||| (Office of the Ombudsman v. Castro, G.R. No.

164678, [October 20, 2005], 510

PHIL 380-389)
The antecedent facts show that on June 19, 2001, a complaint for violation of Social
Security Act of 1997 was filed by Charito C. Ocampo against spouses Salvador and
Ethel Gonzales of Audionet Trading, before the Office of the City Prosecutor. After
preliminary investigation, Asst. City Prosecutor Victor C. Laborte recommended in a
resolution dated August 7, 2001, the filing of an information against the spouses
Gonzales for non-remittance of premiums to the Social Security System (SSS). On
September 28, 2001, an information was filed in court.
On October 10, 2001, spouses Gonzales filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
August 7, 2001 resolution before the Office of the City Prosecutor without leave of court.
On November 7, 2001, respondent Asst. City Prosecutor Mary Ann T. Castro filed a
Comment on the motion for reconsideration and recommended the dismissal of the
complaint.
Ocampo alleged that the filing of a comment by Castro after the information has been
filed in court is irregular. She claimed that once an information has been filed in court,
the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice should no longer entertain a
motion for reinvestigation or a motion for reconsideration. Hence, she filed an
administrative complaint 3against Castro charging her with conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
Respondent Castro claimed that on October 30, 2001, Asst. City Prosecutor Oscar
Capacio, Chief of the Review and Reconsideration Section, Office of the City
Prosecutor, ordered her to reinvestigate the case filed against the spouses Gonzales.
After evaluation of the records and the documentary evidence, she was convinced that
there was no basis for the complaint hence she recommended its dismissal. She
submitted her comment and recommendation to Capacio for review, then to City
Prosecutor Jose Pedrosa, for approval.
She maintained that pursuant to Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors, a motion for
reconsideration is part of due process in preliminary investigation. She alleged that
depriving the accused of this right would be a denial of the right to a full preliminary

investigation preparatory to the filing of the information. The court may therefore not
proceed with the arraignment and trial pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. She claimed that leave of court is not necessary for the filing of the
comment as it was still part of the preliminary investigation over which the Office of the
City Prosecutor exercises jurisdiction.
On April 4, 2003, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding Castro guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The dispositive portion of which
reads: HEDCAS
Wherefore, premises considered, it is hereby deemed that respondent
Asst. City Prosecutor Mary Ann Castro is guilty of Conduct Prejudicial To
The Best Interest of The Service, and is hereby meted the penalty of
SUSPENSION FOR SIX MONTHS WITHOUT PAY.
The administrative complaint against prosecutor Jesus Feliciano is
hereby Dismissed.
SO DECIDED. 4
The Ombudsman found that when the motion for reconsideration was filed, the Office of
the City Prosecutor no longer has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that an
information has been filed in court. Hence, the filing of a comment thereon without leave
of court was not proper, moreso because it effectively resolved the merits of the motion
for reconsideration without prior court approval.
The Ombudsman noted that although the accused has the right to file a motion for
reconsideration, Castro should have verified the status of the case before
recommending its dismissal, which was done beyond the scope of her authority in view
of the prior filing of the information in court.
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, 5 Castro appealed to the Court of
Appeals which annulled the decision of the Ombudsman, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Petition, the same is hereby
GRANTED and the Ombudsman (Visayas) Decision dated October 17,

2002 and Order dated June 5, 200[3] are hereby ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals held that the Regional or City Prosecutor may exercise the power
and authority of their superior, the Secretary of Justice, to review resolutions of their
subordinate in criminal cases despite an information filed in court. The act of filing does
not foreclose the authority of the City Prosecutor, in behalf of the Secretary of Justice, to
review the previously approved resolution of Laborte. 7 Moreover, since Castro's
comment and recommendation was reviewed by Capacio and approved by Pedrosa,
the same is presumed to have been performed in the regular performance of her
duties. 8
The appellate court likewise observed that the filing of the comment without prior leave
of court has been clarified by the trial judge. The latter disregarded Ocampo's claim that
she was not notified of the filing of the comment or given the chance to oppose the
same considering that her counsel was properly served with a copy of the motion to
withdraw information based on the motion for reconsideration and the comment earlier
filed. Ocampo and her counsel were aware of the pending motion to withdraw the
information based on the comment submitted by Castro as the same was heard on
October 7, 2002. The trial judge was convinced that there was no basis for the
complaint, hence, it was ordered dismissed. 9
The Court of Appeals noted that Castro's actuations did not amount to gross
misconduct. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted that there was no
particular law that Castroviolated. 10
Hence, the Ombudsman filed this petition on the sole issue of whether or
not Castro usurped the jurisdiction of the trial court in filing the Comment and
recommending the dismissal of the criminal case filed in court.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner avers that Castro disregarded the basic rule that once the case is filed in
court, leave of court must be secured prior to taking any action on a motion for

