Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pedro O.

Fragante
G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770

April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibaez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said
commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another
ice plant of two and one-half (2-) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the
opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan
and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in
detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its
announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2,
petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied
him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in
question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business,
he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His
transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and
continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence
before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid
right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature
did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a
right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied
application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of
the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum
of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule,
should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right
to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in
his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life
of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out
of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to
exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would
also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative
fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted
right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience the evidence
established that the public needed the ice plant was under the law conditioned only upon the
requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right
to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its
objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the
legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among
other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says
that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the
making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall
come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief
Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights(emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him
if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator,
unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very
nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the
Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove
that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part
and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the
executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the
benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right
involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a
certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but
logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the
right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code,
respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among
other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a
bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to
include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract,
whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the
death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as
with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E.
763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed
after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that
the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person.
The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the
estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of
the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its
legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb.
Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port.

(Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A
natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of
natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes
the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized
only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased
person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness
of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is
sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the
estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept
this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the
forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to
be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding
such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs,
devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal
entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a
due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument
purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the
estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha
cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, the estate and
not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E.
914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is
considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would
entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not
counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also
considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may
be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal
plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said
estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants
Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the
rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court
in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure,
article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13,
22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by
the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of
the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
after his demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal
fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of a legal
exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the
decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to
be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or
administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason
and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954,
among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be
considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act,
as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the
commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of
the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such
entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by
which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and
fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said
State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial
person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be
properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill
of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against
being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no
less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in
his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from
the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that
any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be

exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason
for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise
extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of
the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the
legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the
desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same
principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction
is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by
reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made
in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the
Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its
provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for
reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find
no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the
purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen.
And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice
plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing,
which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not,
there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572
of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of
Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service
Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public
convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities

organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by citizens of the Philippines, nor such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm
or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship
requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device
by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs.
They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural
requisites for their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction
has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of
solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact,
intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to
the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they
are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they
are not, it should be reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship
constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.
We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the
Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
question raised by the petitioner.
We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946,
be set aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual
questions and render a new decision accordingly.

Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case
the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the
satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer
solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the
sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final,
the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety
bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under
the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area
of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on
September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed.
Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality

Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in
the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his
own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug
court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio
Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case
No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No.
T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was
filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against
Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction
over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants
in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted
in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had
acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that
decision the plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the
validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the
other world, was never served with summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the
judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion
vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there
was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as
contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have
validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul
the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against
that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products,

Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in
good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land
covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Eugenio v. Velez
185 SCRA 425, May 17, 1990
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial
Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 8855, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD
VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and
NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ
and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ
and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment
from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988,
a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City)
alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by
herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape,
Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was
filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas
Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but
the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died
on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious
sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his
residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her
body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2)
orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of
the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the
petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b)
of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas
corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted
leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28
September 1988 (or after the filing of thehabeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged
that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with
their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3the Vargases contended
that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister
Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution
on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent
court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de
Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized
government pathologist. 4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17
November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the
second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana
Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners
as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said
deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was
already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29,
1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body
of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the
reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which
reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try
this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is
within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in
Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on
17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the
case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate
civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294
of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas
has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the
custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but
elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly

finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an
action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of
all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. .
. . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody
over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under
Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or
descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law
spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure
questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence,
the consolidation of both cases.12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance
of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23
February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to
the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were
then submitted for decision without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to
recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest
surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the
action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the
dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the
new Family Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more
persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary
rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations
therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper
relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence
introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether
Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised

in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may
refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the
petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief.
However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into
the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full
inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the
petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have
been dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the
petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous
relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez
against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed
preference for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not chose to
continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not
allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in
the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the
court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is
that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings,amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed
in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary
expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by
respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to
resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse
used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he
is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from

even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said,
makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie
and another who are husband and wife de facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in
her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters
(the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and
left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of
the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

Valino v. Adriano
GR 182894, April 22, 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182894

April 22, 2014

FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA
ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE D.
ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision and the May 9, 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the October 1, 1998 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino
(Valino) was entitled to the remains of the decedent.
1

The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office,
married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons,
Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1)
adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to
live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children (respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States
spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned
about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the
interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then
interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were
not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was
buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents
commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to
the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than
twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together,
he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together,
Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that,
unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he
got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying,
Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adrianos last wish that his
remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents.
Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of
Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well
that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that
Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded
that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed
all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that
he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
4

In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty.
Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City,
would not serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected. Decision of the CA
5

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains
of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their
expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to
the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in

relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the
law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latters death, notwithstanding their 30-year
separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to the good
intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were
in the United States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of
Atty. Adriano.
The Courts Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the
persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
6

Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the
same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the
paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent
of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons herein below specified:

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law
partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and
sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter
forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.
7

In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case
notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should
be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his commonlaw wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case,
herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr.
Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children
During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to
'spouse,' the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said,
makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie
and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary
as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner visa-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime. [Emphases supplied]
8

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements
to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately
from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or

renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children
when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not,
opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an
undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of
the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased.
As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adrianos death in the morning of December 19, 1992
(December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the
Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
9

Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to
Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty. Adrianos wish to be buried in
their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valinos
claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was
presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed
burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true
wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption
can be said to have been created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with
Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband
when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right
and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced,
the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased
husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there
be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here,
Rosarios keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even
bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family
plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the
absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In
case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites"
that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty
to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199
of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among
those on which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino),
an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to
the wishes of the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. As
Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be
inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with
10

Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are
not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law.
They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition
of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the
ceremony to be observed. [Emphases supplied]
11

In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the
Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with
the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. As aptly
explained by the appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano
that he be interred at the Floro familys mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the
provisions of the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased to be
interred at the Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do
with the remains to the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving
spouse, and not to defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally
preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may have been very commendable. The law does not
even consider the emotional fact that husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separatedin-fact and had been living apart for more than 30 years.
12

As for Valinos contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty.
Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place other than the Adriano family plot
in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only violate their right provided by
law, but it also disrespects the family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family
plot of his live-in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However,
the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a
decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest
in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead,
also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in
its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having
this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
13

All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. Adriano
during his final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind
to assess actual or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino,
who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly
took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his
remains when he had died.

On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages. Defendantappellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains of Atty. Adriano a decent
burial when the wife and family were all in the United States and could not attend to his burial. Actual
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be
recoverable, they must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty. In this case at bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of
actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be
recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the
damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of because moral damages although
incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury
sustained and actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was any
intended by anyone in this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if
claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would
appear to have been adequately established by plaintiffs-appellants.
1wphi1

As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item
of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the
New Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a
conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this
case, we have searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the award of
attorney's fees.
14

Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the funeral of a
deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and disturbed the proper solemnity
which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such controversies that the
Code Commission saw it best to include the provisions on "Funerals."
15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.