UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1876

In Re:

UNITED REFUSE LLC,

Debtor.

---------------------------------JAMES C. LEHNER AND SUZANNE LEHNER,

Appellants,
and
W. CLARKSON MCDOW, JR., U.S. Trustee,
Party in Interest,
versus
UNITED REFUSE LLC; UNITED LEASING CORPORATION,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (CA-05-438-JCC-1; BC-04-11503; AP-04-1196)

Submitted:

March 8, 2006

Decided:

Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

March 21, 2006

Steven S. Biss, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants.

Kermit A.
Rosenberg,
TIGHE,
PATTON,
ARMSTRONG,
TEASDALE,
P.L.L.C.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee United Refuse, L.L.C.; William
Daniel Sullivan, LECLAIR RYAN, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee United Leasing Corporation.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in
which James Lehner and Suzanne Lehner, the putative owners of the
debtor corporation, United Refuse, LLC (United Refuse), were
directed to convey legal title of United Refuse to its creditor,
United Leasing Corporation (ULC). Dissatisfied with that result,
the Lehners sought to appeal.

However, counsel for the Lehners

filed a notice of appeal solely in the name of United Refuse before

the bankruptcy court and filed the appeal against ULC in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
United

Refuse

and

ULC

to

Following a stipulation between

dismiss

the

bankruptcy

appeal,

the

district court denied the Lehners motion to substitute themselves

for

United

jurisdiction.

Refuse

and

dismissed

the

matter

for

lack

of

We now affirm the district courts disposition of

the bankruptcy appeal.

I.
The underlying factual dispute in this bankruptcy appeal
pertains to the Lehners ownership interests in United Refuse.1

On

ULC is a business that provides equipment financing through

leases to commercial customers.
According to ULC, one of its
clients, Garcias, Inc. (Garcias), a trash removal service,
defaulted on its loan payments. ULC subsequently seized Garcias
assets, voted out Garcias then-owners, and established United
Refuse to operate Garcias assets.
The articles of incorporation filed for United Refuse
originally did not name an owner.
However, by July 2002, the
articles of incorporation were amended to identify the Lehners as
3

April 30, 2004, United Refuse filed a complaint against ULC in

bankruptcy court to determine the validity, priority, and extent of
certain liens.

ULC subsequently asserted a counterclaim against

United Refuse regarding the true ownership of United Refuse, and

joined the Lehners as counterclaim defendants. On October 7, 2004,
the parties stipulated that the Lehners would be dismissed without
prejudice and agreed that the Lehners will be personally bound by
the Courts determination of this matter and will respond to and
participate in discovery in the same manner and to the same extent
as they would be required to do if they were parties named to this
suit.

J.A. 104.

This stipulation was executed by counsel for

United Refuse and counsel for ULC, and individually by James

Lehner,

Suzanne

Lehner,

and

Edward

Shield,

the

controlling

shareholder of ULC.
Following a trial, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on
March 14, 2005, and announced that the Lehners only held legal
title to United Refuse for the benefit of ULC and directed the
Lehners to execute such documents as necessary to convey legal
title to [ULC] which is the sole beneficial owner . . . .
45; J.A. 5.

J.A.

The bankruptcy court then advised the Lehners, who

the 100% owners of United Refuse. According to ULC, United Refuse

was solely intended to act as a workout vehicle for the assets
leased to Garcias and the collateral security given by Garcias
for those leases.
J.A. 157.
Moreover, ULC asserts that the
Lehners only held legal title of United Refuse for the benefit of
ULC, and that ultimately, the Lehners intended to steal United
Refuse from ULC.
4

were present, that you have heard the judgment of the Court and
you have heard your counsel.

You have the right of appeal.

74.

bankruptcy

That

same

memorializing

the

day,

the

above-made

findings

court
and

issued
stating

an

J.A.
order

that,

in

accordance with the executed stipulation, the Lehners are fully

bound by this order the same as if they were parties to this
action.

J.A. 6.

