F-16 without IR based MWS are vulnerable to a number of threats.

One cannot coun

t on RWR. Electronic Warfare Suit is important.
Whay do you guys think ?
Some say ECM pods are enough ! ( I can hardly believe that )
In 1996 TuAF lost an F-16 in a sneak attack from a HAF pilot ( I believe a Mirag
e 2000 with a Magic IR missile ) The Mirage came in at 90 degrees unnoticed and
directly lauched and downed the F-16..
Comments please ?
That event, by no means, was an accident. In simple words it was a blody murder.
Just to make things clear. Not to get off the topic, yes MWS is a must. RWR giv
es warning based on radar signals only. So, an attack executed via IRSTS or simi
lar systems would be unnoticed. As you all know, in 80 percent of the aerial kil
ls, victims were unaware of the attackers.
About the IR MWS: as far as I know it's complex, expensive and doesn't work so g
ood: it's based on detecting the missile's heat plume at launch. Works fine in h
elicopters, but today's IR AAMs can have ranges up to 50 km (MICA IR), 40 Km for
the IR guided R-77, and so on - that's BVR,and in atmospherical conditions less
than ideal, no system can detect its launch (yet).
Again, I am not an expert, but in my opinion an IR countermeasure system (jammer
s like the one used by attack choppers) would be more effective.
New generation missiles can't be fooled by flares or outmaneuvered, so what good
is a warning system? The only way to escape such a missile would be a very powe
rful and effective IR jamming device, that can function as long as you are in a
threat area (like the radar jammers)
The last picture(Blackhawks) uses ALQ-144 IR Jammer...It is very common system u
sed in most NATO helicopters...Pilots call it "Disco Ball" or similar...
There are several MWS in the market. Some of them are AN/AAR-47(Also provides la
ser warning as well as missiles, produced by ATK), AN/AAR-54(produced by Northro
p), AN/AAR-57(produced by BAE Sanders), AN/AAR-60 (produced by EADS), PAWS-2(pro
duced by Elisra)....Among these systems, AN/AAR-47 is the most common and maybe
the oldest system which is used on over 1000 aircraft around the world....That C
-130 in the last picture could be using an AAR-47...

The infrared seeking missile threat[edit]

Analysis of aircraft losses due to enemy action since the 1960s shows that at le
ast 70% of all losses were attributed to passive heat seeking i.e. Infrared (IR)
guided missiles. This might appear surprising considering that radar guided SAM
systems have longer engagement ranges, are faster, have higher maneuvering pote
ntial, carry larger warheads and are equipped with proximity fuzes.
The main reason why IR guided missiles were so effective was that it took much l
onger to develop effective warning systems against them. Most aircraft that were
shot down never knew that the missile(s) were coming. Radar warning receivers o
n the other hand already proved their effectiveness by the early 1970s which con
siderably improved the survival rate of aircraft against radar threats.
The first air-to-air IR missiles appeared in the 1950s. The technology allowed m
ore compact missile designs and made it possible to develop IR Man Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS) i.e. shoulder-launched missiles, which became operatio
nal by the 1960s.

IR MANPADS are relatively cheap, quite robust, easy to operate and difficult to
detect. They also do not require the infrastructure often associated with radarguided SAM deployments which often reveals their presence.
Vast quantities of MANPADS have been manufactured (more than 700,000 produced si
nce 1970 according to CSIS "Transnational Threats Update" Volume 1. No 10. 2003)
. Large numbers proliferated during the Cold War and immediate post Cold War era
. Substantial quantities are available and affordable on the black market and ha
ve found their way into the hands of "non state" organizations or the so-called
"asymmetric" threat. (An estimate by Jane's Intelligence Review of Feb 2003 puts
this number as high as 150 000). An article "Proliferation of MANPADS and the T
hreat to Civil Aviation" of August 13, 2003 by Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency C
entre estimates that the black market price of MANPADS like the SA-7 could be as
low as $5,000.[1]
Intelligence regarding the whereabouts of MANPADS, especially in the hands of "n
on state" organizations, is usually vague and unreliable. This, in turn, makes i
t difficult to anticipate where and when to expect MANPADS attacks.
The 2nd- and 3rd-generation MANPADS appeared by the 1980s and further increased
the performance and effectiveness of MANPADS due to advanced new seeker head tec
hnology, improved rocket motors and aerodynamic refinements. Their performance i
mproved in terms of lethal range, minimum launch angle, maneuvering potential an
d all aspect engagement angles (1st-generation MANPADS were restricted to only r
ear sector attacks). They also became more ECM resistant.
MANPADS therefore became even more lethal specifically against more vulnerable p
latforms such as helicopters, light aircraft, and commercial and military transp
ort aircraft (during approaches and departures). The slower speed of these platf
orms forces them to spend more time within the kill zones of MANPADS compared to
high performance fighter and strike aircraft.
At least 35 MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft are on record. Twenty four were
shot down killing about 500 people in the process.

