B.

WRIT OF AMPARO
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THEPHILIPPINES, versus
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO,
October 7, 2008

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret
walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an
overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and
security in the first petition for a writ of amparofiled before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section
19[1] of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and
law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled
Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)[2] filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop
herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right
to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody
Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable
reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) [3] of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in
their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit
their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise
restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as
guaranteed under Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparotook effect
on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat
Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and
Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the AmparoRule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein
respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter
required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs
prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render
judgment as required in Sec. 18[7] of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.[8]
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under
the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them
to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days
from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division
of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition
onNovember 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.[9]

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners
(herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF
STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1.

To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this
decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already on file herein;

2.

To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt

Hilario akaRollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this
decision.

3.

To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to
the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian)
who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days
from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of
respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latters authority to be
express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein
respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006,
several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the
residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were
not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by
the barangay hall.[11]
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots,
entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo,
replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged
him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground
face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near
the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.[12]
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning
de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz, and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of
the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also
saw outside of his house twobarangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some
soldiers and armed men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being
blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned
their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was
about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was

Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was George who
was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old. [14]
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit
beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person
beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a
house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left
open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other
parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to
his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten up in the other room . The soldiers
asked him if he was a member of the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with
the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed,
and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat
him up would salute them, call them sir, and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when
interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was
put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other
soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of
combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas
corpus case filed in connection with the respondents abduction. [16] While these officials interrogated him,
Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards
got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually
with left-over and rotten food.[17]
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and
beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his
forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a
burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They
then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned
Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him. [18]
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then
made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check
on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed
through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his
chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He
talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was
told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing
him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place
near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with
chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly
called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and
he was returned insideFort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.[20]
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were
treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents
guards got drunk.[21]
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by
steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there,
including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen
people[22] had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.[23]
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were
kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house

was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They
were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the DTU. [24]
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took
their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a
hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two
ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol,
amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents urine test and
advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more
times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias
Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier
named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. [25]
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several
other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren
stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men. [26]
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the
Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan for about three
months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the
house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already
waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from respondents. He began by asking if
respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew
him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to
face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen.
Palparan was an evil man.[27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba
natatakot sa akin?
Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na
mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo
huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil
niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko
doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno. [28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do
otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that
abducted them - brought them to their parents house. Raymond was shown to his parents while
Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other
soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymonds
parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies,
they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.[29]
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking
with the four masters who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. [30] When Gen. Palparan
saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as
Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him
and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He
also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not
be given another chance.[31] During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. [32]

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The
medicine, named Alive, was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this
medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the
medicine. The Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. [33]
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman
instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from
Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted
him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. [34]
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry
Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with
them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were
put on him and he was kept in the barracks.[35]
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the
barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers,
hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms
therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of
the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to
severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the
day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.[36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with
Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called master or commander by his
men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains
were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families
would all be killed.[37]
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they
should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing
of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back
to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was
instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got
acquainted with soldiers of the 24 th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his
affidavit.[38]
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a
camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in
that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion
soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their
guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean,
cook, and help in raising livestock.[39]
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers
brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to
Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The
soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA
members in his house.[40] Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought to
Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house
who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes. [41]

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in
charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed
in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. [42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and
Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he
witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si
Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung
mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming
ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang
katawan at itoy sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong
sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng
dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila
sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang
isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong
pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang
mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng
bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko
sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila
nakita.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil

kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pangitaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng
sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang
haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na
araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan
pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano
ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang
dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na
kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa
gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to
raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which,
he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use
the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from
Rizal, Laguna.[44]

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they
stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they
saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he
could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone
was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved
Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them
while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the
guards. Respondents house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but
they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At
about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took
notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and
barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit insofar as they
related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house
on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also
named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted
to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed
members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back
and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was
separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a
friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name Rodel and to represent
himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in
his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the
vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of
Alive in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded
while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips,
they passed by Fort Magsaysay and CampTecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, Welcome
to Camp Tecson.[46]
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group,
an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was
involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their
escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His
findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical
injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after
respondents escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of
the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. [47]
Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with
the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the
abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested,
forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by
the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their
behalf by petitioners parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431
against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry Battalion; Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely:

Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ On July 4,
2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19,
2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding
that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of
the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007, it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity
in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining
respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the
latter.[48]
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner)
Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was
thus unaware of the Manalo brothers alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7.

The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional
operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the
field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of
the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to
the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of
the Philippines;

8.

In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in
this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in
compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such
compliance Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I
have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP
should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by
a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible;
(3)

to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;

(4)

to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as

well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;

(5)

to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or

disappearance; and

(6)

to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.[49]

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of
the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I
have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result
thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on
the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007,
addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D
PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this
Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as
soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another
Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a
certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to
establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to
bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or
had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when
warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the
process.[50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC)
PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and
Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry
Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24 th IB detachment in
Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the
name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in
Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the
Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and
were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the
alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry,
however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used
by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino. [51]
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen
Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein
petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently
submitted.[52]

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez,
Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in FortMagsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva
Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga,
Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. [53] The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7 th Infantry Division.
[54]

