University of the East vs Jader

CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000

FACTS:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1st semester, he failed to
take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete grade remarks.
He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1,
1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the
exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.
The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his
name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept
30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review
classes and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UEs negligence.
ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
HELD:
SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latters actual
damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not
graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what CA held because its also
respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible
for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his
affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar
examinations, it doesnt only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites
such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00),
with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of
moral damages is DELETED.

Albenson Enterprises vs. CA

Facts:
- In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporationdelivered to
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. mild steel plates. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking
Corporation Check in the amount of P2,575.00 drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
- The check was later dishonored for the reason "Account Closed.". The petitioner discovered that the
dishonored check originated from "Eugenio S. Baltao ,the presidentof Guaranteed and the recipient of the
unpaid mild steel plates. It was also revealed that that E.L. Woodworks was registered in the name of one
"Eugenio Baltao" and that signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."
- On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed a complaint against Eugenio Baltao, however, it appears that the
respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages theE.L. Woodworks in the same
Baltao Building, 3267 V.Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same address of Guaranteed.
- On September 5, 1983, In filing information for violation of BP 22, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had
given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and
therefore, was deemed to have waived his right. Albenson Enterprises vs. CAFacts:- In September, October,
and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporationdelivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc.
mild steel plates. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check in the
amount of P2,575.00 drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
- Claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, Baltao immediately a motion for reinvestigation,
alleging that he had not been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation ,that he
never had any dealings with Albenson and that he did not issue the dishonoured check.
- Fiscal Mauro Castro exenorated Baltao and castigated Sumaway for failing to exercise prudence in
performing his duty that caused injustice to the respondent.
- Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, Baltao, filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner Albenson. The trial court favoured the Baltao while the court of appeals only reduced the
damages. The respondent then brought the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue: whether or not the respondent have a cause of action for damages based on abuse of rights

Held:
No. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. ..A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;(2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for
their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby.
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is
legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and itis done with
intent to injure.
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be
validly made the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the
circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private
respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What
prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent
was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed
was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the
check, and yielded the following results: from the records of the Securitiesand Exchange Commission, it
was discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one
"Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks,
against whose account the check was drawn, was registeredin the name of one "Eugenio Baltao";
verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing
on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
Private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed
at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao.
Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting
business in the same building he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner
acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint beforethe provincial fiscal

219 SCRA 115 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry Article 21 of the
Civil Code
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years
old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in
Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered
to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they
expressed their intention to get married. Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to
the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in
no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked
his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So
Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged
to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino
customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of
promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud
employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying
Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was
not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered
herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions
on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a
foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to
study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21
of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi
delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly
covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books such as the
absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there
was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal
seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses
for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29, 1975

TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
FACTS:
Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on
April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote
the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to
impound and take custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the
motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot
prevent the court from taking custody of the same. 2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial
Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized
the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging
that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and
then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure
upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to
order the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha
in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been
given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch,
its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the
Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond
repair.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative
defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on
April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to
gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to
the filing of a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as
Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN
RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of
his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that
because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were
constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that
they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of

P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000.00.
ISSUES/HELD:
whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor
launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus
delicti of the crime.
ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other
officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant
whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly
suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith. Except for Madella who was merely acting under orders.

RATIO DICIDENDI:
since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have
violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.
Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in
no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act
complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals
to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without
a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections
1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the
provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a
personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the
power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or
magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable
cause exists therefor. 8
We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code
it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that
defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor
launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing
unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's
exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the
Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite
repeated orders from his superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal
Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of
the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could
not prevent the court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded the motor launch on July 6,
1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there
was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to
explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary action from
his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above
circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

LIM V. PONCE DE LEON (G.R. No. L-22554; August 29, 1975)

