Introduction :

City of Manila vs Judge Cuerdo

CITY OF MANILA vs. JUDGE GRECIA-CUERDO
PERALTA, J.:
PETITIONERS: THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS.
LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila
RESPONDENTS: HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON
PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING
CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES,
DOCTRINE:
The authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
appellate jurisdiction
FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, PET Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period
from January to December 2002 against the private respondents. In addition to the taxes purportedly due
from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila
(RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. Private respondents were constrained to pay
the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint denominated
as one for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/ Erroneously Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition
with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied.
PETs then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners petition for
certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition
ISSUE:
WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
YES. The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to
the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why
the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that if a case may be appealed to a particular court
or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This principle was affirmed in De Jesus
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that a court may issue a

writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125
by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
1.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1.
Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
2.
Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case
the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3.
Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4.
Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered
by the Bureau of Customs;
5.
Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or
city board of assessment appeals;
6.
Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review
from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section
2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7.
Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity
or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and
Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No 8800, where either party may appeal the
decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
2.
Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1.
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is
less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried
by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules
of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
2.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a)
Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases
originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b)
Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c)
Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for
taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the principal amount
of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos

(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional
Trial Court.
2)
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a)
Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.

Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Plaza Corp. vs Robert Cullen

Petitioner: MPMCP and MLHI(Meridian)
Respondent: Robert Cullen
Ponente: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Facts: Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium unit of the Medical Plaza Makati covered by
Condominium Certicate of Title No. 45808 of the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later
cancelled and Condominium Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of respondent. On
September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. JoseGiovanni E. Dimayuga,
demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessments amounting to
P145,567.42. Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues
shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner. Petitioner,on the
other hand, claimed that respondent's obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI(previous owner).
Consequently, respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the
2002 election of petitioner's Board of Directors. Respondent thus claried from MLHI the veracity of
petitioner's claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had already been settled.
This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a delinquent
payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the
Complaint for Damages filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. MLHI claims that it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is vested
with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the
following specific grounds for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as respondent himself approved
the assessment when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate
controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies; and (4) the
case is already moot and academic, the obligation having been settled between petitioner and MLHI.
RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioners and MLHIs motions to dismiss and, consequently,
dismissing respondents complaint.
The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by respondent clearly falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. As to petitioner, the court held that the complaint states
12

no cause of action, considering that respondents obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It,
likewise, ruled that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member
CA reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA held that the controversy is an ordinary civil action
for damages which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion
to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the questions involved
pertain to their rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of
the corporation.
Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in
his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by
petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in preventing respondent from
participating in the election of the corporations Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged
unpaid dues and assessments demanded by petitioner. To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of
an intra-corporate controversy, the jurisdiction over which pertains to the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC
over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to
RTCs designated by this Court as Special Commercial Courts. While the CA may be correct that the RTC
has jurisdiction, the case should have been filed not with the regular court but with the branch of the RTC
designated as a special commercial court. Considering that the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was not
designated as a special commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC.31 The CA, therefore, gravely erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Padlan vs Dinglasan
Petitioners: Editha Padlan
Respondents: Elenita Dinglasan; Felicisimo Dinglasan.
Ponente: PERALTA, J:
Doctrine: Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
FACTS: Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land which is covered by
TCT. While on board a jeepney, Elenitas mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura Passion
regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the
owners copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into
several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan. Through a falsified deed of
sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to
different buyers.
On April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots to Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later sold the lot to petitioner
Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT issued under the formers name was cancelled and another TCT
was issued in the name of Editha Padlan.
Respondents filed a case of Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was,
thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed
the complaint. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent.

Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondentsown title. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit,
the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the person of the
petitioner. The same was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
HELD: No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. Here, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in
the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration
was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings,
respondents counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the
next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessors Office. However,
they did not present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof .
Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC
and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

Quesada vs DOJ
EDGARDO V. QUESADA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and CLEMENTE TERUEL, Respondents
G.R. No. 150325 August 31, 2006
FACTS:
- Clemente M. Teruel, herein respondent, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong
City, an affidavit-complaint charging Edgardo V. Quesada (herein petitioner), Ramon P.
Camacho, Jr., and Rodolfo Corgado with the CRIME OF ESTAFA under Article 315, paragraphs 2
and 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
TERUELS CONTENTION
The affidavit-complaint alleges that on June 13, 1998 at Shangrila Plaza Hotel, EDSA,
Mandaluyong City, Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado represented themselves to Teruel as the
president, vice-president/treasurer, and managing director, respectively, of VSH Group
Corporation;
- That they offered to him a telecommunication device called Star Consultant Equipment Package
which provides the user easy access to the internet via television; that they assured him that after
he pays the purchase price ofP65,000.00, they will immediately deliver to him two units of the
internet access device; that relying on their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the two
units; and that despite demands, they, did not deliver to him the units.
CONTENTION OF PETITONER
- It was only petitioner Quesada who filed a counter-affidavit. He alleged that they formed the VSH
Group as a corporation "for the principal purpose of pooling the commissions they will receive as
Star Consultant Trainers and then dividing said commissions among themselves according to
their agreement";
That while he admitted that the two units of internet access devices purchased by herein
respondent Teruel were not delivered to him, however, this was not due to their alleged
fraudulent representations since they merely acted as sales agents of F.O.M. Phils., Inc.;
- That they found out too late that the said company could not cope with its commitment to them as
it ran short of supplies of telecommunication products.
Office of the Prosecutor
- Found probable cause hence a comliant for estafa was filed against the petitioner

While the RTC was hearing Criminal Case No. MC-00-2510, petitioner filed with this Court the
instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of Justice, in dismissing his Petition for
Review in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an instant petition of certiorari can be filed directly to the Supreme Court
HELD:
NO, it is in utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is
in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago

G.R. No. 170354. June 30, 2006
Petitioner: Edgardo Pinga
Respondents: The Heirs of German, Santiago represented by Fernando Santiago
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Doctrine: The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of
defendants to prosecute his counterclaim. (Rule 27, Section 3, Rules of Court)
FACTS:
The Heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago, filed a complaint for injunction in
the Regional Trial Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, against Petitioner Eduardo Pinga alleging
that Pinga had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and
harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. Respondents prayed that petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined
from committing "acts of depredation" on their properties, and ordered to pay damages. In their Amended
Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents ownership of the
properties in question, asserting that petitioners father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived
their interest in the properties, had been in possession thereof since the 1930s. They alleged that as far
back as 1968, respondents had already been ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for
forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga. It was further claimed that respondents
application for free patent over the properties was rejected by the Office of the President in 1971.
Defendants in turn prayed for damages owing to respondents forcible re-entry in the properties and the
irresponsible and reckless filing of the case. However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend the
hearings, the case was dismissed by the RTC. Respondents thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
ask for the entire action to be dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte. Said
motion was granted by the RTC, hence the counterclaim was dismissed. The lower court further ruled
that compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action vis a vis
the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner therefore
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 45 on pure questions of law
also averring that respondents motive for seeking the dismissal of their entire case is to avoid putting
their ownership in controversy in the counterclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint
due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory

or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute the counterclaim.
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court,
the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiffs
fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same or separate action.
Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is
not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the
failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a
matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. The complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief
can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and
proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied,
he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim. The present rule embodied in
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that
any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules,
provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the
same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such
counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.

ZAMORA et al. v. HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO

Petitioner:
Respondent:

Wife and children of PABLO ZAMORA

Heirs of CARMEN IZQUIERDO

Ponente:

J. Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez

Doctrine:
As a precondition to filing a complaint in court, parties shall go through the barangay
conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the
Pangkat.
Facts:
In 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation where the former leased to
the latter one of her apartment units located in Caloocan City. They agreed that the rental is P3,000.00
per month; the leased premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After Carmens death in 1996, her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing the heirs, herein
respondents, prepared a new contract of lease where the rent was increased to P3,600.00 per month.
Petitioners, however, refused to sign it. Pablo died in 1997 and his wife and children continued to reside
in the apartment unit. They refused to pay the increased rental and persisted in operating a photocopying
business in the same apartment.
Meanwhile, Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS) for a
water line installation in the premises. Since written consent from the owner is required for installation,
she requested respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because petitioners

refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a
portion thereof for photocopying business and allowing three families to reside therein.
Petitioner then filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay 16, Zone 2, District 1, Caloocan
City a complaint against respondents docketed as: Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: Hindi Pagbibigay
ng Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng Tubig.
During conciliation proceedings, petitioners still refused to sign the new lease contract and soon after,
was sent a demand letter by respondents to vacate the premises within 30 days. Failing to amicably
settle the dispute, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action. Consequently,
respondents filed with the MTC Branch 49 Caloocan for unlawful detainer and damages.
Petitioner alleges that the barangay Certification to File Action is fatally defective because it pertains to
another dispute the refusal by respondents to give her written consent to petitioners request for
installation of water facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not
constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should
have been conducted.
MTC rendered judgment in favor of Respondents ordering Petitioners to vacate premises and pay
damages.
RTC Branch 125, on appeal, affirmed MTC judgment and subsequently denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
CA, on petition for review, affirmed RTC decision and thereafter denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue:
W/N the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo,
contravenes the law on the Katarungang Barangay as a precondition to filing a complaint in court.
Held:

NO

The Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings
to resolve the dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners contention, the complaint does
not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the
installation of water facilities in the premises, but also petitioners violation of the terms of the lease,
specifically their use of a portion therein for their photocopying business and their failure to pay the
increased rental.
As a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either
before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the Pangkat. It is thus manifest
that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.
We hold that petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section
19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which permits filing of such pleading only when
the ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or
failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint to the Lupon for conciliation
prior to its filing with the court.
Petition DENIED. CA Decision sustaining RTC Decision upholding MTC judgment AFFIRMED.

MAGPALE, JR. v CSC

G.R. No. 97381 November 5, 1992
Petitioner: BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR.
Respondent: CSC and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as the General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).
Ponente: MELO, J.
DOCTRINE(S):
1.)Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without
jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case. (Acena v. Civil
Service Commission, 193 SCRA 623 [1991]).
2.)Appeal is merely a statutory right and must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with
the provision of the law. The phrase Adversely affected party in Sec 49 of EO 292 refers only to
the aggrieved government employee and not the State.
(BACKGROUND LANG TO NI PETITIONER)Petitioner started his career in government as an employee
in the Presidential Assistance on Community Development in 1960. Fifteen years later, or in 1975, he
transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as Arrastre Superintendent. He was promoted to the
position of Port Manager in 1977 of the Port Management Unit (PMU), General Santos City. Then he was
reassigned, in the same year to PPA-PMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharged the functions of
Port Manager. On December 1, 1982, the PPA General Manager designated Atty. William A. Enriquez as
officer-in-charge of PPA-PMU, Tacloban City effective December 6, 1982. On January 6, 1983, petitioner
was ordered to immediately report to the Assistant General Manager (AGM) for Operation, PPA, Manila,
Petitioner reported at PPA Manila on the same date and performed the duties and functions assigned to
him.

FACTS:
In an Internal Control Department Report dated March 5, 1984, the PMU-Tacloban
Inventory Committee and the Commission on Audit (COA) stated that petitioner failed to account
for equipment of PPA value at P65,542.25 and to liquidate cash advances amounting to
P130,069.61. He was found also to have incurred unauthorized absences from May 25, 1984 to
July 23, 1984. 19 months after he began reporting in Manila, a formal charge for Dishonesty,
Pursuit of Private Business without permission as required by Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences and Neglect of Duty was filed against
petitioner. Based on said charges he was ordered preventively suspended and has been out of
service since then.
For almost four years the case remained unacted upon. The formal investigation and hearing
resumed on September 18, 1987. On January 18, 1989 a Decision was rendered by the DOTC
Secretary, through its Administrative Action Board (AAB), finding petitioner guilty of Gross
Negligence on two counts:

(a) for his failure to account for the 44 assorted units of equipment, among them a Sony Betamax
and a TV Camera, and
(b) for failing to render the required liquidation of his cash advances amounting to P44,877.00 for
a period of four years.
Petitioner was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences. Accordingly, he
was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the corresponding accessory penalties.
When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was denied, he appealed
to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission which
reversed the decision of the DOTC AAB stating that the petitioner cannot be held liable for Gross
Negligence for his alleged failure to account for several properties and for failure to liquidate the cash
advances he received as there was no showing that he has been specifically required to do so
either by law or regulation. The mere detail of respondent to PPA-Manila will not necessarily obligate
him to make accounting for the same. Moreover, PD 1445 Section 105 Chapter 5 (The Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines) measured the liability of an officer accountable for government
property only to the money value of said property. Though respondent is the person primarily liable
for these funds and property, he holds this liability jointly with the person who has the actual
possession thereof and who has the immediate responsibility for the safekeeping.
Thereafter the PPA, through its General Manager, herein respondent Rogelio A Dayan, filed an
appeal with the Civil Service Field Office-PPA, and the latter office indorsed the appeal to respondent
CSC. On the other hand, Magpale requested the Secretary of the DOTC to direct the PPA to implement
the MSPB reinstatement decision as it has become final and executory. Said request was reiterated by
petitioner to OIC Wilfredo M. Trinidad of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Legal
Affairs, DOTC. On March 13, 1990, petitioner filed with the MSPB a Motion for Implementation of the
MSPB decision. This was opposed by the PPA through its General Manager.
On April 27, 1990 petitioner filed with respondent CSC his comment to the appeal, contending that:
1.) he is not an accountable officer and is under no obligation to account for the property and equipment;
2.) said property and equipment were not received by him as custodian and he should not be held liable
for the loss of the same;
3.)the said property and equipment were place in PPA-PMU Tacloban City which the herein petitioner left
on October 8, 1982 and since then had lost control over them. Moreover, petitioner averred that as to the
unliquidated cash advances of P44,877.00, the same had long been liquidated.
4.) Finally, petitioner claimed that his failure to secure the clearance for any possible property or financial
obligation in PMU-Tacloban was due to the urgency of his transfer to PPA-Manila and the absence of any
order or demand to secure the clearance.
On June 28, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal of PPA claiming that:
1. Appeal of PPA was filed out of time and that the CSC has no jurisdiction over it;
2. The PPA has not exhausted administrative remedies before appealing to the higher body, the CSC;
3. The MSPB decision has become final and therefore cannot be disturbed anymore.
On October 19, 1990, respondent CSC rendered its now assailed Resolution which reversed the
MSPB decision and reinstated the DOTC-AAB decision, but modified its penalty to 1 year suspension as
it took into account the length of service of petitioner and considered that it was his 1 offense.
st

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC exceeded its authority in taking jurisdiction of the PPAs Appeal.