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry
Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran, [55] through his Assistant Chief of Staff, [56] to investigate the alleged
abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA
Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo
de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the
veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU
auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez testified that this
particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the
Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he
was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction. [58]
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn
statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The investigation started at 8:00 in the
morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.[60] The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad,
took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn
statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and
investigated[61] as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. [62]
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. [63] The six persons were not
known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them. [64] During the entire time that he was
beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a
single question to the six persons.[65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements
was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats
of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66] When the Sworn Statements
were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the
afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the
Chief of Personnel.[68]
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence,
the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO
MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter
were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for
Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela
Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged
members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit B) states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together
with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed
by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that

they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who
abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject
vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May
2006in (Exhibit C) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are
active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando
Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the
time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the
suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the
concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just
came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being
informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any
participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit O) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a
neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also
knew their elder brother KUMANDER BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel,
Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived
home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was
due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando
Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that
reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied
any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit
E) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was
still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was
not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged
members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him
was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of
summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is
an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his
father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
F) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio
mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when

rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
G) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for
twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of
the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader
operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he
was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only
about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of
the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He
claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the
abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that
remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the
proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement
theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as
charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to
quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN:
Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did
the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other
accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA,
this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with
the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGUs, they ought to be
vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside
their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in
so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V.

CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of
abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this
investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment
and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz,
Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be
exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed. [69]
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts assessment of the
foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING
AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING
RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO
BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN
WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO
aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS,
AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF
MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
ofAmparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that
resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide a
broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,[71] hence representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as
all the stakeholders in the justice system[72] participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.[73] It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime .
[74]
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law,i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.[75] On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.[76]
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means protection in Spanish.[77] In
1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in America became available in Mexicoand stirred great interest. Its
description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S.appealed to many Mexican jurists. [78] One of
them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,[79] which
granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal
rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted

pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or
state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in
litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that
motivated the violation.[80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. [81] If, after
hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the
official, or the officials superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the
petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial
review derived from the U.S.with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition
which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in
particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. [82]
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into
various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.[83] It became, in the words of a justice
of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece ofMexicos self-attributed task of conveying to the
worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history
conceived.[84] What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal
freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality
of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and
(5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights derived from the agrarian reform process. [85]
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to
protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general,
these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights,
including socio-economic rights.[86] Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however,
have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or
fundamental rights.[87]
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo,
several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar
general protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo
administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. [88] The Clause is an offspring of the U.S.common law tradition of
judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.[89]
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of
injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition forhabeas corpus under Rule
102,[90] these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ
of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin
American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[91]
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of

impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the
goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order[92] to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of
their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, [93] prior to the promulgation of
the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment
of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When
the AmparoRule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as
anamparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers
enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners first argument in
disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith
and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted,
rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo. [94]
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners
cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of
proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violationby an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by

substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases
supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[95]
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13,
2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent

Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details
of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses
and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at
nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.[96] (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng
sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. [97] May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo
habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas. [98] Tumigil ako sa may
palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena. [99] Tinanong ko sa isang
kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na
nakatira sa malapit na lugar.[100]
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond
Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the
petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU
auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through
the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and
the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz
and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members,
served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military
men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners,
validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that
the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the
abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of
petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at
best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry
Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This onesidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have
refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated
Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the very
least, he was aware of the petitioners captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to
his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told
them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans
direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of
the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military
personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that
unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due
process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division
(Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr.,
member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement could
not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario
drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did
not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in
which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14,
2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the
captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort
Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong
materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to
Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit
D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen.
Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of
the petitioners parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the
message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned
the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to
denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among
four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen.
Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the
medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the
petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military
personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly
established.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in
the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.
[101]

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. [102] Raymonds affidavit and testimony
were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports
prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries
inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in
detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the
DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training
Unit,[104] firms up respondents story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana
Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was
kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commissions findings of fact were mostly based
on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.
[106]
These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was
being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. [107] She was also examined by a
medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and
abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in
detention.[108]
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim
during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from
the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they

were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no
quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now
passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no
longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in every sense of the
word[109] as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents rights to life, liberty and security.[110](emphasis
supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or
even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.[111]
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point out that this right is often
associated with liberty; it is also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture
and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights to be kept free from torture and
from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places[112] fall under the general coverage of the
right to security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an
expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the
1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security
of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may be made
more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty [114] such as
a requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty [115] or
being put under monitoring and surveillance.[116]
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life
and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of personfinds a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including the extensions of his/her
person houses, papers, and effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states
power over a persons home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of
the person himself.[117] The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of
Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
is toprevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion
of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction
and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York,
192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential
condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every
individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and
Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability
of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy

and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for
the best causes and reasons.[119](emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 [120] guarantees essentially the right to be
alive[121] - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is
a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life
lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a
life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history
of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence. [122] In a broad sense, the right to security of person
emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and
his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of
life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual. [123]
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of
this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom
from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. [124] It
is the right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. [125] Article 3 of
the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
(emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to
the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being
baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience
with the stimulus. Thus, in theamparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is
actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter
part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier
part of the provision.[127]
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity
or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. [128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It
may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.[129]