DOCTRINE: To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of
the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with
malice or bad faith.
Injured Party: Lim and Taha
Torts/Event: Unreasonable searches
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor launch named M/L
"SAN RAFAEL". A year later Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal

of Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. Fiscal Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor
launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the
detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Lim, cannot prevent the court from
taking custody of the same. So, upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Maddela,
seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
Plaintiff-appellant Lim pleaded with Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise,
Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized
property to plaintiff-appellant Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the
subject of a criminal offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with
the CFI of Palawan a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon
and Maddela, alleging that on Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and
there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order
of
Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure
of a private property
ISSUE: W/N defendants are civilly liable to plaintiffs for damages allegedly suffered by them
granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
HELD: PONCE DE LEON LIABLE UNDER ART. 32. DEFENDANT MADELLA CANNOT BE LIABLE.
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on
Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: ART. 32. Any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages, (9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is
entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded. In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant Lim claimed that he
purchased the motor launch from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as
advanced payment; that since its seizure, the motor launch had been moored at Balabac Bay and because
of exposure to the elements it has become worthless at the time of the filing of the present action; that
because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he suffered moral damages and that because
of the violation of their constitutional rights they were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer
whom they have paid for attorney's fees.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands of the incident by claiming that "he
was in good faith, without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiffappellant, Jikil Taha" when he ordered the seizure of the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his
defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith.
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that
there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32,
which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on
the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
However, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the
motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for
executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances, which would warrant
Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request
to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch
despite repeated orders from his superior officer.

MHP GARMENTS, INC. VS. CA

GR No. 86720
2 September 1994

DOCTRINE: Under the Civil Code, damages may be recovered for violation of constitutional rights and
liberties from any public officer or private individual. Art 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person
"directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of constitutional rights and liberties. It is not the actor
alone (i.e., one directly responsible) who must answer for damages; the person indirectly responsible also
has to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art 32 makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
Petitioners: MHP Garments, Inc. and its employee, Larry De Guzman
Respondents/Injured Parties: Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales
Tort/Event: Warrantless search and seizure of boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits
FACTS:
MHP Garments Inc. (MHP) was granted the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts
uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In its Memorandum Agreement with the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, MHP was given the authority to undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court
of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and scouting supplies. Upon receipt of information that Agnes Villa
Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales (the respondents) were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority, Larry De Guzman, an employee of MHP, was tasked to undertake
surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (the PC). Thereafter, De Guzman
together with 3 PC men went to the stores of respondents
at the Marikina Public Market and without any warrant, seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and
suits on display at the stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed respondents. The items
were then turned over by the PC Captain to MHP for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair
competition was then filed against respondents. After a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal
dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. Respondents then filed a civil case
against MHP and De Guzman (the petitioners) for sums of money and damages.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners should be held liable for damages, even if they did not actually effect the
seizure of the merchandise YES
HELD:
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure
vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any
public officer or private individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award for
damages. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by
government and indirectly by private entities. Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution protects our people
from unreasonable search and seizure. A warrantless search may only be done under the circumstances
provided in the Rules of Court. The evidence in this case did not justify the warrantless search and seizure.
The progression of time between the receipt of information and the raid shows there was sufficient time for
the application for a judicial warrant. In not procuring a judicial warrant, the petitioners and the PC took the
risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the respondents right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
ON PETITIONERS ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS THE PC THAT CONDUCTED THE RAID AND THEIR PARTICIPATION
WAS ONLY TO REPORT THE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY:
The members of the PC team should have been included in the complaint; still, the omission will not
exculpate petitioners. Under the Civil Code, damages may be recovered for violation of constitutional
rights and liberties from any public officer or private individual. 2 Art 323 speaks of an officer or employee
or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages;
the person indirectly responsible also has to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party. Art 32 makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors. It encompasses within its ambit those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violations.
In this case, petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to the Memorandum Agreement
to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The acts committed by the
PC of unlawfully seizing the merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition were
for the protection and benefit of the petitioners. It is, thus, reasonably fair to infer that it was upon MHP's
instance that the PC conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. Also, the raid was conducted with
the active participation of their employee. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, De Guzman
was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. In fact, MHP even received for safekeeping the
goods unreasonably seized and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint for unfair competition. Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 12994 (LOI) was precisely crafted to
safeguard not only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional
rights. Under the LOI, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Respondents' rights are immutable
and petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any
warrant. And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim;
but they did not.

