A PROJECT REPORT ON:

PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION WITH REFERENCE TO

CONSULTATION OF AFFECTED INTERESTS
SUBMITTED TO:
DR. KAUMUDHI CHALLA
(FACULTY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW)

SUBMITTED BY:
BHARAT RAJ
ROLL NO.-51
VITH SEMESTER

DATE OF SUBMISSION:

15TH FEBRUARY, 2016

HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

RAIPUR, CHHATTISGARH

CONTENTS

S.NO

TOPIC
PAGE NO.

1.

I INTRODUCTION
II

1-2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

-PROBLEM

-RATIONALE

-OBJECTIVES

-REVIEW OF LITERATURE

-NATURE OF THE STUDY

-LIMITATIONS

-CONTRIBUTION

2.

DIRECT GENERAL CONTROL

5-6

3.

DIRECT SPECIAL CONTROL

6-8

4.

INDIRECT CONTROL

8-10

5.

CONSULTATION OF AFFECTED INTERESTS BEFORE PASSING OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION

10-12

SUGGESTION

TO IMPROVE

PARLIAMENTARY

CONTROL OVER

DELEGATED LEGISLATION

12-15
7.

CONCLUSION

16

8.

BIBLIOGRPAHY

17

Declaration

I hereby declare that the project work entitled Parliamentary Control of Delegated Legislation
with reference to consultation of affected interests submitted to HNLU, Raipur, is an original
work, which has been done by me under the able guidance of Dr. Koumudhi Challa, Faculty
Member, HNLU, Raipur.

Bharat Raj
Roll No. 51
SEM-VI

Acknowledgement

At the very beginning, I would like to thank all those who were the guiding lights behind this
project. First of all I would like to take this opportunity with esteem privilege to express my
heartfelt thanks and gratitude to my course teacher Dr. Kaumudhi Challa, (Faculty for
Administrative Law, H.N.L.U.) for having faith in me in awarding me this very significant
project topic. Her consistent supervision, constant inspiration and invaluable guidance have been
of immense help in carrying out the project work with success.
Next, I would like to thank my colleagues for maintaining an academic atmosphere which helped
in creation of new ideas and lines of thought for the betterment of this project.
Subsequently I would like to thank my university for providing such an enriched Library, the
computer lab, internet facility without which this project would have been in a distant realm.
I extend my heartfelt thanks to my family and friends for their moral support and encouragement.
I also take this opportunity to thank all those people who contributed in their own small ways for
the completion of this project.

TABLE OF CASES

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Atlas Cycle Industries v State of Haryana 1979 AIR 1149.

Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay 1952 AIR 181.
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. V. A.P. SEB 1991 AIR 1473.
Jan Mohammad v State of Gujarat 1966 AIR 385.
Lohia Machines v Union of India 1985 AIR 479.
Narendra Kumar v Union of India 1960 AIR 430.
Raza Buland Sugar v. Municipal Board, Rampur 1965 AIR 895.
State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan 1975 AIR 2190.

Chapter I
Introduction
Delegated Legislation means the exercise of legislative power by an agency which is
subordinate to the legislature. Delegated legislation is, referred to as Ancillary, Subordinate,
Administrative Legislation or as Quasi-Legislation. Delegated legislation is a technique to
relieve pressure on legislatures time so that it can concentrate on principles and formulation of
policies. A statute may be inexact, incomplete and may even be misleading unless it is read with
the delegated legislation made there under. The legislature shares the legislative power with the
Executive and other administrative organs of the state. Delegated legislation is generally
expressed as statutory rules and orders, but expressions like regulations, notifications, bye-laws,
schemes, directions etc. are also employed in the same context.1
Delegated legislation is often described as that which proceeds from any authority other than the
sovereign power and is, therefore, dependent for its continued existence and validity on some
superior or supreme authority. This dependence can often take the form of checks and controls,
namely, parliamentary or legislative control; procedural control and judicial control.
Delegated legislation is often criticized as an excuse for the legislators, a shield for the
administrators and a provocation for the Constitutional purists. However, the very mechanism of
delegated legislation cannot and should not be reduced to an evil because it is at the end of the
day a necessity. In the modern world where social, economic, technological, and administrative
speed outstrips the placid traditional legislative processes, delegated legislation is an essential
means of survival. Thus, since it is the legislature which delegates power, it is primarily for it to
supervise and control the exercise of this power, and ensure against its objectionable, abusive &
unwarranted use.
1 Parminderkaur and Ranjit Singh, International Journal of Political Science, Law and International
Relations, Vol. 5, Issue 5, Dec 2015, Delegation of Legislative Powers to Executive, p.1.
6

