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Final Assignment

Prepared for; James Hess


Prepared by; David Doolittle
INTL410 AMU/APUS
June, 2016

Q1. Compare and contrast US CI to that of a foreign countrys CI/security services.


Counterintelligence (CI) has one aim, but numerous definitions, control thwart or
manipulate an adversarys intelligence efforts (Sims, 2009). All CI services of nation states serve
to fulfill this. As a result there are multiple foreign intelligence services (FIS) which operate
similarly. The majority of the global CI community has also adopted similar tradecraft (Johnson,
2009), meaning comparing two security services revolves around examining effectiveness or
interpreting the failures while they conduct CI. This essay examines the successes and failures of
two particular services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
The FBI and MOIS are domestic federal law enforcements organizations (LEO) of their
respective governments. Both were founded on similar pretexts, internal threats being perceived
as too grave to be handled by local LEOs. The US government believed at the turn of the century
the threat from anarchists could not be handled locally (Weiner, 2012). The MOIS initially
sought after security risks to the 1979 Iranian revolution (Rakel, 2007). Both entities created CI
departments as a result of skepticism to the influence foreign governments intelligence agencies
were having during critical times of government vulnerability.
The US government however feared the creation of a secret police therefore did not
pursue the idea of the FBI wholeheartedly (Bonaparte, 1908). It took a treasury secretary to
allocate the departments funds and personnel in 1908 while congress was in recess to create the
Bureau of Investigation (BOI) (ibid). The BOI transitioned from anarchists, to prohibitionists, to
wartime espionage in World War II (Weiner, 2012). In World War II the FBI began its formal CI
program mainly acting as a control and arrest mechanism for Nazi or Japanese intelligence
efforts domestically (Rafalko, 2004).
After the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, the threat of oppositional forces or foreign
influences took precedent for Iran. Revolutionaries formed kumitees (committees) to oversee
policing and exposing traitors (Curtis, 2008). The committees did not often have the policing or
intelligence experience required (Federal Research, 2012. Iran tapped employees of the previous
governments state police organization, SAVAK, to form Sazman Ettelaat va Amniat Melli Iran
(SAVAMA) (ibid). Kumittees felt marginalized, as did the personal protectors of Irans
revolutionary ideals the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Jones, 2011). Both groups
believed SAVAMA was unduly influenced by the former secularist government (ibid). SAVAMA
was integrated into the minister of intelligences office (MIO), and became a direct CI tool of the
Iranian president in 1981 (Federal Research, 2012).
The BOI and MIO both faced an integral event that forced the reorganization of the
policing function into a more counterintelligence centric role. Counterintelligence is not fully
police work and considering it so means not fully understanding the true aim of
counterintelligence (Sims, 2009). Foreign governments need the secret information of their
adversaries to build advantages against them (Godson, 2002). While policing does place those
guilty of collecting the information into custody it does not stop the totality of an adversary's
effort (Sims, 2009). Thus a balanced policing, using the CI function of investigation to lead to
arrests, needs to be incorporated into a comprehensive approach to CI functions (ibid).
Previous to World War II the BOI became the Division of Investigation (DOI) and the
FBI in 1935 (Weiner, 2012). During the 1930s FBI CI remained a policing force, arresting
criminals suspected of bootlegging or bank robberies (ibid). The discovery of 8 Nazi agents
planning to commit mass acts of sabotage against the United States in the late 1930s changed
Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 1

