Statcon:

Particular Latin Rules

MENS LEGISLATORIS

DECISION

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

CORNELIA
MATABUENA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

v.

PETRONILA

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of
the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a
similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of
the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of
that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se
engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,
[according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale
Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without
benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad
Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest
the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long
as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach
to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE
WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of the
donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property.
Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are
called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena,
maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit
of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was
made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the
latters stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A
1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is
indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion
reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within
the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a
view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in
plaintiffs complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix
Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did
assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and
her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when
the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of
facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by
their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased
Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix
Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant,
Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956,
which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the
land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the
common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done
and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on
March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue
of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land
declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It
reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the
donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February
20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At
that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when they
married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been
executed." 6

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We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as
void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals
decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the
old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the
Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter
virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection
for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so
that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1),
it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of
those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand
that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above
pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It
would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be
nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities
would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the
principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission
may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must
be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of
Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a
los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage
on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil
Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister, to the other half. 11

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the
complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void,
with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property
in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

UBI LEX NON

DEBERMUS

DISTINGUIT,

NEC

NOC

DISTINGUERE

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE
APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

COURT

OF

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester
S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive
to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy." 1

Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka

nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi
ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your
own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nagaaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event

and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in
the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:

CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.

ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka

na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung
ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.

CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung

paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.

ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI Eh, di sana

ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka

puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin,
dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to

10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.

ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.

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CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6,
1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the abovenamed accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia
to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly
record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the
contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1

of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6
dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb
or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as
a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that
the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record
the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It
is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the
intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the
board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to
this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he
makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the
bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It
is the communication between one person and another person not between
a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person
should be professed." 14

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of
conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free
conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to
be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others,
has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the
framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations
between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures
and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of
communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion
by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

EJUSDEM GENERIS

When do we apply this rule?

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
respondent.

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a
candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil
action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent
Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign
purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence
of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention
Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any
provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is
to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the
utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for
electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was
orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away,
we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This
opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner,
after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him
five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given
due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped
with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is
"violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek
a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On
the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent
Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970,
at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970.
No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed
by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the
petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision
of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates
"to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,

matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." 3It
was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the
petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3,
1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C.
Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency,
the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same
day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the
absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban
in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the
construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections
would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of
the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus:
"Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is
permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before
us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to
justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority
was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however,
that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans,
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." 5 For
respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order.
We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval
under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or
class as those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to
as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission
was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather
than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain
Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should be
more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of
removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative
enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the
ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute
provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an
interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase
Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor
obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the
above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the
view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of
unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language,
the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has
been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner,
an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent
Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not
resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to
use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to
be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical
contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the
effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot
be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express
terms assures. 10

responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest

elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for
lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission,
the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on
solid footing.

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding
from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system
of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The
three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which
it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of
statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether
substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the
laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law
to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial
review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails
to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the
supreme law.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission

was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the
branch of the executive department although independent of the President
to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court,
as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot
exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no
higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its
powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its

WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent

Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or
implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the
use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the

unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main
opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any
ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would
be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add
the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of
reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution.
Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that
the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and announcing a
meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a
certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting
itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however,
respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be
he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the
condition "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters
placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally
recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms
of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of
R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded
can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E)
of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated
through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district,
respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would
exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by
personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his
spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more
expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's
basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional
test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the
proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and
arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile
unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the
same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not
been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's
premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election
advertisements to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known
to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of
the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through
the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles"
abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of
free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some
sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the
candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend
the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional
right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent
Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the
candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is
to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation
in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate
or by another person with his knowledge and consent.

# Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the
unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main
opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any
ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would
be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add

the following observations:

This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of
reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution.
Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that
the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and announcing a
meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a
certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting
itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however,
respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be
he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the
condition "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters
placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally
recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms
of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of
R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded
can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E)
of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically
recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated
through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district,
respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would
exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by
personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his
spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more
expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's
basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional
test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the
proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and
arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile
unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the
same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not
been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's
premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election
advertisements to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known
to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of
the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through
the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles"
abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of
free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some
sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend
the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional
right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent
Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the
candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is
to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation
in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate
or by another person with his knowledge and consent.

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

G.R. No. L-35376 September 11, 1980

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
petitioners,
vs. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, ETC., ET AL.,
respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines and The Director of Lands seek the
review of the decision dated July 22, 1972 of the respondent Judge in Cad.
Case No. 27, GLRO Rec. No. 1714, Lot No. 4273, Ormoc Cadastre entitled,
"The Director of Lands, petitioner, versus Tiburcio, Florencia, Fabian and
Gonzala, all surnamed Aotes, claimants-movants", the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 28, 1940, declaring
Lot No. 4273 Public Land is set aside and said Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc
Cadastre is hereby adjudicated in favor of herein movants in undivided
interests and in equal share of each to GONZALA AOTES, married to
Victorino Gormanes; TIBURCIO AOTES, married to Epefania Maglasang;
FLORENCIA AOTES, married to Basilio Barabad; and FABIAN AOTES, married
to Dulcisima Barabad; all adjudicatees are Filipinos, of legal ages, the first
named is residing in Can-adiong, Ormoc City, Philippines; and as soon as this
decision shall have become final, let the Commissioner of Land Registration
Commission, Quezon City, issue the corresponding decree of aforesaid parcel
of land in the names of herein adjudicatees, subject to the liability and claims
of creditors, Hens, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after
their distribution as imposed by Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 1
The following facts are undisputed in the instant case:
In a decision dated September 28, 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot No. 4273
of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land.
On February 23, 1972, private respondents Aotes filed with the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, presided by the respondent Judge a
petition to reopen the aforesaid decision dated September 28, 1940 under
Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act 6236 claiming to be the owners and
possessors of Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre by virtue of hereditary
succession but, due to their non-appearance on the date of the hearing of the
Cadastral Case because of ignorance and excusable neglect, said land was
declared public land and that they had been in adverse, peaceful and
notorious possession of the said parcel of land since the time immemorial,
paying all the taxes, interests and penalties. They pray that the decision of
the Cadastral Court affecting Lot No. 4273, Ormoc Cadastre be reopened, and
that they be allowed to file their cadastral answer.
On March 16, 1972, petitioners filed an opposition to the aforesaid petition on
the ground that such petition is barred by the expiration of the period for
reopening cadastral proceedings under Rep. Act 931 which expired on
December 31, 1968 and this period has not been extended under the
provisions of Rep. Act 6236 because the latter applies only to the extensions
of time limit for the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Respondent Judge in its order dated May 9, 1972, denied the opposition for
lack of sufficient merit and set the case for hearing on June 24, 1972.
On July 22, 1972, respondent judge rendered decision setting aside the
decision of the cadastral court dated September 28, 1940 declaring Lot No.
4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the private respondents
in undivided interest in equal share of one-fourth (1/4) each.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed this instant
petition assigning only one error to writ: The trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for reopening of Cadastral Proceedings.
In the Brief, 2 petitioners argue that the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the proceedings for reopening of the cadastral case because under the
provision of Rep. Act 931, the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings
expired on December 31, 1968, and that period has not been extended by
Rep. Act 6236 which applies only to the extension of the time limit for the
filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings. In the
Manifestation and Motion, 3 respondents Aotes claim that considering the time
limit for firing applications for free patents and for judicial confirmation of
incomplete and imperfect titles has been extended up to December 31, 1980,
the reopening of cadastral cases should also be extended until December 31,
1980 in fairness and justice to them.
The sole issue to be resolved, considering the above facts, is whether or not
Rep. Act 6236 which provides for the extension of the time limit to file
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to December 31, 1976 applies also to the reopening of
cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands.
There is merit in the petition.
By way of background, Rep. Act 931, which was approved on June 20, 1953,
is an act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions,
of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land,
by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding
the approval of this act. Under this aforesaid act, all persons claiming title to
parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the
time of the survey were in actual possession of the same but for some
justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during
the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of
the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty
years next preceding the approval of this act, are granted the right within five
years after the date on which this act shall take effect, to petition for a
reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act 2259. Rep.
Act 2061, which took effect on June 13, 1958, refers to an act setting a new
time limit for the filing of applications for free patents, for the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and for the reopening of judicial