The various forms of parliamentary control over delegated legislation at both levels, first at the
time of passing the enabling act and the second at the when the legislature scrutinizes the
delegated legislation have been dealt with in this project. In India parliamentary control of
administrative rule-making is implicit as a normal constitutional function because the executive
is responsible to the Parliament. There are three types of control exercised that is direct general
control, direct special control and indirect control, they have been explained in detail in the
following chapters.
The underlying object of parliamentary control is to keep watch over the rule-making authorities
and also to provide an opportunity to criticize them if there is abuse of power on their part.
Parliament has control in that the enabling or parent Act passed by Parliament sets out the
framework or parameters within which delegated legislation is made. In India, the question of
control

on

rule-making

power

engaged

the

attention

of

the

Parliament.

Every delegate is subject to the authority and control of the principal and the exercise of
delegated power can always be directed, corrected or cancelled by the principal. Hence
parliamentary control over delegated legislation should be a living continuity as a constitutional
remedy. The fact is that due to the broad delegation of legislative powers and the generalised
standard of control also being broad, judicial control has shrunk, raising the desirability and the
necessity of parliamentary control.2

2 Yuvraj Khare, Legal Express An International Journal Of Law, Vol.I, Issue-I November 2014,
Delegated Legislation in favour of Local Authority, p. 2-3.
7

Research Methodology
Problem
The major issue that will be dealt with in the project is in relation to the weak control of
Parliament over Delegated Legislation in India, while addressing this issue, measures will be
recommended to improve the current situation.
Rationale
The underlying principle behind the execution of this project is to analyze how the Parliament
exercises control over Delegated Legislation, how the same process operates in other nations
while keeping in view that the interests of affected parties are also taken into account while
exercising such control.
Objectives
1) To deal with the process through which the Parliament controls Delegated Legislation.
2) To examine the loopholes in the process and suggest measures to remedy the same.
3) To also analyze how the interests of affected parties are taken into account while rules
and regulations are framed by administrative authorities.
Review of Literature
1. I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, Eighth Edition this book
proved to be most helpful towards completion of this project. Delegated Legislation has
been dealt with in detail in the book, which not only provided knowledge specific to the
topic of the project, but also related and ancillary information which helped in getting a
better understanding of the topic.
2. C.K. Thakker, Administrative Law (Eastern Book Company 1992) a very
comprehensive book, comprising over 600 pages, the book dealt deeply even with minor
8

aspects of the topic and especially the several Supreme Court judgments mentioned in the
book were extremely helpful in gaining a much more thorough understanding of the
topic.
Nature of the Study
Throughout the project, doctrinal research approach has been adopted. An attempt has been made
to analyze legal doctrines, legal frameworks and case laws in a logical, systematic and scientific
way. Also, assistance has been taken of several books, articles, cases, etc as guided by the faculty
of Administrative Law towards the completion of this project work.
Limitations
Under the ambit of Administrative Law, Delegated Legislation is a wide topic covering several
doctrines and terms within it. But, in order to arrive at a specific understanding in relation to this
project, only the Parliamentary control aspect of Delegated Legislation has been dealt with. The
project is thereby limited only to one category of control, while ignoring the other categories in
order to arrive at a specific conclusion.
Contribution
This project work covers how the Parliament exercises control over Delegated Legislation. Its
major contribution to Administrative Law is through the suggestions which have been suggested
to improve the Parliamentary control over Delegated Legislation in India. For this, Parliamentary
control over Delegated Legislation has been analyzed in detail.

Chapter II
Direct General Control
The first form of parliamentary control is exercised at the time of passing the enabling act. This
is the proceedings in the Parliament which are in the nature of general and direct control.
In India, various methods and mechanisms are used such as debates on the delegating bill which
include aspects such as the necessity, extent, type of delegation and the authority to whom power
is delegated. Further, any member may ask questions on any aspect of delegation of legislative
powers and if dissatisfied can give notice for discussion under Rule 59 of the Procedure and
Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha Rules.
Budget cuts during a vote of grant and discussions on delegation through a private members Bill
seeking modifications in the parent act or through a debate at the time of discussion on the
address by the President to the joint session of Parliament are also useful.
However, in India as in the U.K. these methods are rarely used. This is purely because of lack of
convention or practice. Scholars however believe that this method should be used extensively
and effectively so as to nip the vices of delegation in the bud.
The above points may be summarized as follows
(a) Through the debate on the act which contains delegation. Members may discuss anything
about delegation including necessity, extent, type of delegation and the authority to whom
power is delegated.
(b) Through questions and notices. Any member can ask questions on any aspect of
delegation of legislative powers and if dissatisfied can give notice for discussion under
Rule 59 of the Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha Rules.

