Springer 2006

Journal of Business Ethics (2007) 70:235245

DOI 10.1007/s10551-006-9108-3

An Ethical Decision-Making Framework

for Competitor Intelligence
Gathering

ABSTRACT. Competitor intelligence gathering involves

the aggregation of competitive information to facilitate
strategic development and a competitive advantage.
Unfortunately, companies are sometimes willing to carry
out questionable gathering practices to collect such information. An ethical decision making framework for competitor intelligence gathering is presented in this paper that
outlines the impact of several strengthening and weakening
factors on individual ethical reasoning. Dialogue is provided about the management of intelligence gathering from
various viewpoints, and the implications of these managerial suggestions are discussed.

Introduction
In order to enhance competitiveness and survivability, companies must effectively gather and utilize
strategic information about competitors. However,
the manner in which such information is collected
and utilized remains a concern. From an ethical
standpoint, what types of information-gathering
activities should be considered either acceptable or
questionable? The purpose of this paper is to present
Terri Rittenburg is an Associate Professor of Marketing at the
University of Wyoming; she is a member of the Editorial
Policy Board for the Journal of Macromarketing. Her research
has appeared in journals such as Psychology and Marketing,
Journal of Business Ethics, and Journal of Macromarketing.
Sean Valentine is an Associate Professor of Management at the
University of Wyoming. His research has appeared in journals such as Human Relations, Journal of Business Research,
Journal of Business Ethics, and Journal of Personal Selling &
Sales Management.
James Faircloth is an Associate Professor of Marketing at the
University of North Dakota.He has previously published in
the Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice and Psychological Reports.

Terri L. Rittenburg
Sean R. Valentine
James B. Faircloth

a theoretical framework that outlines various factors

that impact ethical decision making in competitor
intelligence gathering situations. This paper also
explores current trends that suggest the growing
importance of this issue in todays global environment, and discusses the challenges associated with
competitor intelligence gathering, as well as some
possible solutions and future research.
Background
The importance of ascertaining competitors programs and strategies in the business environment is
widely noted, and success is often based on the
ability to respond to the conditions monitored (e.g.,
Hill and Jones, 2001; Kotler, 2001; Pearce and
Robinson, 2005). Indeed, Kotler (2001) postulated
that organizations should be interested in both their
competitors and customers, and a Conference Board
survey found that a majority of organizations surveyed believed that assessing the competitive competencies of other firms was very important, with
many intending to increase such gathering efforts
(Englade, 1989). Such intelligence gathering is often
conceptualized as the utilization of available business
information to construct positive corporate strategies
and plans (e.g., Luecal and Dahl, 1995).
According to Society of Competitor Intelligence
Professionals (SCIP), intelligence gathering activities
are escalating at a rapid rate (Trumbull, 1992), and
several trends seem to influence the manner in which
intelligence is managed. Highly sophisticated research methods encourage companies to ardently
maintain information privacy, and deregulation
reduces organizations obligation to disclose organizational data to government agencies for public access

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Terri L. Rittenburg et al.