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it
constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving
invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of
freedom from threat as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even
under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was
made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case ofPopov v. Russia.[130] In this
case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused
him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights provides,viz: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law ... (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that (n)o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Although the application failed on the facts
as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in
holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at
the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to
ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx

xxx

xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the
procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.
[131]
(emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a
statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security
and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human
rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human
rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms
include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to
life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State

guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. [133] As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective
and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private
interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [135]
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has
been interpreted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee [136] in not a few cases involving Article
9[137] of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty
under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently
of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to
security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,[138] a case involving death threats to a
religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the
Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its
location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises
only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the
discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other
provisions of article 9.The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers
to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These
elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the
Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in
article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the
right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same
time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known
threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is
not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article
9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of nondetained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the
guarantees of the Covenant.[139] (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and
prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements
following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar
import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,[141]involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the
complainants husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,[143] involving
themurder of the complainants partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his
investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,[144] involving an assassination attempt on the
chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to security not
only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to
afford protection of the right to liberty.[145] The ECHR interpreted the right to security of person under

Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of
persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case, the claimants son had been arrested by state authorities and
had not been seen since. The familys requests for information and investigation regarding his
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her sons right to security
of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with
the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with
the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his
or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable
claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.
[147]
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now
determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty
and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed. In Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after
he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from FortMagsaysay. A call from a certain Mam,
who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to
pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by
virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end
of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan,
respondents captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be
executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng
mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.[148]
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in
detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have
surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but
also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo,
and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as
they are forced to limit their movements or activities. [149] Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts
of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless,
the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a
writ of amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the
failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of

respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness,
Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He
merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom
he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate
Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the
veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given
by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive
dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP
should adopt rules of action in the event the writ ofamparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party;
recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from
them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the
suspected offenders before a competent court.[150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and
that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the
purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of
the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents. [151] To this day,
however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense
on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they
now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a
violation of respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the
part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.

the

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records
and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any,
to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely:
(1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific
offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. [152] In the case at bar, however,
petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent

Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that
the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case
as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under the AmparoRule should not
be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion
of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as
respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things
under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action
is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers,
books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are
in his possession, custody or control
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, [153] the respondent judge, under authority
of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books
and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on
the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held
that the subpoenapertained to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as
the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of
a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the
petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise
of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to
threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilarioaka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their
abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of
territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served
with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
respondents rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the
medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and
necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed
out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that
gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN
BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN
TIMBAS, Petitioners
versus - HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5
Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA.
LOURDES T. SANSON, Respondents. June 17, 2008
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and
4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;[1] and
Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data [2]) is the petition for certiorari and for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the
Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff
Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed
in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu,
18thDivision, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the private
respondents), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the MCTC) a
complaint[3] dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora TapuzMadriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz,
Ivan Tapuzand Marian Timbas (the petitioners) and other John Does numbering about 120. The private
respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a
1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag,Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the disputed
land); (2) they were the disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and
carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed
land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents permission and against the objections of
the private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the
complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed
land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents
certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5] in the private
respondents favor. It found prior possession the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private
respondents favor, thus:
The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended
Commissioners Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the
evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioners Report
and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire
perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said
perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of
the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that

after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex
A, Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the
perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs
were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was
interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of
Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same
and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them
before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain
Glenn Sacapao. As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement
(Annex D, Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the
land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of
January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or
about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a
sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons
by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built
a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex E, Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which
incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs
Certification (Annex F, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same
date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of BarangayBalabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no
settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex G, Complaint,
p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants (sic) contend in their answer that prior to January 4, 2005, they were
already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of
ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic).
(Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed
by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the
Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that
the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993
up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of
force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of
Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs
from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants claims to an older possession must be rejected
as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the
land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon as shown in their
Certification (Annex D, Defendants Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to
the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on
the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioners Amended Report,
pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of
defendants witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
andEdgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- 144, rec.) [sic] categorically
stated that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our

said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our
said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the
intruding armed men.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry
happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants
overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the
controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their
pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the
amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely
inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land
in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered
as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19,
2006[6].
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC,Branch 6
of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (Judge Marin).
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of awrit of
preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance
conditioned on the private respondents posting of a bond. The writ[7] authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario
(the respondent Judge) on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed
condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the
other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and to
Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007[8].
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. [9] The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order[10] a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after
the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition
for Review[11] (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of thePermanent Mandatory
Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition on 19 March 2008.[12]
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last29 April
2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparounder the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions
diametrically opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners
maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private
respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition bases as well of the petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo read:
29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot
guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were

not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day
at 2:00 a.m.two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up
by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained
their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them
who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a
resident of Binun-an, Batad,Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to
ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported
by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns
and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who
resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of
Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of highpowered weapons.
[]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered
petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ
armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and
political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by
defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by
the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are
therefore
disinterested
witnesses
in
the
case
namely:
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong,
Ariel Gac,
Darwin
Alvarez
and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove
that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict
the defendants.[13]
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry
that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves
issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the
property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the
RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed
equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed
orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective,
both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ ofamparo, on the other
hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition
for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the
petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the CA petition) for the review of the same
RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of

the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with
the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least,
the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present
petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA
petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the
assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60)
days[15] from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed
motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners counsel stated in his attached Certificate of Compliance
with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court [16] (Certificate of Compliance) that in the meantime the RTC
and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the
petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC. To
guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to
Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65
cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in
the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders,
and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed
order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the
material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed
in this petition, as the petitions Prayer patently shows. [17]
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of
willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA
G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the
present recourse to us, allegedly because the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the
petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and
academic since the CA refused toresolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce
a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION. [18]
Interestingly, the petitioners counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the
same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance [19] that:
x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that
the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS
is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF,copy of the resolution
of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the
same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
x x x
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is
replete with significance regarding the petitioners intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners act of
misrepresenting in the body of their petition that the CA did not act on the petition up to this date while
stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state
of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without
frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition,
the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The
petitioners act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the
appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both
improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for
the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate
paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised
Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with
us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving
the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, eithersimultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum
shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued
in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil
action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is
a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt. [20]
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1)
of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section
3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who
signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.