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. Under this act
the time for filing applications shall not extend beyond December 31, 1968.
Rep. Act 6236, approved on June 19, 1971, however, extended the time limit
for the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles not to extend beyond December 31, 1976. In
resume, Rep. Act 931 granted a right within 5 years from June 20, 1953 to
petition for a reopening of cadastral proceedings. Rep. Act 2061 fixed a new
time limit which is up to December 31, 1968 to file applications for free
patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and for
the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared
public land. Rep. Act 6236 extended the time limit which is up to December
31, 1976 for the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Respondent Aotes filed on February 23, 1972 a petition to reopen the decision
of the Cadastral Court under Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act 6236.
Respondents Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for
free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and
imperfect titles have been extended up to December 31, 1980, the reopening
of cadastral cases is also extended until December 31, 1980. Rep. Act 6236,
the very law on which respondents Aotes bases his petition to reopen the
cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents' contention. It
will be noted that while Rep. Act 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral
cases which shall not extend beyond December 31, 1968, no similar provision
is found in Rep. Act 6236 expressly 'extending the time limit for the reopening
of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land. As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the Rep. Act 6236
makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, Rep.
Act 2061, expressly did. Under the legal maxim of statutory construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion),
the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of
the human mind. 4 If Rep. Act 6236 had intended that the extension it
provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so
provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral
proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in Rep. Act 6236
is made clearer by reference to Rep. Act 2061 which includes the reopening of
cadastral cases, but not so included in Rep. Act 6236.
We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep. Act 6236 which is
the sole basis for filing the respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral
proceedings applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different
from "filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles."
Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated September 28, 1940, the
respondent Judge has concluded that Rep. Act 6236 is applicable also to

reopening of cadastral proceedings, thereby, altering Rep. Act 6236. That

cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly pertains to
the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeals: 5
"It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law,
leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our
decisions have consistently been to that effect. 6 Likewise, it is a cardinal rule
of statutory construction that where the terms of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, no interpretation is called for, and the law is applied as written,
7
for application is the first duty of courts, and interpretation, only were literal
application is impossible or inadequate. 8
More importantly, the lower court has no longer jurisdiction to entertain the
petition filed by respondents for reopening the cadastral proceedings because
the latter, as we have noted, did not file the aforesaid petition within the
period fixed by the applicable laws to wit: Rep. Act 931 and 2061.
Consequently, the decision dated September 30, 1940 of the Cadastral Court
declaring the land in question a public land has become final and conclusive.
It has also acquired the status of res judicata. It must be remembered that
generally, the fundamental principle of res judicata applies to all cases and
proceedings, including land registration or cadastral proceedings. 9 The
doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from relitigating issues actually
litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It is well-settled that a
prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties
on the subject matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to
matters which were decided in the first action, but also as to every other
matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit. 10
Indeed, settled is the rule that a cadastral case is a judicial proceeding in rem,
which, as such binds the whole world. 11 The final judgment rendered therein
is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof, if not noted
thereon, like those of the petitioner, are deemed barred under the principle of
res judicata. 12 In the case of Cano vs. De Camacho, this Court held:
Although the title of Jesus Vao over said Lot 1-B is not as yet indefeasible,
no decree having been issued in his favor, all rights, interests or claims
existing before said date are deemed barred by said decision, under the
principle of res judicata, once the decision become final, upon expiration of
the thirty-day period to appeal therefrom. 13
By reiterating its ruling, this Court once more stresses and emphasizes that
Rep. Act 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and
as a consequence, the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the petition
of the respondents Aotes to reopen the cadastral proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decisions dated
July 22, 1972 of the respondent Judge and reiterating that of the Cadastral
Court dated September 28, 1940. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

CASUS OMISSUS

any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is
a peace officer.