this (Rafalko, 2004). The FBI began wiretapping individuals suspected of foreign influence, and
when Pearl Harbor occurred this information was used to arrest Japanese whom may have been
foreign agents (Weiner, 2012). Throughout World War II the FBI acted in competition with the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to apply counterintelligence principles to their federal
policing function (Sims, 2009). Perception of threat drove the reorganization and the threats were
diverse: Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, the Japanese Empire, penetrated allied agencies, and
even those within the US government whom may be traitors.
The Iraq-Iran war, 1980-1988, forced Iranian CI to face the Iraqi Baathist partys Party
Intelligence (PI) (Federal Research, 2012). Under the direction of the second Iranian president,
ayatollah Mohammad Ali Rajaei, the MIO sought out the various Iranian based kurdish and
counterrevolutionary groups allied with PI (ibid). Overall though the MIO was ineffective at
stopping PIs external influence during the war. Domestically though the MIO became extremely
effective at finding traitors including a regiment of the Iranian air force prepared to stage a coup
in 1983 (Jones, 2011). From 1980-1983 the Iranian president gave pardon to former SAVAK
counterrevolutionaries, employing them in the MIO, without the Iranian supreme leader's
guidance (Federal Research, 2012). This could explain the domestic success as SAVAK was
extremely capable of finding and arresting the KGB influenced Tudeh party's members before
the revolution (Curtis, 2008). However employing a majority of former SAVAK in the MIO may
have created a rift between the Iranian president's actions and the Iranian parliament.
In 1983 the Iranian parliament decided the MIO had become too unilaterally a secular
institution controlled by the president. Consequently the parliament created the ministry of
intelligence and security (MOIS) (Federal Research, 2012). Strict rules were now put on
membership including a bachelor's degree in shiite theology (ibid). Mostly though the MOIS
separated the Iranian intelligence effort from strictly being a responsibility of the Iranian
president. It also allowed for the ayatollahs to make appointments to the MOIS, assign its
directives, and conduct oversight of its activities (Jones, 2011). The threat starting with Iraqi PI
drove this assemblage of MOIS, allowing for the separation of power discussed above.
It also allowed the MOIS to consolidate fully the IRGCs intelligence department. Doing
so facilitated the MOIS to begin strategic intelligence and CI operations in Shia muslim countries
under the guise of IRGC training. Components of the MOIS helped formed Hezbollah in 1985
and the IRGC provided military training (Jaber, 1997). The parliaments directives to the MOIS
also included the elimination of various opposition groups to the revolution (Federal Research,
2012). Whom were now perceived to be supported by Iraq, the British, United States, and after
the Iran-Iraq war the Israelis. The MOIS created 15 directorates for centralizing Iranian
intelligence activities: Security, Foreign Operations, Hefazat (protection), Technology, Politics,
Evaluation and Strategic Affairs, Education, Research, Archives and Documents, Manpower
(human resources), Administration and Finance, Legal-Parliamentary, Economy, Cultural-Social,
and Counterintelligence (ibid).
FBI CI and the MOIS have distinct differences as to how political reform separated then
maintained the entities CI authority. The church and pike commissions forced the publics
opinion of the FBIs counterintelligence activities (Sims, 2009). Even amongst an egregious
threat such as the Soviet Union expanding influence domestically, the FBI counterintelligence
activities of COINTELPRO drew heavy criticism from the public (ibid). COINTELPRO sought
to infiltrate peace activist and civil rights groups to determine if they were being unduly
influenced by the Soviet Union (ibid). The FBI employed a full spectrum of counterintelligence
activities including some considered borderline unconstitutional. The United States defined in