HELD:
Yes. Although, as the respondent CSC is correct in stating that Under section 47 of EO 292, it has
jurisdiction over appeals on all Administrative cases involving the imposition of:
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.
Such jurisdiction may be exercised only in relation with Section 49 of the same Code; or when
following requisites concur:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the decision;
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the decision, unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed; and
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records of
case, together with the notice of appeal to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of
notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.

the

the
the
the

The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation from office,
rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position.
Consequently, Consistent with the cases of Mendez v. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil
Service Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
Sandoval vs Caneba
SANDOVAL vs CANEBA
GANCAYCO, J.:
It is not the ordinary courts but the Natl Housing Authority (NHA) which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker of salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lot.
Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (Estate) filed a complaint against Nestor Sandoval in the
RTC for the collection of unpaid installments of a subdivision lot, pursuant to their agreement. The RTC
ruled in favor of Estate, and ordered Sandoval to pay. A writ of execution was issued which thereafter
became final and executor.
Facts: Sandoval filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
An MR of the writ of execution was also filed by PET. Estate opposed both motions. RTC denied the
motion to vacate for the reason that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the court to do so. A new writ of
execution was issued.
Sandoval filed a pet alleging that the RTC committed GADALEJ since the exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof is vested w the HLURB (PD 957).
Issue: Whether the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a
subdivision lot
Held: NO. Under Sec 1 of OD 957, the NHA was given the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION to hear and
decide certain cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices;
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condo unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of

subdivision lot or condo unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the PET and RES is vested not on the RTC but on the
NHA. The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter re-named as
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

SUN INSURACE OFFICE LTD. v J. ASUNCION

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Petitioners: SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY
Respondents: HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, RTC-QC and
MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG
Ponente: GANCAYCO, J
DOCTRINE(S):
MAIN: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. (MANCHESTER v CA)
AS TO RETROACTIVITY OF COURT DECISIONS: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint with the Makati RTC for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other
hand, private respondent filed a complaint in the QC RTC for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including
E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P.
Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case
together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the QC-RTC which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter reraffled to the other judges in QC, to the exclusion of Judge Castro.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in an Administrative Case directing
the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment.
The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All
litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in
their complaints. On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano,(temporary judge) issued an order to
the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private
respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate. To forestall a default, a
cautionary answer was filed by petitioners while an amended complaint was filed by private respondent
including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom this case was thereafter assigned, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her

difficulty in complying with the Resolution. Private respondent thereafter filed a "Compliance" and a "ReAmended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000.00 as actual
compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however,
private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
about P44,601,623.70. Respondent Judge then issued another Order admitting the second amended
complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution
and should be reassessed based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as
actual and compensatory damages". This amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee and was subsequently
paid by private respondent which the petitioners questioned via certiorari with the CA.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. Seven months
after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00.
On August 13, 1987, the CA denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and
granted the writ of preliminary attachment but gave due course to questioning of the docket fee
stating that it should be based on P25,401,707.00. During the pendency of this petition and in
conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee
of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the correct and proper docket
fee has not been paid
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
General provisions :
Lumbuan vs Ronquillo
Lumbuan vs. Ronquillo
Petitioners: Milagros Lumbuan
Respondents: Alfredo A. Ronquillo
Ponente: Quisumbing

Doctrine:
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or
pangkat chairman.
It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the
pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.
Facts:
The petitioner was the registered owner of a property located in Tondo Manila. In 1995, the property was
leased to the respondent for a period of three years for the amount of P5000. Also in agreement was an
annual increase of 10% for the succeeding two years, and that the property will be for the exclusive use
of the fastfood business of the respondent, unless any other use is given with the petiotioners prior
written consent.
The property was initially used for the fastfood business of the respondent and later on converted into a
residence without the required written consent of the petitioner. The respondent also failed to pay the
10% increase in rent of P500 a month starting 1996, and P1000 for the year 1997 to the present. Despite
repeated demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the premises.
On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairmans office but the
parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then issued a Certificate to File Action.
On December 8, 1997, a case for unlawful detainer was filed by the petitioner against the respondent.
The respondent received the summons and a copy of the complaint on December 15, 1997 and his
answer by mail was filed on December 24, 1997.
Before the MeTC could receive the respondents answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment dated January 7, 1998. Acting upon this motion, a decision was rendered ordering the
respondent to vacate and surrender possession of the leased premises and to pay the petitioner the
amount of P46, 000 as unpaid rentals with legal interest until fully paid and an additional P5000 for
attorneys fees plus cost of the suit.
A manifestation was filed by the respondent calling the attention of the MeTC to the fact that his answer
was filed on time and praying that the decision be set aside. The MeTC denied the prayer, ruling that the
Manifestation was in the nature of a motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the
Rules of Summary Procedure.
Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the RTC of Manila. The RTC rendered its decision setting aside the
MeTC decision and directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for
further proceedings. Strict compliance was directed with the condition that should the parties fail to reach
an amicable settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded to the MeTC for it to decide the
case anew.
The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion. Relief was thereafter sought from
the CA through a petition for review. The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered
the dismissal of the ejectment case. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the appellate court.
Pending this petition, the parties went through barangay conciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC
of Manila. Again, they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC to issue an order
remanding the case to the MeTC.
A second decision was ordered by the MeTC ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right of
possession under him to voluntarily vacate the property and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
to pay to plaintiff the amount of P387,512.00 as actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals and its
agreed increase up to January 2000 and to pay the amount of P6,500.00 a month thereafter until the

same is actually vacated; and to pay to plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus cost
of the suit.
The respondent appealed the decision and the case was raffled to the RTC of Manila. The RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioner and dismissed the appeal. The case was then elevated by the respondent to the
CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint for the alleged failure of the
parties to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. With the parties subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further
conciliation proceedings, the procedural defect was cured.
The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through barangay conciliation proceedings to settle their
dispute as shown by the Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by
the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that whether there was
defective compliance or no compliance at all with the required conciliation, the case should have been
dismissed.
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or
pangkat chairman.
Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the Certificate to File Action
stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it
was not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The
efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no
pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that
under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient
compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs Melicor

People v Cawaling
Plaintiff: People of the Philippines
Accused: Ulysses M. Cawaling, Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, and Hilario Cajilo
Ponente: Panganiban
Doctrine:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events.
Facts:

An administrative case was filed by Nelson Ilisan before the National Police Commission in which
Policemen Tumbagahan, De Los Santos, and Cajilo were charged with the killing of Ronie Ilisan. A
decision was made which found the police officers guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal
from the service with prejudice.
Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed before the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan,
Romblon an information for murder against the police officers and Mayor Cawaling. After due trial, the
court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The killing was qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and his assailant, as the latter were greater in number and armed with guns.
Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the the accused, as
they were public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in
relation to their office.
Held:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another
tribunal. The only recognised exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise
when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to
actions pending before its enactment.
The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD1606, PD 1850 and BP 129, as amended. Section 4 of
PD 1606 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prison correccional or imprisonment
for six years or a fine of P6,000. However, Pres. Marcos issued presidential decrees placing the members
of the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial.
The jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129. Section
20 of which provides that trial courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall thereafter be exclusively taken cognisance
of by the latter.
In Sanchez vs. Demetriou the court held that public office is not the essence of murder. The
taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and
the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his
office in which event the penalty is increased.
The use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element, and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact
that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. Furthermore,
the information filed against the accused contains no allegation that they were public officers who
committed the crime in relation to the office. In the absence of such essential allegation, and since the
present case does not involve charges of violation of the Anti-Graft Act, the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the present case.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint of information. In the absence of any
allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of the accused or was necessarily

connected with the discharge of their functions, the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Yu vs Pacleb
Petitioners : Yu Ernesto
Respondents : Baltazar Pacleb & registered owners (Cavite)
Ponente : CORONA, J.:
Doctrine : An action for specific performance praying for the execution of deed of sale in connection with
an undertaking in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, action in personam is binding
only upon parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given opportunity to be heard.
Facts :
Respondent Baltazar Pacleb together with his wife were the owners of a parcel of land in Dasmarinas
Cavite covered by a transfer of certificate of title.
1992, there was a deed of sale between Pacleb and Del Rosario, and another deed of sale was made
between Del Rosario and Javier. A contract to sell was also made between Javier and petitioner.
However, these sales were NOT REGISTERED.
The contract stipulated that Yu, to pay 900,000 pesos. 600,000 pesos upon execution of contract and
300,000 pesos balance. Javier deliver the possession to Yu.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Imus a specific performance and damages against Javier to compel to
deliver ownership and possession, and title as well as cancellation of their agreement and return of initial
payment. on the ground that they made it appear that the property was not tenanted but it was actually
tenanted by Pacleb .
They agreed to pay disturbances compensation in which Javier failed.
Javier was declared in default on the ground that he did not appear in proceedings.
TRIAL COURT : ruled in favor of plaintiff and issued a certificate of finality
Petitioner and Ramon Pacleb executed a contract Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan . Petitioner paid Ramon in exchange for waiver of tenancy
rights.
Respondent on the other hand, filed a complaint of annulment of deed of sale of the deed of sale between
Del Rosario and Javier claiming that the deed of sale between the two of them wa spurious and
signatures were forged. He also moved for the summons to be served upon Del Rosario via publication
since her address cannot be found, but was denied. So, respondent moved to dismiss the case which
was granted by the trial court.
1995, the petitioner filed an action for forcible entry against respondent. They contend that they had prior
possession thru Ramon until latter was ousted by respondent. MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and the
RTC affirmed its decision.

However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts. The CA decded that the
respondent had prior possession as shown by payment of real estate taxes.
Respondent filed an instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages alleging that the deed of
sale between him and his late first wife could not have been executed on the date appearing thereon. He
claimed that he was residing in the US at that time and that his late first wife died 20 years ago.
Trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners and held the petitioners purchasers in good
faith. The trial court also held that the petitioners' action for specific performance against Javier was
already final, and the trial court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all other persons claiming under
them to surrender the possession of the property to the petitioners. Upon appeal by the respondent, the
CA reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue :
Whether or not an action for specific performance is an action quasi in rem and is binding upon
respondent even if the latter was not a party
Held :
NO. The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against Javier to compel him to
perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is an action in personam.
The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to
execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of the petitioners. The obligations of Javier
mentioned attach to Javier alone and do not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the
petitioners is an action in personam and is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and
duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the respondent since he was
not a party therein and considering the fact that his signature and that of his late first wife were forged in
the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the
respondent having a better right over the property as the true owner thereof.
Domagas vs Jensen
Republic vs Jensen
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Acting Commissioner of Land
Registration), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses CATALINO SANTOS and
THELMA BARRERO SANTOS, ST. JUDES ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses DOMINGO
CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DE LA FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA,
respondents.
PETITIONER : REP.OF PHILS
RESPONDENTS : CATALINO SANTOS and THELMA BARRERO SANTOS, ST. JUDES
ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses DOMINGO CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DE
LA FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Doctrine : An action to recover a parcel of land is a Real action but is an action in personam , for it binds
a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing .
Facts :

-This case is seeking to set aside the November 29, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- The
assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City---which dismissed
petitioners Complaint for the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) to several lots in
Caloocan City, issued in the name of private respondents.
[1]

[2]

[3]

- Defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land which was subdivided
Lot No. 865-B-1 under subdivision plan as a result thereof the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
cancelled TCT and issued Certificates of Title, all in the name of defendants St. Judes Enterprises, Inc
- Defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. sold the lots covered by TCT Nos. 24013 and 24014 to defendant
Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos[;] TCT No. 24019 to defendant Sps. Domingo
Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus[;] TCT No. 24022 to defendant Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No.
2402[3] to defendant Lucy Madaya
- Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action seeking the annulment and cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT), ground that said Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of [a] null and
void subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 which expanded the original area of TCT No. 22660 in the name
of St. Jude's Enterprises
- Defendants Virginia dela Fuente and Lucy Mandaya were declared in default for failure to file their
respective answer within the reglementary period. Defendants Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto
Santos, St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. and Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad Calaguian filed separate
answers to the complaint.
defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. Interposed defenses, among others, that the cause of action of
plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that the subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the
LRC, the government is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's
allegation that the area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters is without any basis in fact
and in law
TRIAL COURT :
the trial court dismissed the Complaint. While the plaintiff sufficiently proved the enlargement or
expansion of the area of the disputed property, it presented no proof that Respondent St. Jude
Enterprises, Inc. (St. Jude) had committed fraud when it submitted the subdivision plan to the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) for approval.
[7]

Thus, the court concluded, the government was already in estoppel to question the approved subdivision
plan. Finding that Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya had brought their
respective lots from St. Jude for value and in good faith, the court held that their titles could no longer be
questioned, because under the Torrens system, such titles had become absolute and irrevocable
APPELLATE COURT :
upholding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court. It criticized petitioner for bringing the suit only after nineteen (19) years had passed since the
issuance of St. Judes title and the approval of the subdivision plan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that petitioners complaint
before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity of the Torrens System.
SUPREME COURT :
- We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this concept is understood to
refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular BUT THIS IS ABSENT IN
CASE AT BAR .
- In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in
the land area of St. Jude it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
-Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens System,

should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the
law are satisfied

Tamano Vs Ortiz
Petitioner: Estrellita J. Tamano
Respondent: Hon. Rodolfo A Ortiz Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano, Adib A. Tamano and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: BELLIOSILLO
Doctrine:
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Facts:
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda), On 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur. On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda
joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of
Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage
contract false and fraudulent. They further alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita
was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C.
Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements. Estrellita filed
a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for
annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for
annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the
sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
TRIAL COURT: Denied the motion to dismiss. The case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not
exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was also denied.
COURT OF APPEALS: Withheld the trial courts decision assailing that the instant case would fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in
places where there are no sharia courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before
the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
whether or not the Sharia courts and not the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction
Held:
No. A courts jurisdiction does not depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss,
or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. As alleged in the
complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the
position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and
Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested

with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under
Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
La Tondena vs Ponferrada
La Tondea Distillers vs. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 109656, November 21, 1996
Ponente: Francisco, J.
Doctrine:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither appealable until final judgment nor could it generally be assailed in
certiorari.
FACTS:
Defendants reneged on their contract to sell to private respondents a parcel of land located in Bago City. This breach prompted private
respondents to file before the RTC of Bacolod City an action for specific performance with damages against defendants. A notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the latters title although the same was cancelled upon defendants filing a bond.
Pending the trial before the lower court, petitioner bought the above lot from defendants. Aggrieved, private respondents amended their complaint
and impleaded petitioner as an additional defendant alleging that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on two grounds: no cause of action and improper venue. In support of
the first ground, petitioner asserts that it is a buyer in good faith since the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled when it bought the lot. As
for the second ground, petitioner argued that venue should be in Bago City where the lot is located and not in Bacolod City.
Petitioner received a resolution from the lower court denying their motion as there was need for the parties to present evidence on the question of
good faith. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in a resolution.
More than 3 months later, petitioner went directly to this Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the denial of their motions. The
court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their memorandum. After the parties submitted their respective memoranda
as directed, petitioner filed a manifestation alleging for the first time that it sold the lot sometime in September, 1992 to Distileria Bago, Inc. a
separate entity with which the former has substantial stockholdings. Based on such admission, private respondents moved to dismiss the instant
petition, arguing that petitioner is no longer a real party in interest, having sold the lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is warranted.
HELD:
YES. DISMISSAL IS STILL WARRANTED.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither appealable until final judgment, nor could it generally be assailed on
certiorari.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 16, and interpose as defenses, the objections raised in his motion
to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the whole case by appeal in due time.
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if the denial of the motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in deferring action on the motion. Section 3 of Rule 16 sanctions deferment of
hearing on the motion until the trial if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable. Clearly respondent judge had doubts on the
allegation of petitioners good faith. This is a question of fact which necessitates presentation of evidence and is certainly far from indubitable. It
is within the discretion of the court to defer action if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable and that deferment is only deemed a
provisional denial of the motion to dismiss.
Not being an action involving title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.

REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVT CORP.

Petioner: REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN
Respondent: LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:
Doctrines: A misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action, because
parties may be dropped or added at any stage of the proceedings.
Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. A suit for such
breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real estate, subject of the
said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees.
FACTS: Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation, represented by Wilfredo B.Maghuyop -entered into an Agreement with Petitioner Rebecca Cabutihan. Agreement states that petitioner will

facilitate and arrange the recovery of a parcel of land for the respondent Landcenter Construction situated
at Kay-biga, Paranaque, MM as well as the financing of such undertaking necessaryin connection thereto,
including the necessary steps in relation to squatters presently occupying it and legitimate buyers of lot
thereof. Luz Ponce, authorized by the corporation, entered into a Deed of Undertaking with Cabutihans
group. The Deed states that the group shall receive a 36.5% compensation of the total area recovered.
Petitioner filed an Action for specific performance before the RTC of Pasig City (note Property is in
Paranque) after she accomplished the undertaking and after the corporations failure to compensate the
petitioner and the other facilitators.
Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that respondent corporation be ordered to execute the appropriate document
assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots in her favor. The lots represented
compensation for the undertakings she performed and accomplished, as embodied in the Agreement.
RTC ruled that the allegations in the Complaint show that its primary objective was to recover real
property. Equally important, the prayer was to compel respondent to execute the necessary deeds of
transfer and conveyance of a portion of the property corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area or, in
the alternative, to hold respondent liable for the value of the said portion, based on the prevailing market
price. The RTC further ruled that, since the suit would affect the title to the property, it should have been
instituted in the trial court where the property was situated.[12]
Furthermore, the action was filed only by petitioner. There was no allegation that she had been
authorized by Forro, Radan and Anave to represent their respective shares in the compensation.
Finally, since this case was an action in rem, it was imperative for petitioner to pay the appropriate docket
or filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty she failed to discharge. Consequently,
following Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[13] the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
Issues: 1.WON Pasig RTC was an improper venue.
2. WON dismissal by RTC due non-joinder of necessary parties was proper.
3. WON dismissal by RTC due to non-payment of docket fees was proper.
Ruling: 1. We agree with petitioner. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an answer to
the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real
actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. In the present case, petitioner seeks
payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives
rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem
for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the ground of
lack of cause of action.
2. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may
be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courts own initiative at any
stage of the action.[24] The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with
the said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action.
Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading
the companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded with the case
as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent. This
fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no final determination can
be had.[25] At best, they are mere necessary parties who ought to be impleaded for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.[26] The non-inclusion of a necessary party
does not prevent the court from proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be
without prejudice to the rights of such party.[27]
3. We hold that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the case and to
trifle with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the assessed value of the
real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing fees. But the Court has
already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified as
an action not capable of pecuniary estimation.
[17]

[28]

Citizens Surety & Insurance Company vs Judge Melencio_Herrera

Petitioner: Citizens Surety & Insurance Company
Respondent: Judge Melencio-Herrera; Santiago Dacanay; Josefina Dacanay.
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J.
Doctrine: It is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the
one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In
other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of
Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
Facts: Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of Santiago Dacanay, it
issued 2 surety bonds to guarantee payment of P5K promissory notes in favor Gregorio Fajardo and
Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co respectively. As security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed
an Indemnity Agreement to jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses (with 12% annual
interest) and a REM over a parcel of land in Baguio. The promissory notes were not paid and as a result,
plaintiff Surety was compelled to pay. The Dacanays failed to reimburse the Surety for such payments,
whereupon the Surety caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage to pay its claim leaving an
unsatisfied balance of P10,491.69, that plaintiff sought to recover from defendants Dacanay by filing a
case.
At petitioners request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the
Philippines Herald. But despite such publication and deposit of copy with the Manila post office, the
defendant did not appear within 60 days from the last publication.
Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default, but the Judge eventually dismissed the case, the
suit being in personam and the defendants not having appeared.
Issue: W/N summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction
Held: No. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to
the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due
process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
Here, the proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident
defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached, in which case, the attachment
converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may be
valid.
However, given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties, the decision of the respondent Judge was
set aside and held pending in the archives until petitioner tracks down the whereabouts of the defendants
person or properties.
Go vs UCPB
GO vs. UCPB (G.R. NO. 156187)
FACTS:
-

Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark International, Noahs
Ark Sugar Carriers, Noahs Ark Sugar Truckers, Noahs Ark Sugar Repacker, Noahs Ark Sugar
Insurers, Noahs Ark Sugar Terminal, Noahs Ark Sugar Building, and Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.
[4]

Sometime in August 1996, petitioners applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation with
respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine Hundred Million
(P900,000,000) Pesos, and was favorably acted upon by the latter.
[5]

The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land located at
Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837 square meters, and registered in the name of Mr.
Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 14,271 square
meters, registered in the name of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.

On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was
subsequently cancelled by respondent UCPB.
[6]

As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs
(No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed.

UCPB refused to return the same and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate
Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the registration thereof before the Registry of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City on 02 September 1997.

On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered
by TCT No. 64070, for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result, the
public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
[7]

To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate
Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, against respondent bank and its officers, namely, Angelo V. Manahan, Francisco C.
Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty. Edward E. Martin, together with Ex-Officio Sheriff Lydia G.
San Juan and Sheriff IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 266, docketed as Civil Case No. 67878.

The complaint was subsequently amended on 22 May 2000. The amended complaint alleged,
among other things, the following: that petitioner Jimmy T. Go is a co-owner of the property
covered by TCT No. 64070, although the title is registered only in the name of Looyuko; that
respondent bank was aware that he is a co-owner as he was asked to sign two deeds of real estate
mortgage covering the subject property; that the approved omnibus credit line applied for by him
and Looyuko did not materialize and was cancelled by respondent bank on 21 July 1997, so that
the pre-signed real estate mortgages were likewise cancelled; that he demanded from respondent
bank that TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him, but respondent bank refused to do
so; that despite the cancellation of the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had
the two deeds of real estate mortgage dated and notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage constituted on TCT No. 64070; that the auction sale
scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000 be enjoined; that the two real estate mortgages be
cancelled and TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him; and that respondent bank and
its officers be ordered to pay him moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

On 07 June 2000, respondent bank, filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

[8]

[9]

(1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper filing and
docket fees;
(2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;
(3) an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore, the complaint
states no cause of action;
(4) that the complaint was improperly verified; and
(5) that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient and false certification
of non-forum shopping.
-

On 07 June 2000, the trial court issued an order

preliminary injunction

[10]

granting petitioners application for a writ of

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the
purpose of determining venue.
HELD:
Real action
-

The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals, is more particularly instructive. There, we held that
an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property
[31]

is a real action that affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is before the
court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which is the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.
-

Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal action and
since he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by
alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena.
[32]

Petitioners reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena is misplaced.
Firstly, said case was primarily an action to compel the mortgagee bank to accept payment of the
mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That action, which is not expressly included in the
enumeration found in Section 2(a) of Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and now under Section 1,
Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the mortgaged lots. It is a
personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. The
plaintiffs title is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. Hence, the venue of
the plaintiffs personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner was
primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to return to him the properties covered by
TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had already initiated foreclosure proceedings
because of the cancellation by the said respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July
1997. The prime objective is to recover said real properties. Secondly, Carandang distinctly
articulated that the ruling in Hernandez does not apply where the mortgaged property had
already been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed out by the appellate court, respondent
bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and were it not for the timely
issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court, the same would have
already been sold at a public auction.

In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real action,
considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An action for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is,
therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place
where the subject property lies.

[33]

[35]

Gochan vs Gochan
Title: Gochan v. Gochan
G.R. No. 143089. February 27, 2003
Petitioners: Mercedes R. Gochan, Alfredo R. Gochan, Angelina R. Gochan Hernaez, Ma. Merced R.
Gochan Gorospe, Crispo R. Gochan Jr. and Marlon R. Gochan
Respondents: Virginia Gochan, Louise Gochan, Lapulapu Real Estate Corporation, Felix Gochan &
Sons Realty Corporation and Mactan Realty Corporation
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Doctrine:
The elements of the litis pendetia or res judicata are not present as the two petitions do not seek
the same relief. Hence, forum-shopping is commited.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioners,
who, in turn, filed their Answer with Counterclaim and affirmative defenses. Before pre-trial could be
conducted, petitioners filed a motion for a hearing on their affirmative defenses. Respondent judge denied
petitioners motion without conducting a hearing. Respondent judge however did not stop with the denial
but went on to rule on the merits of the affirmative defenses.
The above ruling is the subject of a petition for certiorari which is pending resolution on a motion
for reconsideration. Because of the pendency of this petition, petitioners filed a motion to suspend
proceedings. Instead of suspending proceedings, the respondent judge set the case for pre-trial.

After the termination of the pre-trial, respondent judge proceeded to hear the evidence of private
respondents. Petitioners counsel went to court and was surprised to learn that his motion to reset the
hearing was disregarded and that trial proceeded with private respondents counsel conducting a re-direct
examination of their first witness and presenting their second witness on direct examination.
Petitioners filed a motion to inhibit respondent judge from further sitting in the case on grounds of
partiality, pre-judgment and gross ignorance of the law. The motion was denied on the ground that
petitioners failed to appear to substantiate the motion.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which the respondent judge
likewise denied in his Order, reiterating that petitioners failed to appear during the hearing on the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum shopping.
HELD:
NO. For filing two Petitions raising the same issues, respondents allegedly split their cause of action
and thus became guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners further contend that the elements of litis pendentia
or res judicata are present in the case at bar, because the matter raised in this Petition could have been
taken up in the first one.
The Court made a distinction between the two Petitions filed. The first involved the propriety of the
affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners [herein respondents] in Civil Case No. CEB-21 854. The
second Petition, which is the subject of the present appeal, raised the issue of whether or not public
respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing
Civil Case No. CEB-21 854. The two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals. In
CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial
court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854.
No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the issuance of an
order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case and to assign a new judge
in his stead.

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

v.
CA, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP. et al.
G.R. No. 75919, May 07, 1987
Petitioner:
Respondent:

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

CA, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al.

Ponente:

J. Emilio Gancayco

Doctrine:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
Facts:
Manchester Development Corporation filed a complaint for specific performance against Cityland
Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor of Manchester.
Manchester also alleged that Cityland forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain transaction
causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. The amount was alleged in the body of
the complaint but it was not reiterated in the prayer.
Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. The docket fee is premised on the allegation of petitioner
that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The CA
ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its

complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M.
Said amount was however again not stated in the prayer.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the resolution of the Supreme Court Second Division and
another Motion to refer the case to and be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc.
Petitioner cites the case of Magaspi v. Remolete in support of its contention.
Issue:

W/N an amended complaint or similar pleading will vest jurisdiction in the Court.

Held:

NO

The Court of Appeals aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee
should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee.
Henceforth, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED for lack of merit.
Sunlife v Asuncion
Tacoy vs RTC of Tagum
Maximo Tacay, Ponciano Panes and Antonia Noel vs. RTC of Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Branches 1
and 2, presided by Hon. Marcial Ferndez and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, Patsita Gamutan,
Clerk of Court and Godofredo Pineda, G.R. No. 88075-77, December 20, 1989
Ponente: Narvasa, J.
Doctrine:
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be
assessed on the basis of both
a.

the value of the property

b.

total amount of the related damages sought

Court acquires jurisdiction over the action involving real property upon the filing of the complaint and
payment of prescribed fee. It is not divested of that authority over accompanying claims or damages
because of lack of specification thereof. Those claims as to which no amounts are stated must simply be
expunged or allow a reasonable time for amendment of the complaints to allege the precise amount and
accept payment of requisite fees within the relevant prescriptive period.
Facts: Godofredo instituted 3 actions for recovery of possession docketed as:
1. vs. Antonia Noel Civ Case No. 2209

2.
3.

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.