(Beltramini, 1986). Furthermore, industry competition is becoming more intense, and benchmarking
encourages companies to continually evaluate their
core competencies and position relative to competitors (Camp, 1989). Increasing technologies in the
business environment provide much information,
and many organizations are utilizing outside expertise
to manage this increased intelligence inflow (Englade, 1989; Gruber, 1992; Schlossberg, 1990).
Despite the positive impact and growth of intelligence gathering, there exists a variety of associated
ethical issues and challenges. Triantar et al. (1988,
p. 46) assert that ...a growing number of professionals
are taking corporate sleuthing out of the back alley and
into the boardroom, but it is also recognized that
most efforts are tedious. For example, foreign and
domestic corporate spying is common (e.g., Asiaweek, 1995; Carley, 1994; Dawkins, 1995; Doyle,
1992; Galen, 1991; Grier, 1995; Jones, 1992;
McCartney, 1994; Seib, 1992; Sinai, 1993), and CIA
sources claim that more than 50 countries utilize spies
in the U.S. to gather economic intelligence, while FBI
inquiries of economic espionage have increased
greatly (Anderson and Binstein, 1996). This is a
concern because business and governmental institutions are often adversely affected (e.g., Anderson and
Binstein, 1996; Schweizer, 1996). Since the conclusion of the Cold War, spies have found employment in
both governmental and private organizations. U.S.
intelligence experts believe that more than 6 million
domestic jobs vanished in the 1990s because of economic espionage (Anderson and Binstein, 1996), and
a variety of high-tech and defense industries appear to
be the most adversely affected. According to Brod
(1995, p. A15), American businesses are not lining up
to invite government intelligence operatives into their
strategic
planning
sessions.
Additionally,
OShaughnessy (1984) claimed that the use of spies is
dubious because individuals have an interest in perpetuating their employment and might exaggerate the
relevance of their findings or draw attention away
from information that contradicts their conclusions.
Such circumstances might also influence corporate ethical cultures. If industrial espionage becomes
the norm, it is likely that many other internalized
corporate functions are detrimentally affected. For
instance, if an organizations marketing group
engages in unethical intelligence gathering and is
rewarded, this might suggest to the accounting

division that the same dubious practices can be used

to enhance reported earnings. Such an outcome
could ultimately prompt greater government regulation and decreased corporate autonomy.
Since unethical intelligence gathering adversely
affects the business environment, an assessment of
the approaches implemented to gather such information is needed to facilitate further investigation.
Additionally, the added understanding provided by
an academic evaluation of intelligence gathering
ethics should encourage the development of prescriptive guidance that might enhance the management of the process itself. Consequently, the basis of
this study is the presentation and discussion of a
framework highlighting the individual ethical reasoning process in questionable intelligence gathering
situations, as well as the factors that influence this
cognitive model (see Figure 1). In particular, it is
likely that businesspersons facing ethical problems
related to intelligence gathering recognize the presence of an ethical problem, assess the situation,
establish intentions to behave in an ethical manner,
and behave ethically (e.g., Jones, 1991; Rest, 1986).
According to several models of ethical reasoning in
business (e.g., Brass et al., 1998; Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991;
Trevino, 1986), this core process should be either
strengthened by positive individual, situational, or
contextual factors or weakened by negative conditions that prevent ethical behavior. Figure 1 presents
a framework for ethical decision making in competitor intelligence gathering situations, and this
model highlights some of the more noteworthy
factors that affect an individuals approach to corporate intelligence. The following sections highlight
common ethical issues in information gathering, as
well as some of the personal, situational, and contextual factors that either strengthen or weaken
ethical intelligence practices.

Factors that strengthen ethical decision making

in intelligence gathering situations
The ethics of global competitor intelligence gathering
is an obvious concern to organizations, particularly
those with valuable secrets to protect. Stakeholders
must adopt ethical principles that raise industry and
corporate standards in order to address these concerns.

Framework for Competitor Intelligence Gathering

237

Figure 1. Ethical decision making framework for competitor intelligence gathering (adapted from components presented in other business ethics models e.g. Brass et al. (1998); Ferrell and Gresham (1985); Hunt and Vitell (1986);
Jones (1991); Rest (1986); Trevino (1986); Wotruba (1990).

The following sections summarize several factors that

should enhance the ethics of gathering information at
both the macro and micro levels.
Government regulations/laws
Governments often regulate business activity and
develop laws to protect the interests of both companies and consumers. Government might therefore
take a leadership role in the identification of unacceptable intelligence gathering activities and the
subsequent encouragement of organizations to
publicly disclose corporate misconduct. Evidence
suggests that this is already occurring, and governments utilize different approaches to protect domestic
companies from foreign entities unethical conduct.
As Schweizer (1996) suggests, nations privacy
laws provide a high level of protection and a strong

vehicle for prosecuting those who steal information.