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 2

the 1947 National Security Act the role intelligence services were to serve, and more importantly
the constitutional boundaries . Following the reform the FBIs counterintelligence activities were
more defined to limit power and provide more public oversight.
In the 1990s the MOIS continued their centralized CI approach and covertly assassinated
opposition in Iran, and the Iranian government eventually admitted it to the people (Jones, 2011).
Since the MOIS is an institution designed to report its activities to the Iranian parliament and
president now, their congressional body did not seek reform. Public opinion of the foreign or
domestic CI activities did not matter in the theocracy, an extremely polar perspective from those
of the US public whom are protected with civil rights by the entirety of the US constitution.
These chain-murders occurred as the MOIS aided IRGC elements in covertly assassinating
Kurdish opposition abroad (Federal Research, 2012). In 1992 at a Greek restaurant in Berlin,
Mykonos, the MOIS gunned down 4 kurdish opposition leaders (ibid).
In terms of long term reform the FBI CI branched out its responsibilities, while the MOIS
continually consolidates them. FBI CI delegates some investigational and background collection
to contractors in the 21st century. The FBI, including the bureaus CI activities, is respondent to a
judiciary branch of the US government the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Weiner, 2012). While it
does contribute overall to the nation's security, FBI CI is not directly respondent to the US
president as the MOIS is to the Iranian president. In Iran the only CI duties delegated out are the
individual service branches or Artesh (Jones, 2011). Similarly the United States allows the armed
services to carry out CI (Sims, 2009). A major delegation of the CI duties from the MOIS also
could not occur with the strict membership guidelines the Islamic government posited. The
MOIS has though been known to recruit informants or spies from outside the Islamic
government and collude with allies that are non Muslim (Federal Research, 2012). These
members are only considered assets of MOIS CI and do not constitute members (ibid). All CI
besides Arteshs activities is centralized under MOIS (ibid).
The FBI drew help in developing domestic CI (FBI CI) from Great Britain's domestic
counterintelligence entity MI5 (Weiner, 2012). The MOIS can attribute half of its structural and
functional success to those whom helped form SAVAK before the revolution. SAVAK agents
were trained by British intelligence agents interested in maintaining the secularist government
for shared economic interests and later by the CIA to contain the communist threat in the KGB
influenced Iranian Tudeh party (Jones, 2011). The MOIS incorporated the tradecraft lessons of
classical CI from both western countries with the strategic direction the Islamic revolution
provided.
The FBI and the MOIS have several shared weaknesses. Both the FBI and MOIS have a
significant problem with preventing cyber attacks perpetrated by FIS or their proxies. These
attacks expressively are being conducted as espionage and or sabotage of critical cyber
infrastructure (United States, 2013). For the FBI this could be due to over delegation of CI
duties, namely principal cyber related CI activities. Cyber related CI activities by the FBI are
namely CI functional support to other organizations whom primary intelligence directive is
conducting cyber intelligence or security (ibid). Until recently this was the National Security
Agency (NSA), and now includes the US Cyber Command.
Despite the best efforts of the most talented individuals in the US government, cyber
espionage continues to occur more frequently year after year (Riordan, 2002). Again this is not
the individuals fault but rather likely an indication of a failure in the existing framework. Being
the primary domestic actor in US CI, the FBI should take a more prominent role beyond
functional support in cyber CI (United States, 2013). Even more the USCI community should

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 3

centralize under one body including a cyber CI component. Centralization does have its
drawbacks, and examples such as COINTELPRO demonstrate the abuse one organization
responsible for domestic CI can incur.
The MOIS shares this weakness, minus framework being the culprit. Computer virus
worms perpetrated by the USIC have debilitated Iranian nuclear facilities in the 2000s (United
States, 2013). MOIS has the benefit of simplified structure to conduct cyber CI but lacks the
known capability to prevent continued penetrations for now (ibid). Irans intelligence leadership
claims to know the importance of the internet but beyond this remains vulnerable (Federal
Research, 2012). Another weakness of MOIS CI has been critical infrastructure protection. In
2000 and 2003 FIS provided Iran with faulty and non compatible parts to their nuclear reactors.
Installing resulted in accidents setting back Irans strategic goal of being considered a nuclear
power globally (ibid). As a result of many successful sabotage efforts on the nuclear program the
MOIS developed a sub directorate , Oghab 2 (Eagle 2) in 2005 (Jones, 2011). Eagle 2 is
claimed by the current prime minster of defense, whom also was a former director of MOIS
counterintelligence, to have 10,000 agents (Federal Research, 2012). The purpose of Eagle 2 is to
protect the Iranian nuclear program from adversary infiltration (ibid). Since 2005 Iran has
arrested globally hundreds of suspected foreign spies and even more within Irans borders whom
are often executed after a farce trial (ibid). Many of these spies are claimed by the Iranian
government to have ties to the CIA and Mossad (ibid). Intelligence leadership makes these
claims because they also have suggested their intelligence assets have infiltrated many foreign
networks (ibid). Despite Eagle 2, between 2007 and 2013 several Iranian nuclear scientists were
assassinated supposedly by a myriad of western intelligence entities. Personnel security remains
a weakness (ibid).
Where Iran lacks in critical infrastructure protection and personnel security it exhibits
strength in not allowing penetration of substantial foreign intelligence networks. Adversary
intelligence services seldom have very few high level contacts in Iran (ibid). The MOIS is likely
difficult to penetrate because of its foundational ties to the revolution. As explained above
membership is impossible without a shia theology degree from an institution in Iran. It can be
assumed there is a significant amount of vetting before the educational process begins. Beyond
that the indoctrination the degree provides likely produces zealots extremely loyal to the Islamic
government. Getting a source to turn is highly unlikely without some additional exploitable and
defectors seldom surface from the regime. Most of the information provided here is from a very
small pool of defectors, which may also mean it was intentionally revealed to deceive western
intelligence services from understanding true capabilities and intentions of the MOIS (Federal
Research, 2012)(Jones, 2011).
The MOIS can not be thought of as impossible to penetrate, or efforts will continuously
fail to do so. The FBI however has had several key penetrations, one example is Robert Hanssen.
Robert Hanssen was a former FBI agent who spied for Russia (Wise, 2002). His doubling
operation lasted nearly two decades and it is thought the secrets he revealed led to the death of
many foreign US personnel (ibid). Hanssens lengthy betrayal colludes the accusation personnel
security was a weakness of the FBI CI department. More so Hanssen was seen as a strategic asset
to the strategic direction Russia wanted to take to dismantle their adversaries intelligence
services from within. The lessons from Hanssens damages can be to engage the adversary
intelligence service a strategic operation may produce the most successful results (Johnson,
2007). FBI CI operations can involve a double acting in a suspected FIS operating on US soil,
but this strategic approach is lacking in a majority of known USCI efforts. There lies another