1 OTHER ISSUES: On award of moral damages, the SC held that moral damages are awarded to compensate for injuries suffered and
that respondents avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure were supported by their testimonies. There can be no
doubt that they suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due to the tortious raid. On the award of exemplary
damages, the SC held that the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award and that it will serve as a stern reminder to all
that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality.
2 Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
3Quoting Lim vs Ponce de Leon, the SC explained the nature of Art 32: The very nature of Art 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main
purpose of the article, which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the
pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the article is to put an end to
official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the US this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

JERVOSO VS PEOPLE Case Digest G.R. No. 89306. September 13, 1990
Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111, Rules of Court
FACTS:
In this petition for review, the petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification of the penalty only, the decision of the trial court which convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso
of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso, but which appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The trial court and the Court of Appeals also convicted his wife,
Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against the deceased.
Petitioners contention: The Court of Appeals erred in ordering them (petitioners) to pay indemnity of
P30,000 to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso despite the reservation by said heirs of their right to file a separate
civil action against the accused, which they did file in the RTC. "
ISSUE/HELD: WON the filing of separate civil action precludes the offended party from recovering damages
in the criminal case against the accused. AFFIRMATIVE
RATIO DICIDENDI:
The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by the heirs of the deceased victim is
authorized under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated, or
attempted homicide (Madeja vs. Cruz) Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs
of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the
accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The
trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity
for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals
likewise erred in affirming the award.
The second assignment of error raises a purely factual issue: whether the evidence is sufficient to convict
the accused of homicide. That issue may not be reviewed by this Court in an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only legal issues may be raised.

Barlin v Ramirez [GR L-2832, Nov 24, 1906]ATV

A very old case that happened in 1906, in the pueblo of Lagonoy, province of Ambos Camarines. The
Roman Catholic Church which had been razed to the ground in 1869 was reconstructed, from government
funds and from voluntary labor of the townspeople, upon orders of the town officials, also based on
general laws and guidelines of the Spanish government. Reconstruction was completed in 1873, and until
1902 a Roman Catholic priest administered this church, until it came under the care of P Vicente Ramirez.
In November 1902, a successor to Ramirez was appointed but he refused to turn over the church, convent
and other properties. This was the point in history when Spain ceded authority to the United States and all
its property together with it. Many Filipino clergy rebelled against the Roman Catholic Church whom they
said refused to recognize and grant the rights of the Filipino priests. This Filipino priests joined together

and formed the United Filipino Church, who, though not recognizing the Roman Catholic Church,
nonetheless continued to hold office and ceremonies in the Roman Catholic tradition, on the condition that
unless the Roman Catholic Church recognized them, they will hold on to their church properties and refuse
to turn them over.
For reason, REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal
representative of the general interests of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva
Caceres came to file a case against P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Parochial Church of Lagonoy and the Municipality of Lagonoy.
Rev Barlin held that the church and its adjuncts were a property of the Roman Catholic Church, while Padre
Ramirez held that the town of Lagonoy was the owner of the property.
The court held that the church was a property of the Roman Catholic Church. There was a law that states
that all church buildings were made by the Spanish government and representatives in the Philippines
using government and private local funds, but the Spanish government implemented this to the effect that
the churches andits income were dedicated for the propagation of the faith. Hence, its properties were
beyond the commerce of man. Priests held them in the concept of guardians or stewards.
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the United States,
churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. They were not
public property, nor could they be subjects of private property in the sense that any private person could
the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which was that it was
devoted to the worship of God
Furthermore, the municipality cannot show evidence of title, right of ownership or possession.
On the contention that the Roman Catholic Church no longer had legal and juridical personality in the
islands, since the latter half of the third century, and more particularly since the year 313, when
Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually
entered upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and
transmission of property the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire.
CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] - F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest,
took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His
successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church,
convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by a
written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the
parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands,
and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was
the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that
it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was
retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff.
HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands.
This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in
Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the
temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration.

LIMJUCO vs. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE

45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to
install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining
the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to
Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code,
estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement
and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving
rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante
must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in
harmony with the constitution.
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of PioFragante, 80 Phil 776
FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the
granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality
HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical
person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties. Fragante has rights and fulfillment
of obligation which survived after his death. One of those rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the PSC. The state or the mass of property, rights left by the decedent, instead of heirs
directly, become vested and charged with his rights and obligations. Under the present legal system, rights
and obligations which survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the
deceased.