In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the
supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private
respondents complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not as petitioners may
have misread or misappreciated a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level
courts have had jurisdiction over these cases called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691
amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of
possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the law
established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained.
Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a
plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.[21] Apparently, these latter actions
are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction
may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of
the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court
committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for
violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive
deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it
is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of
fact, to wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well
as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitablereliefs. [22]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a
threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations
heretofore quoted,[23] that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are
supported by the following documents:
(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, ApolsidaUmambong,
Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the
petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private respondents intrusion and the illegal
acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing
of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors descendants of
Antonio Tapuz;
(c)
Unsubscribed
Affidavit
corroborating Nemias affidavit;

of

Melanie Tapuz y Samindao,

essentially

(d)
Certification
dated 23
April
2006 issued
by
Police
Officer
JacksonJauod regarding the incident of petitioners intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating
the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private
respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security
guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a
house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain JorgeBuenavente,
was accidentally burned by a fire.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly
be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the
presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably,
none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the statements
ofNemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by
Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one
Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was
accidental.
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry
case which rejected all the petitioners factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and
detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of

the contending parties positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with
incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the
MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the
appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a
plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the
pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facieexistence of
the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that
pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be
purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress
and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of
ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry
the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that
is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will
obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparodoes not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators,
clear and patent to us, that the petitioners present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a
mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the
appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the
petitioners misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the
recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that
are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of
law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the
writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative
substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the
appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes the situation
obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the
institution of separate actions,[24] for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, [25] and for the consolidation
of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.
[26]
These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance
of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with thepossessory dispute
and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening
through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clearprima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or
security the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or
threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for
the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying
by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

(a)

The

personal

circumstances

of

the

petitioner

and

the

respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that
the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the
acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court
and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine
National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses
of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an
investigation was conducted by the PNP.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum,
thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise
has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities
other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance
of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been
shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than thefishing
expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petitionOUTRIGHT for
deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182795

June 5, 2008

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,

vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following
premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and
embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and
Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only
solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules the "RULE
ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig
City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about
to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles,
to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these
so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting
syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must
be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protges. If unabated
would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this
Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to
answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in
the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable
Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession of the
Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448,
180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the
second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore,
Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be
treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance
of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme
Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers
of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own
previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the
basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for theWrit of Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was
affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among
the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of
amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is,
therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the
petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out
and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its
face, the court ought to issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall
issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be
later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the
petition will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of
the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will
not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the
Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
REYES v CA, et al. December 3, 2009
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
February 4, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It also assails

the CAs Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.
The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty
(50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening
of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of
Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest
proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and
the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure
Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of
petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national
security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36
others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ
Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting
that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in
the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause
must be made personally by a judge.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for
Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court
ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated
with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other
accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the
deadline given to them to come out from the 2 nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves
to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing
ones sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators
absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the
accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes
must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the
DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 07-3126.
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that the
DOJ could not act on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to represent petitioner
is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as
counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the
dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on
December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is

included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of
petitioners counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to
Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines
from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights
abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the
continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of
Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further
maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is
exigent as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1)
that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ
Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998[2] and No. 18 Series of 2007[3] pursuant to his mandate
under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the
government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec.
Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein
petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in
view of public respondents pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008
filed by the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the
DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked
collaterally in an amparoproceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the
Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners counsel Atty.
Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time
petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA
detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the
power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not
file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be
tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.
For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that
the Secretary of the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the
Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law agency of
the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17
has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
Dismissal of the trial court.
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of
the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJs Motion for
Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion
should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time. [4]
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioners
constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold
Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126
has already been dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying
the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [5] thereon

Resolution[6] dated March 25, 2008.

was

also

denied

in

the

assailed

Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:

I.
THE DOJ SECRETARYS ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN REGULARLY
EXERCISED IN THE PAST OR HAS NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).
II.
THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF
THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY
RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 073126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.
III.
THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE
CONTINUING
ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONERS
RIGHT
TO
TRAVEL
THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND DOES NOT
SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE
TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A RESTRAINT.
IV.
DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR
THE DOJ SECRETARYS CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A
STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE,
HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN
A DIRECT PROCEEDING.[7]
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties
protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that [liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use
his faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a
person to travel.
In their Comment,[8] both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan argue that:
1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice
Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,[9] and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007,[10] which were issued pursuant to
said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of
the government, to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration
regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys authority to issue hold
departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.
The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or
threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of
the writ of amparo.
The petition must fail.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the
other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[12]
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[13] the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of
amparo as follows:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances,
and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary
character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires
that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations
of fact, to wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or
uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or

individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,

together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable
reliefs.[14]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facieexistence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail
the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his
right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called
upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1of the Rules
thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[15] the Court explained the concept
of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right
to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that
the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of mans existence. In a broad sense, the right to security
of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also
of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[16]
[17]