One example of the governmental protection is the
U.S. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (GPO, 1996),
which made the stealing of trade secrets illegal and
increased penalties for theft that is authorized by a
foreign government. The legislation also presents a
list of important American commercial areas that
should be safeguarded. An earlier law that was
implemented in 1994 enabled the attorney general to
reward up to $500,000 for efforts minimizing economic espionage (Pasternak and Witkin, 1996).
Furthermore, the National Counterintelligence
Center was advanced in 1994 to reduce concerns
over economic espionage (Pasternak and Witkin,
1996). This legislation protects corporate proprietary
information and establishes paradigms for global
business (Schweizer 1996).

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Terri L. Rittenburg et al.

Another governing organization that monitors

international commercial activity is the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which provides normative
guidance about the bartering among its 146 member
nations. In particular, the WTO has reached a
consensus over the exchange of intellectual property
rights (WTO, 1997), which affects some competitor
intelligence gathering functions. However, issues
related to industrial espionage have not been fully
explored (WTO, 1997), and these concerns might
be addressed within industries and firms.
Established societal/industry/business norms
On a macro level, businesses operate within a societal and industry framework to provide products to
consumers, work to employees, and wealth to
shareholders. Companies are managed and governed
overall by the general population via the government and legal system. A social contract is essentially
developed through the accentuation of property
rights, the legal functions of companies, and the
publics recognition of the markets (McNulty,
1993). The writings of Adam Smith also suggest that
justice and the presence of an underlying ethics code
are important aspects of the contracts between
society and organizations (see Dixon, 1984; Guillet
de Monthoux, 1993; Shepard et al., 1991).
According to Dixon (1984, p. 16), Only within the
prevailing moral climate and legal environment does
the market connect the behavior of individuals to
form a system of unconscious cooperation that
contributes to societal welfare. Fritzsche (1997) also
suggested that unethical actions adversely affect
markets at the macro level and can cause an
improper distribution of valuable resources, which
implies that even the most self-interested organizations operate within a basic moral framework.
Friedman (1970) refers to this system as the rules of
the game that encourage organizations to function
competitively and honestly. Levitt (1958, p. 49)
claimed that firms need ...to obey the elementary
canons of everyday face-to-face civility (honesty,
good faith, and so on) and to seek material gain.
A variety of ethical guidelines establish various
rules of the game for competitive intelligence
gathering. For instance, Wade (1965) classified
business information both legally and ethically, and
these categories were adapted into a new information framework by Laczniak and Murphy (1993).

The Wade System is comprised of three different

classifications of intelligence gathering that include
ethical, arguably unethical, and illegal practices. Each of these three categories contains
descriptions of various behaviors that exemplify the
particular classification, providing prescriptive guidance to intelligence gathering professionals. Paine
(1993) also segmented questionable intelligence
gathering techniques into three basic types, which
include informational deceit or misrepresentation,
the use of enticements to obtain confidential information, and covert surveillance activities.
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges is identifying the appropriate rules of the game for operating in the global environment. Individual and
organizational ethical orientations are often based on
generalized moral principles derived from regional
and national cultural ideologies (Owens, 1983;
Wines and Napier, 1992), and such orientations may
or may not prompt the most appropriate course of
action in the global context. For instance, Falkenberg (1996) claimed that organizations need ethical
standards for business conduct, and that these standards might need to override local norms when
differences are realized.
Several universalistic frameworks provide suggestions for cross-cultural decision making. In particular, Donaldson (1989) developed a model of
global decision making specifying that value incongruities must be identified and evaluated on several
economic and universal standards. Getz (1995)
offered another perspective based on five universal
principles identified across several global organizations that include national sovereignty, social
equity, basic human rights, market integrity,
and organizational autonomy. National sovereignty gives cultures the power to influence what is
considered acceptable conduct, and social equity and
basic human rights impact this ability. Organizational autonomy enables companies to function
according to the law. Perhaps most relevant with
respect to competitor intelligence gathering is the
value of market integrity, which represents a marketplace that is competitive, honorable, and free
moving. While these perfect conditions are likely
impossible, competition is one of the most important
components of market integrity. The free flow of
information is therefore valuable when buyers and
sellers can easily obtain such knowledge. Farmer