1.
2.
3.

a.

vs. Ponciano Panes Civ Case No. 2210

vs. Maximo Tacay Civ Case No. 2211
Cases 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Judge Hernandez and Case 2210 was assigned to Judge Matas.
The complaints have the same facts:
Pineda was the owner of a 790 sqm. parcel of land evidenced by a TCT
the previous owner allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance
Pineda made demands for the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals but was
refused
the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the commencement of suit.
The complaints prayed for the same reliefs:
that the plaintiff be declared the owner of the areas occupied
that the defendants be ordered to vacate and deliver the portions of land usurped by them
that each defendant be ordered to pay 2k as monthly rent, actual damages, moral and nominal
damages, and 30K attorneys fees and representation fees of 5l per day of appearance.
That Pineda be granted further relief and remedies just and equitable in the premises
Motion to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants. Each motion alleged that Trial Court had
not acquired jurisdiction of the case because the complaint violates Circular No. 7 of the SC date March
24, 1988 by failing to specify all the amounts of damages and eben the basic requirement as to the
assessed value of the lot.
Judge Matas DENIED the motion in Civ. Case 2210 but ordered the deletion of the part of the complaint
regarding moral as well as nominal damages and also the handwritten amount for actual damages in the
conclusion and prayer of the complaint.
The motions to dismiss in Civ. Cases 2211 and 2209 were also denied on March 15, 1989 by Judge
Hernandez declaring that
the action at bar is for Reinvindicatoria, Damages and Attorneys fees and as such this court has
exclusive jurisdiction
claims for actual, moral and nominal damages are only one aspect of the cause of action
because of the absence of specification of the amounts of moral, nominal and actual damages they
should be expunged from the records.
In a Joint Petition filed by petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for TRO and/or
writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, praying essentially that said order be annulled and that all
complaints be dismissed on the following grounds
because the complaints failed to state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal
damages, the Trial Court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the 3 civil actions
it was not proper merely to expunge the claims for damages and allow the so-called cause of action for
reivindicatoria to remain for trial by itself.
Issue: WON respondent judges committed grave abuse of discretion. -- NO
Held: Petition is DISMISSED.
Joint petition is dismissed on the following grounds:
1. for failure to comply with Courts Circular No. 1-88 where the copies of the challenged orders were
not certified by the proper clerk of court because the certification was done by the petitioners
counsel which is NOT ALLOWED.
2. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion of the respondent judges
3. Actions are basically NOT for the recovery of sums of money but for recovery of possession of real
property (accion publiciana). Determinative of the courts jurisdiction is the nature not the amount of
damages. Such acion is a real action and may be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages and such would fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
BP 129 provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts."
Circular No. 7 cant be invoked. As laid down in the Manchester case, such application is limited and is
further clarified in the case of SIOL v. Asuncion. In the latter case, it says that,

1. The trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive period
2. damages arising after the filing of the complaint or the similar shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Therefore, in actions or proceedings involving real property the property is immaterial to the courts
jurisdiction, but in actions involving personal property of the recovery of money and/or damages, the
value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trail courts competence.
However, where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees
shall be assessed on the basis of both
a.

the value of the property

b.

total amount of the related damages sought

Court acquires jurisdiction over the action involving real property upon the filing of the complaint and
payment of prescribed fee. It is not divested of that authority over accompanying claims or damages
because of lack of specification thereof. Those claims as to which no amounts are stated must simply be
expunged or allow a reasonable time for amendment of the complaints to allege the precise amount and
accept payment of requisite fees within the relevant prescriptive period.
Ayala Corp vs Madayag
G.R. No. 88421 January 30, 1990
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., petitioners
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL
CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE
SABIO, respondents.
Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.:

Doctrine: the determination of certain damages as exemplary or reactive damages are determined by the
sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount
sought and for the proper assessment of the docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible
for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

FACTS: Private respondents spouses Sabio filed against petitioners Ayala Corp, Las Pias Ventures and
Filipinas Life Insurance an action for specific performance with damages in the RTC of Makati. Petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as
private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee as private respondents only paid the total
amount of P1,616.00 instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real
properties involved as evidence by its tax declaration and specify the amount of exemplary damages
sought both in the body and in the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. However, the trial
court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was likewise denied.
Under the doctrine of Manchester Development Corp vs CA, the docket fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint. However, petitioner contends
that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should be considered in computing
the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which

is an action for specific performance with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real
estate. Petitioner further alleged that since private respondents didn't specify the amount of the exemplary
damages, the complaint must be dismissed.
TRIAL COURT DENIED the motion stating that the determination of the exemplary damages is within the
sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private
respondents to fix the amount of the exemplary damages to be prayed for.
The trial court cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion in support of its ruling.
2

The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable tune but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of specified amount in exemplary damages prayed for is a material defect
in the case.
RULING: The court ruled that the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court
wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified,
the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there
is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the
Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute
a lien on the judgment.
Under the doctrine of Tacay vs RTC of Tagum, the court ruled that the phrase "awards of claims not
specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The
amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any
pleading, should be specified. Although it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary
or reactive damages are determined by the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties
claiming such damages to specify the amount sought and for the proper assessment of the docket fees.
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for
determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount
thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect
in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge from the record the
claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not
specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private respondents to amend their
pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate
reglementary or prescriptive period. No costs.

Negros Oriental vs Negros

Negros Occidental Planters Association vs. Hon. Presiding Judge of Negros
Petitioner: Negros Occidental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA)
Respondents: Hon. Presiding Judge of Negros and Aniceto Manojocampos
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Doctrine:
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with
the technical rules of procedure while at the same time hoping for relaxation of the technicalities in its
favor.
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking reversal of CAs resolution dated May 23, 2007 and August 15, 2007 that
outrightly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA against Campos.
On March 17, 1999, Campos filed a complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages against NOPA before
the RTC of Negros Occidental. Capos and NOPA entered into 2 separate contracts denominated as
Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos paid the consideration for such agreement in full but was only to
receive partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement with regard to the quality of the
products delivered.
On August 17, 2005, NOPA filed its answer and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure of
Campos to file the correct filing fee. The petitioner further claimed that Campos deliberately concealed in
his complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the received goods
to escape payment of proper docket fees.
On June 30, 2006, RTC denied the motion to dismiss and NOPA received the same on July 17, 2006.
On August 1, 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and on January 5, 2007 RTC denied the
same.
On April 2, 2007, NOPA filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA but was dismissed on May 23, 2007
on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the petitioner to state that the allegations are based on authentic records (violating Sec. 4
of Rule 7 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
2.
Failure of the petitioner to append relevant pleadings and documents which would aid in the
resolution of the petition (violating Sec. 1 of Rule 65 of Rules of Court)
3. Failure of the petitioners counsel to indicate his current IBP Official Receipt Number (Bar matter No.
1132 and/or A.M. No. 287)
On June 22, 2007 NOPA filed a motion for reconsideration attaching the amended petition for certiorari in
compliance with the above mentioned requirements. CA denied said motion dated August 16, 2007.
Issue:

WON CA committed reversible error when it ruled that there was no substantial compliance with the
procedural requirements when the petitioner failed to allege in its verification that the allegations therein
are true and correct of this personal knowledge or based on authentic records and failure to attach the
necessary documents as required in Sec. 1, Rule 65 or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Held/Ratio:
Resolutions of CA outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against Campos are
AFFIRMED.
Petitioner argues the following:
1.
The requirement that the pleading be verified is a merely formal and not jurisdictional. The court
may give due course to unverified pleading where material facts alleged are a matter of record and the
question raised are mainly of law.
2.
That NOPA had attached clearly legible and duplicate original or certified true copy of judgment
or final order or resolution and the requisite number of copies and such material portions of record as
would support the petition.
3.
NOPAs substantial compliance demonstrates its good faith to abide by the procedural
requirements
4.
Jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner against the Public respondent CA would justify the
relaxation of rules.
As to the first argument, the petitioner is mistaken in claiming that a verification that contains the
allegation to the best of my knowledge and the allegation are true and correct, as cited in the case of
Decano v. Edu and Quimpo v. De La Victoria, constitute substantial compliance because such cited
cases were promulgated prior to the amended of Sec. 4 of Rule 7 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
made the verification requirement stricter and as such the party cant now merely state under oath that he
believes the statements made in the pleading. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to
be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records. Such failure to verify a pleading will
be treated as unsigned and not uncurable as in Sec. 5 (forum shopping). It produced no legal effect and
is subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In this case, CA refused to
allow such deficiency.
Note: CA may reverse the exercise of discretion of the lower court (upon showing of a strong and clear
case of abuse of power to prejudice the appellant or is rested on an erroneous principle of law) but the
GENERAL RULE is the decisions of a trial court which lie in discretion will NOT be reviewed on appeal,
whether the case be civil or criminal at law or in equity.
The case at bar also demonstrates a situation where in there is no effect on the substantial rights of the
litigant because the alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees would not inure to NOPAs benefit.
While it such requirement is jurisdictional, it is also a technicality and in seeking leniency of this court,
NOPA is praying for a writ of certiorari from being decided on merits.
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with
the technical rules of procedure while at the same time hoping for relaxation of the technicalities in its
favor.
The case of Manchester as cited by the petitioner where in the court ruled that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of prescribed docket fee is not applicable in this case
because there is lack of deliberate intent to defraud which was manifested in the mentioned case. Hence
the case of SIOL v. Asuncion must be applied an the Motion to dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
Causes of Action
Juana Complex vs Fil Estate Land

Del Rosario v FEBTC

Petitioners: Ernesto C. Del Rosario and Davao Timber Corporation

Respondents: Far East Bank & Trust Company, and Private Development Corporation of the Phils.
Ponente: Carpio-Morales
Doctrine:
To allow the re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled in a prior case is to allow the splitting
of a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4, Rule 2. This rules proscribes a party from
dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more
actions based on it.
Facts:
1st Case
Petitioner Davao Timber Corp (DATICOR) and respondent Private Development Corp of the
Phils. (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP extended to DATICOR a foreign
currency loan of $265,500 USD and a peso loan of P2.5 million.
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land (one situated in Manila
registered in the name of petitioner Del Rosario, and five in Mati, Davao Oriental) and chattel mortgages
over pieces of machinery and equipment.
Petitioners paid a total of P3 Million to PDCP which was applied to interest, service fees and
penalty charges. By PDCPs computation this left an outstanding balance on the principal of more than
P10 Million.
On March 1982, petitioners filed a complaint against PDCP before the CFI of Manila for violation
of the Usury Law, annulment of contract and damages. The case was dismissed. On appeal, the IAC set
aside the dismissal of the complaint and declared void and of no effect the stipulation of interest in the
loan agreement. PDCP appealed to the Supreme Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from the
petitioners to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) under a deed of assignment for a
consideration of P5.435 Million. FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners later executed a
memorandum of agreement whereby petitioner agreed to pay FEBTC the amount of P6.4 Million as full
settlement of the receivables.
The SC affirmed in toto the decision of the IAC. It determined that after deducting the P3 Million
earlier paid by the petitioners, their remaining balance was only P1.4 Million.
2nd Case
On September 1992, petitioners filed a complaint for sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC
before the RTC of Makati, mainly to recover the excess payment which they computed to be P5.3 Million;
P4.335 Million from PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the sum of P4.035 Million to bear
interest until fully paid, to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages, and to return the
corresponding titles. As for the complaint against FEBTC, the RTC dismissed it for lack of cause of action,
ratiocinating that the Memorandum between petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to its decision.

Petitioners and PDCP appealed to the CA. The CA held that when PDCP assigned its
receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC,
irrespective of and stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have provided in the deed of assignment,
DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence not bound by its terms. Noting that DATICOR claimed
in its complaint only the amount of P965,000 from FEBTC, the CA held that it could not grant a relief
different from or in excess of that prayed for.
FEBTCs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. SC denied the subsequent appeal.
3rd Case (ito yung main case)
On April 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC of Makati a complaint against FEBTC to recover
the balance of the excess payment of P4.335 Million.
FEBTC submitted that nowhere in the CAs decision (2nd case) was it held liable to return the
whole amount of P5.435 Million representing the consideration for the assignment to it of the receivables.
FEBTC later filed a third party complaint against PDCP praying the the later be made to pay the
P965,000 adjudged by the CA.
The RTC dismissed the petitioner's complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause
of action. The RTC recalled that the petitioners had filed a previous case (2nd case) to recover the
overpayment both from PDCP and FEBTC; that when said case was appealed, the CA ordered PDCP to
release and cancel the mortgages and FEBTC to pay P965,000 which became final and executory on
November 1999, and that a notice of satisfaction of judgment between petitioners and FEBTC was in fact
submitted on August 2000. Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the RTC held that FEBTCs
payment to petitioners was in compliance with the final judgment of the CA, hence, it could not entertain
such claim.
The RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the present petition.
Issue:
WON there is res judicata.
Held:
Petition is bereft of merit.
Section 47, Rule 39 provides two rules on the doctrine of res judicata.
First, bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment. This states that the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any
other tribunal.
Second, conclusiveness of judgment. This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same.
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of bar by prior judgment:
(a) finality of the former judgment

(b) the court which rendered the judgement had jurisdiction

(c) it must be a judgment on the merits
(d) identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action
In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same alleged wrongful act of mistakenly
receiving and refusing to return an amount in excess of what was due it in violation of their right to a
refund. The same facts were also pleaded by the parties in support of their allegations for, and defenses
against, the recovery of the P4.335 Million. It is a well established that a party cannot, by varying the form
of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifying circumstances
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
To allow the re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled as between petitioners and FEBTC in
a prior case is to allow the splitting of a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4, Rule 2.
This rules proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or
claims and instituting two or more actions based on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds of
recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to edit an
upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to
recover for the same wrong or injury.

CGR Corporation vs Treyes

Petitioner : CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN
M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO
Respondent : Ernesto L Treyes
Ponente : Carpio Morales
Doctrine : Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result
of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not
be considered as splitting of cause of action.
Facts :
Petitioners claimed to have occupied 37 hectares of public and in Barangay Bulanon (Negros Occidental).
Respondent allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the lease properties and once inside barricaded
entrance to fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road foing to petitioners, fishponds, and
harvested several tons of milkfish
Petitioner promptly filed with MTC in Sagay City separate complaints for forcible entry with TRO and
Preliminary Injunction and Damages
There were separate moves wherein petitioner filed with RTC of Bacolod a complaint for damages. Prior
to the issuance of fishpond lease agreement in favor of plaintiffs, they had already been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation. They prayed for 100, 000 pesos of moral
damages, and 200,000 pesos for attorneys fees.
However, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of litis pendentia, res judicata, and forum
shopping

RTC : Dismissed petitioners claim on the ground that it is prematurely filed. RTC held that a complaint for
damages may only be maintained after trial determination on forcible entry cases has been made.
Issue :
W/N during pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently
institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occuring after
dispossession by respondent
Held :
Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their
dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not be
considered as splitting of cause of action.
Res Judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for
damages other than the use and occupation of premises and attorneys fees.
One of those elements of litis pendentia which is that the identity between pending actions, with respect
to parties, rights asserted and relief prayed for , is such that any judgement rendered on one action will,
regardless of which is succesful amounting to resjudicata inthe action under consideration is NOT
present. Hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages.
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis
pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res
judicata in the former.