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,
in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The
term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare. x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.[18] thoroughly expounded on the import of
the right to security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of
the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.
(emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an
aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the
right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from
fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right
and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear
is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by
the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of
the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in theamparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security
is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with
violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of
the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a
search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal
law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to
the bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones
rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into
the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee
of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis
supplied)[19]

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. [20] As we have stated
in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should
be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound
discretion. [22]
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to
life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,[23] this Court ruled that:
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her
right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in
order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the
writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available
under the writ of amparo.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a
motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTCMakati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues
that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to
limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the
power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.[24] We quote with approval the CAs ruling on this matter:
The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its
pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[25] that once a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound
discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondents MR of the dismissal of the
case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126
which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the
authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The
relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the
criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).[26]
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and
directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[27] thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clearprima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or securitythe personal concern that
the writ is intended to protectis immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger
or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance
of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,

applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed
criminal case.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that
the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. [28] Petitioners apprehension is at best merely
speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a
petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on
this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 ( Prescribing Rules
and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007
(Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and
for Other Purposes).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4,
2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, v Gloria Macapagal-Arryoyo, et. al. September 7, 2010
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 26 August 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the
Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the
Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order and
return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby
grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the
distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers relative to Petitioners Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the
CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an
inspection order, production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings
are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are
responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents
pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete
the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and
her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation
and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs. [3]
We begin with the petitioners allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.[4] While in the United States, petitioner enrolled
in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of
America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.[5] During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured

various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members
of BAYAN-Tarlac[6]in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.[7]
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard
disk, IPOD,[8] wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.[9]
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr.
Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.[10] At around 1:30 in the afternoon,
however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging
at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.[11]
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.[12] The armed men were all in civilian
clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. [13]
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied
her hands.[14] At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already
blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.
[15]
Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the vanbruising her
arms, legs and knees.[16] Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to
see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her.[17] The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. [18] Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were
ordered to alight.[19] After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal
doors.[20] From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and
some construction bustle.[21] She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in
Laur, Nueva Ecija.[22]
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. [23] The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to the
fold.[24] The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the
petitioner.[25]
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.[26] Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which
she became acquainted with a woman named Rose who bathed her. [27] There were also a few times
when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings. [28]
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of
her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as Dex, James and RC. [29] RC even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations Group, and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle.[30]
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon
City.[31] Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a
SIM[32] card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password, [33]a plastic bag containing
biscuits and books,[34] the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.[35] Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the groupKarapatan or something untoward will happen to her
and her family.[36]

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone
given to her.[37] Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her
family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs
of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.[38] Petitioner impleaded public officials
occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it
was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her
suit Rose, Dex and RC.[39]
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or
even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention
areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to
produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7 thInfantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent
to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any
document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the
same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card,
laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and
her P15,000.00 cash.[40]
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to
the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. [41] The Resolution also
directed the respondents to file their verified written return. [42]
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs[43] on
behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as stage managed. [44] In
support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as
contained in the Special Report[45] of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed
that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to
avoid leaving the house.[46] From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that,
except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner
and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. [47] This can only mean, the public
respondents concluded, that if ever there was any abduction it must necessarily have been planned by,
or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves. [48]
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate[49] of the petitioner, as actually belying her
claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while
the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that could have easily
produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.
[50]

For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of
petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence,
public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade
fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media
mileage to her and the group that she represents. [51]
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents
insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as

against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit,
[52]
and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific
allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such
atrocities.[53]
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the
truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.[54] In both the police and military arms of the government
machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of 19
May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to
report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere inBarangay Kapanikian.[55] Acting on the report, the
police station launched an initial investigation.[56]
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators
of an abduction incident involving three (3) personslater identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito
Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his house. [57] Mr. Paolo disclosed that the
abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily
armed men who forced their way inside his house. [58] Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed
that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM
motorcycles with no plate numbers.[59]
At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the
different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and
motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.[60]
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report[61] that
was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy
Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of
Region 3 about the abduction.[62] Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued. [63]
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional
Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN (Task
Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and
Jandoc.[64]
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the
victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the
identity of the perpetrators.[65] Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the
Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations trusted by petitionerin the hopes of
obtaining the latters participation in the ongoing investigations. [66] Unfortunately, the letters sent by the
investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded. [67]
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports[68] that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still
unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task
group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in
their investigative efforts.[69]
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the
alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him

and the other respondents to file their return. [70] Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum
Directive[71] addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an
inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction. [72]
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP
Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message [73] addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin
N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an
investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.[74]
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen.
Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an
investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported
abduction of the petitioner.[75] In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the
Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation.[76]
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7 th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report[77] detailing
the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioners allegations as opinionated and
thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. [78]
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,[79] the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners version
that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court
noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court,
and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth. [80]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that
the abduction of the petitioner was stage managed, as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation
that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly
taken.[81] The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only
affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to
have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by
her abductors onto their van.[82]
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the
petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of RC to contact and monitor her, even after she was released.
[83]
This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police
authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. [84] Thus, the appellate court extended
to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection
to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations
involving the abduction.[85]
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the
petitioner, noting the existence of records of investigations that concerns the petitioner as a suspected
member of the CPP-NPA.[86] The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph
and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan)
and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel
exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female
CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the
proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part
of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts
further strain on her already volatile security.[87] To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of
the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any
records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to
her abduction and torture.[88]