reconsideration filed by the accused with the Office of the City Prosecutor. Thus, it is the
intentional disregard of this established jurisprudence on jurisdiction and the doctrinal
laws on delineation of authority that made her administratively liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 11
Respondent Castro claims that she has not violated any law, rule or regulation that
would warrant any administrative sanction. She maintains that she was following the
order of her superior to reinvestigate the case. Therefore, there was no reason for her to
be suspended by the Ombudsman. 12
She asserts that she is being discriminated and singled out by the Ombudsman who
should also have investigated her superiors who ordered the reinvestigation and
approved her recommendation, and the Secretary of Justice who gave his imprimatur to
the dismissal of the case. Notably, even the trial judge approved its dismissal. 13
Upon review, we find that Castro's conduct in resolving the motion for reconsideration is
not prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
We note that it was Laborte who initially handled the case; found probable cause that
spouses Gonzales violated the SSS law; and recommended that an information be filed
against them. Capacio, as Chief of the Review and Reconsideration Section, assigned
the case to Castro after a motion for reconsideration was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor. By virtue of her functions, Castro has the discretion to uphold, modify or
reverse the findings and conclusion of Laborte. Consequently, it was not unusual that,
upon review of the evidence presented, her observations would be diverse from that of
Laborte's.
Besides, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the city prosecutor is allowed. Section 3 of the Department of Justice
Circular No. 70 reads:
SEC. 3. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the assailed decision. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed.

Likewise, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is consistent with the principle of due
process and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors. 14 In the subject
case, the information was filed in court on September 28, 2001. However, the spouses
Gonzales received a copy of the unfavorable recommendation of Laborte only on
October 1, 2001. 15 Thus, they filed on October 10, 2001 a motion for reconsideration
which was the appropriate and available remedy for them.
In Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 16 we held that the denial of the opportunity to file a motion
for reconsideration is tantamount to a denial of due process, thus:
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the
preliminary investigation proper. There is no dispute that the Information
was filed without first affording petitioner-accused his right to file a
motion for reconsideration. The denial thereof is tantamount to a denial
of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone already
renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. The
inevitable conclusion is that the petitioner was not only effectively denied
the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
final resolution but also deprived of his right to a full preliminary
investigation preparatory to the filing of the information against him. 17

In the instant case, the information was filed before the spouses Gonzales could file a
motion to reconsider the adverse recommendation of Laborte. The filing of the
information deprived them of the right to a full-blown preliminary investigation.
We find that Castro did not usurp the jurisdiction of the trial court as the comment was
only recommendatory in nature. The judge was not deprived of the authority to make a
personal evaluation of the evidence before him and to act accordingly. In fact, spouses
Gonzales moved for the dismissal of the case not before the Office of the City
Prosecutor but before the trial court where the information was filed. This Court
in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 18 stated:
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is
not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge

must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence

against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an
assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What
was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such
evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of
judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its
supposed insufficiency.
We are aware of our ruling in Crespo v. Mogul 19 that discourages the Secretary of
Justice from entertaining any appeal from the action of the fiscal once the case is filed in
court to avoid a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court. However, the comment
filed by Castro was only recommendatory. As such, it could either be adopted or
disregarded by the trial judge who has full discretion and jurisdiction over the
case. Castro's participation in the case was in compliance with the orders from her
superiors. If at all, she was only performing her duty as a reviewing officer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77646 is AFFIRMED. E

(Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113930, [March 5, 1996], 324 PHIL 568642)
Facts:
Several thousand holders 6 of "349" Pepsi crowns in connection with the Pepsi
Cola Products Phils., Inc.'s (PEPSI's) Number Fever Promotion 7 filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City complaints against the petitioner. The complaints
respectively accuse the petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the following crimes:
(a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; (c) violation of E.O. No. 913; 8 and (d) violation of Act No. 2333, entitled
"An Act Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading Advertisements," as amended
by Act No. 3740. 9