Framework for Competitor Intelligence Gathering

(1987) claimed that open societies with readily
available information facilitate global exchange and
economic progress more so than do closed systems.
Yet, unethical competitor intelligence gathering can
increase self-interest and reduce market integrity and
competition.
Professional approaches/standards
The importance of competitor intelligence has
promoted the development of a professional organization called the SCIP (Jones, 1992; Schlossberg,
1990). The organization and its members clearly
differentiate between competitive information
gathering and other intelligence activities such as
spying (Jones, 1992). According to Leonard Fuld,
who is head of the Boston-based consulting firm
Fuld & Co., One is legal, ones illegal. Ones
ethical, ones unethical (Jones, 1992, p. 62). The
members of the SCIP also sustain an ethics code that
supports acceptable intelligence practices (Western,
1995), and professional ethical standards can enhance
individuals ethicality (e.g., Dean, 1997; HiggsKleyn and Kapelanis, 1999; Valentine and Fleischman, 2005). Increased international membership in
organizations such as SCIP, as well as the adoption of
the SCIP ethics code, suggests a growing emphasis
on the positive management and policing of the
competitor intelligence function overall.
Organizational approaches/standards
Besides relying on professional and normative standards, business leaders should also consider competitor intelligence when developing organizational
guidelines and strategies (Paine, 1993), especially
since research suggests that organizational guidelines
and codes do not always adequately address competitor intelligence gathering issues (Getz, 1990). In
particular, creating an ethical organizational environment and involving employees in company
planning might diminish questionable intelligence
gathering (e.g., Beltramini, 1986; Cohen and Czepiec, 1988). Educational programs should accentuate
the gravity of intelligence confidentiality and highlight the ethical dilemmas that personnel might
encounter in their jobs (Laczniak and Murphy,
1993; Western, 1995). Johnson and Maguire (1988)
suggested that firms improve security systems,
monitor employees for misconduct, and increase
individual awareness of business espionage.

239

Companies could create internal ethical codes to

better advance desirable standards of conduct (e.g.,
Farrell and Farrell, 1998; McCabe et al., 1996;
Murphy, 1995, 1998; Sims, 1991; Valentine and
Barnett, 2002). According to Adams et al. (2001,
p. 199), ethics codes improve the organizational
climate so that individuals can behave ethically, and
institutionalize the morals and values of the company founders such that they become part of the
corporate culture and help socialize new individuals
into the culture. Ethics training outlining a companys ethics might also enhance ethical intelligence
gathering (e.g., Chen et al., 1997; Loe and Weeks,
2000; Minkes et al., 1999; Sims, 1991). Furthermore, firms should consider emphasizing acceptable
ethical values and practices (e.g., Akaah and Lund,
1994; Badovick and Beatty, 1987; Hunt et al., 1989;
Schein, 1985; Trevino et al., 1998). Reidenbach and
Robin (1991, p. 273) stated, it is the organizations
culture that undergoes moral development, and
such an environment enhances employees support
for business ethics (Goodman and Dean, 1989; Sims,
1991). Ethical standards should therefore be articulated by the organization in its day-to-day routine
activities (Fritz et al., 1999, p. 290).
A number of specific tools should facilitate these
efforts. For instance, the SCIP ethical standards
provide organizations with a viable framework for
developing their own ethics codes and training.
Paine (1993) concluded that managers must build
commitment to ethical codes and values, actively
discuss what constitutes questionable information
gathering, and reward ethical practices when they
occur. By supporting a competitive system that
respects the principles of common morality and the
right of rivals not to divulge certain information,
management supports its own vitality and the vitality
of the competitive system (Paine 1993, p. 279).
Laczniak and Murphy (1993) suggested that the
Wade System be utilized to make evaluations about
information, and that employees be informed about
unacceptable intelligence gathering. The Ethical
Top Ten and Dirty Dozen standards include
positive practices ignored in the Wade System such
as debriefing various interested parties and using
headhunters to obtain internal company information, as well as unethical practices such as misrepresentation to gain access to proprietary
information (see Johnson and Maguire, 1988). A