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military
or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction
and torture of the petitioner.[89] The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the
petitioner merely believed that the military was behind her abduction. [90] Thus, the Court of Appeals
absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner. [91] The
petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view
of her immunity from suit.[92]
[93]

Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied.
Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate. [94]
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from
any responsibility in her abduction and torture. [95] Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of
Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. [96]
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as
the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove
government involvement.[97]
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in
her amparo petition.[98] Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents
as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings. [99]
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in heramparo petition, is legally
inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in
an amparo petition.[100]
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,[101] which was the first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes
that:[102]
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development
of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in
its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." [103] In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility,[104] foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding
a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is " an
omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the

perpetrators[105] (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal,

underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it
is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. [106] While the
principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing,
fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law.[107] The rationale underpinning this peculiar
nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo:[108]
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner;it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full
and exhaustive proceedings.[109](Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on
the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command
responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v.
Tagitis,[110] the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special
and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading
the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption
that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. [111]
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who
were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her
abduction and torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates;
utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of
physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being
practiced by the military or other state forces.[112]

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was
actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while
thereat.[113]
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at
Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with
those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present
case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the
government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence
of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence
that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise
clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,[114] the
cartographic sketches[115] of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of
this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to
the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has
not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much
less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were
not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by
the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the
estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made
mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the
Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful.[116] With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim that she was
taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were
actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither
does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to
the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the
acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the
failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. [117] We
agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To
the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail

regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction
of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of
the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a
full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a
mere summary amparoproceeding.[118]
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact
that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of
property rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.[119] Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,
[120]
which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.[121]
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military
camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to
sanctioning a fishing expedition, which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the
interim relief of inspection order.[122] Contrary to the explicit position[123] espoused by the petitioner,
theAmparo Rule does not allow a fishing expedition for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. [124] A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is
reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does
not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a
minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in
itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out
a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be
ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable
and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from distributing or causing the distribution to the
public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the petitioners
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture. Though not raised as
an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court
of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion[125] of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports
and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be
produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in
the Governments Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political

opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and
perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before
Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where
they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who
wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover
claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner
holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person in
said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such
nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioners abduction where
she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly
caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPPNPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the
public, Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or
transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of
this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of
Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public
consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioners
right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to
grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. [126] The writ operates to protect a persons
right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is
the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim.[127] This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence
on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of
the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have
violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other
reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the
origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such
video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form,
reports, documents or similar papers relative to the petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA, appears
to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing
something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for
the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in
violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege
of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any
form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide
Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary
diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the
petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights, [128] must be tapped in order to fill certain
investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may
be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This
awkward situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or
extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the evidentiary difficulties faced by any
petitioner in any amparo case.[129]
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the
respondent who is a public official or employee to prove that no less than extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. [130] Thus,
unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that
extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of
responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the AmparoRule, was not
fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on
the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports
are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time,
comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors
of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in
exposing the motive behind the abductionits necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the
perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came
up with allegations about the motive of her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or
non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.[131] While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have
facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the formers
reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or
avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. [132] Indeed, while the allegations of government
complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of law
they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if
only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of
investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to
explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the victims,

is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to
obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by
petitioners account, was not wearing any mask.
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches
included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of,
and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on the abduction and
torture of the petitioner.[133] But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of
this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation
under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to
this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very
real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient
investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift
the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon
the CHR.[134] We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and
confidence of the petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already
conducted by the commission.[135] Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that
the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing
farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this
petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of
affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows
1.)

Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding
the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts;
and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.

2.)

Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and
the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

3.)

Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of
this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

4.)

Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her
stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of
monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit
its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to
have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:

1.)

AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal belongings;

2.)

AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of
Fort Magsaysay.

3.)

REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.

4.)

5.)

MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows

a.

APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with
conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the
persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction
and torture.

b.

DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and
the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to
extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights,
including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the
time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent
with the Constitution and existing laws.

c.

Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his
successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations,
other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision.

d.

Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of
Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its
investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to
provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such
time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:
a.

To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;

b.

To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the
abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the
public respondents; and on the basis of this determination

c.

To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and
recommendation of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall
include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public
respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for
the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found
responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer
for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

C. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA,

LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA,
EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND
MARIAN TIMBAS, versus
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE stationed in BoracayIsland, represented
by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18thDIVISION, SPOUSES
GREGORIO SANSON & MA.LOURDES T. SANSON,
June 17, 2008
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance
(pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1
and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;[1] and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data[2]) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the
writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the
Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br.