10

(c) Through moving resolutions and notices in the house. Any member may move a
resolution on motion, if the matter regarding delegation of power is urgent and
immediate, and reply of the government is unsatisfactory.
(d) Through vote on grant . Whenever the budget demands of a ministry are presented, any
Member may propose a cut and thereby bring the exercise of rule-making power by that
ministry under discussion.
(e) Through a private Members Bill seeking modifications in the parent Act, or through a
debate at the time of discussion on the address by the president to the joint session of
Parliament, Members may discuss delegation. However, these methods are rarely used.3

Chapter III
Direct Special Control
Concern for popular control of increasingly extensive administrative activities has brought forth
various proposals by which congressional supervision can be maintained. Prominent among
these remedies is the device of laying on the table, which requires that administrative
legislation made under delegated authority be presented to the legislature for approval.
Laying may take various forms such as laying with no further direction wherein the purpose is
to simply inform the House. Laying subject to negative resolution implies the coming into force
of the rules with the exception that it shall cease to have effect if the House annuls it. Another
form is laying subject to affirmative resolution where the rules need approval for coming into
effect or else they cease to be in operation until such resolution. The process of laying in draft
subject to negative resolution means that within 40 days of laying, the rules will come into force
unless disapproved and laying in draft subject to an affirmative resolution is coupled with the
power of modification and then approval.

3 I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, Eighth Edition, p. 115.
11

However, in India, the dichotomy remains as the courts judge if they are mandatory or directory
and then proceed to judge the legal consequences. A careful analysis of few cases will show the
confusion inherent.4
In the case of Narendra Kumar v Union of India5, Section 3(6) of the Essential Commodities Act,
1955 which reads as, Every order made under this section by the Central Government or by any
officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, as
soon as may be, after it is made was called mandatory primarily because of the words shall be
laid.
However, this ruling was not followed as such in the case of Jan Mohammad v State of
Gujarat6. In this case, Section 26(5) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939
prescribed a similar laying procedure. The rules were framed in 1941 however were not laid
before the legislature in its first session citing World War II as a lawful emergency. Thereafter,
the rules were laid before the Houses of Parliament in its second session. The Court did not stand
by its previous interpretation and in fact held that the Act did not prescribe that the rules acquired
validity only from the date on which they were placed before the Houses of Legislature. Thus
laying was not mandatory. Further, since the Act did not categorically say that if the rules were
not placed in the very first session itself, they would be invalid, inferring the same is not
required.
Even assuming that the above was not really a deviation as it was due to certain special
circumstances, the ruling in Atlas Cycle Industries v State of Haryana 7 was clearly a very
doubtful.

4 http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/parliamentary-control-of-administrativerule-making-constitutional-law-essay.php (visited on 11th February, 2016).

5 1960 AIR 430.
6 1966 AIR 385.
7 1979 AIR 1149.
12

In Atlas Cycle Industries case, the same provision of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 was
under consideration as in the Narendra Kumar case. The Court gave a surprisingly different
verdict when it left the tool of literary interpretation to lay down different standards in case of
delegated legislations. It held that, Two considerations for regarding a provision directory are (i)
Absence of any provision for the contingency of a particular provision not been complied with
and (ii) Serious general inconvenience and prejudice to the general public, if rules are declared
invalid. On applying these two principles to the facts in hand, it held that Section 3(6) does not
stipulate negative or affirmative resolution by either Houses. It is not subject to the approval or
disapproval of Parliament. Further, the section does not stipulate any period of time or a penalty
for non-observance. Hence, simple use of the words must or shall do not determine the
nature of the laying provisions.
It is therefore seen that lack of a uniform and general law has lead to very ambiguous
interpretations which do not give any clear direction as to the position of law.8
In America, even though the concept of strict separation of powers makes parliamentary control
rather invisible, Reorganisation Acts of 1939 and 1945 provided that the Presidential
organizational plans were not to have any effect for a specified period during which they could
be annulled by any Congress through a concurrent resolution of both the Houses. In six states,
namely, Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Virginia and Wisconsin, provisions exist for
laying the rules before the legislative houses.
In England, on the other hand, this requirement of laying is used effectively and extensively. The
Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 clearly lays down uniform provisions such as deferring the
legislation until approval of House; coming into effect of legislation subject to disapproval by
House; sending notification to Lord Chancellor and Speaker of House of Commons incase such
provisions cannot be maintained.
It is also important to assess the legal consequences of non-compliance with laying provisions. In
England Section 4(2) of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 makes laying provisions mandatory
and hence, any violation would lead to nullity of the legislation or rendering the rule void.9