Flores vs Mallare-Philipps
Petitioner: Remedio V. Flores
Respondent: HON. Judge Hellia S. Mallare-Philipps, Ignacio Binoncal & Fernando Calion
Ponente: FERIA
Doctrine:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any
plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest.
Facts:
This case involved an appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Two causes of action was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet
Province. One as against Ignacio Binoncal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing
cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to
October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982. Counsel for respondent
Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand
against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). They further state that although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly

indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of
the other respondent.
TRIAL COURT: Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction
Held:
No. In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of
Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead
of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. In the case at bar, the lower court
correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5
of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint,
it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents
Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
Introduction :
City of Manila vs Judge Cuerdo
CITY OF MANILA vs. JUDGE GRECIA-CUERDO
PERALTA, J.:
PETITIONERS: THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS.
LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila
RESPONDENTS: HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON
PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING
CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES,
DOCTRINE:
The authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
appellate jurisdiction
FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, PET Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period
from January to December 2002 against the private respondents. In addition to the taxes purportedly due
from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila
(RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. Private respondents were constrained to pay
the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint denominated
as one for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/ Erroneously Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition
with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied.
PETs then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners petition for
certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition
ISSUE:

WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
YES. The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to
the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why
the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that if a case may be appealed to a particular court
or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This principle was affirmed in De Jesus
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that a court may issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125
by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
1.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1.
Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
2.
Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case
the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3.
Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4.
Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered
by the Bureau of Customs;
5.
Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or
city board of assessment appeals;
6.
Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review
from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section
2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7.
Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity
or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and
Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No 8800, where either party may appeal the
decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
2.
Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1.
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is
less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried

by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules
of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
2.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a)
Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases
originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b)
Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c)
Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for
taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the principal amount
of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional
Trial Court.
2)
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a)
Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.

Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Plaza Corp. vs Robert Cullen

Petitioner: MPMCP and MLHI(Meridian)
Respondent: Robert Cullen
Ponente: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Facts: Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium unit of the Medical Plaza Makati covered by
Condominium Certicate of Title No. 45808 of the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later
cancelled and Condominium Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of respondent. On
September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. JoseGiovanni E. Dimayuga,
demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessments amounting to
P145,567.42. Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues
shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner. Petitioner,on the
other hand, claimed that respondent's obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI(previous owner).
Consequently, respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the

2002 election of petitioner's Board of Directors. Respondent thus claried from MLHI the veracity of
petitioner's claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had already been settled.
This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a delinquent
payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the
Complaint for Damages filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. MLHI claims that it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is vested
with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the
following specific grounds for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as respondent himself approved
the assessment when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate
controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies; and (4) the
case is already moot and academic, the obligation having been settled between petitioner and MLHI.
RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioners and MLHIs motions to dismiss and, consequently,
dismissing respondents complaint.
The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by respondent clearly falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. As to petitioner, the court held that the complaint states
no cause of action, considering that respondents obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It,
likewise, ruled that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member
CA reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA held that the controversy is an ordinary civil action
for damages which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion
to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the questions involved
pertain to their rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of
the corporation.
Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in
his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by
petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in preventing respondent from
participating in the election of the corporations Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged
unpaid dues and assessments demanded by petitioner. To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of
an intra-corporate controversy, the jurisdiction over which pertains to the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC
over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to
RTCs designated by this Court as Special Commercial Courts. While the CA may be correct that the RTC
has jurisdiction, the case should have been filed not with the regular court but with the branch of the RTC
designated as a special commercial court. Considering that the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was not
designated as a special commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC.31 The CA, therefore, gravely erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
12

Padlan vs Dinglasan
Petitioners: Editha Padlan
Respondents: Elenita Dinglasan; Felicisimo Dinglasan.
Ponente: PERALTA, J:

Doctrine: Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
FACTS: Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land which is covered by
TCT. While on board a jeepney, Elenitas mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura Passion
regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the
owners copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into
several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan. Through a falsified deed of
sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to
different buyers.
On April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots to Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later sold the lot to petitioner
Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT issued under the formers name was cancelled and another TCT
was issued in the name of Editha Padlan.
Respondents filed a case of Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was,
thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed
the complaint. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent.
Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondentsown title. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit,
the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the person of the
petitioner. The same was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
HELD: No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. Here, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in
the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration
was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings,
respondents counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the
next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessors Office. However,
they did not present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof .
Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC
and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

Quesada vs DOJ
EDGARDO V. QUESADA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and CLEMENTE TERUEL, Respondents
G.R. No. 150325 August 31, 2006
FACTS:
- Clemente M. Teruel, herein respondent, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong
City, an affidavit-complaint charging Edgardo V. Quesada (herein petitioner), Ramon P.
Camacho, Jr., and Rodolfo Corgado with the CRIME OF ESTAFA under Article 315, paragraphs 2
and 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
TERUELS CONTENTION
The affidavit-complaint alleges that on June 13, 1998 at Shangrila Plaza Hotel, EDSA,
Mandaluyong City, Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado represented themselves to Teruel as the
president, vice-president/treasurer, and managing director, respectively, of VSH Group
Corporation;

That they offered to him a telecommunication device called Star Consultant Equipment Package
which provides the user easy access to the internet via television; that they assured him that after
he pays the purchase price ofP65,000.00, they will immediately deliver to him two units of the
internet access device; that relying on their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the two
units; and that despite demands, they, did not deliver to him the units.
CONTENTION OF PETITONER
- It was only petitioner Quesada who filed a counter-affidavit. He alleged that they formed the VSH
Group as a corporation "for the principal purpose of pooling the commissions they will receive as
Star Consultant Trainers and then dividing said commissions among themselves according to
their agreement";
That while he admitted that the two units of internet access devices purchased by herein
respondent Teruel were not delivered to him, however, this was not due to their alleged
fraudulent representations since they merely acted as sales agents of F.O.M. Phils., Inc.;
- That they found out too late that the said company could not cope with its commitment to them as
it ran short of supplies of telecommunication products.
Office of the Prosecutor
- Found probable cause hence a comliant for estafa was filed against the petitioner
- While the RTC was hearing Criminal Case No. MC-00-2510, petitioner filed with this Court the
instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of Justice, in dismissing his Petition for
Review in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an instant petition of certiorari can be filed directly to the Supreme Court
HELD:
NO, it is in utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is
in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
-

Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago

G.R. No. 170354. June 30, 2006
Petitioner: Edgardo Pinga
Respondents: The Heirs of German, Santiago represented by Fernando Santiago
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Doctrine: The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of
defendants to prosecute his counterclaim. (Rule 27, Section 3, Rules of Court)
FACTS:
The Heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago, filed a complaint for injunction in
the Regional Trial Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, against Petitioner Eduardo Pinga alleging
that Pinga had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and
harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. Respondents prayed that petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined
from committing "acts of depredation" on their properties, and ordered to pay damages. In their Amended
Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents ownership of the
properties in question, asserting that petitioners father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived
their interest in the properties, had been in possession thereof since the 1930s. They alleged that as far
back as 1968, respondents had already been ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for
forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga. It was further claimed that respondents

application for free patent over the properties was rejected by the Office of the President in 1971.
Defendants in turn prayed for damages owing to respondents forcible re-entry in the properties and the
irresponsible and reckless filing of the case. However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend the
hearings, the case was dismissed by the RTC. Respondents thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
ask for the entire action to be dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte. Said
motion was granted by the RTC, hence the counterclaim was dismissed. The lower court further ruled
that compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action vis a vis
the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner therefore
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 45 on pure questions of law
also averring that respondents motive for seeking the dismissal of their entire case is to avoid putting
their ownership in controversy in the counterclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint
due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory
or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute the counterclaim.
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court,
the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiffs
fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same or separate action.
Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is
not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the
failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a
matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. The complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief
can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and
proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied,
he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim. The present rule embodied in
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that
any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules,
provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the
same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such
counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.

ZAMORA et al. v. HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO

Petitioner:
Respondent:

Wife and children of PABLO ZAMORA

Heirs of CARMEN IZQUIERDO

Ponente:

J. Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez

Doctrine:
As a precondition to filing a complaint in court, parties shall go through the barangay
conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the
Pangkat.

Facts:
In 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation where the former leased to
the latter one of her apartment units located in Caloocan City. They agreed that the rental is P3,000.00
per month; the leased premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After Carmens death in 1996, her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing the heirs, herein
respondents, prepared a new contract of lease where the rent was increased to P3,600.00 per month.
Petitioners, however, refused to sign it. Pablo died in 1997 and his wife and children continued to reside
in the apartment unit. They refused to pay the increased rental and persisted in operating a photocopying
business in the same apartment.
Meanwhile, Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS) for a
water line installation in the premises. Since written consent from the owner is required for installation,
she requested respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because petitioners
refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a
portion thereof for photocopying business and allowing three families to reside therein.
Petitioner then filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay 16, Zone 2, District 1, Caloocan
City a complaint against respondents docketed as: Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: Hindi Pagbibigay
ng Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng Tubig.
During conciliation proceedings, petitioners still refused to sign the new lease contract and soon after,
was sent a demand letter by respondents to vacate the premises within 30 days. Failing to amicably
settle the dispute, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action. Consequently,
respondents filed with the MTC Branch 49 Caloocan for unlawful detainer and damages.
Petitioner alleges that the barangay Certification to File Action is fatally defective because it pertains to
another dispute the refusal by respondents to give her written consent to petitioners request for
installation of water facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not
constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should
have been conducted.
MTC rendered judgment in favor of Respondents ordering Petitioners to vacate premises and pay
damages.
RTC Branch 125, on appeal, affirmed MTC judgment and subsequently denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
CA, on petition for review, affirmed RTC decision and thereafter denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue:
W/N the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo,
contravenes the law on the Katarungang Barangay as a precondition to filing a complaint in court.
Held:

NO

The Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings
to resolve the dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners contention, the complaint does
not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the

installation of water facilities in the premises, but also petitioners violation of the terms of the lease,
specifically their use of a portion therein for their photocopying business and their failure to pay the
increased rental.
As a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either
before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the Pangkat. It is thus manifest
that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.
We hold that petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section
19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which permits filing of such pleading only when
the ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or
failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint to the Lupon for conciliation
prior to its filing with the court.
Petition DENIED. CA Decision sustaining RTC Decision upholding MTC judgment AFFIRMED.
MAGPALE, JR. v CSC
G.R. No. 97381 November 5, 1992
Petitioner: BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR.
Respondent: CSC and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as the General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).
Ponente: MELO, J.
DOCTRINE(S):
1.)Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without
jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case. (Acena v. Civil
Service Commission, 193 SCRA 623 [1991]).
2.)Appeal is merely a statutory right and must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with
the provision of the law. The phrase Adversely affected party in Sec 49 of EO 292 refers only to
the aggrieved government employee and not the State.
(BACKGROUND LANG TO NI PETITIONER)Petitioner started his career in government as an employee
in the Presidential Assistance on Community Development in 1960. Fifteen years later, or in 1975, he
transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as Arrastre Superintendent. He was promoted to the
position of Port Manager in 1977 of the Port Management Unit (PMU), General Santos City. Then he was
reassigned, in the same year to PPA-PMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharged the functions of
Port Manager. On December 1, 1982, the PPA General Manager designated Atty. William A. Enriquez as
officer-in-charge of PPA-PMU, Tacloban City effective December 6, 1982. On January 6, 1983, petitioner
was ordered to immediately report to the Assistant General Manager (AGM) for Operation, PPA, Manila,
Petitioner reported at PPA Manila on the same date and performed the duties and functions assigned to
him.

FACTS:

In an Internal Control Department Report dated March 5, 1984, the PMU-Tacloban

Inventory Committee and the Commission on Audit (COA) stated that petitioner failed to account
for equipment of PPA value at P65,542.25 and to liquidate cash advances amounting to
P130,069.61. He was found also to have incurred unauthorized absences from May 25, 1984 to
July 23, 1984. 19 months after he began reporting in Manila, a formal charge for Dishonesty,
Pursuit of Private Business without permission as required by Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences and Neglect of Duty was filed against
petitioner. Based on said charges he was ordered preventively suspended and has been out of
service since then.
For almost four years the case remained unacted upon. The formal investigation and hearing
resumed on September 18, 1987. On January 18, 1989 a Decision was rendered by the DOTC
Secretary, through its Administrative Action Board (AAB), finding petitioner guilty of Gross
Negligence on two counts:
(a) for his failure to account for the 44 assorted units of equipment, among them a Sony Betamax
and a TV Camera, and
(b) for failing to render the required liquidation of his cash advances amounting to P44,877.00 for
a period of four years.
Petitioner was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences. Accordingly, he
was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the corresponding accessory penalties.
When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was denied, he appealed
to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission which
reversed the decision of the DOTC AAB stating that the petitioner cannot be held liable for Gross
Negligence for his alleged failure to account for several properties and for failure to liquidate the cash
advances he received as there was no showing that he has been specifically required to do so
either by law or regulation. The mere detail of respondent to PPA-Manila will not necessarily obligate
him to make accounting for the same. Moreover, PD 1445 Section 105 Chapter 5 (The Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines) measured the liability of an officer accountable for government
property only to the money value of said property. Though respondent is the person primarily liable
for these funds and property, he holds this liability jointly with the person who has the actual
possession thereof and who has the immediate responsibility for the safekeeping.
Thereafter the PPA, through its General Manager, herein respondent Rogelio A Dayan, filed an
appeal with the Civil Service Field Office-PPA, and the latter office indorsed the appeal to respondent
CSC. On the other hand, Magpale requested the Secretary of the DOTC to direct the PPA to implement
the MSPB reinstatement decision as it has become final and executory. Said request was reiterated by
petitioner to OIC Wilfredo M. Trinidad of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Legal
Affairs, DOTC. On March 13, 1990, petitioner filed with the MSPB a Motion for Implementation of the
MSPB decision. This was opposed by the PPA through its General Manager.
On April 27, 1990 petitioner filed with respondent CSC his comment to the appeal, contending that:
1.) he is not an accountable officer and is under no obligation to account for the property and equipment;
2.) said property and equipment were not received by him as custodian and he should not be held liable
for the loss of the same;
3.)the said property and equipment were place in PPA-PMU Tacloban City which the herein petitioner left
on October 8, 1982 and since then had lost control over them. Moreover, petitioner averred that as to the
unliquidated cash advances of P44,877.00, the same had long been liquidated.