5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the
Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP
Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18 thDivision, and
the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes
T. Sanson (the private respondents), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the MCTC) a complaint[3] dated 24 April 2006
for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz,
Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga,
Liberty
M.
Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga,
Excel Tapuz,
Ivan Tapuzand Marian Timbas (the petitioners) and other John Does numbering
about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located
at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag,Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the disputed land); (2) they
were the disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos
and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering
120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents permission and against the objections of the private respondents
security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material
allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual
and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to
the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint
and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a
decision[5] in the private respondents favor. It found prior possession the key
issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents favor, thus:
The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the
Amended Commissioners Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248

of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown
in the Amended Commissioners Report and Sketch that the land in
question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in
pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said
perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The
foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in
question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex A, Affidavit
of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the
perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp.
271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred
that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in
question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic)
when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of
Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of
inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff
Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector
Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of
their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex D,
Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of
the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the
incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards,
however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain
firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force
and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built
a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex E, Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot
in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper
authorities as shown by plaintiffs Certification (Annex F, Complaint,
p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006,
the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of BarangayBalabag, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate
to File Action (Annex G, Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants (sic) contend in their answer that prior to January 4,
2005, they were already occupants of the property, being indigenous

settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous,

adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic).(Paragraph 4, Answer,
p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in
question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs
sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and
reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs
where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from
1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the
defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19
SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to
April 19, 2006, defendants claims to an older possession must be
rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized
at the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly
entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 oclock in
the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex D, Defendants
Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their
allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in
question that they built structures on the land in question only on April
19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioners Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247),
after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical
statements
of
defendants
witnesses,
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
andEdgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- 144, rec.) [sic]
categorically stated that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed
men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed
tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away
from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding
armed men.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of
forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19,

2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security

guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures
depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were
not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by
the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures
are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question,
accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be
considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question
prior to April 19, 2006[6].

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC,Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M.
Marin (Judge Marin).
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the
issuance of awrit of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26
February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents posting
of a bond. The writ[7] authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC
decision was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the
respondent Judge) on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied
with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of
the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in
an Order dated 17 May 2007[8].
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. [9] The
respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order[10] a writ of demolition to
be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners
to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively
take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, a Petition for Review[11] (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure) of thePermanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of

the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to
Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.[12]
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present
petition last29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies,
namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the
issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and
finally, the issuance of the writ of amparounder the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present
factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal
reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior
possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private
respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition bases as well of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo read:
29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting
12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in
dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the
defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m.two houses of the defendants
were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence
put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed
men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of
them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old,
single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad,Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing
them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were
reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists
trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and
MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant
violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children,
which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent
and
unlettered
petitioners
continue
because
the
private
respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are
influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and
political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot
in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced
into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses
who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested
witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong,
Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the
affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict
the defendants.[13]

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing
Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of
title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value
of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally
cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to
where the MCTC decision was appealed equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the
case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data
fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance
of the writ ofamparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to
content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the
petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has
been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending
petition with the Court of Appeals (the CA petition) for the review of the same

RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never
disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA
petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2
August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the
latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the
latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more
than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present
petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC
orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty
(60) days[15] from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial
of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners counsel stated in his attached
Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme
Court[16] (Certificate of Compliance) that in the meantime the RTC and the
Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to
counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their
counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC. To guard against any insidious argument that
the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best
to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65
cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners counsel. The
Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from
the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It
is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus
an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from
the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate
subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this
case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65
purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in
this petition, as the petitions Prayer patently shows.[17]
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have
been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the
very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals (docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now
also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly
because the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the
petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render
the case moot and academic since the CA refused toresolve pending urgent
motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the
defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION.[18]
Interestingly, the petitioners counsel - while making this claim in the body
of the petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of
Compliance[19] that:
x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held
that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES
OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR
RELIEF,copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring
supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this
date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
x x x

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the

appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners
intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners act of misrepresenting in the body of
their petition that the CA did not act on the petition up to this date while stating
the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to
hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead
us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the
Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from
us, via the present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners act of seeking against the
same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court
and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are

both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can
sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the
combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule
46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of
Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and
possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation
where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders,
with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, eithersimultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted
to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one
forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or
a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses
their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court
dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt.[20]
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum
shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not
sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule
65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who
signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary
Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the
basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents complaint, which specifically
alleged a cause for forcible entry and not as petitioners may have misread
or misappreciated a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had
jurisdiction over these cases called accion interdictal even before the R.A.
7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to
the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the
property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value

of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately

from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of
possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of
ownership.[21] Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to
when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in
which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial
courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As
the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no
jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited
formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having
been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that
are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of
the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown
or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission

of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed

with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority
or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitablereliefs.[22]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits
that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of
the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the
factual allegations heretofore quoted,[23] that are essentially repeated in paragraph
54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena
B. Onag, ApolsidaUmambong,
Ariel Gac,
Darwin
Alvarez
and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the
petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private respondents
intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and
their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging
the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard
against minors descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao,
essentially corroborating Nemias affidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer

JacksonJauod regarding the incident of petitioners intrusion into the
disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer
Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and
the security guards of the private respondents, including the gunpoking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R.
Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by
a certain JorgeBuenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is
the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except
to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the
statements ofNemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical
and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other
hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay,
and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was accidental.
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its
decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners factual
claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made
under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the
contending parties positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a
court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the
backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat

thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently
brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to
the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on
interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that,
if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with
the prima facieexistence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a
writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be
purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners
wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on
the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings,
as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC
ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of
nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will
obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparodoes not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider
too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners present
recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the
assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate
court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from
the petitioners misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of
forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the
writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and
sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law
fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial
measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though
they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,
particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or
certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes the
situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, [24] for the effect

of earlier-filed criminal actions,[25] and for the consolidation of petitions for the
issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.
[26]
These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with
petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other
parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with
thepossessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no
point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence
of any clearprima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security
the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger
or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no
legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case,
by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order

enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of
the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against
them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the
petitioners with copy of the same;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the
police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners
in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an
investigation was conducted by the PNP.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically,
we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not
alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of
police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than thefishing
expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had
in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these
lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petitionOUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body
and attachments.