8 Supra Note 4.
13

Chapter IV
Indirect Control
This form of control is exercised by the Parliament through its Committees. In 1950, the then
Law Minister made a suggestion for the establishment of a committee of the House of the pattern
of the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments, 1944 to examine delegated legislation and
bring to the notice of the House whether administrative rule making has exceeded the intention
of Parliament or has departed from it or has affected any fundamental norm or principle. Such a
committee known as the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of Lok Sabha was appointed on
1st December, 1953. This committee comprised 15 members nominated by the Speaker for one
year. The Chairman is appointed by the Speaker from amongst its members. A similar Committee
was established in the Rajya Sabha in 1964. In England, it is a rather healthy tradition to appoint
the Leader of Opposition as Chairman. The Committee has the power to appoint sub-committees
and may refer any matter for its consideration.
According to Rule 223 of the Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure, the main functions of the
Committee shall be to examine the following:
(i)
(ii)

Whether the rules are in accordance with the general object of the Act,
Whether the rules contain any matter which could more properly be dealt with in the

(iii)
(iv)
(v)

Act,
Whether it is retrospective,
Whether it directly or indirectly bars the jurisdiction of the court, and questions alike.
Whether, for any reason, it requires further elucidation.

The Committee has between 1953 and 1961, scrutinized about 5300 orders and rules has
submitted 19 reports.
This Committee has also suggested various means by which the process of delegated legislation
in India can be better organized and effective. It states that all enabling Acts must mandate laying
in a language which is simple, clear and concise. Ambiguity or unnecessary wideness should be
9 Supra Note 3.
14

avoided. Any financial levy or tax should not be imposed by rules as it contains the latent threat
of financial abuse and corruption by the authorities. A very coherent policy should be laid down
by the Legislature so that the Executive can frame rules only within those parameters. Even then,
the power of the Parliament to modify and the courts power of judicial review should not be
curtailed in any manner. Further, inordinate delay must not be excused and rules themselves
should be self-explanatory so as to avoid unnecessary confusions regarding purpose and
intention.
There is also a similar Committee of the Rajya Sabha which was constituted in 1964. It
discharges functions similar to the Lok Sabha Committee.
The Committee on Subordinate Legislation has made the following recommendation in order to
streamline the process of delegated legislation in India .
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Power of judicial review should not be taken away or curtailed by rules.

A financial levy or tax should not be imposed by rules.
Language of the rules should be simple and clear and not complicated or ambiguous.
Legislative policy must be formulated by the legislature and laid down in the statute
and power to supply details may be left to the executive, and can be worked out

(v)

through the rules made by the administration.

Sub-delegation in very wide language is improper and some safeguards must be
provided before a delegate is allowed to sub-delegate his authority to another

(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)

functionary.
Discriminatory rules should not be framed by the administration.
Rules should not travel beyond the rule-making power conferred by the parent Act.
There should not be inordinate delay in making of rules by the administration.
The final authority of interpretation of rules should not be with the administration.
Sufficient publicity must be given to the statutory rules and orders.10

The working of the Committee is on the whole satisfactory and it has proved to be a fairly
effective body in properly examining and effectively improving upon delegated legislation in
India. Sir Cecil Carr aptly remarks: It is evidently a vigorous and independent body.11

Chapter V
10 C.K. Thakker, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company 1992, p.154-155.
11 Supra Note 3.
15

