Family Code

Manzano vs. Sanchez

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano
having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in
Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband
contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties
were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage
was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of
David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband
and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both
left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses
due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting
parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they
have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a
subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both
separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage
null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Manzano vs. Sanchez
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on
May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David
contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta,
Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time,
Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an
affidavit stating that they were both married however due to incessant
quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with
them. They have lived together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed
to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the
law against Sanchez.
ISSUE: WON David Manzanos marriage with Payao is valid?
HELD: NO. Sanchez fined P20,000.00
RATIO:
1. FC Art. 34: legal ratification of marital cohabitation exempts a couple from

obtaining a marriage license but the ff requisites must be present: lived

together as husband & wife for at least five years, no legal impediment to
marry each other, fact of absence of legal impediment must be present at
time of marriage , affidavit stating that theyve been living together for at
least 5 years & without legal impediments , solemnizing officer should
execute sworn statement that he ascertained qualifications of contracting
parties.
2. None of requisites were present. They declared that they were separated
but judge still solemnized marriage. Mere separation and free & voluntary
cohabitation with another person do not dissolve the marriage tie.
Cohabitation for at least five years exempts them from the marriage license
but it does not free them of their legal impediment to contract a subsequent
marriage.
3. Marriage was void & bigamous. Judge displayed gross ignorance of the law.

MANZANO VS SANCHEZ
March 8, 2001
Facts:
-

Herminia and David married on

children

May 21, 1966 and had four

Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano, the lawful wife of the late

David Manzano, charges respondent Judge Sanchez with gross
ignorance of the law. Facts

On 22 March 1993, David contracted another marriage with one

Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge which he solemnized
knowing that such is void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.

The respondent claimed that he did not know that Manzano was
legally married, and had he known such facts, he should have
advised David Manzano not to marry again. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven
years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit.

Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the

dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction. In those affidavits, both Manzano and Payao expressly

Family Code
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo
Relos, and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
-

Respondent Judge alleged that he believed Manzano and Payao so

he solemnized marriage in accordance with Article 34 of the FC
which states that no marriage license is necessary for two persons
cohabitating provided that they follow these following requisites
*The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
*The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
*The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage;
*The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
*The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he
had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Issue: W/N the respondent demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized the marriage.
Held: One of the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties have
subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both
separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage
null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO,
ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent.

Petitioner,

vs.

ANNABELLE

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.

They applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed a

false affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the
same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia
A. De Castro. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the
latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her
as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Petitioner denied that he is
married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed
upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant
state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before
he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband
and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give
her support. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule
that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of
nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the
Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to
prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty
the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of
his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court
of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner,
wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it
was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as null and void in the very same case.
There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to
it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family
Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof
to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that
can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether of not their marriage is valid.
HELD: Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant
case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent

Family Code
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous
cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void
ab initio.
MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they
had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support
to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda
filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The
RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however
reversed by CA.
Issues: Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the
respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
Held: Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is
no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or
a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this
Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully

employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic
v. CA and Molina.

Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000

FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos
and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They later on
became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the EDSA
revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He
engaged to different business ventures but failed. She always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head
of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit
and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they
were already living separately. She did not want him to stay in their house
anymore so when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. She sought for nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Brenda submitted
herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation. The court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their children.
RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent
to prove psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented
in this case show psychological incapacity
HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Family Code
declaration of nullity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. More so, chronic infidelity, abandonment, gambling and
use of prohibited drugs are not grounds for psychological incapacity.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals

Psychological Incapacity
Parties:
Petitioner Luisita Estrella Hernandez (W)
Private Respondent Mario C. Hernandez (H)
Dates:
January 30, 1996 petition for review on certiorari the decision of CA
affirming the decision of the RTC on April 10, 1993, which dismissed the
petition for the annulment of marriage filed by the petitioner.
January 1, 1981 they got married in Silang Cavite.
June 12, 1992 private respondent left the conjugal home.
July 10, 1992 petitioner filed a petition seeking to annul her marriage to
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity.
April 10, 1993 RTC dismissed the petition for annulment.
Facts:

They were married, and had three children.

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment due to psychological

incapacity because:
o
Failed to perform his obligation to support the family and
contribute to the management of the household.
o
Engaged in drinking sprees with friends.
o
Cohabited with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child.
o
Having affairs with different women.
o
Infected with STD that was transmitted to petitioner.
o
Beats her
o
Irresponsible
o
Immature
o
Unprepared for the duties of a married life.
o
Abadoned his family.

Private respondent was 5 years younger than petitioner.

Petitioner was the teacher of private respopndent in college.

From 1983-1986, he could not find a stable job.

1986-1991, he was able to secure a job uppon the recommendation

of a family friend but he availed himself to early retirement that was
offered to him by the company.

RTC denied the petition for nullity becaus ethe reasons cited by the
petitioner are grounds for Legal Separation and not in accordance
of Art. 36 of the FC which is psychological incapacity.

