Hospital and left a holographic will
stating therein that all her real and personal properties be inherited upon her death by
petitioner herein Dra. Soledad L. Maninang and do not consider Nonoy (Bernardo Aseneta)
as her adopted son.

Petitioner Soledad filed a petition to probate the Will of the decedent with the CFI of Quezon
City testate case. Meanwhile, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted
son, claims to be the sole heir of the decedent, and instituted intestate proceedings with the
CFI of Pasig, Rizal intestate case. The testate and intestate cases were ordered
consolidated. Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the
ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir,
was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. On the other hand, in her Motion to
Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will,
the Courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the
decedent.

Lower court ordered dismissal of the testate case and appointing Bernardo as the
administrator of the decedents estate. Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari
Petition before respondent CA alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in
issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case. However CA denied certiorari and ruled
that the trial Judges Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the
Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail
of. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON Lower Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued orders of
dismissal of the Testate Case.

HELD: YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will
is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.

Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of
a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic)
of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may
be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or
legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its
only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.

Suffice it to state that in view of the finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his
jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a
Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. And even
assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader
interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal
would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

[G.R. No. L-58509. December 7, 1982.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA,
deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET
AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

FACTS: The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased
did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was
lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

HELD: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court
with the standard writings of the testator.

[G.R. No. 156021. September 23, 2005.]

CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P. COLLADO, JUDITH PROVIDO,
CLARITA PROVIDO, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA E.
PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL
ARENGA, RUTH BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO MARIN,
JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and MATHILDE MARIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, respondents.

DOCTRINE:
Extrinsic Fraud-An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the
fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents
a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining no to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

FACTS: On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition
for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado
(decedent).On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort
North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the
decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

Thereafter, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings.
On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for being
unmeritorious. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary
injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision dated 30 May 2001 and
Order dated 11 January 2002.

In its Resolution promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found
that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of their own. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution,
but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy is an annulment of judgment or the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief for judgment and other appropriate
remedies

HELD: Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new
trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule
permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of
damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision
or final order is contrary to law. Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under
Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence.

A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are
remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is
rendered.


In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned
to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment. However, petitioners
in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the
probate proceedings.

A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said
will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies
of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.In fact,
petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with
petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings.
However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision
became final and executory. Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after
it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the
denial of their motion to reopen.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to
them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise,
they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.

[G.R. No. L-24742. October 26, 1973.]
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO
MANGUERRA, CARMEN-CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO
GONZALEZ, respondents.

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a
petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court
held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the
probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal
CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUES:
Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to
the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling
and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other
courts.

D. ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL (Rule 76 & 77)

1. CONTENTS OF PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF WILL

(1) Jurisdictional facts

(a) Death of the decedent;
(b) Residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is sitting;
(c) If he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his leaving his estate in such province

(2) Names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent
(3) Probable value and character of the property of the estate
(4) Name of the person for whom letters are prayed
(5) If the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of
it.

DEFECT IN PETITION will not void the allowance of the will, or the issuance of letters
testamentary or of administration with the will annexed.

2. GROUNDS FOR DISALLOWING A WILL

(1) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of
its execution;

(3) If executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that
the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

Note : The grounds for disallowance of will are exclusive.

3. REPROBATE; REQUISITES BEFORE WILL PROVED OUTSIDE ALLOWED IN THE
PHILIPPINES; EFFECTS OF PROBATE

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may
be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines (now
RTC).

REQUISITES FOR ALLOWANCE
(1) Copy of the will
(2) Order or decree of the allowance in foreign country
(3) Filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines by executor or other person
interested
(4) Court having jurisdiction shall fix a time and place for the hearing
(5) Cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.

EFFECT
The will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

4. EFFECTS OF PROBATE

Decree of probate is conclusive as to its due execution, subject to the right of appeal. (Thus,
no suit for forgery of a will, which has been duly probated and such order becoming final)
[ Rodelas v Aranza (1982)] :

General Rule: If a holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available,
the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
testator in said will.

Exception: A photostatic copy or Xerox of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

[G.R. No. L-5405. January 31, 1956.]
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C.
QUINTO, respondents.

FACTS: Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his
wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural
daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land

which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing
to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and
based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated.
She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with.

HELD: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy.

Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

[G.R. No. L-23135. December 26, 1967.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG, petitionerappellee, vs. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA,
LICERIA PABELLA and ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS: Mariano Sumilang filed petition for the probate of the will of Hilarion Ramagosa
which instituted Sumilang as the sole heir. This was opposed by Saturnina Ramagosa
alleging that the will was executed under duress and later on alleging that the will was
revoked by implication when the testator sold the parcels of land subject of the will to
Sumilang. The CFI denied the motion to dismiss of the oppositors on the ground that it goes
into the intrinsic validity of the will hence the case at bar.

ISSUE: W/N the probate be denied

HELD: NO. The petition for probate is limited to the extrinsic validity that is the testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. The alleged sale in the case at bar is
no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing, the validity of
the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and
the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

[G.R. Nos. L-3087 & L-3088. July 31, 1954.]
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant, vs.
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.

Doctrine:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may
be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
FACTS: Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the

Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by his first marriage
with Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora,
Emiliano, and children with his second marriage to Maria Natividad Lim Billian namely Jose,
Jr. and Silvino.

Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Apolonio
Suntay was declared administrator. After his death, Federico C. Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate. Maria Natividad filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and
signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was
denied because of the loss of said will and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish
the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will
and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the
will and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further
proceedings.

Silvino Suntay, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his
late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased
on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district
court, Province of Fookien, China, filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for
the probate of the will executed in the Philippines or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien,
China. Witnesses were presented to prove the existence of the will allegedly left by Jose
Suntay.

Lower Court Ruling: Dissallowed alleged will and testament executed in Manila on
November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China,
on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the wills allegedly left by Jose Suntay can be probated.

HELD: Upheld decision of the Court of First Instance. Granting that there was a will duly
executed by Jose B. Suntay, and that it was in existence at the time of, and note revoked
before his death, the testimonies of the witnesses presented fall falls short of the legal
requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who
testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on
the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides: Wills proved and allowed in a foreign
country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides: When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated,
is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person
interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the
hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance.

Section 3 provides: If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the
Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge,

and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be
filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved
and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved.
The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The
legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be
established by competent evidence. However, there was no evidence presented to prove
this point.

The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the
Consul General of the Republic of China, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are
inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify
and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate
matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to
confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy
were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that
the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the
absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in
the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made.
The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence
shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, does not purport to probate or
allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the
alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted
basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of
wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed,
filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

[G.R. No. 169144. January 26, 2011.]
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA
PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, petitioners, vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, respondent.

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON Probate of the will in the foreign country
where the alien deceased resides condition sine qua non for Reprobate of the will in the
Philippines

FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States
(U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she

executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the a
petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment asspecial administrator of
her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas(Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta,opposed the petition on the ground that
Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed
it.

The RTC issued an order:
(a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will;
(b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio,
the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and
(c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated
will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the
Philippines.

The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the
will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior
probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated
in the Philippines. The present case is different from reprobate, which refers to a will
already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures.

ISSUE: WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.

HELD: Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may
take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state
that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in
the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost
or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:
(a) the jurisdictional facts;
(b) the names,ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it.

Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign

country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign
will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will
already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the
will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter
rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court
provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have
the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of
their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.

[G.R. No. L-12190. August 30, 1958.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO
E. GAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.

FACTS: Gan filed a petition for probate of the holographic will allegedly executed by
Felicidad Yap. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband, Ildefonso Yap asserted that the
deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will
itself was not presented. Petitioners tried to establish its contents and due execution by the
statements of 4 witnesses who testified that Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a
holographic will and that Felicidad allowed them to read the will.

ISSUE: w/n a holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses.

HELD: NO

When the will itself is not submitted, the means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence
are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticitythe testators handwriting
has disappeared.

Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or
destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills:

Holographic will
Ordinary will
1. guarantee
of
authenticity:
the
1. guarantee of authenticity: testimony of
handwriting itself
the subscribing or instrumental
2. if oral testimonies were admissible, only
witnesses
one man could engineer the whole fraud.
2. hard to convince 3 witnesses
3. In case of a lost holographic will, the
deliberately to lie.
witnesses would testify as to their
3. In case of a lost will, the 3 subscribing
opinion of the handwriting which they
witnesses would be testifying to a fact
allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot
which they saw the act of the testator
be tested in court because the
subscribing the will.
handwriting itself is not at hand.