JUDGE NAPOLEON INOTURAN, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q.

LIMSIACO, JR
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362
May 6, 2005
Facts:
Mario Balucero was charged before the RTC of Makati Branch 133, the presiding judge
of which is Napoleon Inoturan, with the violation of BP 22. Balucero, however, failed to appear
during arraignment despite notice. Inoturan then issued a bench warrant against him. Balucero
was subsequently arrested in Bacolod City, but was released upon posting of a property bail
before the MCTC of Pulupundan, Negros Occidental, which order was signed by Judge Manuel
Limsiaco, Jr. The arraignment of Balucero was subsequently set, but he failed to appear
notwithstanding his receipt of notices. Inoturan then ordered that the property bond be cancelled
and forfeited. He then ordered Ignacio Denila, the Clerk of Court of the MCTC to forward the
property bond. Unable to comply with Inoturans order, Denila was cited in contempt and was
detained. Denila was ordered released by Limisiaco. Upon investigation, the Office of Court
Administrator found that Judge Limsiaco ordered the release of the some other accused
although they did not post bail. Limsiaco was administratively charged for gross ignorance of the
law and negligence in the performance of his duties.
Issue:
What are the requisites before an order for release can be given in cases of bail?
Held:
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by
him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions herein after specified. It is thus clear that without bail, an accused under detention
cannot be released. As found by the investigating Judges, accused Balucero did not post bail
but still respondent Judge Limsiaco ordered his release.
A person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
liberty. Indeed, bail is unavailing with respect to an accused who has not voluntarily surrendered
or has yet to be placed in legal custody. In this case, Limsiaco issued the Order for the release
of accused Balucero on November 21, 1996 or fifteen (15) days before December 6, 1996, the
day he was actually arrested.
Moreover, Limsiaco acted without authority in approving Baluceros alleged application
for bail. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if the
accused is arrested in a province, city of municipality, other than where the case is pending, bail
may be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. Here,
respondent should not have approved Baluceros application for bail. It is only one of the 14
Branches of the RTC in Bacolod City which has the authority to act thereon.

FERMIN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 179695
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
On March 29, 2007, Mike A. Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor
of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. On April 20, 2007,
private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another mayoralty candidate, filed
a Petition for Disqualification [the Dilangalen petition] against Fermin. The petition alleged that
the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy.
Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said
case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor. The latter
subsequently filed an election protest.
G.R. No. 179695 Case:
On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, in SPA No. 07-372, disqualified Fermin
for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan.
Petitioner contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Following Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6646, the same must be filed within 5 days from the last day for the filing of CoC,
which, in this case, is March 30, 2007, and considering that the said petition was filed by
Dilangalen only on April 20, 2007, the same was filed out of time. The COMELEC should have
then dismissed SPA No. 07-372 outright.
In his comment, private respondent counters that the petition it filed is one for
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the last day for
filing of the CoC but not later than the candidates proclamation should he win in the elections.
As he filed the petition on April 20, 2007, long before the proclamation of the eventual winning
candidate, the same was filed on time.
G.R. No. 182369 Case:
Assailing the RTCs denial of his motions, Dilangalen filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition docketed as SPR No. 45-2007 with the COMELEC. On February 14, 2008, the
COMELEC ordered to dismiss the same.
Fermin subsequently filed in succession his motions for reconsideration and for the
consolidation of G.R. Nos. 179695 & 182369. Considering that the two petitions were
interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 or Section 78 of the OEC.
RULING:
As aforesaid, petitioner, on the one hand, argues that the Dilangalen petition was filed
pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC; while private respondent counters that the same is based on
Section 68 of the Code.

The Court finds that the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a
Section 78 petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the
representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the
candidate (the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate
made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification
for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render him ineligible. It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidates
eligibility for public office.
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office
he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she
is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for
public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78
to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78
petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation
of the wining candidate.
At this point, we must stress that a Section 78 petition ought not to be interchanged or confused
with a Section 68 petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and
resulting in different eventualities.