ANTONIO ABACAN, JR., RUFO C. VENUS, JR., ENRIQUETO I. MAGPANTAY and MARIETA Y. PALANCA, petitioners, vs. NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY, INC., respondent. [G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005]
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision [1] dated July 22, 1999 and the
Resolution[2] dated November 12, 1999, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Two opposing factions within respondent Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the Castro and the Nicolas factions, seek control as the legitimate
board thereof.[3] These two factions are parties to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 12-96-5469 [4] which is an action filed by the
Nicolas faction to nullify the election of the directors of NUI belonging to the Castro faction and SEC Case No. 12-96-5511 [5] which is a counter-suit
initiated by the Castro faction seeking the nullification of several board resolutions passed by the Nicolas faction. [6] On December 19, 1996, SEC Hearing
Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., pursuant to SEC Case No. 12-96-5511, issued an Order authorizing the Castro faction and the Metropolitan Bank
(Metrobank) Laoag City branch to withdraw the amount of P2,555,274.99 from the account of NUI with said bank. [7] Metrobank complied and
released P1.4 M[8] in favor of the Castro faction. The Nicolas faction then initiated a criminal complaint for estafa against the Castro faction as well as the
petitioners herein who are officers of Metrobank, to wit: Antonio Abacan, Jr., President; Rufo C. Venus, Jr. and Enriqueto I. Magpantay, legal officers; and
Marieta Y. Palanca, assistant branch manager of its Laoag City branch. The criminal case was later dismissed insofar as petitioners are concerned. [9]
On July 16, 1997, NUI, through Roy A. Nicolas of the Nicolas faction, filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 11296-14, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag, for damages with application for attachment against petitioners together with the employees of NUI belonging to the Castro
faction, namely: Jose G. Castro, Ernesto B. Asuncion, Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S. Hernando and Virginio C. Rasos as well as their counsel, Edgar S.
Asuncion, and SEC Hearing Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. NUI claims that between December 16 and December 20, 1996, defendants from the Castro
faction, acting together, and helping one another, with herein petitioners taking undue and unlawful advantage of their respective positions in Metrobank,
withdrew and released to themselves, for their own personal gain and benefit, corporate funds of NUI deposited with said bank in the sum of P1.4 M
without the knowledge, consent or approval of NUI to the grave and serious damage and prejudice of the latter. NUI also claims that defendants have
not accounted for the said amount despite several demands for them to do so.[10]
On September 15, 1997, defendant, herein petitioner, Marieta Y. Palanca filed a motion to dismiss alleging that: (1) the complaint fails to state a
cause of action against her since she is not a real party in interest; (2) plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; and (3) the complaint is dismissible under

Section 5, Rule 7 of the New Rules of Civil Procedure on the certification against forum shopping. [11] She likewise pointed out that SEC Case No. 12-965469 must take precedence over the civil case since it is a logical antecedent to the issue of standing in said case. [12]
[13]

On April 28, 1998, the RTC issued an Order, denying Palancas motion and ordering her and her co-defendants to file their respective answers.
Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:

Atfirstimpression,thecontroversycommencedbythecomplaintappearstobeoneinvolvinganintracorporatedispute.Acloserscrutinyoftheallegationsinthe
complaint,however,showsotherwise.Consideringthedoctrinethatamotiontodismisshypotheticallyadmitstheallegationsinthecomplaint,whatisadmittedisthat
theactionisoneforasumofmoney.TheCourtexaminedExhibitCofmovantandfoundoutthatitreferstoacaseintheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission
docketedasSec.CaseNo.12965511wherethepetitionersinsaidSECcase(somearedefendantsintheinstantcase)wereauthorizedtowithdrawfromMetrobank
(LaoagCityBranch)theamountofP2,555,274.99fromtheBankaccountofNorthwesternUniversity,Inc....Ontheotherhand,thehereincomplaintaversthat
plaintiffNorthwesternUniversity,Inc.seeksrecoveryoftheamountofP1,600,000.00[14]allegedlywithdrawnbythehereindefendantsduringtheperiodfrom
December16toDecember20,1996fromthecorporatefundsofplaintiffdepositedwithMetrobankLaoagCityBranchunderCurrentAccountNo.7140525096and
SavingsAccountNo.314052509.TheSECOrder(ExhibitC)wasissuedDecember19,1996.Thereis,therefore,aninferencethatthewithdrawalreferredtointhe
complaintashavingbeeneffectedbetweenDecember16to20,1996,couldpossiblybethewithdrawalinconsequenceoftheSECOrderofDecember19,1996.
However,theinferenceremainsassuchandcannotripentoalegalconclusionbecausetheevidenceonhanddoesnotsufficientlypreponderatetowarrantsucha
conclusion.Inthefirstplace,thereisnoevidenceadducedthatthepurportedwithdrawal,ifevermade,wasdrawnagainstthecurrent/savingsaccountsmentionedinthe
complaint.Inthesecondplace,theamountauthorizedtobewithdrawnwasP2,555,274.99whiletheamountsoughttoberecoveredisP1,600,000.00.[15]TheCourt
cannotrelyoninferenceorspeculationtocogentlyresolveamatter.Whileitappearsthatmovantsareinvokingtheissueofforumshopping,theycannot
overcometheissuesraisedinthecomplaint,whichasearlierstated,havebeenhypotheticallyadmitted,andwhichissueshavetobejoinedbythefilingofthe
answerbythedefendants.TheCourtnotesthatintheinstantcase,plaintiffisacorporationandisnotarespondentinSECCaseNo.12965511.Moreover,
theissuesraisedthereinandintheinstantcaseareentirelydifferent.Thereisalsonoshowingthatthereislegalbasistopiercetheveilofcorporatefiction.In
theothercase(SECCaseNo.12965469),whileitappearsthatNorthwesternUniversity,Inc.isoneoftheplaintiffstherein,thecomplaintreferstoa
declarationofnullityofthespecialstockholdersmeetingof3October1996oftheelectionofdirectorsandoftheOctober3,1996amendedbylaws,andis
essentiallyanactionfordamages.Thecomplaintinthiscase,forasumofmoney,isalsofarremovedfromthenatureoftheactioninthesaidSECCase.
Thus,itisclearthattherearegenuineissuestobetriedinthiscase,whichcallsforatrialonthemerits.Themotiontodismissmust,perforce,bedenied.
(Emphasissupplied)
...
Asaboveshown,theallegedfraudisstatedingeneralities.Inthisjurisdiction,fraudisneverpresumed(Benitezvs.IAC,154SCRA41).
Instead of filing their answers or a motion for reconsideration of the said Order, herein petitioners Abacan, Magpantay, Venus and Palanca went to
the CA on a petition forcertiorari and prohibition raising the same issues.[16]
On July 22, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision which dismissed the petition explaining thus:
Acarefulreviewandconsiderationoftherecordsofthecase,revealthatpetitionerfailedtocomplywithaconditionsinequanonforthefilingofthePetition,whichis