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Terri L. Rittenburg et al.

similar evaluation system is offered in the Ten

Commandments of Legal and Ethical Intelligence
Gathering (see Fuld, 1995).
Perceived potential for customer backlash
Organizations must also develop strategies to combat
unethical intelligence gathering, which could
increase the costs of doing business, as well as the
price customers must pay for products and services.
Furthermore, information collected illicitly might
disadvantage consumers further if competition is
lessened. Trust can also be an issue. Many consumers
reasonably expect that businesses ...obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-face civility...
(Levitt, 1958, p. 49). If ethical standards are overlooked, a lack of trust in the institution or business
(or diminished consumer confidence) is likely to
follow. Consequently, intelligence gathering needs
to be managed institutionally to prompt ethical
behavior.

Factors that weaken ethical decision making in intelligence

gathering situations
Technology
Technological advances make information more
accessible, promote globalization, and encourage
increased information gathering among companies.
New technology also facilitates the selection of key
indicators for analysis, as well as the combining of
different information sources. Not only are more
data obtainable, but also the information is available
faster and updated more frequently. For example,
the global business information collected by the U.S.
Department of Commerce that was once available
through updated paper publications can now be
accessed through the Internet. Similar public company information such as annual and financial reports
is now available through electronic sources.
Despite the associated advantages, the use of
technology can also be a challenge. According to
Johnson and Maguire (1988, p. 171), Spy technology has become a major industry, leading to
increasingly sophisticated products and an everexpanding public interest, and advertisements for
such products are widely printed. Today, ads for
such equipment appear regularly in mass-market
magazines, promoting surveillance gear as executive

tools, communication aids, protection insurance,

or simply high-tech toys (p. 172). Personal
computers and the Internet have also created security
concerns for companies (Carey, 1993; Geyelin,
1995), and these issues are only indirectly considered
in the SCIP ethics code.
The impact of technology is critical to an
understanding of competitor intelligence gathering
not only in terms of the available devices, but also
because of the psychology that drives the process.
Although spies formerly had to get more involved in
their intelligence gathering activities, technology has
transformed spying into an impersonal action that is
often quite easy to perform and rationalize (Johnson
and Maguire, 1988). In fact, many spies randomly
explore the vast information available with the hope
that something important will be identified. The
ease with which competitors technology information can be located also encourages further investigation (Pepper, 1990).
Corporate collaboration
Another trend that affects intelligence gathering is
competitor collaboration through strategic alliances.
Strategic alliances involve cooperative arrangements
developed among different organizations to obtain a
competitive advantage (Hill, 2005), and the number
of these agreements has risen from a global standpoint for several decades. While such collaboration is
beneficial overall, companies must be careful not to
give away more than they gain. For example,
auditors in Congress found that foreign-owned
organizations obtain highly classified American
defense information through their subsidiaries located in the U.S. (Diamond, 1996). Even though the
growth in competitor collaborations might lead to
unethical intelligence gathering as indicated by the
SCIP ethics code, there is nothing inherently
unethical about the collaborations themselves.
Therefore, specific unethical actions within the
context of these collaborations should be monitored
and ultimately decreased with managerial action.
Concentrated/high competition
Increased competition and corporate restructuring
characterize the current global environment, which
also creates different competitor intelligence gathering challenges. The formation of the WTO and
the new emphasis on emerging markets continually

