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Major Malik Munawar Khan Awan, GK, SJ




If War 1965 is taken as a


match between India &
Pakistan Major Munawar
was rightly The MAN OF
THE MATCH

Research & Analysis by


Maj (R) Imtiaz Awan
imtiazawan33@yahoo.com
Cell # +92300-9715258

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famous quote: A

historian ought to be exact, sincere and


impartial; free from passion, unbiased by interest, fear,
resentment or affection; and faithful to the truth, which
is the mother of history, preserver of great actions, the
enemy of oblivion, the witness of the past and the
direction of the future. A true picture of history can
only be seen if history is just compiled and not created.

It is a story of extra ordinary chivalry, velour,


gallantry, superb planning, bold execution,
dedication to cause, Dynamic Leadership and
miraculous achievements, which ended in open /
historical injustice and dishonesty .(It is an extract of
various books and articles written by Indian and Pakistani authors ; mostly
available on Internet ,& interviews of Kashmeeri immigrants/participants of
operation Gibraltar Indo-Pak War 1965.)

An account of achievements of Pakistan Armys guerrilla officer


Major Munawar Khan who captured about 2000 square miles (Gen
Mehmud and few other authors believe it was 500 square miles) of
Indian Held Kashmir,(Rajouri , Poonch and Budhil Regions)
taught unforgettable lessons to Indian Security Forces and
established his own Government. He appointed his own DC, SP and
Judges. He was ordered by the GHQ to come back after UN
mandated Cease Fire but he protested against the orders .He stood
as a Hero amongst the war heroes of Indo-Pak armies during war
1965. But contents of this story were kept secret for many decades
due to secrecy policy of the Government of Pakistan.
1.

HIS EARLY LIFE:

Allah Almighty blessed Malik Muqarab Khan a farmer of village Jhatla Tehsil
Talagang, District Attock British India (Now Chakwal) with a son. It was 24th
Jan 1921, while Malik Muqarab Khan was working in his fields with oxen,

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received this good news. He rushed towards his home in excitement to see the
new born. The new born was named as Munawar Khan (later to be known as
Malik Munawar Khan Awan). He studied in village Jhatla and Talagang.
Besides his studies he was very fond of playing kabbadi, hockey and
horse/camel riding. As a young agile boy, he was spotted by a British officer
winning an athletics race that Munawar had entered on the spur of the moment
and was nurtured by the British for a role in the army.
His career had begun in the British Indian Army. He was among those captured
and made prisoner of war by Japanese forces at Singapur while his Regiment
was trying to defend Rangoon in World War II. He learned the Japanese
language while incarcerated and his fluency brought him to the attention of his
captors. They moved him out of the prison camp and enlisted him in the
Imperial Japanese Army, where he received special training.
When the Indian National Army, led by Subhas Chandra Bose, was formed in
1942, Munawar joined its fight for Indias independence from
British rule. Where as a Captain Munawar commanded 2nd
INAs 1st Guerrilla Battalion of 2nd Guerrilla Brigade under
command Colonel Inayat Kiani. During famous Battle of
Imphal he led the Battalion and fought fiercely against Allied
Forces. Later he was captured by the Allied forces and faced a Munawar as INA officer
trial for treason at the end of World War2 and was put in
Multan Jail.(An attempt to defame Nehru by G Ramachandram & Muslim
Contributions to Indias Freedom Struggle and A Different Narrative by
Professor Nazeer Ahmed).
While in the jail a Hindu billionaires daughter fell in love with Munawar Khan
and would visit him in jail daily carrying along a bouquet of flowers. Marry
me, she said to him one day. I cant, he replied. Why?, she asked.
Because youre a Hindu and I am a Muslim, he said. I will convert, she
replied. Youre a billionaires daughter and I am the son of a poor father, he
said. Never mind, Ill serve you and your family happily.
The young beautiful girl dared Munawar to escape from jail and come for
dinner at her fathers home to prove his bravado. Munawar took up the
challenge. In the evening, the jail superintendent made a final round. Munawar
grabbed him and knocked him out when he reached his cell. He quickly
changed into his uniform and confidently walked out of the prison to sit in the
superintendents waiting car. It was dark and Munawars cap covered his face.
He ordered the driver to take him to the billionaires home where the young
lady and her family were speechless. Of course on his return to the prison, he
was given the third degree and thrown into a solitary cell to be court
martialled. (Dawn News, The 20-watt fountain of energy by Anjum Niaz Published Apr 21, 2013)