On March 24, 2005, counsel for the Lehners, Steven S. Biss,

filed a notice of appeal in the name of United Refuse against ULC
in the bankruptcy court.

The notice bore two captions: In re:

United Refuse LLC, Debtor and United Refuse LLC, Plaintiff, v.

United Leasing Corporation, Defendant. J.A. 82. In addition, the
only parties named within the notice of appeal were United Refuse
and ULC.
On May 9, 2005, Biss, apparently at the direction of the
Lehners, filed an appellate brief solely in the name of United
Refuse before the district court, seeking to reverse the ownership
determination rendered by the bankruptcy court.

The brief set out

a host of issues related to the true ownership of United Refuse.

Specifically,

the

brief

challenged

the

bankruptcy

courts

determination that the Lehners only held bare legal title for the
benefit of ULC.
That same day, counsel for United Refuse and ULC executed a
joint

stipulation

dismissing

the

bankruptcy

appeal.

The

stipulation represented that Biss was not counsel for United

Refuse and has no right, authority, or even color of authority to
prosecute

an

action

on

behalf

of

United

Refuse.

J.A.

95.

According to the stipulation, counsel for United Refuse attested

that in conducting his fiduciary duties, he reviewed the issues
presented by Biss, but concluded that there was neither any basis
for the appeal nor any conceivable benefit to the estate by the
prosecution of the appeal.

On June 3, 2005, Biss, acting on behalf

of the Lehners, filed an opposition to the stipulation of dismissal

and sought to substitute the Lehners for United Refuse in the
bankruptcy appeal.2
On July 6, 2005, the district court denied the Lehners motion
to strike the dismissal of appeal and motion to substitute the
parties on appeal.

In addition, the district court dismissed the

appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Lehners

had not identified themselves as appellants in the notice of
appeal.

The Lehners now appeal both the dismissal of the appeal

and the denial of their motion to substitute themselves for United

Refuse as parties on appeal.

Meanwhile, the Lehners quitclaimed their ownership interests

in United Refuse and conveyed legal title to ULC on May 19, 2005.
6

II.
A.
The Lehners first challenge the district courts dismissal of
the bankruptcy appeal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Specifically,

the

Lehners

assert

that

the

notice

of

appeal

sufficiently identified them as appellants for the purposes of

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001(a).

In dismissing the

appeal, the district court reasoned that the notice of appeal

failed to name the Lehners as appellants, to express the Lehners
intent to appeal, or to establish privity between the Lehners and
United Refuse, thereby rendering their appeal unperfected.

For

these reasons, the district court confined the notice of appeal to

United Refuse, the only party explicitly asserted as the appellant,
and determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
Lehners appeal.

We agree with the reasoning of the district

court.
1.
We apply de novo review to the district courts dismissal of
the bankruptcy appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 2005).
2.
This appeal causes us to consider two distinct procedural
rules governing the sufficiency of notices of appeal: Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001(a), which specifically governs notices

of appeal related to bankruptcy appeals to the district courts, and

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), which generally governs
notices of appeal.

Rule 8001(a) provides, in relevant part:

The notice of appeal shall (1) conform substantially to

the appropriate Official Form, (2) contain the names of
all parties to the judgment, order, or decree appealed
from and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
their respective attorneys, and (3) be accompanied by the
prescribed fee.
Bankr. R. 8001(a).

The accompanying advisory committee notes

further explain that Rule 8001 require[s] that a notice of appeal

be filed whenever a litigant seeks to secure appellate review.
Bankr. R. 8001 advisory committee notes.
Rule 3(c) provides that a notice of appeal must specify the
party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the
caption or the body of the notice, but an attorney representing
more than one party may describe those parties with such terms as
all parties, the defendants, the plaintiffs A, B, et al. or
all defendants except X.

Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A).

