CABANAS V.

PILAPIL
GR NO. L-25843 July 25, 1974
FACTS:
Deceased Florentino Pilapil insured himself and instituted as beneficiary
his 10 years old child named Millian Pilapil. Defendant Francisco Pilapil, the
brother of the deceased, was instituted to act as trustee during the childs
minority. Upon the death of Florentino, the proceeds were paid to Francisco.
Hence Plaintiff Melchora Cabanas, the mother of the child, with whom the child is
living, filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum. Defendant invoked the
terms of the insurance policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the insurance proceeds should be delivered to the mother?
RULING:
Yes. Adhering to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation
affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It is the tradition
of the country for a parent to be preferred. The judiciary as the instrumentality of
the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of
her plea.
A quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties. What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this
concept. It reads: The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that
has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case
were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would
have led the lower court to decide as it did.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA
GR NO. 187167 August 16, 2011
FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of
the Philippines as an archipelagic State. In March 2009, Congress amended RA
3046 by enacting RA 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines. The law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to
comply with the terms of the UNCLOS III, ratified by the Philippines in February
1984. Professor Magallona and others questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments
are as follows:
a) The law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over
Sabah;
b) The law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens water landward of
the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and
aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national

security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging

marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c) The classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results
in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is
not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has
nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine
territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and
NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it
increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with
the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was
440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was
increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of
Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term
it as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises
sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due
to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their
right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS
and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate
their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is
because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would
already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should
follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones
where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we
can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we
have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered
by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant,
wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch
253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation
of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually
begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with
another woman, died a year before she entered into the
judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally

married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either

Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of
Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary
for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of
living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved
by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to
legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding
minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of
and procedures for executing the declaration which was
completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in
Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and
recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and
be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the

benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of

the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the
OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to
the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondents plea of
religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the
compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential
that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents position that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it
is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court
could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free
Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of
the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to

intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity

(a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's
claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override
respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show
that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is
the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The
rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the
Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156,

February 3, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the
GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked
the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry
it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to
implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to
the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing
legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may
be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.

10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are
not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its

enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by
its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

Hotel

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to

heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and
the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot
sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is
mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the
sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In

constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the

government are considered state action covered by the Constitution
(1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make
the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the
act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent
GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority
from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the
sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound
to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one
with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any

reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of
shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission

of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of

a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM

G.R. No. 183591

October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum
of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOAAD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to
consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. MacapagalArroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of
full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both
national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In
fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under

our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national

government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the

MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring

amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the abovediscussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose

constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor
even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros
and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,

includes not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds
that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOAAD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which
is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights
of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides
for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and

prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous

Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical
to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement
of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse
of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process,
as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371.
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

(IRRI)
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured
in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was
charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle
to start because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal
process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed
by petitioner, not having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order
issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives
its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal
obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its
immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint
dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international
organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the
case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines
on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship?
Held: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil
and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived
by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be
a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its DirectorGeneral is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that
such waiver is discretionary on its part.

MALONG v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

GR NO. L-49930 August 7, 1985

FACTS:
The Malong spouses filed a complaint alleging that their son Jaime
Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was
between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near
the door of a coach. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in
view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR
be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370. The trial court dismissed
the complaint and ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a
government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. The Malong
spouses appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PNR is immune from suit?

RULING:
No. PNR is not immune from suit. The state divested itself of its sovereign
capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor,
the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did
not remove itself from the operation of provisions in the Civil Code on common
carriers.
The rule is that not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suit. Immunity from suit is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized.
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have
assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against
the State. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations
of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any
governmental function. The point is that when the government enters into a
commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other private corporation. Justice Abad in his separate opinion stated that all
corporations organized by the government are its instrumentality by the very
reason of their creation. But that fact alone does not invest them with immunity
from suit.

MERRITT v. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GR NO. L-11154 March 21, 1916

FACTS:
Merritt was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was
bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merritt sustained severe
injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act
2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the
negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waived its immunity from
suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
RULING:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to
his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO v. FIRME

GR NO. L-52179 April 8, 1991

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality
of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of
the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died. The heirs of Bania filed a
complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn,
filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck driver,
Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability
of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered
Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Bania.
ISSUES:
1. Are municipal corporations suable?
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?
RULING:
1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State
when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue
and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be
held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental

capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was
on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence,
the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his
office.
Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any
liability.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDOVAL

GR NO. 84607 March 19, 1993

Campos, Jr.,
Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of
Authority
Facts:

The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre
(background: Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the
petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent
Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the
Republic of the Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being
charged in their personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all,
would not result in financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for
reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their
demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo,
presented their problems and demands such as:
giving lands for free to farmers

zero retention of lands by landlords

stop amortizations of land payments

Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform

(MAR) began on January 15, 1987

On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez

Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to
the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet
meeting

Tension mounted the next day

The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR

premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez
and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air their
demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students
(LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was
heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was
impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola

The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm

From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue

took place; "pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13
according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all
belonging to the group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered
minor physical injuries
The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the
incident on February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit

The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by

law

The security men assigned to protect the government units were

in civilian attire (prohibited by law)

There was unnecessary firing by the police and military

The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law

It is not clear who started the firing

The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use
to disperse the crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into
operation because:

there was no order to use them

they were incorrectly prepositioned

they were out of range of the marchers

The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four

unidentified, uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at
the direction of the marchers

The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers

of both the Western Police District (WPD) and Integrated National Police
(INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public
Assembly Act of 1985

Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended

It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding

the rally without permit and for inciting sedition

Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers

for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing
the dispersal operations in Mendiola:

Gen. Ramon E. Montao

Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim

Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres

Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz

Col. Cezar Nazareno

Maj. Filemon Gasmin

Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and

wounded victims to be compensated by the government

It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their

claim for damages from the government

No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims

On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages

against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers,
and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident

Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the

State cannot be sued without its consent

Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit

Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no
such waiver

Motion for Reconsideration was also denied

Issues:
1.

Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e.

Whether or not this is a suit against the State with its consent)

Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the

Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and
by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State has
consented to be sued
2.

Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State

Holding:
1.

No.

2.

This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

No.

Ratio:
1.

Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without

its consent

The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way

mean that liability automatically attaches to the State

The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall

serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State
immediately

President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the

State; they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State
2.

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:

When the Republic is sued by name;
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the
case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer
but to the government

Although the military officers and personnel were

discharging their official functions during the incident, their
functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their
authority

There was lack of justification by the government forces in the

use of firearms.

Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order,
but they fired at the crowd instead

No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.

SHAUF v. COURT OF APPEAL

GR NO.

November 27, 1990

Facts:

Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a

member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor
in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently
qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an
equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don
Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for
alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant
Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy
occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy
occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future
vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary
Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment
was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that
the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as
retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this
allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in
accordance of with the applicable regulation.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the
Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial
Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as
actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral &
exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the
damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand,
continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts
done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental
functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that
the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the
exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA
reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity
thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that
the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal &
unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of
international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US
Armed Forces
Held:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay
petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
Ratio:

They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and
agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts
without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable
in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his
act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch
as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against
the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that
an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or

invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional
act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit
against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in
ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they
should be held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff
Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the
defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo
Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?
guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also
completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for a
doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level
for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in
1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant
Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but
referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was
not eligible to the position.
Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State
shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973
Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in
committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic
constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very
much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held
accountable
Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself
of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of
opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other
remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under
a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is
entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not
otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There
is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which
should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive
representations of private respondents on that score.

HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO

GR NO. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican
City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio;
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of
petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of
the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to
private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and
Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by
private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering
into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to
us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on
its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p.
87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an

act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized
as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired
said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.
The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner
to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right
of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state,
necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22).
This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in
the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for
profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of
the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the
lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by
private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person
who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign
Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the
Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of
course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected
Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]).
Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases
to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993

FACTS:

 Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
(NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to
Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San
Francisco.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity
exchange manager.
Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she
had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong
Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon
Bradfords instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it
was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on
her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found
thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.
Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was
informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the
store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that
would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords propensity to
suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts
committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been
exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims
that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land
w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary
damages of P100k.
May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she
along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US
w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit
for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance
Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power &
authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It
will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US
personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX
is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash &
equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about
to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors.
Motion granted by RTC.
July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was

outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond
Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford cant
rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus under
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case
to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.
RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on
issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford
declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search
was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was
awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses.
Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing
decision.
Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental
functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the
immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a
public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this
case is under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US
Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its
jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts
can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.

ISSUES/RATIO:

1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES

Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court
(something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should
not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have
allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to
RTCs jurisdiction.

2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion to dismiss. - NO

Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules
of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would
be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to
dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this
is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC.

3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO

Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity
also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in
discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as
appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it
has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where the
public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights
of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose
rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of
the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public
official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he
acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA)
Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it
or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge
of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts
done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the
doctrine of state immunity.

4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO

First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military
Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity
are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations).

HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.

US v. RUIZ
GR NO. May 22, 1985
Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon
damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied
with the requests based on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the
U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway,
William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.
The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects
and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants,
the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p.
50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to
reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to
be able to invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set
aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts
(jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and
can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a
State but the legal nature of the act

US v. GUINTO
February 26, 1990
Facts:

In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa
Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts
through its contracting officer James F. Shaw
Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto
T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar

Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private
respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid

The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives

petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private
respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not
been awarded to Dizon

But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO
club concession

On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court
below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to
Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the
private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating
the concessions pending litigation

Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the

status quo

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition
to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in
effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability

On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction

On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his
dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air
Station in Baguio City

It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup
stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers

His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball,

Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base

Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio

The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to

dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of
the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official
capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not
given its consent to be sued

Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their

official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for;
this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they
may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:

Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen
F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of
Special Investigators (AFOSI)

Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of

the charge

He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners,

claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed

Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the
enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement

The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in
their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US
without its consent

Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military

Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the
defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted
their answer

On the fourth suit:

Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the
petitioners (except USA)

According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed

the, and unleashed dogs on them

Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for
theft and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest

USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against
the United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were
also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in
the performance of their official functions

Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be
considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:

Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States
of America without its consent

In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for
acting within their official functions.

Holding and Ratio:

1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises
operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces.
Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower
court.

2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the
employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.)

3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise
of their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued.

4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study.

Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in
what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

Rissa M. Mira - Case Digest

DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National
Medical Admission Test) three times. When he applied to
take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the
three-flunk-rule. He then filed a petition before the RTC on
the ground of due process and equal protection and
challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition
was granted by the RTC therefore this petition. The
respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule
of the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of police power,
depriving respondent of his right to pursue medical
education thus this petition for review before the higher
court.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid
and constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents
to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health. The method employed by the challenged regulation
is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary
or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute.
The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right
to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to
quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one
must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was
reversed.
The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly

oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the
challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation
is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The
three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The
state needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by
directing students to the course where he is best suited through initial tests and
evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge was reversed.