After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor, Ramon M. Gerona,

released on 23 March 1993 a Joint Resolution 10 where he recommended the filing of
an information against the petitioners and others for the violation of Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code and the dismissal of the complaints for the violation of Article 315,
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code; R.A. No. 7394; Act No. 2333, as amended by Act No.
3740; and E.O. No. 913.
The information for estafa attached to the Joint Resolution was approved (on 7
April 1993) by Ismael P. Casabar, Chief of the Prosecution Division, upon authority of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, and was filed with the RTC of Quezon City on 12
April 1993.
On 14 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a
motion for the reconsideration of the Joint Resolution 14 alleging therein that (a) there
was neither fraud in the Number Fever Promotion nor deviation from or modification of
the promotional rules approved by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), for from
the start of the promotion, it had always been clearly explained to the public that for one
to be entitled to the cash prize his crown must bear both the winning number and the
correct security code as they appear in the DTI list; (b) the complainants failed to allege,
much less prove with prima facie evidence, the specific overt criminal acts or omissions
purportedly committed by each of the petitioners; (c) the compromise agreement
entered into by PEPSI is not an admission of guilt; and (d) the evidence establishes that
the promo was carried out with utmost good faith and without malicious intent.
On 15 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for
Review 15 wherein, for the same grounds adduced in the aforementioned motion for
reconsideration, they prayed that the Joint Resolution be reversed and the complaints
dismissed.
On that same date, the petitioners filed in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198
Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest on the ground that they had filed the aforesaid Petition for Review. 16
On 21 April 1993, acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State Prosecutor
Zenon L. de Guia issued a 1st Indorsement, 17 directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon

City to inform the DOJ whether the petitioners have already been arraigned, and if not,
to move in court for the deferment of further proceedings in the case and to elevate to
the DOJ the entire records of the case, for the case is being treated as an exception
pursuant to Section 4 of Department Circular No. 7 dated 25 January 1990.
On 22 April 1993, Criminal Case No. Q-93-41398 was raffled to Branch 104 of the RTC
of Quezon City. 18
In the morning of 27 April 1993, private prosecutor Julio Contreras filed an ExParte Motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest. 19
In the afternoon of that same day, petitioner Paul Roberts, Jr., filed a
Supplemental Urgent Motion to hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and to
Suspend Proceedings. 20 He stressed that the DOJ had taken cognizance of the
Petition for Review by directing the City Prosecutor to elevate the records of I.S. No. P4401 and its related cases and asserted that the petition for review was an essential
part of the petitioners' right to a preliminary investigation.
The next day, respondent Judge Asuncion, Presiding Judge of Branch 104 of the
RTC of Quezon City, issued an order advising the parties that his court would "be
guided by the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul,
151 SCRA 462 and not by the resolution of the Department of Justice on the petition for
review undertaken by the accused." 21
On 30 April 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed with the trial
court a Motion to Defer Arraignment wherein he also prayed that "further proceedings
be held in abeyance pending final disposition by the Department of Justice." 22
On 14 May 1993, the petitioners filed a Memorandum in support of their Motion
to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrants of
Arrest. 28
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying
the petitioners' Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest and the public prosecutor's Motion to Defer Arraignment and (2)

directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest "after 21 June 1993" and setting the
arraignment on 28 June 1993.
||| ISSUES:
The pleadings of the parties suggest for this Court's resolution the following key issues:
1. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the
motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after
the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
2. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without
examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
3. Whether the DOJ, through its "349" Committee, gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the petition for review on the following
bases: (a) the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals
denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and (b)
of public respondent Asuncion's denial of the abovementioned
motions.
4. Whether public respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion (a) in denying the motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction solely on the ground that public respondent Asuncion
had already before him the Joint Resolution of the investigating
prosecutor when he ordered the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, and (b) in ultimately dismissing the petition on the ground
of mootness since the DOJ has dismissed the petition for review.
5. Whether this Court may determine in this proceedings the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of
estafa.

We resolve the first four issues in the affirmative and the fifth, in the negative.
I.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul 51 which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of
an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court." More
specifically, it stated:
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court. 52
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 53 this Court explicitly declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal
cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as
practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court.
In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may
file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is
subject to the discretion of the court.
Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the
last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court 54 which recognizes the
authority of the Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.