As

detailed in the advisory committee notes, the rule reflects a

liberalized pleading standard in response to Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988),3 which held that a partys

Unlike Rule 8001(a), which has enjoyed a relatively sparse

legislative history, Rule 3(c)(1)(A) was recently amended in 1993
to its present form following Torres. Torres held that Rule 3(c)s
specificity requirement--i.e., that a notice of appeal shall
specify the party or parties taking the appeal--is a strict
jurisdictional threshold, notwithstanding Rule 3(c)s additional
language indicating that an appeal shall not be dismissed for
informality of form or title of the notice of appeal. Torres, 487
8

failure to comply strictly with the specificity requirement of Rule

3(c) forfeits its right to appeal.

In particular, the advisory

committee notes explain:

The amendment states a general rule that specifying the
parties should be done by naming them. Naming an
appellant in an otherwise timely and proper notice of
appeal ensures that the appellant has perfected an
appeal. However, in order to prevent the loss of a right
to appeal through inadvertent omission of a party's name
or continued use of such terms as et al., which are
sufficient in all district court filings after the
complaint, the amendment allows an attorney representing
more than one party the flexibility to indicate which
parties are appealing without naming them individually.
The test established by the rule for determining whether
such designations are sufficient is whether it is
objectively clear that a party intended to appeal. A
notice of appeal filed by a party proceeding pro se is
filed on behalf of the party signing the notice and the
signers spouse and minor children, if they are parties,
unless the notice clearly indicates a contrary intent. .
. . Finally, the rule makes it clear that dismissal of
an appeal should not occur when it is otherwise clear
from the notice that the party intended to appeal. If a
court determines it is objectively clear that a party
intended to appeal, there are neither administrative
concerns nor fairness concerns that should prevent the
appeal from going forward.
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) advisory committee notes (emphases added).

U.S. at 314. In so holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that [t]he

failure to name a party in a notice of appeal is more than
excusable informality; it constitutes a failure of that party to
appeal. Id. at 314; see also In re Case, 937 F.2d 1014, 1021 (5th
Cir. 1991) (Rule 3(c) is jurisdictional in nature and the failure
to comply with its specificity requirement invokes a strict rule of
forfeiture which denies an individual partys right to appeal.).
However, due to the heavy onset of satellite litigation spawned
from Torress admittedly harsh result, the 1993 Amendments permit
an attorney representing more than one party the flexibility to
indicate which parties are appealing without naming them
individually. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) advisory committee notes.
9

The

considerable

overlap

between

the

two

rules

raises

significant issues regarding the degree of specificity and formal

compliance required in identifying appellants in notices of appeal.
Yet

the

rules

themselves

provide

little

insight

into

that

relationship, particularly since Rule 8001 directs appellants to

name[] themselves and is otherwise silent as to the formality of
pleading,

whereas

Rule

3(c)

directs

appellants

to

specify

themselves in the notice of appeal and permits liberal pleading.

See Fadayiro v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 371 F.3d 920, 921 (7th
Cir. 2004) (The two rules governing notices of appeal differ
mysteriously.).

Not surprisingly, the courts of appeals have not

fully converged as to whether Rule 3(c) is coextensive with Rule

8001(a) or altogether inapplicable in the bankruptcy context.

See

id. (holding that Rule 8001(a), rather than Rule 3(c), applies to
notices of appeal from bankruptcy court decisions); In re Cascade
Roads, Inc., 34 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Rule
8001(a),

not

Rule

3(c),

applies

bankruptcy court decisions);

to

notices

of

appeal

from

Case, 937 F.2d at 1021 (exclusively

applying Rule 8001(a)); cf. In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d

120, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying Rule 3(c) to notice of appeal
from bankruptcy decision); Storage Technology Corp. v. United
States District Court, 934 F.2d 244, 247-48 (10th Cir. 1991)
(applying

the

pre-1993

Amendments

version

of

Rule

3(c)

in

interpreting Rule 8001(a) and concluding that the failure to

10

specifically designate a party somewhere in the notice of appeal is

a jurisdictional bar to that partys appeal), superseded by rule
on other grounds, Fed. R. App. 3(c), as recognized in Dodgers Bar
& Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. of County Commrs,

32 F.3d

1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1994).4

We need not determine the applicability of Rule 3(c) or its
rationale because, as the district court concluded, the Lehners
have failed to satisfy the requirements of either Rule 8001(a) or
Rule 3(c).