SO ORDERED.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN
A. SAPITULA, versus ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the
evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke
the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein
imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which
imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering
Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at
which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA
NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA
NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA
RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.[1]

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO

linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the
Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.[2]

By Memorandum[3] dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of

MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to
MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July
18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and
threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security.
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A.
Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource
Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive
nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling
travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation
of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this
wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have
intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so
that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even
serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and
the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these
accusations and threats to be [ sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are
just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats
exist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an
unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a sitting
duck so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of
management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my
security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale
for managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to
me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me,
the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive
one.[4] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her

transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a
petition[5] for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting
of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information
about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning
threats to her safety and securityamount to a violation of her right to privacy in life,
liberty and security, correctible byhabeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the
issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the
following:
a)

a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in

relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the
alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such
data and the purpose for its collection;

b)

the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality

of such data or information; and

c)

the currency and accuracy of such data or information

obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO
Alabang Sector.
By Order[6] of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed
petitioners to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008,
the trial court granted respondents application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on
the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in
order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[7]
By Decision[8] of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of
respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing
petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a
writ ofhabeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and
political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life
and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information
or data on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[9] contending that
1) the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCOs
prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the
issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data.[10]
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is
clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that although ingeniously crafted as a
petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the

transfer of her place of work by her employer[11] and the terms and conditions of
her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the
implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondents place of
work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 792003[12] expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in laborrelated cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or
private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that
MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of
a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial

complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and
to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a
persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent
is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.[13]
Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del
Rosario[15]that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support
of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. [16] Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. [17] It
is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are
what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to
privacy vis-a-visthe right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners
refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. [18] And
she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real
intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22,

2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is
herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc.
No. 213-M-2008
is,
accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193636

July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte,
and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial
Office, Ilocos Norte,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to
Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010
Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City,
Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor
of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou
C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O.
Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the
Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No.
275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private
Armies in the Country."7The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission,8 was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the
future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission released and submitted
to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The
Independent Commission Against Private Armies Report to the President" (the Report). 10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a
series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG.12Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the

information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission, 13 thereby causing her inclusion in the
Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the
following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group
(STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities." 16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and
captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies
PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent
personalities with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a
PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa. 18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacaang on
March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP
report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four
(24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more than
eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but
that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring
the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the
Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbao stressed that the Commissions efforts have preempted the
formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the
PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan
also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow
fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation in
the field, the PNP complied with the Commissions recommendation that they revise their validation
system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by
the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the
PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. 21 Gamboa averred that
her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as
someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte
gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission. 23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious
or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the

Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. 25 In her Petition, she prayed for
the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b)
withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to
her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e)
restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face. 27 Thus, the trial
court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the
Zearosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the
Zearosa Commission, or to any other government entity, information that they may have gathered
against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the
writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23
July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their
mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. 29 The information stored in
their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a)
a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and
(b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well
as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the
following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to
privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security
of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the
location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information. 31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not
the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa. 32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition. 33 The trial court
categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as
published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs,
Gamboas right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her
life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG
could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security
that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further
malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was
certainly intrusion into Gamboas activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as
basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zearosa Commission was tasked
to investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
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By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused
respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the
Zearosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of
information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x. 34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from
respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zearosa Commission without the benefit
of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official
positions, information on her may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zearosa
Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose
information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the
Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010, 38 raising the following
assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as either a
necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link
respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission to [sic]
the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present
substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b)
the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient
proof showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a
PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to
dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the
gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful. 41 She also

reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information
originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this
Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of
habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and
finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis--vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long
way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission
of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is
much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more
than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of
fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
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x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of
the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of
the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme
Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy
which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
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So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language
of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the

individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological
age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 44 (Emphases
supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in
Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the
Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
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Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
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Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into
the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of

letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion
of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x. 46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 47 this Court
underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state
that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every
invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In
Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no
infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a
valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this
purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative
investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate
and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a persons right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence.
Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection, 51 this Court
can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of
citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its
national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary
replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military
security zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an
unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register, which was kept in
accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access. 54 He
claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political
background would warrant his classification in the register as a security risk. 56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life
of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an
interference in his right to respect for private life. 57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was
justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was
the protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection,
recording and release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must
be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social
need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia,
the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of
appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim
pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the
interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced against
the seriousness of the interference with the applicants right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the
Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect
and store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for
national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate interests through
the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public
service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the
Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, 3435), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his
leading a private life of his own choosing.

In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the
respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in
choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
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66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr.
Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of such
communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of
1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it
desirable that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the
Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control
(see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in
the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2).
Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to
consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual
interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was
subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
(Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of
whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in
this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the
relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of the state to
dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one police
force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a
national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an
investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books,
and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any
other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions. 63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take
all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes. 64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions
accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. 65 One of those
individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report
listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the
forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that
violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.
Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the
fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information
to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy
since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which
was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data
mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
1wphi1

Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence
gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the
accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the
right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into
ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." 67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential
nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach.
But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported
damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data
unnecessary and improper.
1wphi1

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ
of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No.
14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies
Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.