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Soon after the above incident his luck rescued him. Munawar was freed, along
with other INA prisoners, when the Partition of India occurred. Here while he
was in jail Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan visited him and
offered him to join the Pakistan Army. Being a court martial case Munawar
could not be re-inducted in Pakistan armys regular units, therefore he was
offered to join Azad Kashmir Regular Force. He accepted the offer and as a
formality was sent to Officers Training School Kohat for few months. He then
joined a Battalion of Azad Kashmir Regular Force (AKRF), which later became
21st Battalion of The Azad Kashmir Regiment. He fought 1948 Kashmir war
against India. While serving in Poonch sector as a Lieutenant he won the AJKs
2nd highest non-operational award Ghazi-e-Kashmir which is admissible for
outstanding and meritorious services. (History of the Azad Kashmir Regimnt,
Vol-1). His subordinates and friends used to say that Munawar was hardy and
bold and quite unaccustomed to the fear, he feared none but ALLAH. As a
Muslim he had very strong faith in ALLAH Almighty and was a true lover of
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and Hazrat Ali (RA).He loved them to the extent
of madness. Recitation of Surah-e-Muzamil from the Holy Quran, early in the
morning and before going to bed at night was his daily routine. He was very
fond of recitation of Darood-e-Pak and mediation of names of ALLAH and he
continued with the same routine during war and peace.

Capt Munawar under going Tactical & Weapons courses at SI&T Quetta

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In early 1964 Munawars wife told him that she had dreamt about him that he
was fighting against Indian Army in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR and defeated
the Indians. Munawar laughed it out but after a month or so a messenger sent by
Peer Barkatullah, a saint and a spiritual friend of Munawar from Neelam
valleys village Dawarian, contacted him at Tatta Pani AK and told him to meet
the saint as soon as possible. In April 1964 he visited Peer Barkatullah and
surprisingly he told him that there was a prophecy for him be ready for raising
KALMA-E-HAQ in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR. Munawar was astonished
and said there were no chances of war in the near future, how could he do the
needful in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR? But he said that he had dreamt the same
and he should believe him it was going to happen. Munawar then asked the
saint, if it was so than you pray I should embrace shahadat in this Jihad-eFisabeelillah. (Pray that I should embrace martyrdom in the way of Allah) No
you will return unbeatable and successful the saint replied.
2.

Selection for Operation GIBRALTAR

In May 1965 as a Major he was selected to undergo special training for


Operation Gibraltar behind enemy lines in Indian Held Kashmir. This operation
included Salahuddin; Tariq; Babur; Qasim; Khalid; Nusrat; Kundeshah;
Sikander; Khilji; Ghaznavi Forces and the Headquarters. He was appointed as
GHAZNAVI Force Commander. He himself trained the officers and other ranks
of GHAZNAVI force at Dungi, Khuiratta AK, and later in the end of July 1965,
led them to Indian Held Kashmir for guerrilla operations.

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Major Munawar Khan being GHAZNAVI force commander had 5 Infantry


companies and a section of SSG under his command. Companies were
commanded by the following officers:
1. Capt Maqsood Hussain Shah
2. Capt Sher Ahmed
3. Capt Khursheed Ahmed
4. Capt Ghulam Hussain
5. Lt Khadim Hussain
6. N/Sub Mehrban Khan (SSG Section Commander)
Unfortunately, out of 10 forces of Gibraltar Operation, all except GHAZNAVI
Force, failed to accomplish their missions.

ZONES OF OPERATIONS
Handwara Zone
W ullar
Zojila

Baramula
Gulmarg

Northern Zone

Srinagar

Bedori

Srinagar Zone
Punch

Budil Zone
Naushera

Rajauri
Budil

Rajauri Zone
Naushera

Ramban

Riasi

Jammu Zone

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Name of Force

Area of operation

Name of Force

Area of operation

Salahudin

Srinagar Valley

Qasim

BandipuraSonarwain

Ghaznavi (Initial

Naushaera, Mendhar,

Employment )

Rajouri, Thanamandi,

Khalid

Qazinag-Naugam

Budhil and Riasi

Ghaznavi after
merger of Nusrat
elements &
stragglers of other
forces in the

(Bihmbar Gali, Naushaera,


Mendhar, Poonch, Mandi,
Rajouri, Thanamandi,
Budhil and Riasi)

vicinity
Babar

Nowshera-Sundarbani

Nusrat (14 Groups)

Tithwal-Tangdhar

Tariq

Kargil Drass

Sikandar

Gurais

Kunde Shah

Hillan Nil Kanth Gali

Khilji

Kel-Minimarg

Detail of Employment - GIBRALTAR Forces:

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14 NUSRAT GROUPS
OPERATION GIBRALTAR

12 DIV
Def AJK Sec

DESIGN OF
OPERATIONS

3. Major Munawars Final Sermon to His GHAZNAVI Force before


Commencement of Infiltration:
On 21st July 1965 Major Munawar addressed his force at Dungi in Khuiratta
valley. He started his address with the recitation of following Verses of Quran:


"



Those who barter the life of this world for the next should fight in the way of
God. And We shall bestow on him who fights in the way of God, whether he is
killed or is victorious, a glorious reward.