Under Rule 8001(a), the Lehners concede that they

failed to name themselves as parties in the appeal, but contend

that the rule only applies to the parties extant at the time the
bankruptcy court rendered its decision.

However, this argument

flies in the face of the uncontested facts that (1) the Lehners had
been originally named as counterclaim defendants in the underlying
bankruptcy proceeding; and (2) they executed a stipulation, which
bound them to the bankruptcys ultimate determination of the
ownership of United Refuse--the very issue they now seek to raise

Indeed, according to the Seventh Circuit, the fact that Rule

8001(c) does not contain the specificity requirement casts doubt
over whether a failure of absolute compliance with the rule even
constitutes a jurisdictional defect as defined by Torres.
See
Fadayiro, 371 F.3d at 922 (rejecting rule that failure to comply
with Rule 8001(a) is a jurisdictional defect and remarking that
[n]othing in the history of the rule, the case law, the treatises,
the discussion by the district judge, or the appellees brief
suggests that such dire, irrevocable consequences should flow from
the difference in wording between Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) and Bank. R.
8001(a), significant as that difference is); Case, 937 F.2d at
1021 (stating that the wording of Rule 8001 and Rule 3(c) is
materially different).
11

on appeal.

Significantly, the Lehners were dismissed without

prejudice from the action solely pursuant to the stipulation, which

provided that the Lehners will be personally bound by the Courts
determination of this matter and will respond to and participate in
discovery in the same manner and to the same extent as they would
be required to do if they were parties named to this suit.
104 (emphasis added).

J.A.

As a result, the Lehners forbearance in

exercising their right to litigate the ownership dispute does not

undermine the bankruptcy courts determination of that issue in
light of their explicit agreement to be bound.5

Moreover, the

We further note that the other cases cited by the parties

stand for the limited proposition that counsel for appellants need
not name itself as a party because of the close privity between
counsel and client in conducting litigation. Miltier v. Downes,
935 F.2d 660, 663 n.1 (4th Cir. 1991) (reviewing sanctions award
against appellants counsel even though the notice of appeal did
not name counsel because counsel was the only party adversely
affected by the courts ruling, to the extent that there was no
risk of ambiguity or confusion); Case, 937 F.2d at 1021 (holding
that the district court properly reviewed attorneys fees awarded
against appellants counsel even though the notice did not
specifically list counsel as an appellant because an attorney is
not a litigant who must be listed under Rule 8001); Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d 938, 939 n.1 (11th Cir.
1989) (entertaining jurisdiction over counsels appeal from fee
award imposing joint and several liability on the appellant and its
counsel based on the close privity between a lawyer and his client
with respect to the conduct of litigation). Here, there is no
indication of any relationship between the Lehners and United
Refuse beyond their claims of putative ownership over United
Refuse. See G.E. Smith & Assocs., Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 608
F.2d 126, 127 (11th Cir. 1979) (dismissing appeal asserted only by
one co-plaintiff because the co-plaintiffs were not one and the
same but are different entities in contract with another, one as
owner and the other as party to do construction work).
12

bankruptcy court specifically apprised the Lehners of their right

to appeal the ownership determination.

For these reasons, we

conclude that the Lehners, as litigants in the underlying action

and parties bound to the challenged ownership decision, failed to
comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8001(a) in asserting
their appeal.
Nor

can

the

Lehners

seek

refuge

liberalized pleading standard.

in

Rule

3(c)

and

its

The notice of appeal bore two

captions--In re: United Refuse LLC, Debtor and United Refuse

LLC, Plaintiff, v. United Leasing Corporation, Defendant--and
exclusively designated United Refuse and ULC as the parties on
appeal.

Nowhere did the Lehners name themselves in any capacity.