tofileamotionforreconsideration.InTanvs.CA,275SCRA568theSupremeCourtspecificallyruledthat:Thespecialcivilactionofcertiorariwillnotlieunlessa
motionforreconsiderationisfirstfiledbeforetherespondentcourttoallowitanopportunitytocorrectitserrors.
InfilingthisinstantpetitionbeforeUs,petitionersinitspetition,whileadmittingfailuretofileaMotionforReconsideration,justifiedthesame,whenitallegedthus:
13.01Underthecircumstances,thefilingofamotionforreconsiderationmaybedispensedwith.Allissuesareessentiallylegalandhavebeensquarelyraisedand
passeduponbythelowercourt.[KlavenessMaritimeAgency,Inc.vs.Palmos,232SCRA448.]
Regrettably,however,thecaserelieduponbypetitioner,a1994decision,istheexceptiontotherule,andnotapplicabletothecaseatBench.Inthesaidcasethe
SupremeCourtsaidandWequoteapriorMotionforReconsiderationisnotindispensableforcommencementofcertiorariproceedingsiftheerrorssoughttobe
correctedinsaidproceedingshadbeendulyheardandpasseduponorweresimilartotheissue/sresolvedbythetribunaloragencybelow.(underliningforemphasis)A
readingoftheOrderofpublicrespondentclearlyshowsthatnohearingontheissueswashad.ThepenultimateparagraphoftheOrderofpublicrespondentjudge
states:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,theCourtherebydenies:
1.Themotiontodismiss;
2.Theapplicationforawritofpreliminaryattachment;and
3.Theappointmentofaspecialsheriff.
DefendantJoseG.Castroisherebygiveneleven(11)daysfromreceiptofacopyofthisdenialwithinwhichtofilehisanswer;defendantMarietta[sic]YoungPalanca
andtheotherdefendantswhohavenotfiledtheiransweraregivenfive(5)daysfromreceiptoftheOrdertofiletheirrespectiveanswers.
SOORDERED.
Asitwas,theonlythingresolvedbythecourtaquowasinrelationtothemotiontodismisstheapplicationforawritofpreliminaryattachmentandtheappointmentof
aspecialsheriff.Petitionerhasnotfiledanyanswerwhichwouldoutlinetheissuesthathewouldwantthecourtaquotoresolve.
Undersuchsituation,therefore,sincenoproceedingsweredonetohearandpassupontheissuestoberaisedbypetitioner,thenthegeneralrulethatamotionfor
reconsiderationmustfirstbefiledbeforeapetitionunderSec.1ofRule65mustbeapplied.Havingfailedtodoso,petitionerspetitionmustbe,asitishereby
DENIED.[17]
A motion for reconsideration was thereafter filed by petitioners but was denied by the CA on November 12, 1999. [18]
Hence the present petition.
Petitioners argue that: (1) following the case of Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos,[19] prior resort to a motion for reconsideration before
the filing of a petition forcertiorari or prohibition is not a mandatory rule and may be dispensed with in this case since the issues involved herein are
purely legal and have already been passed upon; (2) it is contrary to the policy against judicial delay and multiplicity of suits for a higher court to remand
the case to the trial court when the former is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it; (3) the impleaded bank officers are not
real parties-in-interest since they are not privy to the contract of deposit between NUI and Metrobank, and they merely complied with the SEC Order
authorizing the release of funds from the account of NUI with Metrobank; (4) the Nicolas faction has no legal capacity to sue in behalf of NUI not being
the de jure board of trustees; and (5) intra-corporate case No. 12-96-5469, lodged before the SEC, must take precedence over the damage suit pending
before the trial court.[20]