4.) Finally, petitioner claimed that his failure to secure the clearance for any possible property or financial
obligation in PMU-Tacloban was due to the urgency of his transfer to PPA-Manila and the absence of any
order or demand to secure the clearance.
On June 28, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal of PPA claiming that:
1. Appeal of PPA was filed out of time and that the CSC has no jurisdiction over it;
2. The PPA has not exhausted administrative remedies before appealing to the higher body, the CSC;
3. The MSPB decision has become final and therefore cannot be disturbed anymore.
On October 19, 1990, respondent CSC rendered its now assailed Resolution which reversed the
MSPB decision and reinstated the DOTC-AAB decision, but modified its penalty to 1 year suspension as
it took into account the length of service of petitioner and considered that it was his 1 offense.
st

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC exceeded its authority in taking jurisdiction of the PPAs Appeal.
HELD:
Yes. Although, as the respondent CSC is correct in stating that Under section 47 of EO 292, it has
jurisdiction over appeals on all Administrative cases involving the imposition of:
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.
Such jurisdiction may be exercised only in relation with Section 49 of the same Code; or when
following requisites concur:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the decision;
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the decision, unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed; and
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records of
case, together with the notice of appeal to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of
notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.

the

the
the
the

The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation from office,
rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position.
Consequently, Consistent with the cases of Mendez v. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil
Service Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
Sandoval vs Caneba
SANDOVAL vs CANEBA
GANCAYCO, J.:
It is not the ordinary courts but the Natl Housing Authority (NHA) which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker of salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lot.
Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (Estate) filed a complaint against Nestor Sandoval in the
RTC for the collection of unpaid installments of a subdivision lot, pursuant to their agreement. The RTC
ruled in favor of Estate, and ordered Sandoval to pay. A writ of execution was issued which thereafter
became final and executor.
Facts: Sandoval filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the

RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

An MR of the writ of execution was also filed by PET. Estate opposed both motions. RTC denied the
motion to vacate for the reason that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the court to do so. A new writ of
execution was issued.
Sandoval filed a pet alleging that the RTC committed GADALEJ since the exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof is vested w the HLURB (PD 957).
Issue: Whether the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a
subdivision lot
Held: NO. Under Sec 1 of OD 957, the NHA was given the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION to hear and
decide certain cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices;
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condo unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condo unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the PET and RES is vested not on the RTC but on the
NHA. The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter re-named as
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

SUN INSURACE OFFICE LTD. v J. ASUNCION

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Petitioners: SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY
Respondents: HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, RTC-QC and
MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG
Ponente: GANCAYCO, J
DOCTRINE(S):
MAIN: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. (MANCHESTER v CA)
AS TO RETROACTIVITY OF COURT DECISIONS: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint with the Makati RTC for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other
hand, private respondent filed a complaint in the QC RTC for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including
E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P.
Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case
together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the QC-RTC which were under

investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter reraffled to the other judges in QC, to the exclusion of Judge Castro.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in an Administrative Case directing
the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment.
The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All
litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in
their complaints. On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano,(temporary judge) issued an order to
the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private
respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate. To forestall a default, a
cautionary answer was filed by petitioners while an amended complaint was filed by private respondent
including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom this case was thereafter assigned, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her
difficulty in complying with the Resolution. Private respondent thereafter filed a "Compliance" and a "ReAmended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000.00 as actual
compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however,
private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
about P44,601,623.70. Respondent Judge then issued another Order admitting the second amended
complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution
and should be reassessed based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as
actual and compensatory damages". This amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee and was subsequently
paid by private respondent which the petitioners questioned via certiorari with the CA.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. Seven months
after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00.
On August 13, 1987, the CA denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and
granted the writ of preliminary attachment but gave due course to questioning of the docket fee
stating that it should be based on P25,401,707.00. During the pendency of this petition and in
conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee
of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the correct and proper docket
fee has not been paid
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the

pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
General provisions :
Lumbuan vs Ronquillo
Lumbuan vs. Ronquillo
Petitioners: Milagros Lumbuan
Respondents: Alfredo A. Ronquillo
Ponente: Quisumbing
Doctrine:
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or
pangkat chairman.
It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the
pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.
Facts:
The petitioner was the registered owner of a property located in Tondo Manila. In 1995, the property was
leased to the respondent for a period of three years for the amount of P5000. Also in agreement was an
annual increase of 10% for the succeeding two years, and that the property will be for the exclusive use
of the fastfood business of the respondent, unless any other use is given with the petiotioners prior
written consent.
The property was initially used for the fastfood business of the respondent and later on converted into a
residence without the required written consent of the petitioner. The respondent also failed to pay the
10% increase in rent of P500 a month starting 1996, and P1000 for the year 1997 to the present. Despite
repeated demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the premises.
On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairmans office but the
parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then issued a Certificate to File Action.
On December 8, 1997, a case for unlawful detainer was filed by the petitioner against the respondent.
The respondent received the summons and a copy of the complaint on December 15, 1997 and his
answer by mail was filed on December 24, 1997.
Before the MeTC could receive the respondents answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment dated January 7, 1998. Acting upon this motion, a decision was rendered ordering the
respondent to vacate and surrender possession of the leased premises and to pay the petitioner the
amount of P46, 000 as unpaid rentals with legal interest until fully paid and an additional P5000 for
attorneys fees plus cost of the suit.
A manifestation was filed by the respondent calling the attention of the MeTC to the fact that his answer
was filed on time and praying that the decision be set aside. The MeTC denied the prayer, ruling that the
Manifestation was in the nature of a motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the
Rules of Summary Procedure.
Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the RTC of Manila. The RTC rendered its decision setting aside the
MeTC decision and directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for
further proceedings. Strict compliance was directed with the condition that should the parties fail to reach

an amicable settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded to the MeTC for it to decide the
case anew.
The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion. Relief was thereafter sought from
the CA through a petition for review. The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered
the dismissal of the ejectment case. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the appellate court.
Pending this petition, the parties went through barangay conciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC
of Manila. Again, they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC to issue an order
remanding the case to the MeTC.
A second decision was ordered by the MeTC ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right of
possession under him to voluntarily vacate the property and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
to pay to plaintiff the amount of P387,512.00 as actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals and its
agreed increase up to January 2000 and to pay the amount of P6,500.00 a month thereafter until the
same is actually vacated; and to pay to plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus cost
of the suit.
The respondent appealed the decision and the case was raffled to the RTC of Manila. The RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioner and dismissed the appeal. The case was then elevated by the respondent to the
CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint for the alleged failure of the
parties to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. With the parties subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further
conciliation proceedings, the procedural defect was cured.
The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through barangay conciliation proceedings to settle their
dispute as shown by the Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by
the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that whether there was
defective compliance or no compliance at all with the required conciliation, the case should have been
dismissed.
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or
pangkat chairman.
Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the Certificate to File Action
stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it
was not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The
efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no
pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that
under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient
compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs Melicor

People v Cawaling

Plaintiff: People of the Philippines

Accused: Ulysses M. Cawaling, Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, and Hilario Cajilo
Ponente: Panganiban
Doctrine:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events.
Facts:
An administrative case was filed by Nelson Ilisan before the National Police Commission in which
Policemen Tumbagahan, De Los Santos, and Cajilo were charged with the killing of Ronie Ilisan. A
decision was made which found the police officers guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal
from the service with prejudice.
Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed before the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan,
Romblon an information for murder against the police officers and Mayor Cawaling. After due trial, the
court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The killing was qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and his assailant, as the latter were greater in number and armed with guns.
Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the the accused, as
they were public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in
relation to their office.
Held:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another
tribunal. The only recognised exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise
when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to
actions pending before its enactment.
The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD1606, PD 1850 and BP 129, as amended. Section 4 of
PD 1606 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prison correccional or imprisonment
for six years or a fine of P6,000. However, Pres. Marcos issued presidential decrees placing the members
of the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial.
The jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129. Section
20 of which provides that trial courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall thereafter be exclusively taken cognisance
of by the latter.
In Sanchez vs. Demetriou the court held that public office is not the essence of murder. The
taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and

the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his
office in which event the penalty is increased.
The use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element, and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact
that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. Furthermore,
the information filed against the accused contains no allegation that they were public officers who
committed the crime in relation to the office. In the absence of such essential allegation, and since the
present case does not involve charges of violation of the Anti-Graft Act, the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the present case.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint of information. In the absence of any
allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of the accused or was necessarily
connected with the discharge of their functions, the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Yu vs Pacleb
Petitioners : Yu Ernesto
Respondents : Baltazar Pacleb & registered owners (Cavite)
Ponente : CORONA, J.:
Doctrine : An action for specific performance praying for the execution of deed of sale in connection with
an undertaking in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, action in personam is binding
only upon parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given opportunity to be heard.
Facts :
Respondent Baltazar Pacleb together with his wife were the owners of a parcel of land in Dasmarinas
Cavite covered by a transfer of certificate of title.
1992, there was a deed of sale between Pacleb and Del Rosario, and another deed of sale was made
between Del Rosario and Javier. A contract to sell was also made between Javier and petitioner.
However, these sales were NOT REGISTERED.
The contract stipulated that Yu, to pay 900,000 pesos. 600,000 pesos upon execution of contract and
300,000 pesos balance. Javier deliver the possession to Yu.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Imus a specific performance and damages against Javier to compel to
deliver ownership and possession, and title as well as cancellation of their agreement and return of initial
payment. on the ground that they made it appear that the property was not tenanted but it was actually
tenanted by Pacleb .
They agreed to pay disturbances compensation in which Javier failed.
Javier was declared in default on the ground that he did not appear in proceedings.
TRIAL COURT : ruled in favor of plaintiff and issued a certificate of finality

Petitioner and Ramon Pacleb executed a contract Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan . Petitioner paid Ramon in exchange for waiver of tenancy
rights.
Respondent on the other hand, filed a complaint of annulment of deed of sale of the deed of sale between
Del Rosario and Javier claiming that the deed of sale between the two of them wa spurious and
signatures were forged. He also moved for the summons to be served upon Del Rosario via publication
since her address cannot be found, but was denied. So, respondent moved to dismiss the case which
was granted by the trial court.
1995, the petitioner filed an action for forcible entry against respondent. They contend that they had prior
possession thru Ramon until latter was ousted by respondent. MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and the
RTC affirmed its decision.
However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts. The CA decded that the
respondent had prior possession as shown by payment of real estate taxes.
Respondent filed an instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages alleging that the deed of
sale between him and his late first wife could not have been executed on the date appearing thereon. He
claimed that he was residing in the US at that time and that his late first wife died 20 years ago.
Trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners and held the petitioners purchasers in good
faith. The trial court also held that the petitioners' action for specific performance against Javier was
already final, and the trial court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all other persons claiming under
them to surrender the possession of the property to the petitioners. Upon appeal by the respondent, the
CA reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue :
Whether or not an action for specific performance is an action quasi in rem and is binding upon
respondent even if the latter was not a party
Held :
NO. The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against Javier to compel him to
perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is an action in personam.
The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to
execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of the petitioners. The obligations of Javier
mentioned attach to Javier alone and do not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the
petitioners is an action in personam and is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and
duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the respondent since he was
not a party therein and considering the fact that his signature and that of his late first wife were forged in
the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the
respondent having a better right over the property as the true owner thereof.
Domagas vs Jensen
Republic vs Jensen
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Acting Commissioner of Land
Registration), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses CATALINO SANTOS and
THELMA BARRERO SANTOS, ST. JUDES ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses DOMINGO

CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DE LA FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA,

respondents.
PETITIONER : REP.OF PHILS
RESPONDENTS : CATALINO SANTOS and THELMA BARRERO SANTOS, ST. JUDES
ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses DOMINGO CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DE
LA FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Doctrine : An action to recover a parcel of land is a Real action but is an action in personam , for it binds
a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing .
Facts :
-This case is seeking to set aside the November 29, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- The
assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City---which dismissed
petitioners Complaint for the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) to several lots in
Caloocan City, issued in the name of private respondents.
[1]

[2]

[3]

- Defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land which was subdivided
Lot No. 865-B-1 under subdivision plan as a result thereof the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
cancelled TCT and issued Certificates of Title, all in the name of defendants St. Judes Enterprises, Inc
- Defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. sold the lots covered by TCT Nos. 24013 and 24014 to defendant
Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos[;] TCT No. 24019 to defendant Sps. Domingo
Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus[;] TCT No. 24022 to defendant Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No.
2402[3] to defendant Lucy Madaya
- Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action seeking the annulment and cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT), ground that said Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of [a] null and
void subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 which expanded the original area of TCT No. 22660 in the name
of St. Jude's Enterprises
- Defendants Virginia dela Fuente and Lucy Mandaya were declared in default for failure to file their
respective answer within the reglementary period. Defendants Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto
Santos, St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. and Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad Calaguian filed separate
answers to the complaint.
defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. Interposed defenses, among others, that the cause of action of
plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that the subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the
LRC, the government is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's
allegation that the area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters is without any basis in fact
and in law
TRIAL COURT :
the trial court dismissed the Complaint. While the plaintiff sufficiently proved the enlargement or
expansion of the area of the disputed property, it presented no proof that Respondent St. Jude
Enterprises, Inc. (St. Jude) had committed fraud when it submitted the subdivision plan to the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) for approval.
[7]

Thus, the court concluded, the government was already in estoppel to question the approved subdivision
plan. Finding that Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya had brought their
respective lots from St. Jude for value and in good faith, the court held that their titles could no longer be
questioned, because under the Torrens system, such titles had become absolute and irrevocable
APPELLATE COURT :

upholding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court. It criticized petitioner for bringing the suit only after nineteen (19) years had passed since the
issuance of St. Judes title and the approval of the subdivision plan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that petitioners complaint
before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity of the Torrens System.
SUPREME COURT :
- We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this concept is understood to
refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular BUT THIS IS ABSENT IN
CASE AT BAR .
- In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in
the land area of St. Jude it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
-Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens System,
should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the
law are satisfied

Tamano Vs Ortiz
Petitioner: Estrellita J. Tamano
Respondent: Hon. Rodolfo A Ortiz Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano, Adib A. Tamano and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: BELLIOSILLO
Doctrine:
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Facts:
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda), On 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur. On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda
joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of
Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage
contract false and fraudulent. They further alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita
was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C.
Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements. Estrellita filed
a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for
annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for
annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the
sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
TRIAL COURT: Denied the motion to dismiss. The case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not
exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was also denied.
COURT OF APPEALS: Withheld the trial courts decision assailing that the instant case would fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in

places where there are no sharia courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before
the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
whether or not the Sharia courts and not the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction
Held:
No. A courts jurisdiction does not depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss,
or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. As alleged in the
complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the
position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and
Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under
Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
La Tondena vs Ponferrada
La Tondea Distillers vs. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 109656, November 21, 1996
Ponente: Francisco, J.
Doctrine:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither appealable until final judgment nor could it generally be assailed in
certiorari.
FACTS:
Defendants reneged on their contract to sell to private respondents a parcel of land located in Bago City. This breach prompted private
respondents to file before the RTC of Bacolod City an action for specific performance with damages against defendants. A notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the latters title although the same was cancelled upon defendants filing a bond.
Pending the trial before the lower court, petitioner bought the above lot from defendants. Aggrieved, private respondents amended their complaint
and impleaded petitioner as an additional defendant alleging that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on two grounds: no cause of action and improper venue. In support of
the first ground, petitioner asserts that it is a buyer in good faith since the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled when it bought the lot. As
for the second ground, petitioner argued that venue should be in Bago City where the lot is located and not in Bacolod City.
Petitioner received a resolution from the lower court denying their motion as there was need for the parties to present evidence on the question of
good faith. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in a resolution.
More than 3 months later, petitioner went directly to this Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the denial of their motions. The
court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their memorandum. After the parties submitted their respective memoranda
as directed, petitioner filed a manifestation alleging for the first time that it sold the lot sometime in September, 1992 to Distileria Bago, Inc. a
separate entity with which the former has substantial stockholdings. Based on such admission, private respondents moved to dismiss the instant
petition, arguing that petitioner is no longer a real party in interest, having sold the lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is warranted.
HELD:
YES. DISMISSAL IS STILL WARRANTED.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither appealable until final judgment, nor could it generally be assailed on
certiorari.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 16, and interpose as defenses, the objections raised in his motion
to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the whole case by appeal in due time.
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if the denial of the motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in deferring action on the motion. Section 3 of Rule 16 sanctions deferment of
hearing on the motion until the trial if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable. Clearly respondent judge had doubts on the
allegation of petitioners good faith. This is a question of fact which necessitates presentation of evidence and is certainly far from indubitable. It
is within the discretion of the court to defer action if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable and that deferment is only deemed a
provisional denial of the motion to dismiss.
Not being an action involving title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.

REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVT CORP.

Petioner: REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN
Respondent: LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:
Doctrines: A misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action, because
parties may be dropped or added at any stage of the proceedings.
Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. A suit for such
breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real estate, subject of the
said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees.
FACTS: Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation, represented by Wilfredo B.Maghuyop -entered into an Agreement with Petitioner Rebecca Cabutihan. Agreement states that petitioner will
facilitate and arrange the recovery of a parcel of land for the respondent Landcenter Construction situated
at Kay-biga, Paranaque, MM as well as the financing of such undertaking necessaryin connection thereto,
including the necessary steps in relation to squatters presently occupying it and legitimate buyers of lot
thereof. Luz Ponce, authorized by the corporation, entered into a Deed of Undertaking with Cabutihans
group. The Deed states that the group shall receive a 36.5% compensation of the total area recovered.
Petitioner filed an Action for specific performance before the RTC of Pasig City (note Property is in
Paranque) after she accomplished the undertaking and after the corporations failure to compensate the
petitioner and the other facilitators.
Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that respondent corporation be ordered to execute the appropriate document
assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots in her favor. The lots represented
compensation for the undertakings she performed and accomplished, as embodied in the Agreement.
RTC ruled that the allegations in the Complaint show that its primary objective was to recover real
property. Equally important, the prayer was to compel respondent to execute the necessary deeds of
transfer and conveyance of a portion of the property corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area or, in
the alternative, to hold respondent liable for the value of the said portion, based on the prevailing market
price. The RTC further ruled that, since the suit would affect the title to the property, it should have been
instituted in the trial court where the property was situated.[12]
Furthermore, the action was filed only by petitioner. There was no allegation that she had been
authorized by Forro, Radan and Anave to represent their respective shares in the compensation.
Finally, since this case was an action in rem, it was imperative for petitioner to pay the appropriate docket
or filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty she failed to discharge. Consequently,
following Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[13] the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
Issues: 1.WON Pasig RTC was an improper venue.
2. WON dismissal by RTC due non-joinder of necessary parties was proper.
3. WON dismissal by RTC due to non-payment of docket fees was proper.
Ruling: 1. We agree with petitioner. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an answer to
the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real
actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. In the present case, petitioner seeks
payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives
rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem
for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the ground of
lack of cause of action.
2. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may
be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courts own initiative at any
stage of the action.[24] The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with
the said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action.
Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading
the companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded with the case
as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent. This
[17]

fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no final determination can
be had.[25] At best, they are mere necessary parties who ought to be impleaded for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.[26] The non-inclusion of a necessary party
does not prevent the court from proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be
without prejudice to the rights of such party.[27]
3. We hold that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the case and to
trifle with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the assessed value of the
real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing fees. But the Court has
already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified as
an action not capable of pecuniary estimation.
[28]

Citizens Surety & Insurance Company vs Judge Melencio_Herrera

Petitioner: Citizens Surety & Insurance Company
Respondent: Judge Melencio-Herrera; Santiago Dacanay; Josefina Dacanay.
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J.
Doctrine: It is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the
one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In
other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of
Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
Facts: Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of Santiago Dacanay, it
issued 2 surety bonds to guarantee payment of P5K promissory notes in favor Gregorio Fajardo and
Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co respectively. As security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed
an Indemnity Agreement to jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses (with 12% annual
interest) and a REM over a parcel of land in Baguio. The promissory notes were not paid and as a result,
plaintiff Surety was compelled to pay. The Dacanays failed to reimburse the Surety for such payments,
whereupon the Surety caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage to pay its claim leaving an
unsatisfied balance of P10,491.69, that plaintiff sought to recover from defendants Dacanay by filing a
case.
At petitioners request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the
Philippines Herald. But despite such publication and deposit of copy with the Manila post office, the
defendant did not appear within 60 days from the last publication.
Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default, but the Judge eventually dismissed the case, the
suit being in personam and the defendants not having appeared.
Issue: W/N summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction
Held: No. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to
the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due
process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
Here, the proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident
defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached, in which case, the attachment
converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may be
valid.
However, given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties, the decision of the respondent Judge was
set aside and held pending in the archives until petitioner tracks down the whereabouts of the defendants
person or properties.
Go vs UCPB
GO vs. UCPB (G.R. NO. 156187)
FACTS:

Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark International, Noahs
Ark Sugar Carriers, Noahs Ark Sugar Truckers, Noahs Ark Sugar Repacker, Noahs Ark Sugar
Insurers, Noahs Ark Sugar Terminal, Noahs Ark Sugar Building, and Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.
[4]

Sometime in August 1996, petitioners applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation with
respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine Hundred Million
(P900,000,000) Pesos, and was favorably acted upon by the latter.
[5]

The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land located at
Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837 square meters, and registered in the name of Mr.
Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 14,271 square
meters, registered in the name of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.

On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was
subsequently cancelled by respondent UCPB.
[6]

As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs
(No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed.

UCPB refused to return the same and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate
Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the registration thereof before the Registry of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City on 02 September 1997.

On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered
by TCT No. 64070, for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result, the
public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
[7]

To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate
Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, against respondent bank and its officers, namely, Angelo V. Manahan, Francisco C.
Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty. Edward E. Martin, together with Ex-Officio Sheriff Lydia G.
San Juan and Sheriff IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 266, docketed as Civil Case No. 67878.

The complaint was subsequently amended on 22 May 2000. The amended complaint alleged,
among other things, the following: that petitioner Jimmy T. Go is a co-owner of the property
covered by TCT No. 64070, although the title is registered only in the name of Looyuko; that
respondent bank was aware that he is a co-owner as he was asked to sign two deeds of real estate
mortgage covering the subject property; that the approved omnibus credit line applied for by him
and Looyuko did not materialize and was cancelled by respondent bank on 21 July 1997, so that
the pre-signed real estate mortgages were likewise cancelled; that he demanded from respondent
bank that TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him, but respondent bank refused to do
so; that despite the cancellation of the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had
the two deeds of real estate mortgage dated and notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage constituted on TCT No. 64070; that the auction sale
scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000 be enjoined; that the two real estate mortgages be
cancelled and TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him; and that respondent bank and
its officers be ordered to pay him moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

On 07 June 2000, respondent bank, filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

[8]

[9]

(1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper filing and
docket fees;
(2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;
(3) an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore, the complaint
states no cause of action;
(4) that the complaint was improperly verified; and

(5) that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient and false certification
of non-forum shopping.
-

On 07 June 2000, the trial court issued an order

preliminary injunction

[10]

granting petitioners application for a writ of

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the
purpose of determining venue.
HELD:
Real action
-

The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals, is more particularly instructive. There, we held that
an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property
is a real action that affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is before the
court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which is the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.

Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal action and
since he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by
alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena.

[31]

[32]

Petitioners reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena is misplaced.
Firstly, said case was primarily an action to compel the mortgagee bank to accept payment of the
mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That action, which is not expressly included in the
enumeration found in Section 2(a) of Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and now under Section 1,
Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the mortgaged lots. It is a
personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. The
plaintiffs title is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. Hence, the venue of
the plaintiffs personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner was
primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to return to him the properties covered by
TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had already initiated foreclosure proceedings
because of the cancellation by the said respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July
1997. The prime objective is to recover said real properties. Secondly, Carandang distinctly
articulated that the ruling in Hernandez does not apply where the mortgaged property had
already been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed out by the appellate court, respondent
bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and were it not for the timely
issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court, the same would have
already been sold at a public auction.

In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real action,
considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An action for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is,
therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place
where the subject property lies.

[33]

[35]

Gochan vs Gochan
Title: Gochan v. Gochan
G.R. No. 143089. February 27, 2003
Petitioners: Mercedes R. Gochan, Alfredo R. Gochan, Angelina R. Gochan Hernaez, Ma. Merced R.
Gochan Gorospe, Crispo R. Gochan Jr. and Marlon R. Gochan
Respondents: Virginia Gochan, Louise Gochan, Lapulapu Real Estate Corporation, Felix Gochan &
Sons Realty Corporation and Mactan Realty Corporation

Ponente: Panganiban, J.:

Doctrine:
The elements of the litis pendetia or res judicata are not present as the two petitions do not seek
the same relief. Hence, forum-shopping is commited.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioners,
who, in turn, filed their Answer with Counterclaim and affirmative defenses. Before pre-trial could be
conducted, petitioners filed a motion for a hearing on their affirmative defenses. Respondent judge denied
petitioners motion without conducting a hearing. Respondent judge however did not stop with the denial
but went on to rule on the merits of the affirmative defenses.
The above ruling is the subject of a petition for certiorari which is pending resolution on a motion
for reconsideration. Because of the pendency of this petition, petitioners filed a motion to suspend
proceedings. Instead of suspending proceedings, the respondent judge set the case for pre-trial.
After the termination of the pre-trial, respondent judge proceeded to hear the evidence of private
respondents. Petitioners counsel went to court and was surprised to learn that his motion to reset the
hearing was disregarded and that trial proceeded with private respondents counsel conducting a re-direct
examination of their first witness and presenting their second witness on direct examination.
Petitioners filed a motion to inhibit respondent judge from further sitting in the case on grounds of
partiality, pre-judgment and gross ignorance of the law. The motion was denied on the ground that
petitioners failed to appear to substantiate the motion.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which the respondent judge
likewise denied in his Order, reiterating that petitioners failed to appear during the hearing on the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum shopping.
HELD:
NO. For filing two Petitions raising the same issues, respondents allegedly split their cause of action
and thus became guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners further contend that the elements of litis pendentia
or res judicata are present in the case at bar, because the matter raised in this Petition could have been
taken up in the first one.
The Court made a distinction between the two Petitions filed. The first involved the propriety of the
affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners [herein respondents] in Civil Case No. CEB-21 854. The
second Petition, which is the subject of the present appeal, raised the issue of whether or not public
respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing
Civil Case No. CEB-21 854. The two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals. In
CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial
court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854.
No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the issuance of an
order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case and to assign a new judge
in his stead.

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

v.
CA, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP. et al.
G.R. No. 75919, May 07, 1987
Petitioner:
Respondent:

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

CA, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al.

Ponente:

J. Emilio Gancayco

Doctrine:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

Facts:
Manchester Development Corporation filed a complaint for specific performance against Cityland
Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor of Manchester.
Manchester also alleged that Cityland forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain transaction
causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. The amount was alleged in the body of
the complaint but it was not reiterated in the prayer.
Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. The docket fee is premised on the allegation of petitioner
that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The CA
ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its
complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M.
Said amount was however again not stated in the prayer.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the resolution of the Supreme Court Second Division and
another Motion to refer the case to and be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc.
Petitioner cites the case of Magaspi v. Remolete in support of its contention.
Issue:

W/N an amended complaint or similar pleading will vest jurisdiction in the Court.

Held:

NO

The Court of Appeals aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee
should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee.
Henceforth, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED for lack of merit.
Sunlife v Asuncion
Tacoy vs RTC of Tagum
Maximo Tacay, Ponciano Panes and Antonia Noel vs. RTC of Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Branches 1
and 2, presided by Hon. Marcial Ferndez and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, Patsita Gamutan,
Clerk of Court and Godofredo Pineda, G.R. No. 88075-77, December 20, 1989
Ponente: Narvasa, J.
Doctrine:

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be
assessed on the basis of both

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.