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 4

weakness of FBI CI, the inability to prevent clandestine intelligence networks from developing
on US soil.
The reasoning behind this is simple, people are able to assemble into like minded groups
anywhere in the United States unless their activities result in laws being broken. Countries like
Iran do not have the rights to assemble, and the MOIS can search out suspects without probable
cause (Curtis, 2008). The FBI is not only limited in power but also protected from becoming a
secret police as congress feared so long ago by the US constitution (Bonaparte, 1908). It is
important the constitutional processes and limits set by congress on the intelligence community
are followed, in doing so though a FIS can establish a presence without fear of arrest until illegal
acts begin being committed.
FBI and MOIS CI organizations are extremely adept at finding arresting and punishing
individuals or groups suspected of physical espionage. Both organizations have fundamental
differences in their punishments though. Suspected spies in Iran are assumed guilty until proven
innocent, and often do not get the chance to be proven innocent before being publicly hung
(Curtis, 2008). Two suspected Mossad agents, whom Iran believes were responsible for
coordinating the kurdish assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, were hung before an
international trial could establish any partial innocence (Federal Research, 2012). In the US those
suspected of being foreign spies are put before a judge and jury, usually in a district court, unless
they are members of the military. Military spies are put before a military tribunal. In most cases
even spies found guilty are not executed in the modern era. The US DOJ and military tribunals
often arrange pleas in exchange for the useful information a spy may have on their employer, a
foreign intelligence service (Johnson, 2009).
As expected there are many similarities between the FBI and MOIS. This could be a
result of similar foundations, or that CI may be a universal craft (ibid). A proper examination of
the two services failures and successes occurred. Although there is still much to learn on the
MOIS as information is often limited. Better understanding the MOIS will require eventually a
strategic CI approach (Johnson, 2007). The FBI is uniquely different because of the system of
governance the United States has. It is possible then to better understand the MOIS more useful
political knowledge of the Iranian government needs to be incorporated.

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 5

Works Cited:
Banerjea, Udit. "Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps." Journal of Strategic Security JSS 8, no. 3 (2015): 93-106. doi:10.5038/2375-0901.8.3.1449.
Bonaparte, Charles Joseph. "Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States, 1908, p.7".
Curtis, Glenn E., and Eric J. Hooglund. Iran: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, 2008.
Federal Research Division. "Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile." The Library of Congress.
December 2012. Accessed June, 2016. https://fas.org/irp/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf .
Godson, Roy, and James J. Wirtz. Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002.
Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Johnson, Loch K. Strategic Intelligence. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007.
Johnson, William R. Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad How to Be a Counterintelligence Officer.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.
Jones, Oliver. "RS 84C Iran Insights- Irans Intelligence and Security Apparatus" UK Defense Forum. December
2011. Accessed June, 2016. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.457.4482.
Rafalko, Frank J. Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution to World War II. [Washington, D.C.]: National
Counterintelligence Center, 2004.
Rakel, Eva Patricia. "Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979-2006." Perspectives on
Global Development and Technology 6, no. 1 (2007): 159-87.
Riordan, Barrett. "State-Sponsored economic deception and its determinants." Intelligence and National Security 17,
no. 4 (2002): 1-30. doi:10.1080/02684520412331306620.
Sims, Jennifer E., and Burton L. Gerber. Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.
United States. Cyber Threats from China, Russia, and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure : Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee
on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 20, 2013.
2013.
Weiner, Tim. Enemies: A History of the FBI. New York: Random House, 2012.
Wise, David. Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America. New York: Random House,
2002.