Casus ominus pro omisso habendus est (Restrictive rule)

G.R. No. 14129

July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

plaintiff-appellant,

vs. GUILLERMO

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. Padilla Law Office for
defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in
the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is,
consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged
with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary
investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause
that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial
started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of
the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower
court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within
the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who
cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was
held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the
answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the
prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single
question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or
employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal
or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended

among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He
submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any
Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or
exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise
than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words
"justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature
to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that
under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was
modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54
of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words,
justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e.,
judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however,
there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic
and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase
and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts
of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the
courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as
"judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a
judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier
Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide
litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that
capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are
judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and
clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709,

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a
relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No.
1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter
18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and
3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to
the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth,
the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 1947,
when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic
provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666,
657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867,
2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep.
Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following
should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he
be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at any
municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the
position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice
of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly
election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being
disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide,
however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any
person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted
January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or
officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of
Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to take part in
any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and
shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a
term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be
construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any
election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative
Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any
Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or

exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise
than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No.
3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge
of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province, any officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the
police of any municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the
classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the
provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising
the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor
more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor
more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved
December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August
22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice,
judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of
the Army, the Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural
police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is
a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative
development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the
first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep.
Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words
"justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge,"
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to
justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of
the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer
from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".

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It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed
congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the
discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has
eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications
from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from
the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by
reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word
"judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last
mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the
peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the
phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the
enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial
officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there
be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals
are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and
assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the
defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that
rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be
held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus"
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section
54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called
"judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case,
defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being
restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be
strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed
against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and
the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted
against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal

statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process
demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law
intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed.
816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere
fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty
that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there
has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p.
56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the
intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be
noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy
and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court
may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of
Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction
of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be
construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose.
(U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory
Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of
criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes
situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354;
See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale
L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the
purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the
judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute,
are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the
legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit?
Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General,
to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First
Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention
was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all
judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such
as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and
to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan
political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the
other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself
why justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with
Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they
are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs.
103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided
inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for
candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election
cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature
had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an
unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that
the administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace
within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No.
237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the
petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that
one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was
found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the
Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676,
which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under
Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included among the
officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with
the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing
laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a
proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to
section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was
a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was
filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be
considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives,
opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the
legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec.
213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a

bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices
of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected.
To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid
down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from
participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election
Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so
enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the
prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied
the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the
conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the
Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to
infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace
from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice
of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the
Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there
appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius
est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to
particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why
other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included,
and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim
expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v.
Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court
should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

DURA LEX SED LEX

G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA
Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General
Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C.
Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower
court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a
secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense
to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information
dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO
MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in
his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver
(Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court
at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that
the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he
has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can
hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the
authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of
law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to
be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his
firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so
that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following
question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six
rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his
possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding
authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits

consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,"
then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed
to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office
of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to
the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for
the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he
was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret
agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is
exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits
were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him
are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The
decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set
aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent
was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the
accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of
a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within
the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with
what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Statcon: Particular Latin Rules

G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS SANTAYANA
Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

(1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or
more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts
over Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for
not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00)
pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said
courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with
which the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of
not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or
both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00)
pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the
offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over
the same.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de

Castro and Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal
possesion of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus
Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C.
Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for
equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior
SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an
undated certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an accredited
member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt
was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he
was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his
official duty and for his personal protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused
was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described pistol with
four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An
investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was
filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused
was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the
case was appealed to US and the accused assigned three errors allegedly
committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the
present subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal
court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the appointment
of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him
to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit
corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of
Republic Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over
cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance
of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offense
charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First
Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a fine of
more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the
information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was

appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess
firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his
official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant
was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a
license or to register the said firearm because it was government property
and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6
Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also
informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because
you are already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the
appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8
revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967.
Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's
appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of
the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus
Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his provisional
release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.