Indeed, the Lehners counsel, Biss, solely identified himself as

counsel for Appellant, United Refuse LLC in filing the notice of
appeal and the appellate brief.

Furthermore, the notice of appeal

failed to contain any signifiers such as all the parties, et

al., or the plaintiffs that would indicate that parties other
than United Refuse and ULC were implicated in the appeal.
Dodgers Bar & Grill,

Cf.

32 F.3d at 1440 (holding that designation of

additional plaintiffs as et al. and other individually-named

plaintiffs

was

sufficient

to

satisfy

Rule

3(c));

see

also

Fadayiro, 371 F.3d at 922 (finding compliance where the appellant

solely identified one defendant in the notice of appeal, but
appended the names of the remaining defendants to the notice of

13

appeal).

From the face of the notice of appeal itself, we are hard

pressed to conclude, by any stretch of the imagination, that the

Lehners

specified

themselves

as

appellants,

or

that

it

was

objectively clear that the Lehners intended to appeal.

The Lehners nevertheless contend that the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates that they intended to appeal.

In

effect, the Lehners request this Court to infer that they were the
real parties in interest for the purposes of the appeal.

We

decline to make that assumption because in the bankruptcy context,

as

the

Seventh

Circuit

has

observed,

not

all

parties

to

bankruptcy decision will necessarily be involved in the appeal:

A bankruptcy will often spawn multiple subproceedings.
Whereas in normal civil litigation it can be safely
assumed that everyone who is not an appellant must be an
appellee, that is not a safe assumption in bankruptcy.
Many parties will be bystanders to a particular adversary
proceeding, or other subproceedings, that has given rise
to the appeal. It is therefore important that the notice
of appeal name the appellees.
Fadayiro, 371 F.3d at 922.

Thus, even if Rule 3(c) applied in this

context, the Lehners have failed to meet its pleading standard.6

The Lehners assertion that a cover letter attached to the

notice of appeal identified them as appellants was never presented
to the district court.
Nor was the letter included in the
appellate record. Therefore, we decline to consider this argument
on appeal.
In addition, because we find that the Lehners have failed to
satisfy the liberalized pleading standard of Rule 3(c), we cannot
waive its jurisdictional requirements even in the face of good
cause.
Torres, 487 U.S. at 317.
Thus, we cannot notice the
Lehners equitable concerns--i.e., that they are now precluded from
raising an appeal--in waiving the requirements of Rule 3(c).
14

In sum, the Lehners, as parties bound by the bankruptcy

courts challenged decision, were required to name themselves as
appellants in accordance with Rule 8001(a).

We further conclude

that the Lehners failure to do so was not the result of clerical

mistake or inartful pleading under either Rule 8001(a) or Rule
3(c). Accordingly, we affirm the district courts dismissal of the
bankruptcy appeal.

B.
The Lehners alternatively assert that the district court
abused

its

discretion

in

denying

their

motion

to

substitute

themselves for United Refuse as parties to the appeal.

district court denied the motion without comment.

The

We perceive no

error in the district courts decision.

1.
We review the district courts denial of the Lehners motion
to substitute themselves for United Refuse in prosecuting the
bankruptcy appeal for abuse of discretion.

See Esposito v. United

States, 368 F.3d 1271, 1273 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citations
omitted).
2.
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides,
in relevant part:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
15

until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection

for ratification of commencement of the action by, or
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest;
and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).

On appeal, the Lehners simply assert that

denial was inappropriate because they are the real parties in

interest and that justice can only be served if the appeal is
permitted to proceed. However, because the Lehners failed to raise
these arguments before the district court, we deem them waived on
appeal.

In re Wallace and Gale Co., 385 F.3d 820, 835 (4th Cir.

2004) (failure to raise argument before the district court results

in

waiver

of

circumstances).

that

argument

on

appeal

absent

exceptional

Accordingly, we affirm the district courts

disposition of the motion.

III.
The district courts dismissal of the bankruptcy appeal and
denial of the motion to substitute parties is affirmed in its
entirety.
AFFIRMED

16