Petitioners then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 11296-14 against them, or in the alternative, to hold in abeyance the
proceedings therein until after the final determination of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469.[21]
NUI in its Comment contends that: the Klaveness case does not apply in the case at bar since the issues raised herein are dependent upon facts
the proof of which have neither been entered into the records of the case nor admitted by the parties; petitioners cannot, on their bare and self-serving
representation that reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally disregard what the law requires and deny the trial court its right to review its
pronouncements before being hailed to a higher court to account therefor; and contrary to petitioners assertion, no hearing for the presentation of
evidence was had before the trial court on the factual matters raised in petitioners motion to dismiss.[22]
NUI further argues: it did not fail to state a cause of action; the complaint alleged that petitioners acted in connivance with their co-defendants and
as joint tortfeasors, are solidarily liable with their principal for the wrongful act; as officers and employees of the bank, they are also considered agents
thereof who are liable for fraud and negligence; the complaint charged the perpetration of the unlawful and unjust deprivation by the petitioners of NUIs
right to its property for which petitioners may be held liable for damages making them real parties-in-interest; petitioners, as officers and employees of
Metrobank had an obligation to protect the funds of NUI and it was the petitioners act of conniving to unlawfully withdraw NUIs funds which violated NUIs
legal right, thus entitling the latter to sue for such tortuous act; it is also not true that petitioners could not be held liable for damages since they merely
complied with the order of the SEC; as pointed out in the Order dated April 28, 1998, the amount allegedly authorized to be withdrawn
wasP2,555,274.99 while the amount sought to be recovered in the complaint was P1.6 M; it cannot be inferred conclusively therefore that the amount
subject of the complaint refers to the same amount authorized by the SEC to be withdrawn; in any case, such argument is more a subject of defense
rather than a proper ground for a motion to dismiss.[23]
NUI disagrees with the contention of petitioners that it has no legal capacity to sue, stating that NUI had already conducted subsequent elections
wherein Roy A. Nicolas was elected as member of the board of directors and concurrently the administrator of NUI. [24]
NUI further avers that: there is no merit to the claim of petitioners that there exists a prejudicial question which should prompt the trial court to
suspend its proceedings; the rule on prejudicial question finds no application between the civil complaint below and the case before the SEC as the rule
presupposes the pendency of a civil action and a criminal action; and even assuming arguendo that the issues pending before the SEC bear a similarity
to the cause of action below, the complaint of NUI can stand and proceed separately from the SEC case inasmuch as there is no identity in the reliefs
prayed for.[25]
Evaluating the issues raised, it is clear that the only questions that need to be answered in order to resolve the present petition are the following:
(1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action; (2) Whether a motion for reconsideration of the order of the RTC dismissing a motion to dismiss prior
to the filing of a petition for certiorari before the CA is dispensable; and (3) Whether the proceedings in Civil Case No. 11296-14 must be held in
abeyance pending resolution of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469.
First issue. Whether the complaint states a cause of action against petitioners. We rule in the affirmative.
It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the
failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment
on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for.[26] Indeed, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should
not be alleged in the complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of applying the test. [27]
In this case the complaint alleges that:
...
10.BetweenDecember16andDecember20,1996,thedefendants,actingtogetherandhelpingoneanother,withdefendantsAndaya,Abacan,Magpantay,Venusand
Palancatakingundueandunlawfuladvantageoftheirrespectivepositions,withdrewandreleasedtothemselves,fortheirownpersonalgainandbenefit,thecorporate
fundsofplaintiffdepositedwithMetrobankLaoagCityBranchunderCurrentAccountNo.7140525096andSavingsAccountNo.314052509inthesum
ofP1,400,000.00withouttheknowledge,consentorapprovalofplaintifftothegraveandseriousdamageandprejudiceofthelatter. [28]
From this statement alone, it is clear that a cause of action is present in the complaint filed a quo. NUI has specifically alleged an act, that is, the
undue withdrawal of funds from its account with Metrobank, which the petitioners and the other defendants committed, to the prejudice of NUIs rights.
Petitioners argue that as mere officers and employees of Metrobank, they are not privy to the contract of deposit between their bank and NUI, thus
they cannot be held liable for any erroneous withdrawal made in NUIs account with their bank. They also do not stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment, i.e., they are not real parties-in-interest, thus the complaint a quo is dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
We are not persuaded.
As aptly explained by respondent NUI in its comment, petitioners are being sued and held liable for their alleged participation in the wrongdoing of
the other defendants. The complaint is not based on the contract of deposit between Metrobank and NUI but on the alleged tortuous act of defendants of
wrongfully withdrawing NUIs funds. As contracts are not the only sources of obligations, petitioners cannot escape responsibility on the bare assertion
that the have no contract with NUI.
Second issue. Whether a motion for reconsideration is dispensable in the case at bar. We rule in the affirmative.
Indeed, it is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the
lower court the opportunity to correct itself. [29] It is also the rule that since an order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory, which is neither
appealable until final judgment nor could it generally be assailed on certiorari, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose as
defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss.[30]
However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the general rule:
(a)wheretheorderisapatentnullity,aswherethecourtaquohasnojurisdiction;
(b)wherethequestionsraisedinthecertiorariproceedingshavebeendulyraisedandpasseduponbythelowercourt,orarethesameasthoseraisedandpassed
uponinthelowercourt;
(c)wherethereisanurgentnecessityfortheresolutionofthequestionandanyfurtherdelaywouldprejudicetheinterestsoftheGovernmentorofthepetitionerorthe
subjectmatteroftheactionisperishable;
(d)where,underthecircumstances,amotionforreconsiderationwouldbeuseless;
(e)wherepetitionerwasdeprivedofdueprocessandthereisextremeurgencyforrelief;
(f)where,inacriminalcase,relieffromanorderofarrestisurgentandthegrantingofsuchreliefbythetrialcourtisimprobable;
(g)wheretheproceedingsinthelowercourtareanullityforlackofdueprocess;