Framework for Competitor Intelligence Gathering

pressure companies to develop high-quality global
products. Furthermore, concentration within
industries creates larger organizations that wield
more industry power through predatory practices.
Beltramini (1986) suggested that various economic
and foreign competitive challenges encourage
organizations to more aggressively pursue intelligence gathering. With global trade barriers falling,
companies operating more smartly, and competition
growing ever fiercer, more companies are starting or
expanding competitive intelligence units (Western,
1995), and the augmented need for intelligence
could increase unethical practices. For example, it is
reasonable to expect unethical intelligence gathering
in international bidding situations where such practices provide an advantage.
Inexperience with competitor intelligence gathering
The increased emphasis on competitor intelligence is
further augmented by the growth in new small
businesses over the last several decades. Since 1980,
the American economy has created approximately
34 million new jobs in the start-up sector. Additionally, more than 3 million new entrepreneurial
companies are formed each year in the U.S. (Timmons and Spinelli, 2004). Many of these new businesses are likely inexperienced with regard to
competitive intelligence, which might increase their
utilization of questionable practices to remain competitive. Indeed, much of the growth in electronically accessible competitive information benefits
larger organizations rather than newly formed small
businesses. Furthermore, Lee (1990) indicates that
competitive intelligence is vital to smaller and more
responsive companies, and traditional information
gathering might not satisfy the demand for information. Competitive intelligence gathering inexperience is suggested in an SCIP survey, which
reported a majority of organizations participating
indicated that their competitor intelligence activities
have been organized for five years or less, and that a
majority of their competitor intelligence professionals had five or fewer years of tenure in their jobs
(Martin and Stedman, 1991). Many professionals
were also employed in departments related to corporate planning or marketing, and almost half of the
individuals who participated in the study indicated
that they spent less than one-third of their time on
intelligence gathering.

241

Varying ethical standards in industries and nations

Perhaps one of the greatest challenges is identifying
the appropriate standards for operating in the global
environment. Individual and organizational ethical
orientations are often based on generalized moral
principles derived from regional and national cultural ideologies (Owens, 1983; Wines and Napier,
1992). An approach that captures underlying values
common across cultures is necessary. Falkenberg
(1996) indeed claimed that organizations need ethical standards for business conduct, and that these
standards should override local norms when differences are realized.
Unfortunately, the SCIP Code provides little
guidance in cultural conflicts that prompt ethical
inconsistencies. The SCIP Code requires organizations to comply with all applicable laws, domestic
and international. There is no provision for differing laws that reflect the divergent national cultures. Following SCIP standards could potentially
institutionalize unethical practices that exist in different regions and cause conflicts in cultures that
reprimand such actions. Consider the dilemma that
results when a company does business in a country
that condones bribery. The SCIP ethics code would
seem to decry bribery if a countrys standards speak
against such conduct, yet behaving ethically might
be difficult when the result is an economic loss.
Other companies questionable intelligence gathering
practices
Unethical intelligence gathering likely prompts a
variety of negative outcomes. When unethical
conduct occurs, organizations must either engage in
questionable activities that incur additional costs or
they must choose not to act unethically and risk not
sustaining a competitive position. The recognized
tactics of competitors also appear to influence these
generalized attitudes. Many businesspeople perceive
that competitors go beyond generally accepted
gathering practices, which can escalate a companys
own questionable actions (Cohen and Czepiec,
1988). Rehbein et al. (1992) concluded that business
professionals beliefs about the severity of questionable activity are often higher than reality, which
causes a rationalization of further unethical business
practices. Even though questionable conduct can be
justified, the SCIP ethics code does not condone
such conduct, and executives should be realistic

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Terri L. Rittenburg et al.