( )







What has come upon you that you fight not in the cause of God and for the
oppressed, men, women and children, who pray: "Get us out of this city, O
Lord, whose people are oppressors; so send us a friend by Your will, and send
us a helper."







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Those who believe fight in the way of God; and those who do not, only fight for
the powers of evil; so you should fight the allies of Satan. Surely the stratagem
of Satan is ineffective.

".
( )

(Surah Al-Nisaa, Ayaat No: 74, 75, 76)


After recitation of Quran and its translation in Urdu, he said All of us are
voluntarily going in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR for a sacred cause. You all
must keep few things in mind before leaving for INDIAN HELD KASHMIR
and while staying and operating over there under my command.
a. To me cowardice is a great sin and an unforgivable crime. Remember a
Coward dies hundred times a day but a bold dies once in a life.
b.

We are going to repeat the history of our ancestors Tariq Bin Ziyad and
Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi. We will not look back to see or to know about
our families and homes. Remember we will either come back as
victorious and liberators of INDIAN HELD KASHMIR or vultures of
INDIAN HELD KASHMIR will have feast over our dead bodies.

On 25th July 1965 the GHAZNAVI force reached its launching pad and started
infiltration into Indian Held Kashmir in the 1 st week of August in small groups
and assembled at pre decided Rendezvous in Rajouri Valley.
4. Merger of NUSRAT Forces Elements and stragglers of Babar/
Sallahudin Force in GHAZNAVI Force:
NUSRAT Forces were to operate in the immediate rear of the Indian positions
along the Cease Fire Line. The task of the Nusrat forces was essentially fixation
of the Indian troops deployed along the Cease Fire Line through harassing
attacks. The groups of Nusrat force after accomplishment of their mission were
either to merge with the GIBRALTAR Forces operating in their vicinity or
exfiltrate to AK. (History of Indo-Pak War 1965 by Gen Mahmud Ahmed).
According to Gen Harbakhsh Singh No 4 company of GHAZNAVI Force
was to function in conjunction with NUSRAT Force. It is worth pointing out
that Gen Mahmud Ahmed and Gen Harbakhsh Singh have been crediting group
G, H &K for operations in Naushera, Mendhar and Mandi, may be because of
the operational plan of GIBRALTAR and NUSRAT Forces. But the ground
realities were different. Like all other forces of GIBRALTAR Operation
(except GHAZNAVI Force), groups of NUSRAT Force also met the same fate

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on the very outset of their infiltration in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR. They were
also detected by the civil population and compromised.
Few commanders had lost command and control over their groups and in one
case a commander of a group who was Subedar, was killed by the Indian army,
the group was disintegrated. Hence, many of their infiltrators exfiltrated to
AZAD KASHMIR. Sense prevailed upon the officers of NUSRAT elements
operating in Bhimber Gali, Poonch and Mehndar area. They realized that it was
an uphill task which could not be accomplished without popular support. In the
mean time news regarding consecutive successful guerrilla actions by
GHAZNAVI Force led by Major Munawar prevailed in all the nooks and
corners of INDIAN HELD KASHMIR. Major Munawar was even otherwise a
renowned, experienced guerrilla officer who had fought guerrilla war against
Allied forces in 1942 while serving in Indian National Army (INA) under
Sobash Chander Bous. Many NUSRAT Forces elements instead of exfiltrating
back to AK, preferred to merge themselves in GHAZNAVI Force. They
contacted Major Munawar and he inducted them in GHAZNAVI Force. Major
Munawar regrouped his force including elements of NUSRAT and stragglers of
Babar & Sallahudin forces . Therefore all operations in Naushera, Mendhar and
Mandi were also conducted by the GHAZNAVI Force.
Indian Version:
Lt Col Vivek Chadha writes: Nusrat groups were to operate in the immediate
rear of enemy positions along the Cease Fire Line. Depending on its outcome
the force was to merge with Gibraltar Forces. None of the Nusrat groups
succeeded in making any impact on enemy positions. (Low Intensity
Conflicts in India: an Analysis by Lt Col Vivek Chadha)
According to D.R.Mankekar, This group (GHAZNAVI Force) was also
responsible for the incidents in Rajouri, Mendhar, Surankot, Galuthi and
Bhimber Gali. Indeed, by the middle of September, this region was swarming
with infiltrators who shot at our posts and convoys, raided villages, carried out
sabotage activity and clashed with our security forces. One company of this
force spread out to Poonch and Mandi. (Twenty two Fateful Days for India)
Later when an in depth study and analysis regarding GIBRALTAR Operation
was carried out by a team of Indian Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis, it revealed that operations in Naushera, Mendhar & Mandi were also
carried out by GHAZNAVI Force. (Extract of the subject analysis will be
mentioned in the forth coming paragraphs regarding Battle of Mandi).

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5.