(h)wheretheproceedingwasexparteorinwhichthepetitionerhadnoopportunitytoobject;and
(i)wheretheissueraisedisonepurelyoflaworwherepublicinterestisinvolved.[31](Emphasissupplied)
Circumstances (b) and (d) above are present in this case.
In Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos,[32] which is being invoked by petitioners, we held that:
Apriormotionforreconsiderationisnotindispensableforcommencementofcertiorariproceedingsiftheerrorssoughttobecorrectedinsuchproceedingshadbeen
dulyheardandpassedupon,orweresimilartotheissuesalreadyresolvedbythetribunaloragencybelow.Accordingly,theCourthasexcusedthenonfilingofa
motionforreconsiderationwhensuchamotionwouldbebasicallyproformainnatureandcontent,andwhere,asinthepresentPetition,thequestionsraisedare
essentiallylegalinnature.[33]
We agree with the argument of petitioners that a motion for reconsideration of the order of the trial court, prior to the filing of their petition
for certiorari before the CA, was dispensable since the questions involved are essentially legal in nature and the errors sought to be corrected had
already been heard and passed upon. One of the errors sought to be corrected is the ruling of the trial court that there exists a cause of action against
petitioners. This issue that was raised in the motion to dismiss has been heard and passed upon by the trial court.
The other crucial issue that has been raised in the motion to dismiss and duly passed upon by the trial court is the question whether the case
before the trial court should be held in abeyance until resolution of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. Palanca pointed out in her motion that said SEC case,
which is an action to nullify the election of the directors of NUI belonging to the Castro faction, must take precedence over Civil Case No. 11296-14
before the trial court since it is determinative of whether or not Roy Nicolas has the legal standing to file the suit in behalf of NUI. The trial court ruled in
the negative and held that the civil and the SEC cases can proceed independently of each other since they involve different parties and issues. Thus,
inasmuch as this issue has already been raised and passed upon in the trial court, we agree with petitioners that motion for reconsideration in this
instance may be dispensed with.
Third issue. Whether the proceedings in Civil Case No. 11296-14 must be held in abeyance pending resolution of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. We
rule in the affirmative.
Petitioners argue that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469, which is an action to nullify the election of the directors of NUI belonging to the Castro faction, is
a necessary and logical antecedent of the issue of whether the withdrawal of P1.4 M or P1.6 M, as the case may be, as well as the institution of this suit
for the recovery thereof was authorized by the NUI.
Technically, there would be no prejudicial question to speak of in this case, if we are to consider the general rule that a prejudicial question comes
into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[34] However, considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question, being to
avoid two conflicting decisions,[35] prudence dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the case at bar.
A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. [36] The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
it must be lodged in another court or tribunal.[37]
In the present case, the question of which between the Castro and the Nicolas factions are the de jure board of directors of NUI is lodged before
the SEC. The complaint before the RTC of Laoag meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their co-defendants, comprised of the Castro faction,
wrongfully withdrew the amount of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas of the Nicolas faction is a duly
elected member of the Board of NUI and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint in behalf of the NUI depends on the findings of the SEC in
the case pending before it. It would finally determine whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas
lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI. It is petitioners claim, and we agree, that the presence or absence of their liability for
allowing the withdrawal of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the Castro faction is reliant on the findings of the SEC as to which
of the two factions is the de jure board. Since the determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial to the
resolution of the case before the RTC, we find that the trial court should suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its findings.
We apply by analogy our pronouncement in Quiambao vs. Osorio,[38] to wit:
Facedwiththesedistinctpossibilities,themoreprudentcourseforthetrialcourttohavetakenistoholdtheejectmentproceedingsinabeyanceuntilaftera
determinationoftheadministrativecase.Indeed,logicandpragmatism,ifnotjurisprudence,dictatesuchmove.Toallowthepartiestoundergotrialnotwithstanding
thepossibilityofpetitionersrightofpossessionbeingupheldinthependingadministrativecaseistoneedlesslyrequirenotonlythepartiesbutthecourtaswellto
expendtime,effortandmoneyinwhatmayturnouttobeasheerexerciseinfutility.Thus,1AmJur2dtellsus:
Thecourtinwhichanactionispendingmay,intheexerciseofasounddiscretion,uponproperapplicationforastayofthataction,holdtheactioninabeyancetoabide
theoutcomeofanotherpendinginanothercourt,especiallywherethepartiesandtheissuesarethesame,forthereispowerinherentineverycourttocontrolthe
dispositionofcausesonitsdocketswitheconomyoftimeandeffortforitself,forcounsel,andforlitigants.Wheretherightsofpartiestothesecondactioncannotbe
properlydetermineduntilthequestionsraisedinthefirstactionaresettledthesecondactionshouldbestayed.
Whilethisruleisproperlyapplicabletoinstancesinvolvingtwo[2]courtactions,theexistenceintheinstantcaseofthesameconsiderationsofidentitiesofpartiesand
issues,economyoftimeandeffortforthecourt,thecounselsandthepartiesaswellastheneedtoresolvethepartiesrightofpossessionbeforetheejectmentcasemay
beproperlydetermined,justifiestherulesanalogousapplicationtothecaseatbar.[39]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 22, 1999 and Resolution dated November 12, 1999 are SET
ASIDE. The RTC of Laoag City, Branch 14, is hereby DIRECTED to suspend further proceedings in Civil Case No. 11296-14 until after a final
determination is made in SEC Case No. 12-96-5469.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.