Q2. Explain the responsibility of CI in a major Intelligence failure


Being able to understand daeshs intelligence apparatus is an ongoing major
counterintelligence failure of the US. Seemingly these attackers have been able to self radicalize

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 6

and carry out terrorist acts. However if one examines Abu Bakr Naji, whose name literally
translates to companion of the prophets safety, books that predate the creation of the so called
Islamic state an alternative explanation can be discerned. The titles of Najis that are referenced
include Governance In The Wilderness and The Management of Savagery. In examining
other academic work and journalism on daesh, Najis work may have created the environment
for a vast clandestine intelligence network to develop for the terrorist group. The implications of
which are visible today.
Naji is a prominent ideologue and well respected theoretician to daesh. In 2004 while the
US involvement in Iraq spiked, Najis first wrote Governance In The Wilderness (Naji, 2004).
In it he explained the lengths the jihadist movement needed to take. Najis first order of business
was to create a civil war between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq. By implementing this Naji
believed the overwhelming Sunni population could be recruited to build an Islamic state after the
sunnis won the war (Taheri, 2015). From here the war would expand to the wilderness, or areas
outside the Islamic states control against the non believers, to create global archipelagos of
liberated zones (ibid). It was important to Naji to not establish emirates because a centralized
Islamic government in a foreign country would draw military action against it, he cites the
Taliban government in Afghanistan as an example (Naji, 2004).
The head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq Zarqawi, adopted Najis ideas and used his organization to
direct terrorism at Shia Muslims in bombing campaigns during crucial Shia holy days. Naji
wrote The Management of Savagery as a guiding document to the future of salafist jihadism
after the region of Iraq had descended into regions of complete chaos or savagery (Naji, 2006).
Naji mentions several times in light of recent developments the process must begin
now to further the stages necessary to build the future Islamic caliphate (ibid). He is referring to
how a AQI movement after Zarqawis civil war can place itself to become a sunni Islamic State
and strategically create advantages which will maintain it. In terms of this strategy as it relates to
counterintelligence efforts, Naji sets up processes infiltrators of the adversary need to follow and
the framework for daeshs current intelligence policies. Management.. contains a section
entitled, Mastering the Security Dimension: Surveillance and Infiltrating Adversaries and
Opponents of Every Kind (ibid).
To begin this section Naji comments the conflict will be long and the time to begin
infiltration is now (ibid). Infiltrators are sought for their ability to blend in and work alongside
the Taghut. The Taghut were the name given to those worshipping idols other than Allah during
the time of Muhammed (Clark, 2003). When Naji was writing Management... he was a close
confidant of Zarqawi (Hume, 2015). By 2014 he was considered one of daeshs most prominent
ideologues without a formal position, or the title remained unknown to their adversaries likely
due to his importance. In the Islamic State a rise in position comes from continued
accomplishment and service to the organization. Advancement is not dissimilar to a mafioso type
organization. His contribution to the formation of the Islamic caliphate is undoubted, what is
often unrecognized is his contribution to creating its foreign intelligence policy. Demonstrated
successes may have caused his reputation within the group to accrue as Managements lessons
were adopted throughout the organization.
If even a few years after writing Management... Najis advice was taken literally the
infiltration of the wilderness would have began. Najis reference to the areas outside
Muhammeds territories include all of the areas where Muslims existed but were prosecuted for
their belief (Naji, 2006). Since all Islam is guided by the principle humans are Muslims, that
have yet to be awakened (Clark, 2003), the wilderness also includes all areas not recognizing