Petitioner appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision of

the RTC citing the ruling in Santos v. CA that the grounds for

Issue:
WON the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annuled on
the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.
Held:
The decisions of RTC and CA were affirmed by the SC.
Ratio:

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less that a mental

incapacity and not physical incapacity .
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism
merely renders the marriage contract VOIDABLE under Art. 55 of the
FC, these are mere grounds for LEGAL SEPARATION.
Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
Lack of drive to work, philandering, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not themselves
constitute grounds for finding that the private respondent is
suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the FC.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, Dec.08, 1999
FACTS: Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in
Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcios teacher for two consecutive
semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on
became sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a
child. Lucita supported the family as her husband continued
studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their
marriage went okay. But this eventually changed. Marcio had an
extra-marital relation with another student who was also married.
When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised
to but did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home and child. After
some time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However,
his attitude worsened when he got employed to Reynold Philippines,
Inc. He engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter

Family Code
part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea
and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a
heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was
then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of
their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time
with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC and CA
denied the petition. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
marital obligations
HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the
celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity,
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds
per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitionerappellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her
respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Republic vs. Cuison-Melgar
In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,[33]
we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she
must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage
had to be shown.[34] A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a
manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her
essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only
showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting
in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations.
SUAZO v. SUAZO
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years
old only. Without any means to support themselves, they lived with
Angelitos parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work
and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this
often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left
Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged
physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of
Jocelyns testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not
personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage
on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation,
such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational
judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence
on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next
drinks but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have
failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical
abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The
theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an
anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not
the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The
evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally
show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a
loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no
reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to
declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only
in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.
The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be

Family Code
conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true
for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologists
report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization
of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling
and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not,
by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He
searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a
male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They
then lived separately.

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE V. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. NO. 168796, [April 15, 2010]

HELD: Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

DOCTRINE:
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established
by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.
Private respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage. her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored.
In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their
marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to reform
dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino

Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina
Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that
May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became
manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null
and void. Its findings were based on the Psychological Evaluation Report of
Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private
respondents
alleged
sexual
infidelity, emotional
immaturity
and
irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify
and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage null
and void due to psychological incapacity.

RATIO: In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave

abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision dismissing
petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) in-curability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It is the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish
respondent Mays psychological incapacity.
Petitioners testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of
private respondents condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root
cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological

Family Code
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating
nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level
of the psychological incapacity that the law requires. Private respondents
act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
Petitioner must be able to establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Ligeralde vs. Patalinghug
FACTS: During the marriage of A (Husband) observed that B (wife) was
acting immature, irresponsible and carefree. B admitted to A to having lived
an adulterous life. A came to believe that B is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. A approached Dr. C who
performed a psychological evaluation which certified that B was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations;
that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest
after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.
Issue: Is Sexual Infidelity of the wife Tantamount to Psychological
Incapacity?
RATIO: Bs act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown
that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
Neither As testimony nor the psychologist findings failed to establish the root
cause of Bs incapacity to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state. The Court stressed that the root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during
trial.
REPUBLIC v. GALANG (G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011)
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, the Molina Doctrine unintentionally became
a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit
into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from
abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based
on psychological incapacity.

Ricardo P. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring and Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Justice Brion
Facts: Ricardo and Teresita were married and had 3 children. Ricardo then
filed a petition for annulment based on Teresita psychological incapacity. He
alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. The doctor who
performed the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo and their son,
Richardson, testified that the major factor that contributed to the demise of
the marriage is Teresita Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
incapable to fulfill her essential marital obligations.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis to declare Ricardo and Teresita
marriage void due to psychological incapacity.
Held: No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability,
to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should
refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
It is not acceptable that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and
Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered
only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the
conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Toring vs. Toring
FACTS: A and B were husband and wife. B filed a petition for annulment
before the RTC. He claimed that A was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and
subsequent to the celebration of their marriage.
Ricardo offered; the psychological evaluation of his expert witness,
psychiatrist. Dr Albaran testified A had Narcissistic Personality Disorder that
rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations based on the information she gathered from her psychological
evaluation on B and the couples son, C. The doctor did not personally
examine A. B alleged that A was an adulteress and a squanderer.
The RTC annulled the marriage. The CA reversed saying that RTC failed to
specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused As psychological
incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at
the time of celebration of marriage. The CA found that the conclusions from

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Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from
well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and
rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos allegations on As overspending
and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in declaring the nullity of the
marriage.
RULING: No, the RTC was wrong. CA decision affirmed.
According to Molina case, the definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of this article are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
The intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party
to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the
petitioners evidence to be insufficient to prove that A was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife.
Though the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be
personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. However, it
is still essential although from sources other than the respondent spouse
to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of
marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential
obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the
condition.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was
ever asked to give statements for purposes of As psychological evaluation
was C, the spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a
witness because he could not have been there when the spouses were
married and could not have been expected to know what was happening
between his parents until long after his birth.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr.
Albarans psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what,
how, when, where and since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating
nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the
essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good
doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and
incurable was As psychological disorder.
B failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that TA suffered from
psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must
fail.
We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to
a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of
marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the
Family Code addresses.
B also failed to show the adverse integral element and link to As allegedly
disordered personality. Moreover,B failed to prove that As alleged character
traits already existed at the inception of their marriage.
Finally, the root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in
a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code. What is not
required is the expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. CA decision affirmed.

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