Cost considerations[edit]
Procuring EW self-protection systems has direct and indirect cost implications.
Direct costs involve the initial price of the system, spare parts as well as tes
t equipment to ensure that the performance and availability of the systems is ma
intained throughout their entire life cycle.
Installing and integrating EW systems on aircraft is another direct cost
Indirect cost on the other hand involves degradation of the aircraft s performance
as a result of having the system on-board which in turn impacts negatively on t
he operating cost of the aircraft.
The lowest initial price of a system does therefore not necessary offer the best
solution as all the factors needs to be considered. The overall cost effectiven
ess of systems i.e. price versus performance is more important in deciding which
system to select.

Missile Approach Warning (MAW) system requirements[edit]

Protecting aircraft against IR guided missiles depends in most cases firstly on

reliable detection and warning of missiles and secondly on applying effective EC

M.
An exception to this are Omni Directional IR jammers which do not make use of mi
ssile warning at all as they simply radiate modulated IR energy for as long as t
hey are switched on. These jammers have been around since the 1970s and when the
correct jamming modulation techniques were applied, were reasonably effective a
gainst 1st-generation amplitude-modulated MANPADS, which operated in the near-IR
band (1 to 2 micrometres (m)). The arrival of 2nd- and 3rd-generation MANPADS, h
owever, changed that. They operate in the mid-IR band (3 to 5 m) and make use of
more advanced modulation techniques (for example frequency modulation). Therefor
e, instead of jamming these missiles, the Omni Directional IR jammer now actuall
y became a source for the missiles to home in.
Functional requirements[edit]
Providing timely warning against IR MANPADS is a challenge. They give no warning
of their presence prior to launch, they do not rely on active IR, radar guidanc
e or a laser designator which would possibly emit a detectable radiation. They a
re typically fire-and-forget and can lock on and engage a target, speed to the t
arget and destroy it in seconds. They do, however, have a small but visible rada
r signature and also a propellant which burns
depending on the platform, typical
ly for a very short duration.
MANPADS are relatively short-range weapons, typically up to about five kilometer
s with the heart of the kill envelope one to three kilometers. They therefore al
low very little margin for error to effectively counter them as the time to impa
ct (TTI) on a target at one kilometer, is only about three seconds. The TTI for
targets at three and five kilometers is also relatively short
only seven to a li
ttle over eleven seconds respectively.
The MAW must therefore provide reliable and timely warning to allow appropriate
counter measure responses. Near 100% probability of warning (POW) and very fast
reaction times to counter nearby missile launches (in the order of one second) a
re therefore essential.
Air crew will only rely on the system if they have high confidence in it. The MA
W must therefore also have sufficiently low false alarm rates (FAR), even when i
lluminated by multiple sources (which may include threats) from different direct
ions.
Quick response times and low FAR are however inherently conflicting requirements
. An acceptable solution therefore requires a balanced approach to provide the m
ost successful end result without compromising the POW. Since a longer time-to-i
mpact (TTI) warning is almost invariably desirable, this leads to the conclusion
that there is something like a too-low FAR: all warning systems gather data, an
d then make decisions when some confidence level is reached. False alarms repres
ent decision errors, which (assuming optimal processing) can only be reduced by
gathering more information, which means taking more time, inevitably resulting i
n a reduced time-to-impact. Most users would tolerate an increased FAR (up to so
me point where it starts limiting operations) instead of a reduced TTI, because
their probability of survival depends fairly directly on the TTI, which represen
ts the time in which countermeasures can be deployed.
Accurate azimuth and elevation angle of attack (AOA) information can be another
very important requirement. Directional IR Counter Measures (DIRCM) systems depe
nd on MAW systems for accurate enough initial pointing (about two degrees) to en
sure that the DIRCM acquires and engages incoming missiles timely and successful
ly.
Accurate AOA is also important in deciding the dispensing direction of the count