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 7

the correct interpretation of Sharia law. Naji believed these infiltrators would need to find
employment in industries unlikely to be suspected, or those containing the most defiant non
believers, among the wilderness (Naji, 2006).
Naji follows up in describing a security apparatus with an operational agent that will be
in contact with the infiltrator or operative (ibid). They are to wait for instructions to initiate an
act of destruction or if the infiltration has made carrying out an act claiming one or more
lives easy to proceed doing so (ibid). In counterintelligence terms this is the definition of a
sleeper agent or asset (Socrates, 2014).
In 2011 daesh took advantage of the Syrian civil war and created an operational base,
expanded, and created their envisioned caliphate (Clapper, 2016). Before this though Najis
Management.. mentions the most critical phase the Ummah must pass through (Naji, 2006).
At the heart of this phase is establishing the infiltrators that when the Islamic caliphate is
established can take the threat of foreign intervention away from the state (Naji, 2004). These
foreign acts of violence would demonstrating the power of the states reach to the Islamic world
through instilling fear in the inhabitants of the wilderness, including Muslims not aligned with
the Islamic state (Taheri, 2015).
In Governance In The Wilderness Naji explained the best means to do this would be
polar of Al-Qaedas few single large attacks modus operandi (Naji, 2004). Instead Naji
believed the Mujahid would have to make life for westerners unbearable through countless
small operations or ghazyas (Taheri, 2015). Ghazyas is the arabic word for raid, and
symbolically represent the military raids Muhammed took place in during his tenure as the
keeper of the Islamic faith and those taken by the first caliphs directly after his death (Clark,
2003).
Representatives of daesh explained the November 15th Paris attacks as their first
ghazya (Taheri, 2015). To Naji these ghazya needed to target every facet of life non believers
had. Especially with westerners in America whom Naji perceived as too weak willed for war
(ibid). He believed they would abandon their ways of life and convert to Islam furthering the
goal of a global caliphate (ibid). In the Quran Muhammed used the Ghazyas to set up conquering
Mecca and Medina, the first sunni Caliph used Ghazyas to expand influence in the non Muslim
world (What Are The Purposes, n.d.). It can only be interpreted from the salafist literalist
mindset, daesh hopes by the completion of theses raids following the early Islamic narrative, to
pass through to the final stage as a global caliphate.
These acts are also meant to draw in the zealous youths already willing to carry out
martyrdom (Naji, 2006). However the most important operations have to be chosen among
jihadists in the training process not revealing themselves to be pious or overtly religious, whom
can maintain their ideals while being surrounded by those who do not share them according to
Management.. (ibid). Following Najis death daesh will be left with only his texts, but the
framework for his legacy may have been established years ago in them.
In the most recent attacks daesh would like to make their adversaries governments
assume individuals were self radicalized after appearing to not be overtly religious, carry out an
attack, then recognize the martyrdom afterwards officially on social media. Doing so allows any
still active sleepers in their adversaries countries or the mechanisms which activate them to
continue infiltration and seeking out targets. It also makes the counterintelligence role nearly
obsolete when no security apparatus is identified to subvert deny or manipulate (Sims, 2009).
Which will continually lead to a counterintelligence failure until this intelligence apparatus is
identified (ibid).

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 8

Naji spoke of a security apparatus, communication agent to the operative, mujahids