Consultation of affected Interests before passing Delegated Legislation

Parliamentary control over administrative rule-making is admittedly weak because legislators are
sometimes innocent of legal skills. A constant search is thus on for an alternative mechanism
which, besides providing effective vigil over administrative rule-making, can guarantee effective
people participation for better social communication, acceptance and effectivity of the rules.
Procedural control mechanism has the potential to meet the abovementioned requirements for
allowing specific audit if rules by those for whose consumption they are made. One of the major
components through which procedural control mechanism operates is through consultation with
affected interests.
This control mechanism makes administrative rule-making a democratic process and, therefore,
increases its acceptability and effectivity.
In India there is no existence of any specific general law which provides for administrative
authorities to consult with affected persons before rules and regulations are framed by them.
Because of this, the provision of prior consultation is sometimes provided in the enabling act
itself. Such provision, if there, is considered to be mandatory to be followed and its violation is
visited with the invalidity of rules. However, if the parent Act does not make it mandatory to
consult affected interests before making rules, then such rules will not be invalidated if the
authorities fail to consult the affected interests. Thus, prior consultation shall only be mandatory,
when some consequences are provided in the absence of such consultation.
The Supreme Court in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. V. A.P. SEB12 held that the failure to consult does not
render the exercise of power invalid because consultation with the council has not been made
mandatory, in the sense that no consequence is provided in the absence of such consultation. In
India, the provisions for prior consultation made in the enabling Act may be grouped into five
possible headings:
(i)

Official consultation with a named body The Banking Companies (Acquisition and
Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 provides for prior consultation with Reserve
Bank of India before making rules under the Act.

12 1991 AIR 1473.

16

(ii)

Consultation with administrative boards The Mines Act, 1901 sets up

Administrative Boards to advise the government and makes obligatory prior
consultation with the boards before the Central Government can make rules under the

(iii)

Act.
Consultation with a statutory board in charge of a particular subject Under the Tea
Board Act, 1949, the Tea Board has been constituted as a statutory body in charge of
the whole subject of tea cultivation, development, marketing, etc. The Act makes it

(iv)

obligatory to consult this Board before the government can frame rules under the Act.
Consultation with interested persons Under the Industrial Development and
Regulation Act, 1951 representations from industry and the public are invited.
Similarly, the law authorized municipalities to frame rules for the imposition of tax,
but made it obligatory to publish draft rules in a Hindi daily and consult the
inhabitants of the area who are going to be affected by such tax. This growing
awareness of the need to invite peoples participation is certainly a healthy

(v)

development in administrative rule-making in India.

Preparation of rules by the affected interests Under this, the Mines Act empowers
the owners of mines to draft rules themselves for the safety and prevention of
accidents in mines and submit the draft rules to the inspector of mines. Such rules
become operative on being approved by the government.13

Chapter VI
Suggestions to improve Parliamentary control over Delegated Legislation
A careful analysis of Indian parliamentary control over delegated legislation will show that it is
very weak and undeveloped or rather under-utilized. Reasons for this include lack of legal skills
with parliamentarians; lackadaisical attitude of ruling parties; too much dependence on courts for
any problem.
It is striking to note that a country like America which has strict separation of powers thereby
making parliamentary control a mere fiction as per their Constitution, believes in the importance
of it and incorporates it in significant areas. India, a country with quasi-federal structure and a
13 Supra Note 3.
17

separation of powers which is quite diluted has ironically failed to realize the significance and
effectiveness of parliamentary control as a check on excessive delegation.
Parliamentary control in England is the most effective because it is done in a non-political
atmosphere with a uniform law and the extent of making the Leader of Opposition the Chairman
of the Committee which scrutinizes. India thus should learn from this and strive to move away
from dreams of individual power to realizing the values of true democracy.
In India, thus, if parliamentary control of administrative rule-making is to be made a living
continuity as a constitutional necessity, it is necessary that the role of the committees of
Parliament be strengthened and a separate law like the Statutory Instruments Act providing for
uniform rules of laying and publication must be passed. The committee may also be
supplemented by a specialized official body to make the vigilance of administrative rule-making
more effective.
Each of the three areas of legislative control is not free from problems and each problem has its
solutions laid down as follows.
First, the area of direct general control is most unutilized. This is indeed unfortunate considering
that it is the very essential function of Parliament to debate, discuss, argue and draft the best
possible laws and rules. The Opposition has the golden chance to point out major flaws and delve
into future problems that might be foreseen. Even the ruling party can gain from these points.
Further, this will prevent any unwarranted or unfair legislation from being passed in the first
place. This is why this control, exercised at the stage of passing the law is crucial in avoiding
future litigations and harassment to the people of our democracy.
Second, in the area of direct special control, which is the more popular form of check, Indian
politics and law has several loopholes. The most obvious and glaring of them all is the lack of a
law which is uniform, general and lucid and which clearly declares laying as mandatory with a
clear intention of declaring the rules or the enabling act itself void on non-compliance. The
suggestion of the Committee for a uniform period of 30 days for laying before final publication
is helpful with exceptions created in cases of urgency. This is in order to infuse speediness in the
Parliamentary proceedings.
18