Pursuant to the said provision, the Secretary of Justice had promulgated the rules on
appeals from resolutions in preliminary investigation. At the time the petitioners filed
their petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
governing rule was Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990. Section 2 thereof provided
that only resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary
of Justice. Its Section 4, 55 however, provided an exception, thus allowing, upon a
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, appeals from resolutions finding
probable cause, provided that the accused has not been arraigned.
The DOJ gave due course to the petitioners' petition for review as an exception
pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 7.
Meanwhile, the DOJ promulgated on 30 June 1993 Department Order No. 223 56 which
superseded Circular No. 7. This Order, however, retained the provisions of Section 1 of
the Circular on appealable cases and Section 4 on the non-appealable cases and the
exceptions thereto.
There is nothing in Department Order No. 223 which would warrant a recall of the
previous action of the DOJ giving due course to the petitioners' petition for review. But
whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter
of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the
motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever
opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would
undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still
capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing
of the aforementioned motions at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion
to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for
review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. Before that time,
the following pronouncement in Crespo did not yet truly become relevant or applicable:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or

the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of

the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. 57
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge
may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative. This Court pertinently stated so in Martinez
vs. Court of Appeals: 58
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is
not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge
must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence
against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an
assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What
was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such
evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of
judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its
supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make
an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring
the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge
relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it
was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided
what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp
in violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul.

||| (Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. No. 176033, [March 11, 2015])

On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed
a Complaint-Affidavit 3 for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to be business partners in
financing casino players, private respondents alleged that sometime in March and April
2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty
Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles
which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be
owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit, 4 denying the accusation
against him, and claiming that his only participation in the transaction between private
respondents andAguinaldo was limited to having initially introduced them to each other.
On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their Reply-Affidavit, 5 asserting that
Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of the registration paper of the motor
vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well as the one who personally took them out
from the rent-a-car company.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit, 6 stating that neither original
nor photocopies of the registration was required by private respondents to be submitted
to them because from the very start, they were informed by Aguinaldo that she merely
leased the vehicles from LEDC Rent-a-Car.
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga issued a
Resolution 7 recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). He also noted
that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any controverting evidence despite the
subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information 8 (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners with the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-216182,

entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez," the case
was raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of
Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted in an Order of even
date. 9 TIHCcA
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to Recall or
Quash Warrants of Arrest, 10 alleging that the Resolution dated February 25, 2003 has
not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file a motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their "Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila." 11 Citing the Counter-Affidavit
and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez, Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or
false pretenses was committed because private respondents were fully aware that she
does not own the pledged motor vehicles.
On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order 12 granting the motion for
withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest warrant only insofar
as Aguinaldowas concerned, pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration with
the OCP.
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment,
pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon
the prosecution's motion, 13 the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be
deferred until the resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 14
On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived pending
resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of Manila. 15
On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel, filed a Motion
to Set Case for Trial, 16 considering that petitioners' motions for reconsideration and for
withdrawal of the information have already been denied for lack of merit.

On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition
for review 17 in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled "Benjamin Perez and
Felilibeth Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson."
Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion to set the case for trial,
the public respondent issued an Order 18 dated March 15, 2004 directing the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and
Suspend Further Proceedings, 19 until their petition for review before the DOJ is
resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration 20 of the Order dated March 15, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel
arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration. 21
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapea and Associates,
filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. 22 De Castro alleged
that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered archived.
Petitioners filed an Opposition with Motion to Expunge, 23 alleging that De Castro is not
a party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for
review before the DOJ.
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation 24 informing the public
respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated September 6,
2004 denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. Nos. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820 for
estafa, entitled "Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo." 25
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor
with conformity of the public prosecutor. . . .
It appears from the records that:

(1) the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was

recalled pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the
DOJ; . . .
(2) the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed . . .
(3) accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond. aSIHcT
In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let
warrant of arrest be issued against accusedAguinaldo.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 26
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash
Warrant of Arrest. 27
On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest, and setting petitioners'
arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows
only a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul, 28 he also
ruled that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial
court. He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the petition for
review, although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing the Orders dated May 16,
2005 and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a
Resolution 29 dated December 4, 2006. Hence, this instant petition for review
on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE

THAT THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE CASE AND ISSUE A
WARRANT OF ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA DE CASTRO
WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182.
II.
A PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITY THAT THE SUSPENSION ALLOWED
FOR ARRAIGNMENT IS ALREADY BEYOND THE 60-DAY PERIOD
MAY BE RELAXED IN THE INTEREST OF AN ORDERLY AND
SPEEDY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
III.
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE I.S. NO. 02L-51569
(CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182) BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF MANILA HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED. 30
On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in issuing the Order
dated

May 16,

2005

reinstating

the

case

and

issuing

an

arrest

warrant

against Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to Reinstate the Case and to Issue a
Warrant of Arrest against Aguinaldo was filed by De Castro who is not a party in
Criminal

Case

No.

03-216182,

entitled"People

of

the

Philippines v.

Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez," instead of private complainants Reynaldo

P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. They also assert that said motion was erroneously granted
based on the purported denial of their petition for review by the DOJ, despite a
Certification

showing

that

their

actual

petition

in

I.S.

Number

02L-51569,

entitled"Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo," has not yet been resolved and
is still pending with the DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely
directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their procedural right to due process, as
their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ.

On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could receive a copy
of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and thus move for its
reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-216182 had already been filed
with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend that such precipitate filing of the
Information and issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration
without the preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In support
of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that an Information filed
without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an
adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a complete preliminary
investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to due process and
infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.
The petition is denied for lack of merit. EAISDH
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to Reinstate the
Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest 31 was filed by one Levita De Castro who is not a
party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not even a
private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly
used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their
P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners' motion to
expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect,
as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted based on the
purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ. In reinstating the case and
issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the public respondent erroneously relied
on the DOJ Resolution dated September 6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a
different case, i.e.,I.S. Nos. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820, entitled "Levita De Castro v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo, for two (2) counts of estafa." As correctly noted by petitioners,
however, their petition for review with the DOJ is still pending resolution. In particular,
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido, Jr. certified that based on available
records of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, their petition for review filed in I.S.

Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo" for estafa,
is still pending resolution as of May 27, 2005. 32 It bears stressing that their petition
stemmed from Criminal Case No. 03-216812, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez" wherein the public respondent issued the
interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now before the Court.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision
of Section 11 (c), 33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against
them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway, 34 the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition
for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits
the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment. 35
In Dio v. Olivarez, 36 the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of
the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice
Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored on the rule
provided under Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which
mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be
seventy-five (75) days. 37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court ruled that in a long line of
decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed,
the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to
the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by
the mere expedience of invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of
procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by
compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. 39

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such reasons shown to
warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the CA correctly ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004,
upon the petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein
was ordered deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the
period of one year and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005
when the public respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of petitioner Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give the
petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for
review from the DOJ. The petitioners though submitted a Certification
from the DOJ dated May 30, 2005 stating that their petition for review is
pending resolution by the Department as of May 27, 2005. However,
such delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days
prescribed under the afore-quoted Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Besides, the petitioners may be
faulted for the delay in the resolution of their petition. According to their
counsel, she received the letter dated April 15, 2004 from the DOJ
requiring her to submit the pertinent pleadings relative to petitioners'
petition for review; admittedly, however, the same was complied with
only on October 15, 2004. We therefore find that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. 40
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument that the
precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners
at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been completed
because they were not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. In support of their

argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan 41 wherein it was held that since
filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation
proper, an Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation. cTCADI
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales 42 as misplaced. A closer look into said
case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to move for a
reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary
investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman before the filing of an
Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for
reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed
their "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information
Prematurely Filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila," 43 pursuant
to Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal) 44 and
Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors. 45
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003,
the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The
Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the
time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 2005 46 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than
ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In
fact, the public respondent had been very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years
having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be
arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal
case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with
the DOJ had long lapsed.

On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary investigation

as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the affirmative. Having submitted
his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit to the OCP of Manila before the filing of
Information for estafa, Perez cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary
investigation was not completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally
informed of any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information,
she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation. In
petitioners' motion for reconsideration 47 of the February 25, 2003 Resolution of ACP
Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of
Perez to assail the recommendation of the prosecutor to indict her for estafa. Since the
filing of such motion for reconsideration was held to be consistent with the principle of
due process and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors, 48 she
cannot complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, "[d]ue process simply
demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process." 49
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16, 2005 Order
granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was filed by
one who is not a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition
for review in a different case. Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the
public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August
23, 2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one, the
public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court which allows suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For
another, records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the
preliminary investigation of their estafa case.

Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without petitioners
having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial court for
trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or
the "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure a
Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.'" In
this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to
speedy trial because Section 9 (3) ofCircular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time
within which trial must commence the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for
review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because
the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable
cause exists. Moreover, judges should take note of the following: HaIESC
1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court
may suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties.
However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and
direct the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of
the motion on or before the period fixed by the court, which in no
instance could be more than the period fixed by the court counted
from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise
the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and
without further delay.
2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However,
the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the
DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before
the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more

than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review
before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the
arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated December 4, 2006 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, are AFFIRMED. Considering that the proceedings in this
criminal case had been held in abeyance long enough, let the records of this case be
remanded to the trial court which is hereby DIRECTED to try the case on the merits with
dispatch in accordance with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.
SO ORDERED.