the operative will visit in the wilderness, and secret codes the operative must have to put him
in touch with the central security apparatus (Naji, 2006). All of this has the characteristics of a
classical clandestine intelligence network (Socrates, 2014). The operative is the intelligence asset
(ibid). The communication agent is the operatives handler (ibid). The mujahids would be
intelligence or logistics support to the operatives infiltration mission whom come to the
wilderness to occupy an area. This could be considered renting or owning a building for the
purposes of supplying and having a safehouse for the operative (ibid). Naji recommends the
Mujahid remain in the wilderness unless the operatives mission results in martyrdom (Naji,
2006). The security apparatus is the center for collection of information, issuing of orders, and
furthering strategic directives the sleeper operatives can carry out (ibid).
Beginning in 2013 daesh began issuing social media threats using hashtag campaigns on
twitter from supposed sympathizers (Macias, 2014). Then in 2014 vague threats that they were
already among us surfaced (AP, 2016). This followed in 2015 with cryptic messages of the US
states daesh supposedly had their people in ready to carry out attacks (ibid). These should not be
seen as threats propaganda or attempts to stir fear, but the truth. The confidence to be able to
make these statements occurs when the actuality of having the capability to carry out an attack is
present (Kam, 2004). Daesh has this capability and sadly has demonstrated it since, while
retaining deniability any clandestine intelligence network likely built the advantages necessary.
Instead, like earlier sections of Najis document indicate, the Islamic state has carried out a
propaganda campaign to confuse and deceive on a massive scale to their true intentions,
simultaneously convincing the youth enabled by social media to join the movement (Naji, 2006).
At the very least the level of social media presence the security apparatus has is
ambiguous (Berger, 2015). It is impossible to discern sympathizers from actual daesh assets
without further information. It is possible the security apparatus could be using this method to
activate sleepers, or pass coded information to communication agents. The majority of Muslims
do not approve of the caliph Baghdadi or his means in establishing a caliphate. This is not
evident when examining the social media support the Islamic state has (ibid). It may be
indication a large portion of the accounts supporting daesh are fictitious, and the creation of their
central security apparatus. Any operatives using this method for activation or receiving orders
from either the communication agent or central security would likely not be active on social
media. It is far more likely the individual(s) would have knowledge of the username, then
observe activity on the account, to maintain anonymity while utilizing this operational tool.
In examining the 2015 San Bernadino and 2016 Orlando terrorist attacks there are many
operational similarities. The San Bernardino shooters found casual employment in a service
industry of mentally disabled people's (AP, 2016), while in Orlando the shooter infiltrated the
LGBT community through social media platforms also visiting the target for over a year (Mickle,
2016). The means of doing so involved some knowledge of tradecraft, especially with the
Orlando shooter whom exploited members of the LGBT community to likely gain operational
information to his target. It is unknown how long both were sleepers of the security apparatus but
both fit the profile Naji required: not particularly religious, able to be strengthened in the faith
while surrounded by Taghuts, and personality to lead double lives (Naji, 2006). Both also made
baya, pledging allegiance, only after the attack was set into motion (Wagemakers, 2015). In the
case of the San Bernardino shooters, significant effort was made to preserve operational security
in destroying the electronics used by the operatives in a nearby lake the morning of the attack
(AP, 2016).

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 9

The Director of National Intelligence believes one of the reasons it is difficult to catch
potential ISIL attackers is the group is extremely concerned with operational security (Clapper,
2016). Daesh uses nearly unbreakable encryption in peer to peer communications, so even if a
relationship between an operative and communication agent was discovered it may be impossible
to discern the true identities (AP, 2016). The US counterintelligence community may have more
success in burning identities of daeshs clandestine network through understanding the structural
form it takes. It's possible the mechanisms behind it have been in front of the public's eye since
Management of Savagery was published (Naji, 2006).
Documents recovered in 2014 from raids on daeshs Syrian facilities indicate the
structure of their Islamic government's secret services (Reuter, 2015). It can be assumed despite
these being for regions of the Islamic state, they are also adopted structures for foreign
intelligence activities until proven otherwise. The structure is headed by an Emir of the Security
Division For A Region, then followed by branching deputies, whom control individual roles in
the secret service, and supervisory roles of Islamic law reporting to the region's security Emir
(ibid).
In this framework the communication agent role in a clandestine network would be the
representative of the security division whom is responsible for individual secret services
personnel and information cells (ibid). This role reports directly to the Emir of Security for A
District whom reports only to Emir of security for the region (ibid). The Emir of a region makes
direct recommendations to the caliph and his council if daesh follows the historical system of
governance to a caliphate (Clark, 2003). The United States is considered a region of the future
caliphate and it is passing through the phase of vexation and exhaustion as Najis words dictate
(Hume, 2015)(Taheri, 2015). Until daeshs regional authority is established in this wilderness
it is unlikely the provisional security framework would include positions supporting security of
Sharia law (Hume, 2015). It would however have Security Emirs of the Region (the United
States), Emirs of districts (however the United States is divided), and representatives of the
security division or communication agents in this interpretation of Najis work (Naji, 2006).
This framework creates a limited channel of communication directly to the caliph if it
exists as is. Much like the infamous operations of the UK and US during world war II were
highly successful due to exploiting the Nazis limited channels (Sims, 2009), discovering the
nodes in this relationship may provide counterintelligence a means to monitor issuance orders of
strategic direction from regional Emir positions or even Baghdadi himself. This could lead to
exposure of future operations in planning stages. In monitoring information communication
agents collect from their operatives US counterintelligence could learn the potential targets
selected and how the central security apparatus responds to various operative actions. Knowing
the reactions the central authority presents to various operative actions could lead to designing
false information to be planted in the nodes of communication that would be recepted as truth.
Both directional communications can be monitored for a myriad of potential exploitable avenues
if these nodes are discovered.
The United States foreign counterintelligence community may need to focus on
exploiting the relationships between descending levels of this framework beyond simply
monitoring when engaging counterintelligence in ISILs territory. An active offensive
counterintelligence approach may lead to the revelation of domestic operatives identities, or at
least the mechanisms between the central authority and the operatives (ibid). A goal should be to
secure a reliable double agent of ISILs domestic security apparatus. The counterintelligence

