No. 13-7384
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon.
James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:06-cr-00040-JPJ-PMS-1)
Argued:
Decided:
an
eight-year
conviction.
He
term
appeals
of
the
imprisonment
district
courts
for
denial
2013
of
his
or
release
dangerousness--would
based
best
on
be
an
served
insanity
by
acquittees
delaying
Conrads
J.A. 164.
I.
In
2006,
federal
grand
jury
indicted
Appellant
for
and
for
possessing
an
unregistered,
sawed-off
shotgun,
Pursuant
18
U.S.C.
4243(a),
ordered
Appellant
committed
until
determination
serves
as
the
basis
for
this
Because
disputes
statute
provides
commitment
at
issue
procedural
of
in
this
framework
defendants
appeal,
for
adjudicated
18
the
NGI. 1
U.S.C.
4243,
evaluation
An
NGI
and
verdict
(e).
psychological
18
U.S.C.
examination
4243(a).
ordered
under
Following
subsection
(b),
a
a
forty
days
of
the
NGI
verdict.
Id.
4243(c).
When
serious
the
underlying
damage
to
offense
anothers
involves
property,
bodily
or
Id. 4243(d).
appropriate
standard
that
his
release
will
not
pose
met
unconditional
Baker,
155
his
burden,
release.
F.3d
392,
the
See
395
id.
(4th
subsection
allows
4243(e);
United
Cir.
1998).
If
for
only
States
v.
indefinitely
subsection
(f),
but
only
upon
following
Appellants
2007
NGI
determination.
The
court
public
released.
due
to
present
mental
disease
or
defect
if
August
2008,
the
Commonwealth
of
Virginia
charged
Appellants
conditional
release
in
July
2010
on
the
In February 2010,
5,
2012).
While
subsection
(e)
authorizes
courts
to
of
disposition--unconditional
release
or
indefinite
of
inapplicable
the
statute
because
it
that
applies
does,
only
subsection
if
the
The only
(f),
was
acquittee
was
original
grant
of
conditional
release
was
to
revert
the
It
against
convicted
Appellant
felon
substances--charges
and
for
possession
conspiracy
similar
to
to
those
result
in
Appellants
firearm
distribute
brought
of
2013
in
by
controlled
2006,
which
and
current
imprisonment.
In the 2012-2013 case, the district court initially found
Appellant
incompetent
to
stand
trial.
It
therefore
stayed
further action in the case before us--arising from the 2007 NGI
adjudication--until Appellant became competent.
then
commitment
moved
the
district
proceedings
His release
in
the
court
case
to
dismiss
below.
He
the
argued
J.A. 139.
He
authority
imprisonment
to
delay
because
the
the
hearing
statute
until
after
imposes
his
term
specific
of
timing
hearing
should
be
delayed
until
his
release
from
federal
insanity
criminal
will
not
defendant
be
found
not
guilty
onto
the
streets.
released
by
reason
of
J.A.
148
for
writ
of
omitted).
Once
government
argued,
appropriate
to
commitment.
J.A. 148.
certiorari))
Appellant
a
becomes
hearing
determine
(internal
eligible
pursuant
his
to
quotation
for
release,
4243
suitability
marks
for
would
the
be
further
Appellant
finding
that
purposes.
completes
such
his
delay
current
would
term
best
of
imprisonment,
serve
the
statutes
II.
Although the statutory blueprint of 4243 is relatively
straightforward, its applicability to Appellant is complicated
by
the
fact
unrelated
that
he
the
one
to
circumstance
that
is
currently
for
4243
which
does
incarcerated
he
not
was
for
adjudicated
expressly
crime
NGI--a
contemplate.
as
an
inmate
prevents
him
from
as
an
by
denying
motion
to
dismiss
the
commitment
Rather,
commission.
With
respect
to
the
hearings
delay,
the
did
not
intend
strict
enforcement
of
the
forty-day
We
whether
address
4243
these
arguments
remains
in
applicable
turn,
to
determining
Appellant,
and
first
second,
As the questions
Cir. 1995).
acquittee
subsequent
Appellant
to
nullify
offenses
is
the
statutes
and
that
released
from
application
delaying
prison
is
the
by
committing
hearing
consistent
with
until
the
11
release
under
4243(e)
or
(f),
he
offers
for
support
mandate,
shall
conducted
be
4243(c).
the
Appellees
after
Br.
an
at
NGI
20,
that
[a]
adjudication,
hearing
18
U.S.C.
ground
incarcerated
that
the
when
he
defendant
committed
in
the
that
case
was
for
which
offense
already
he
was
found NGI.
While
Appellant
specifically
nonetheless
to
his
is
correct
particular
continues
to
that
4243
does
circumstances,
apply.
Appellant
not
the
points
speak
statute
to
no
identified
statutes
no
provision
applicability
permitting
through
12
And he has
nullification
subsequent
commission
of
of
defendant
committed
in
the
that
case
was
crime--assaulting
already
a
Unlike Appellant,
incarcerated
correctional
when
he
officer--for
the
effect
determination,
of
and
crime
thus
commission
provides
subsequent
no
support
to
for
an
NGI
allowing
that
the
district
court
did
not
err
by
We
denying
next
consider
whether
4243
authorizes
the
delay
first
the
statutes
specific
13
timing
provisions,
We
and
1.
Appellant asserts that the delay imposed by the district
court is impermissible because the text of 4243(c) requires a
hearing
within
40
days
of
the
NGI
verdict,
which,
under
government
counters
that
Congress
did
not
mandate
Section 4243(b)
contemplates
the
extension
by
requiring
that
psychological
apply
for
reasonable
extension
[for
the
14
to
4247(b),
order
may
take
psychological
place
after
evaluation,
those
40
which,
days
have
under
passed,
had
passed
psychiatric/psychological
facilities, id. at *2.
due
to
examinations
a
at
backlog
federal
of
medical
The
court
the
reasoned
that
the
evaluation
would
be
crucial
to
of the statute.
virtually
Id.
impossible
comply
with
the
forty-day
time
hearing
until
such
examination is completed.
time
as
the
appropriate . . .
Id.
is
not
always
possible
in
the
context
of
In United States
v. Tucker, 153 F. Appx 173, 175 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(unpublished), we affirmed delay of the acquittees 4243(c)
hearing while he served a state sentence.
only
reasonable
discussed
in
one
here,
detail
below,
given
of
the
both
protecting
twin
the
goals,
acquittee
control,
contention
that
but
an
within
circumstances
acquittees
beyond
control--such
the
as
Even though
16
conclude
district
courts
that
the
decision
to
statutes
delay
purposes
the
4243
support
hearing
the
until
Appellant contends
health
care
following
an
NGI
verdict
and
immediate
provide him with prompt rather than delayed access to such care
as a deprivation of liberty without due process. 9
The
an
insanity
acquittal
is
to
determine
whether
the
Jones v.
United
4243,
States,
463
U.S.
354,
368
(1983).
Section
in
from
the
acquittees
potential
dangerousness.
We
18
First,
delay
serves
the
purpose
of
ensuring
Appellants
is
not
eligible
for
release
while
he
remains
until
delaying
his
he
is
no
hearing
longer
until
he
in
prison.
By
served
his
has
contrast,
term
of
it
will
matter:
in
2019,
when
Appellant
completes
his
these
reasons,
we
find
that
the
district
courts
his prison term does not run counter to the statutes purposes,
but rather furthers them.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district courts denial of
Appellants motion to dismiss his commitment proceedings under
18 U.S.C. 4243 and its order that the proceedings be delayed
while Appellant completes his current term of imprisonment are
AFFIRMED.
20