er measure decoys (flares). It is vital to avoid the situation where the platfor
m and the dispensed decoys both remain within the instantaneous field of view (I
FoV) of incoming missiles. In situations like that missiles could very well, onc
e they pass the decoys, still hit the platform. This is of particular importance
where separation between the decoys and the platform takes too long as is the c
ase with slow flying aircraft.
Accurate AOA is further important where the platform should preferably maneuver
when dispensing decoys to increase the miss distance. This is however more appli
cable to fast jets where their high speed tends to negate the separation caused
by the decoy's ejection velocity. A turn towards approaching missiles to establi
sh/increase the angle between the decoy and the platform is especially important
in cases where a missile approaches from the rear between the five or seven 'o
clock sectors. If the AOA is not accurate enough, the pilot could very well turn
in the wrong direction and set himself up for the situation as described above.
The system must also be fully automated as the human reaction time in relevant c
ases (short range launches) is too long.

Pulse doppler based MAW[edit]

See also: Pulse-Doppler radar
Advantages
Can measure distance and speed of approaching missiles. It can therefore determi
ne the time to impact (TTI) and optimize the timing of countermeasure (flare) di
spensing.
Does not depend on the motor of missiles to be burning.
Less sensitive to weather conditions.
Disadvantages
In sophisticated threat environments active systems could reveal the aircraft's
presence with the radar radiation by the MAW and therefore increase its vulnerab
ility.
Detection range of small missiles with low radar cross section like MANPADS is l
imited and could result in marginal warning time and consequent late decoy dispe
nsing.
Cannot measure direction accurately enough to direct DIRCM systems.
Susceptible to false alarms caused by other RF sources.
Can cause interference with ground air traffic control radars if operating frequ
ency is not selected carefully.
More difficult to integrate[why?] than passive systems.
Infrared based MAW[edit]
See also: Infrared and Thermographic camera
Advantages
In good weather conditions, the atmospheric transmission of IR radiation tends t
o be better than that of solar-blind UV radiation.
Can potentially achieve longer detection ranges at altitude where there is no gr
ound clutter.
Can potentially detect the kinetic heat of missiles after motor burnout at altit
ude but probably not at low level due to high IR background clutter.
Provides good AOA information for pointing a DIRCM and good decision making rega
rding decoy dispensing direction and maneuvering.
Disadvantages
Very low IR transmission through liquid water and ice, which precludes all-weath
er operation. Even a few tens of micrometers of water on the lens, or in the atm
osphere between the threat and the sensor, is sufficient to effectively blind bo
th MWIR and LWIR sensors.
Must compete with massive amounts of natural (sun) and man made IR clutter.
False alarm rate and/or Probability of Warning is therefore a huge problem again
st surface-to-air missiles due to high IR background clutter originating from th