about competitors unethical conduct (Rehbein

et al., 1992).
Discussion
Competitive intelligence gathering is an increasingly
vital tool in todays global marketplace, but pressures
to gather intelligence have resulted in some unethical practices. We discussed the nature of competitive intelligence ethical problems and extant
attempts to cope with the unethical practices that
occur. This study proposed a framework for considering internal and external environmental factors
that should strengthen or weaken the competitive
intelligence gathers ethical decision making process.
In presenting this framework, we discussed an ethical
decision making process that is conceptualized as a
continuum ranging from recognition of an ethical
competitor intelligence gathering situation to actual
behavior relative to the situation. Additionally, we
presented a discussion of the relevant factors that
strengthen ethical decision making, such as government regulations and laws, societal norms,
and organizational and professional codes and
guidelines. Finally, we suggested factors that would
weaken the ethical decision making process, such as
development of technology, increased competition and business development, and concern for
a competitors violations. This research fills a significant literature gap, that is, no previous attempts
to model the contextual and situational factors that
influence the ethical decision making process in
competitive intelligence gathering.
Through the framework, we believe ethical
decision making for competitive intelligence gathering can be proactively managed. While the
environmental variables that weaken ethical decision
making might not be directly controlled, their impact can be mitigated by development and nurturing
of the strengthening factors. How can this be
accomplished? A number of managerial actions can
be considered. Corporate secrets can be managed
and protected through technology that more reliably
secures them from competitor intelligence gatherers.
Thus, technology that prompts ethical reasoning
may be utilized to mitigate unethical competitive
intelligence attempts. Competitive collaborations
can be affirmatively managed to require full disclosure of all interests and clearly indicate what intelli-

gence gathering is acceptable to partners, and

sensitizing employees to the need for discretion
involving inappropriate disclosures. The prevalence
of more competitive markets should force managers
to assume competitive information is being targeted,
particularly in industries/sectors that show signs of
increased competitive concentration. Nevertheless,
while a certain defensiveness regarding unethical
competitor intelligence gathering is appropriate,
overreaction to the possibility is not. As stated
previously, research suggests an organizations
competitors are often not as unethical as we might
think. Consequently, managers should be reluctant
to engage in reactive unethical competitive intelligence gathering based on the perception the competition is doing so.
Several other managerial implications should be
noted. We believe smaller companies are particularly
vulnerable to lapses of unethical behavior. Frequently, this behavior might be attributable to inexperience in the competitive intelligence process.
Small ventures might minimize these lapses with
attention to training in the processes of intelligence
gathering and ethical behavior. In particular, ignorance of what constitutes and influences unethical
behavior should not be an excuse. Our research also
suggests the need for businesses to champion
enhanced competitive intelligence ethical standards
for industries and nations. Respect for cultural norms
must be balanced against the need for ethical behavior. Clearly these ethical considerations should be
integrated into an organizations ethical codes so that
the behavior is not easily dismissed for cultural exigencies. Senior leadership will have to take the lead in
this effort. The managerial implications are quite
significant for the strengthening factors. Here, firms
can frequently manage the factors. Organizations
must fully appreciate and consider these factors since
they will often be the first line of defense in mitigating
the negative weakening influences. For example,
while cultural norms may work against ethics, organizations may be encouraged to go against the cultural
norms if internal codes of ethics are in place.
While this study proposed a useful theoretical
model, several limitations of the research should be
articulated. We attempted to identify factors that
either strengthen or weaken the ethical decision
making process for competitive intelligence gathering. Without doubt, other factors not identified

Framework for Competitor Intelligence Gathering

should influence the process. Additionally, empirical
support for our framework does not currently exist.
We suggest that future research should focus in
several areas. First, measures of the strengthening and
weakening factors and the ethical decision making
process for competitive intelligence gathering
require development and validation. Second,
examination of the factors influence on the ethical
decision making process should be undertaken.
Third, future research should focus on other influencing factors not identified in this paper. Finally,
future research might investigate any ethical decision
making processes that are specific to industry or
country.

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T. L. Rittenburg
S. R. Valentine
Department of Management &
Marketing College of Business
University of Wyoming
1000E University Avenue Laramie,
WY, 82071,
U.S.A.
E-mail: valentin@uwyo.edu
J. B. Faircloth
College of Business and Public Administration
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, ND, U.S.A
E-mail: jim.faircloth@mail.business.und.edu