The courts too have been caught in this web of lack of uniform laws as they decide cases
differently on different principles. Instances where the same provision has been held mandatory
due to words used like shall, must and then directory due to implication and intention show
that the judiciary too has failed to give a clear direction. This is deplorable considering that the
judiciary has wide powers to correct the otherwise incorrect laws.
In cases like, Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay 14, this Court observed that law which
creates public duties is directory but if it confers private rights it is mandatory. It is not beyond
doubts that delegated legislation confers powers on authorities to exercise duties of public nature
but these have a direct impact on private rights of citizens. Thus, the courts should interpret
provisions of laying as mandatory even by this guideline.
Further, in the case of Raza Buland Sugar v. Municipal Board, Rampur15 ; and State of Mysore v.
V.K. Kangan16, this Court held that as to whether a provision is mandatory or directory, would
depend upon the intent which has to be gathered from the phraseology of the provision and its
design. Keeping this principle in mind, sections of enabling acts which use the words shall or
must clearly display the intention of making it a strictly applicable provision. A strict
interpretation would go a long way in bringing in efficiency despite the lack of a uniform law.
Third, the special control mechanism has been reduced to a mere suggestive and
recommendatory body wherein committees are established; their suggestions are heard but rarely
implemented. Examples from Australia, Scotland and United Kingdom would show how this
area of special control is taken with utmost seriousness. In India, the idea of setting up bodies of
enquiry, commissions and committees for almost any occurrence is a frequent phenomenon.
Most believe that this is a way of hushing up the public discontent. However, it must be kept in
mind that these Committees are made up of members of the Parliament who are actually elected

14 1952 AIR 181.

15 1965 AIR 895.
16 1975 AIR 2190.
19

by the people of our country. Their suggestions if implemented can solve not only problems of
excessive delegation but also never ending litigations.
It must be stressed that as stated in the case of Lohia Machines v Union of India17, it was held
that since every Rule made under the Act is required to be laid before each House of
Parliament so that both Houses of Parliament have an opportunity of knowing what the rule is
and considering whether any modification should be madethus, Parliament has not parted with
its control over the rule making authority and it exercises strict vigilance and control over the
rule making power exercised by the Central Board of Revenue. This is a strong circumstance
which militates against the argument based on excessive delegation of legislative power. Hence,
parliamentary control is a vital feature in assessing the extent of delegation by the enabling act to
check on the vices of excessive delegation.
Thus, the evils of the necessity called delegated legislation can be kept in check by the
Parliament, judiciary and by keeping to strict procedures. Amongst all of this, it is the Parliament
which must take active interest and control in order to reduce pressure on the judiciary and keep
alive the doctrine of separation of powers without clogging the wheels of the government.18

17 1985 AIR 479.

18 Supra Note 8.
20

Conclusion
If in India parliamentary control over delegated legislation is to be made a living continuity, it is
necessary that the role of the committees of the Parliament must be strengthened and a separate
law like the Statutory Instruments Act, providing for uniform rules of laying and publication,
must be passed. The committee may be supplemented by a specialised official body to make the
vigilance of delegated legislation more effective. Besides this other measures should be taken to
strengthen the control of Parliament over delegated legislation.
The Parliamentary control over delegated legislation in USA and India is not as effective as in
UK. In UK the laying off procedure is followed effectively because there all administrative rulemaking is subjected to the control of Parliament through the Select Committee on Statutory
instruments. In India the control is not very much effective. There are no statutory provisions
regarding laying of delegated legislation. Though the working of the Scrutiny committees is not
very effective, yet they have proved to be an effective body in examining and improving upon
the legislative control over delegated legislation.

21

Bibliography
1. C.K. Thakker, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company 1992.
2. I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, Eighth Edition, 2012.
3. Parminderkaur and Ranjit Singh, International Journal of Political Science, Law and
International Relations, Vol. 5, Issue 5, Dec 2015, Delegation of Legislative Powers to
Executive.
4. Yuvraj Khare, Legal Express An International Journal Of Law, Vol.I, Issue-I November
2014, Delegated Legislation in favour of Local Authority.
5. http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/parliamentary-control-ofadministrative-rule-making-constitutional-law-essay.php.

22