e earth.
Needs vast computing power to alleviate false alarm problem which in turn drives
up cost.
Two colour detectors are used in some systems to assist in the suppression of ba
ckground clutter and lower FAR. Even though it solves some problems, it creates
others as it complicates the system further due to the optical, sensitivity and
extremely high pixel rate requirements which impact negatively on cost and relia
bility.
Cannot provide actual range information.
Traditionally IR detectors have very narrow instantaneous fields of view to achi
eve good enough signal to target ratio. Large detector arrays are therefore requ
ired to provide 360 azimuth coverage which is another cost driver.
Requires cooled detectors which complicates life cycle logistic support and resu
lt in high cost of ownership.
Detection range could be limited against future new technology low IR/UV emissio
n rocket motors.
Ultra violet based MWS[edit]
See also: Ultraviolet
Advantages
Operates in solar blind UV spectral wavelength region and therefore has no natur
al (sun) false alarms. UV based MAW systems therefore have a much reduced false
alarm problem to solve compared to IR based systems.
Very good probability of warning in high clutter background environments.
All-weather operation, as it is impervious to solar clutter, and hardly affected
by liquid water.
Wide instantaneous field of view.
Provide very good AOA information for good decoy dispensing decision making, man
euvering and for pointing DIRCMs.
Has fast response time against nearby missile launches.
Is a simpler system than Pulse Doppler & IR technologies.
Does not require cooling and needs only moderate computing power.
Low life cycle cost.
Disadvantages
To detect approaching missiles, the rocket motor of the missile must be burning
it requires the high effective burning temperatures associated with solid fuel r
ocket motors.
IR-based systems are probably better at altitude but UV is better against surfac
e-to-air missiles.
Cannot provide actual range information but can derive TTI from the rapid increa
se in amplitude of the approaching missile s signal.
Detection range could be limited against future new technology low IR/UV emissio
n rocket motors.
MAW systems[edit]
Current available MAW systems as well as those under development, represent all
three types of technologies. Each technology has strong and weak points and none
provide a perfect solution.
Pulse-Doppler radar based[edit]
See also: Pulse-Doppler radar
France
MWS - 20 (Damien) originally from Dassault Electronique (now Thales)
Israel
EL/M-2160 (ALQ 199) from ELTA
Japan
J/APQ
1 * from Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation
Russia
LIP MAW (Obsolete system)
Arbalet-D from Phazatron NIIR Corporation
UK
PVS 2000 originally from GEC Marconi and Plessey Avionics (now SELEX and Thales)

(Obsolete system)
UK and Italy
AMIDS from SELEX and Elettronica (Uncertain of production/development status)
USA
AN/ALQ
127 originally from Westinghouse (now Northrop Grumman) (Obsolete system)
AN/ALQ 153 originally from Westinghouse (now Northrop Grumman) (Obsolete system)
AN/ALQ 154 from AIL (Obsolete system)
AN/ALQ 156 from BAE Systems EI&S
Infrared based[edit]
Israel
PAWS from Elisra
France
DDM-SAMIR/DDM-NG from Sagem and MBDA (Uncertain of production/development status
)
Germany
PIMAWS from BGT (Uncertain of production/development status)
Germany and France
MIRAS from EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company N.V.) and Thales
UK
ELIX-IR from Thales UK (Uncertain of production/development status)
USA
AN/AAR 44B from L-3 Cincinnati Electronics
MIMS from Northop Grumman (Uncertain of production/development status)
JATAS, under development by Alliant Techsystems (ATK) and BAE Systems under a US
N contract, with initial operational deployment scheduled for late 2015
AN/AAR-56 from Lockheed Martin for F-22 (operational)
AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) from Northrop Grumman for F-35 (In p
roduction/testing)
USA and Israel
PAWS - 2 from Raytheon and Elisra
Ultraviolet based[edit]
Germany
AN/AAR 60 or MILDS (Missile Launch Detection System) from EADS.[2]
Israel
Guitar 350 from Rafael (Uncertain of production/development status)
Sweden/South Africa
MAW 300 from Saab Avitronics[3]
USA
AN/AAR 47 with upgraded AN/AAR-47A(V)2 sensors.
AN/AAR 54 originally from Westinghouse (now Northrop Grumman)
AN/AAR 57 originally from Sanders (now BAE Systems EI&S)
Russia
101KS-U part of the 101KS Atoll Electro-Optical (EO) system for the Russian Air
Force PAK FA T-50 fifth generation aircraft.