1.
2.
3.

a.

a.

the value of the property

b.

total amount of the related damages sought

Court acquires jurisdiction over the action involving real property upon the filing of the complaint and
payment of prescribed fee. It is not divested of that authority over accompanying claims or damages
because of lack of specification thereof. Those claims as to which no amounts are stated must simply be
expunged or allow a reasonable time for amendment of the complaints to allege the precise amount and
accept payment of requisite fees within the relevant prescriptive period.
Facts: Godofredo instituted 3 actions for recovery of possession docketed as:
vs. Antonia Noel Civ Case No. 2209
vs. Ponciano Panes Civ Case No. 2210
vs. Maximo Tacay Civ Case No. 2211
Cases 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Judge Hernandez and Case 2210 was assigned to Judge Matas.
The complaints have the same facts:
Pineda was the owner of a 790 sqm. parcel of land evidenced by a TCT
the previous owner allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance
Pineda made demands for the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals but was
refused
the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the commencement of suit.
The complaints prayed for the same reliefs:
that the plaintiff be declared the owner of the areas occupied
that the defendants be ordered to vacate and deliver the portions of land usurped by them
that each defendant be ordered to pay 2k as monthly rent, actual damages, moral and nominal
damages, and 30K attorneys fees and representation fees of 5l per day of appearance.
That Pineda be granted further relief and remedies just and equitable in the premises
Motion to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants. Each motion alleged that Trial Court had
not acquired jurisdiction of the case because the complaint violates Circular No. 7 of the SC date March
24, 1988 by failing to specify all the amounts of damages and eben the basic requirement as to the
assessed value of the lot.
Judge Matas DENIED the motion in Civ. Case 2210 but ordered the deletion of the part of the complaint
regarding moral as well as nominal damages and also the handwritten amount for actual damages in the
conclusion and prayer of the complaint.
The motions to dismiss in Civ. Cases 2211 and 2209 were also denied on March 15, 1989 by Judge
Hernandez declaring that
the action at bar is for Reinvindicatoria, Damages and Attorneys fees and as such this court has
exclusive jurisdiction
claims for actual, moral and nominal damages are only one aspect of the cause of action
because of the absence of specification of the amounts of moral, nominal and actual damages they
should be expunged from the records.
In a Joint Petition filed by petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for TRO and/or
writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, praying essentially that said order be annulled and that all
complaints be dismissed on the following grounds
because the complaints failed to state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal
damages, the Trial Court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the 3 civil actions
it was not proper merely to expunge the claims for damages and allow the so-called cause of action for
reivindicatoria to remain for trial by itself.
Issue: WON respondent judges committed grave abuse of discretion. -- NO
Held: Petition is DISMISSED.
Joint petition is dismissed on the following grounds:
1. for failure to comply with Courts Circular No. 1-88 where the copies of the challenged orders were
not certified by the proper clerk of court because the certification was done by the petitioners
counsel which is NOT ALLOWED.
2. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion of the respondent judges

3. Actions are basically NOT for the recovery of sums of money but for recovery of possession of real
property (accion publiciana). Determinative of the courts jurisdiction is the nature not the amount of
damages. Such acion is a real action and may be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages and such would fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
BP 129 provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts."
Circular No. 7 cant be invoked. As laid down in the Manchester case, such application is limited and is
further clarified in the case of SIOL v. Asuncion. In the latter case, it says that,
1. The trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive period
2. damages arising after the filing of the complaint or the similar shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Therefore, in actions or proceedings involving real property the property is immaterial to the courts
jurisdiction, but in actions involving personal property of the recovery of money and/or damages, the
value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trail courts competence.
However, where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees
shall be assessed on the basis of both
a.

the value of the property

b.

total amount of the related damages sought

Court acquires jurisdiction over the action involving real property upon the filing of the complaint and
payment of prescribed fee. It is not divested of that authority over accompanying claims or damages
because of lack of specification thereof. Those claims as to which no amounts are stated must simply be
expunged or allow a reasonable time for amendment of the complaints to allege the precise amount and
accept payment of requisite fees within the relevant prescriptive period.
Ayala Corp vs Madayag
G.R. No. 88421 January 30, 1990
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., petitioners
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL
CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE
SABIO, respondents.
Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.:

Doctrine: the determination of certain damages as exemplary or reactive damages are determined by the
sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount
sought and for the proper assessment of the docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible
for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

FACTS: Private respondents spouses Sabio filed against petitioners Ayala Corp, Las Pias Ventures and
Filipinas Life Insurance an action for specific performance with damages in the RTC of Makati. Petitioners

filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as
private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee as private respondents only paid the total
amount of P1,616.00 instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real
properties involved as evidence by its tax declaration and specify the amount of exemplary damages
sought both in the body and in the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. However, the trial
court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was likewise denied.
Under the doctrine of Manchester Development Corp vs CA, the docket fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint. However, petitioner contends
that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should be considered in computing
the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which
is an action for specific performance with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real
estate. Petitioner further alleged that since private respondents didn't specify the amount of the exemplary
damages, the complaint must be dismissed.
TRIAL COURT DENIED the motion stating that the determination of the exemplary damages is within the
sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private
respondents to fix the amount of the exemplary damages to be prayed for.
The trial court cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion in support of its ruling.
2

The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable tune but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of specified amount in exemplary damages prayed for is a material defect
in the case.
RULING: The court ruled that the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court
wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified,
the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there
is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the
Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute
a lien on the judgment.
Under the doctrine of Tacay vs RTC of Tagum, the court ruled that the phrase "awards of claims not
specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The
amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any
pleading, should be specified. Although it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary

or reactive damages are determined by the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties
claiming such damages to specify the amount sought and for the proper assessment of the docket fees.
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for
determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount
thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect
in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge from the record the
claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not
specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private respondents to amend their
pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate
reglementary or prescriptive period. No costs.

Negros Oriental vs Negros

Negros Occidental Planters Association vs. Hon. Presiding Judge of Negros
Petitioner: Negros Occidental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA)
Respondents: Hon. Presiding Judge of Negros and Aniceto Manojocampos
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Doctrine:
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with
the technical rules of procedure while at the same time hoping for relaxation of the technicalities in its
favor.
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking reversal of CAs resolution dated May 23, 2007 and August 15, 2007 that
outrightly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA against Campos.
On March 17, 1999, Campos filed a complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages against NOPA before
the RTC of Negros Occidental. Capos and NOPA entered into 2 separate contracts denominated as
Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos paid the consideration for such agreement in full but was only to
receive partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement with regard to the quality of the
products delivered.
On August 17, 2005, NOPA filed its answer and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure of
Campos to file the correct filing fee. The petitioner further claimed that Campos deliberately concealed in
his complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the received goods
to escape payment of proper docket fees.
On June 30, 2006, RTC denied the motion to dismiss and NOPA received the same on July 17, 2006.
On August 1, 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and on January 5, 2007 RTC denied the
same.
On April 2, 2007, NOPA filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA but was dismissed on May 23, 2007
on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the petitioner to state that the allegations are based on authentic records (violating Sec. 4
of Rule 7 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

2.
Failure of the petitioner to append relevant pleadings and documents which would aid in the
resolution of the petition (violating Sec. 1 of Rule 65 of Rules of Court)
3. Failure of the petitioners counsel to indicate his current IBP Official Receipt Number (Bar matter No.
1132 and/or A.M. No. 287)
On June 22, 2007 NOPA filed a motion for reconsideration attaching the amended petition for certiorari in
compliance with the above mentioned requirements. CA denied said motion dated August 16, 2007.
Issue:
WON CA committed reversible error when it ruled that there was no substantial compliance with the
procedural requirements when the petitioner failed to allege in its verification that the allegations therein
are true and correct of this personal knowledge or based on authentic records and failure to attach the
necessary documents as required in Sec. 1, Rule 65 or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Held/Ratio:
Resolutions of CA outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against Campos are
AFFIRMED.
Petitioner argues the following:
1.
The requirement that the pleading be verified is a merely formal and not jurisdictional. The court
may give due course to unverified pleading where material facts alleged are a matter of record and the
question raised are mainly of law.
2.
That NOPA had attached clearly legible and duplicate original or certified true copy of judgment
or final order or resolution and the requisite number of copies and such material portions of record as
would support the petition.
3.
NOPAs substantial compliance demonstrates its good faith to abide by the procedural
requirements
4.
Jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner against the Public respondent CA would justify the
relaxation of rules.
As to the first argument, the petitioner is mistaken in claiming that a verification that contains the
allegation to the best of my knowledge and the allegation are true and correct, as cited in the case of
Decano v. Edu and Quimpo v. De La Victoria, constitute substantial compliance because such cited
cases were promulgated prior to the amended of Sec. 4 of Rule 7 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
made the verification requirement stricter and as such the party cant now merely state under oath that he
believes the statements made in the pleading. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to
be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records. Such failure to verify a pleading will
be treated as unsigned and not uncurable as in Sec. 5 (forum shopping). It produced no legal effect and
is subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In this case, CA refused to
allow such deficiency.
Note: CA may reverse the exercise of discretion of the lower court (upon showing of a strong and clear
case of abuse of power to prejudice the appellant or is rested on an erroneous principle of law) but the
GENERAL RULE is the decisions of a trial court which lie in discretion will NOT be reviewed on appeal,
whether the case be civil or criminal at law or in equity.
The case at bar also demonstrates a situation where in there is no effect on the substantial rights of the
litigant because the alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees would not inure to NOPAs benefit.
While it such requirement is jurisdictional, it is also a technicality and in seeking leniency of this court,
NOPA is praying for a writ of certiorari from being decided on merits.
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with
the technical rules of procedure while at the same time hoping for relaxation of the technicalities in its
favor.
The case of Manchester as cited by the petitioner where in the court ruled that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of prescribed docket fee is not applicable in this case
because there is lack of deliberate intent to defraud which was manifested in the mentioned case. Hence
the case of SIOL v. Asuncion must be applied an the Motion to dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
Causes of Action

Juana Complex vs Fil Estate Land

Del Rosario v FEBTC

Petitioners: Ernesto C. Del Rosario and Davao Timber Corporation
Respondents: Far East Bank & Trust Company, and Private Development Corporation of the Phils.
Ponente: Carpio-Morales
Doctrine:
To allow the re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled in a prior case is to allow the splitting
of a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4, Rule 2. This rules proscribes a party from
dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more
actions based on it.
Facts:
1st Case
Petitioner Davao Timber Corp (DATICOR) and respondent Private Development Corp of the
Phils. (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP extended to DATICOR a foreign
currency loan of $265,500 USD and a peso loan of P2.5 million.
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land (one situated in Manila
registered in the name of petitioner Del Rosario, and five in Mati, Davao Oriental) and chattel mortgages
over pieces of machinery and equipment.
Petitioners paid a total of P3 Million to PDCP which was applied to interest, service fees and
penalty charges. By PDCPs computation this left an outstanding balance on the principal of more than
P10 Million.
On March 1982, petitioners filed a complaint against PDCP before the CFI of Manila for violation
of the Usury Law, annulment of contract and damages. The case was dismissed. On appeal, the IAC set
aside the dismissal of the complaint and declared void and of no effect the stipulation of interest in the
loan agreement. PDCP appealed to the Supreme Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from the
petitioners to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) under a deed of assignment for a
consideration of P5.435 Million. FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners later executed a
memorandum of agreement whereby petitioner agreed to pay FEBTC the amount of P6.4 Million as full
settlement of the receivables.
The SC affirmed in toto the decision of the IAC. It determined that after deducting the P3 Million
earlier paid by the petitioners, their remaining balance was only P1.4 Million.
2nd Case

On September 1992, petitioners filed a complaint for sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC
before the RTC of Makati, mainly to recover the excess payment which they computed to be P5.3 Million;
P4.335 Million from PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the sum of P4.035 Million to bear
interest until fully paid, to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages, and to return the
corresponding titles. As for the complaint against FEBTC, the RTC dismissed it for lack of cause of action,
ratiocinating that the Memorandum between petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to its decision.
Petitioners and PDCP appealed to the CA. The CA held that when PDCP assigned its
receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC,
irrespective of and stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have provided in the deed of assignment,
DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence not bound by its terms. Noting that DATICOR claimed
in its complaint only the amount of P965,000 from FEBTC, the CA held that it could not grant a relief
different from or in excess of that prayed for.
FEBTCs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. SC denied the subsequent appeal.
3rd Case (ito yung main case)
On April 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC of Makati a complaint against FEBTC to recover
the balance of the excess payment of P4.335 Million.
FEBTC submitted that nowhere in the CAs decision (2nd case) was it held liable to return the
whole amount of P5.435 Million representing the consideration for the assignment to it of the receivables.
FEBTC later filed a third party complaint against PDCP praying the the later be made to pay the
P965,000 adjudged by the CA.
The RTC dismissed the petitioner's complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause
of action. The RTC recalled that the petitioners had filed a previous case (2nd case) to recover the
overpayment both from PDCP and FEBTC; that when said case was appealed, the CA ordered PDCP to
release and cancel the mortgages and FEBTC to pay P965,000 which became final and executory on
November 1999, and that a notice of satisfaction of judgment between petitioners and FEBTC was in fact
submitted on August 2000. Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the RTC held that FEBTCs
payment to petitioners was in compliance with the final judgment of the CA, hence, it could not entertain
such claim.
The RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the present petition.
Issue:
WON there is res judicata.
Held:
Petition is bereft of merit.
Section 47, Rule 39 provides two rules on the doctrine of res judicata.
First, bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment. This states that the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any
other tribunal.

Second, conclusiveness of judgment. This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same.
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of bar by prior judgment:
(a) finality of the former judgment
(b) the court which rendered the judgement had jurisdiction
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits
(d) identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action
In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same alleged wrongful act of mistakenly
receiving and refusing to return an amount in excess of what was due it in violation of their right to a
refund. The same facts were also pleaded by the parties in support of their allegations for, and defenses
against, the recovery of the P4.335 Million. It is a well established that a party cannot, by varying the form
of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifying circumstances
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
To allow the re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled as between petitioners and FEBTC in
a prior case is to allow the splitting of a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4, Rule 2.
This rules proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or
claims and instituting two or more actions based on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds of
recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to edit an
upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to
recover for the same wrong or injury.

CGR Corporation vs Treyes

Petitioner : CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN
M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO
Respondent : Ernesto L Treyes
Ponente : Carpio Morales
Doctrine : Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result
of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not
be considered as splitting of cause of action.
Facts :
Petitioners claimed to have occupied 37 hectares of public and in Barangay Bulanon (Negros Occidental).
Respondent allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the lease properties and once inside barricaded
entrance to fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road foing to petitioners, fishponds, and
harvested several tons of milkfish
Petitioner promptly filed with MTC in Sagay City separate complaints for forcible entry with TRO and
Preliminary Injunction and Damages

There were separate moves wherein petitioner filed with RTC of Bacolod a complaint for damages. Prior
to the issuance of fishpond lease agreement in favor of plaintiffs, they had already been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation. They prayed for 100, 000 pesos of moral
damages, and 200,000 pesos for attorneys fees.
However, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of litis pendentia, res judicata, and forum
shopping
RTC : Dismissed petitioners claim on the ground that it is prematurely filed. RTC held that a complaint for
damages may only be maintained after trial determination on forcible entry cases has been made.
Issue :
W/N during pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently
institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occuring after
dispossession by respondent
Held :
Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their
dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not be
considered as splitting of cause of action.
Res Judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for
damages other than the use and occupation of premises and attorneys fees.
One of those elements of litis pendentia which is that the identity between pending actions, with respect
to parties, rights asserted and relief prayed for , is such that any judgement rendered on one action will,
regardless of which is succesful amounting to resjudicata inthe action under consideration is NOT
present. Hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages.
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis
pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res
judicata in the former.

Flores vs Mallare-Philipps
Petitioner: Remedio V. Flores
Respondent: HON. Judge Hellia S. Mallare-Philipps, Ignacio Binoncal & Fernando Calion
Ponente: FERIA
Doctrine:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any
plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest.
Facts:
This case involved an appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Two causes of action was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet
Province. One as against Ignacio Binoncal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing
cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to

October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982. Counsel for respondent
Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand
against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). They further state that although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly
indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of
the other respondent.
TRIAL COURT: Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction
Held:
No. In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of
Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead
of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. In the case at bar, the lower court
correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5
of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint,
it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents
Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.