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 10

effort will need shared support between the domestic and foreign counterintelligence community
of the United States government. A central nexus point for this collaboration could be the NCIX.
From each failure US counterintelligence has comes an opportunity to expand the CI
knowledge base by understanding the enemy's capabilities and intentions, then make applicable
the lessons to future uses of counterintelligence across the community. No direct responsibility
for the intelligence failures provided here should attempt to chastise one service or the other.
While tragic, the greatest justice that can be delivered for the victims of these attacks is to use
this knowledge to mitigate or lessen threats in the future.

Final Assignment: Doolittle (June, 2016) 11

Works Cited:
AP. "In the Media: From ISIS in America to San Bernardino." Center for Cyber & Homeland Security The George
Washington University. 2016. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Media%20Coverage.pdf.
Berger, J.M., and Jonathan Morgan. "The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS
supporters on Twitter." Brooking's Center For Middle East Policy. March 20, 2015.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-bergermorgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf.
Clapper, James R. "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community." United States Committee on
Armed Services. February 9, 2016. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pdf.
Clark, Malcolm. Islam for Dummies. New York, NY: Wiley Pub, 2003.
Hume, David. "The Management of Savagery." Think Defence. March 16, 2015.
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/03/management-savagery/.
Kam, Ephraim. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004.
Macias, Amanda. "ISIS Has A New Twitter Hashtag For Threats Against Americans." Business Insider. June 27,
2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-using-twitter-to-make-threats-to-us-2014-6.
Mickle, Tripp. "Investigators Probe Whether Orlando Shooter Used Gay Dating App." Wall Street Journal. June 14,
2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/investigators-probe-whether-orlando-shooter-used-gay-dating-app-1465932752.
Naji, Abu Bakr. Governance In The Wilderness. 2004.
Naji, Abu Bakr, and William McCants. "The Management Of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage The Ummah Will
Pass Through." Strategic Studies At Harvard University. May 23, 2006.
https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stagethrough-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf.
Reuter, Christoph. "Islamic State Files Show Structure of Islamist Terror Group." SPIEGEL ONLINE. April 18,
2015. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a1029274.html.
Sims, Jennifer E., and Burton L. Gerber. Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10313997.
Socrates. "Terms and Definitions For Counterintelligence Professionals." Federation Of American Scientists. June
9, 2014. https://fas.org/irp/eprint/ci-glossary.pdf.
Taheri, Amir. "The Jihadis Master Plan to Break Us." New York Post. November 15, 2015.
https://nypost.com/2015/11/15/the-jihadis-master-plan-to-break-us/.
Wagemakers, Joas. "The Concept of Bay a in the Islamic States Ideology." Perspectives On Terrorism 9, no. 4
(August 2015).
"What Are the Purposes of Wars That Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) Fought?" Questions on Islam. June 17, 2013.
http://www.questionsonislam.com/article/what-are-purposes-wars-prophet-muhammad-pbuh-fought.

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