3d 7
65 USLW 2696
Background
3
Although the charges were "expunged" from his record, Miller served 125 days
in the SHU before the finding of misconduct was vacated.
7
On February 3, 1994, Miller brought this action pro se1 under 42 U.S.C.
1983, alleging that defendants deprived him of procedural due process by
excluding him from the confidential testimony and by preventing him from
reviewing transcripts of that testimony. The complaint also alleged that Selsky
violated New York law by initially affirming the imposition of discipline.
Miller sought compensatory and punitive damages.
On November 10, 1994, defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that
(1) Selsky's eventual reversal of the initial finding "cured all procedural errors";
(2) Selsky was entitled to absolute immunity; (3) both defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity; and (4) Miller could not recover compensatory or
punitive damages because he had not alleged a constitutional injury.
Magistrate Judge Daniel Scanlon Jr., to whom the motion was referred for
recommendation and report, recommended that defendants' motion for
summary judgment be granted.2 The magistrate judge found that Miller had
received due process during the disciplinary proceedings and that Selsky had
qualified immunity from any potential liability for failing to ascertain promptly
that the hearing record was incomplete and therefore subject to reversal.
10
On review, the district court reached the same result, 3 but applied another
rationale, drawn from the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision
in Sandin. The district court interpreted Sandin to mean that the imposition of
segregated confinement, as a matter of law, does not create a "hardship" that is
"atypical and significant" compared with the "ordinary incidents of prison life,"
and accordingly does not involve an actionable deprivation of liberty. The court
also held that as Miller's good time credits were restored before he became
eligible for parole, their temporary loss did not deprive him of liberty.
Discussion
11
We agree with the district court that in Sandin the Supreme Court explicitly
held that disciplinary confinement does not deprive an inmate of a liberty
interest unless the confinement imposes an "atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S.
at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. But the Court did not intimate that disciplinary
confinement could never, as a matter of law, impose such a hardship.
12
To the contrary, the Court examined closely the circumstances of the inmate's
12
To the contrary, the Court examined closely the circumstances of the inmate's
confinement and compared them to the conditions facing the general inmate
population. Noting the duration (30 days) and character of the confinement, and
the fact it would not "inevitably affect the duration of his sentence," the Court
found that the "regime to which he was subjected as a result of the misconduct
hearing was within the range of confinement to be normally expected for one
serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life." id. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at
2301-02.
13
The language and analysis in Sandin make clear that the Court did not intend to
suggest that discipline in segregated confinement could never present such an
"atypical, significant deprivation." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2301. We have
implicitly reached this conclusion in other cases since the Supreme Court
decided Sandin. In Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir.1996) (per
curiam), we affirmed the dismissal of an inmate's action because the district
court's "extensive fact-finding" supported its decision. In doing so, we noted
that the inmate had "not shown that the conditions of his confinement in the
SHU were dramatically different from the 'basic conditions of [his]
indeterminate sentence.' " Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. at
2301). In Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.1996), and Branham v.
Meachum, 77 F.3d 626 (2d Cir.1996), we remanded for district courts to
consider whether inmates who had been confined to their cells had been
deprived of a liberty interest.
14
15
Miller's confinement did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship ... in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," the ruling should identify
specific facts that support this conclusion.
16
Because Sandin was decided after the parties briefed the summary judgment
motion, neither side submitted evidence or arguments on the issue of whether
Miller's confinement was an "atypical and significant" deprivation. Nor did the
state have the opportunity to make the argument it raises on appeal--that New
York statutes and prison regulations do not create a liberty interest in avoiding
segregated confinement. Unless the court decides the motion on a different
basis, the state should be offered the opportunity to expand the record on the
pertinent issues, and Miller to reply. The district court is free as well to rely on
other grounds of the defendants' motion, such as whether defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity, whether Miller received due process,4 and
whether New York has created a liberty interest in avoiding segregated
confinement.Conclusion
17
Although Miller proceeded pro se in the district court, he has been represented
by counsel on appeal
The defendants contend the district court ruled in their favor on the due process
issue. Although there is language in the district court's opinion that may support
this contention, the passage is unclear and includes a mistaken statement of law
on the effect of administrative reversal of the disciplinary hearing. We are not
confident the district court resolved the motion on this alternative ground