THE GIBRALTAR OPERATION- 1965 INDOPAK WAR

Major Malik Munawar Khan Awan Verses


Commander GHAZNAVI Force
Pakistan Army
Additional Resources
Local Support

Major Gen Amreek Singh


Commander 25th Infantry
Division.
Indian Army
Additional Resources
52 Brigade, 191 Brigade

According to the plan of GIBRALTAR Operation, GHAZNZVI Force was to


operate under Major Munawar Khan in area Naushera, Jhangar, Rajouri,
Bhimber Gali, ThanaMandi, Mendhar, Poonch, Mandi, Budhil, Ramban and
Riasi. This was the area of responsibility of 25th Indian Infantry Division under
command Major Gen Amreek Singh.

Shardi
Dudhnial

Athmuqam

KARGIL
GANDARBAL

Handwara

SONAMARG

Jura
Bandipura
Tithwal

Sopore

GUND

BADGAM

Naukot
Lipa Valley
Chhota Kazi Nag

Rampur

SRINAGAR

Pir Kanthi
Ziarat
HP Pass

Badori

MANDI

Chand Tekri

XX SUMBAL

25 Indian
Infantry Div

PUNCH
Punch

Hajira
Chiri Kot

MENDHAR

Satwal
Batal

Mendhar

Kotli

GHAZNAVI

Nikial

BUDIL

RAJAURI

Kot Katera

Jhangar

Baghsar

THANA MANDI

NAUSHERA

RIASI

Thub

JAMMU
14

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Map prepared regarding employment of GIBRALTAR forces after Research &


Analysis by a team of Indian Institute of Defence Studies & Analysis in 2013 is
also appended below.

Major Munawar along with his GHAZNAVI Force crossed the Fire Control
Line from Khuiratta to INDIAN HELD KASHMIR in the 1st week of
August1965. Gibraltar Forces was given (by Headquarters 12 Division) a few
names of collaborators whom they were to contact after infiltration inside Indian
Held Kashmir but their liability was uncertain. In fact none came forth to help
the guerrilla forces. Therefore, despite undetected infiltration across the Cease
Fire Line, all the GIBRALTAR Forces, with the exception of GHAZNAVI
Force, ran into trouble at the very outset of their operations.
According to General Mahmud Ahmed, The GHAZNAVI Force which
consisted of five companies, raised entirely by Number 3 Sector at Dungi in the
Khuiratta valley. Ghaznavi force was tasked to destroy the bridges at Ramban,
Naushahra, Rajouri and Dhanwa Kot (located on the Cease Fire Line nine miles
south-west of Rajouri), raid the Headquarters of 25 Division and 80 Brigade,
and destroy several military installations. It was to base itself at Sundartop (the
height immediately west of the Banihal Pass referred to as Point 12725) and
deny the road Ramban-Islamabad. It was also to assit SALAHUDDIN Force in
demolishing the tunnels at Banihal Pass. From its base at Dungi in the Khuiratta
valley, GHAZNAVI Force commanded by Major Munawar, made its way to
Rajouri-Buudil area without detection. Undoubtedly, the most successful of

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all the GIBRALTAR Forces was GHAZNAVI Force. (History of Indo-Pak


War 1965 by Gen Mahmud Ahmed)
Indian author D.R.Mankekar says Of the several groups of Pakistani raiders
that infiltrated into Kashmir, the SALAHUUDDIN Force, which headed for
Srinagar and the Valley, and the GHAZNAVI Force that operated in the
Mendhar-Rajouri area, have taxed our security authorities the most
(Twenty two Fateful Days for India)
Libration of Kashmiri women and children from Indian army and
police camps:
In the first week of August 1965 when Major Munawar was holding a
conference (Jirgah) of locals in village Nandan of Kandi area, suddenly an old
woman making hue & cry appeared and asked where was the leader of
guerrillas who had come from Azad Kashmir to our rescue. Major Munawar
stood up and asked as to why does she want to meet him? She while weeping
told him that her two young daughters had been put in the illegal detention by
the Indian army. Major Munawar consoled the old women and told an Ex police
Inspector Raja Sohbat Ali to find out the details. Raja Sohbat Ali revealed that
there were over 1100 Muslim women and children in Poonch, Rajouri areas and
a biggest camp where there were about 2000 Kashmiri women and children in
Budhil area in the illegal detention of Indian army and Police. They were kept in
Indian army camps and police stations. Major Munawar tasked few active
members of his intelligence network under Raja Sohbat Ali to carry out
reconnaissance of these camps and police stations and discuss within one week.
He decided to liberate Kashmiri Muslim women and children from military
camps and police stations. Parties of GHAZNAVI force raided these camps and
librated the women and children. These actions had a tremendous effect and he
won the hearts of Kashmiri Muslims in Poonch, Rajouri and Budhil areas.
According to the history of AK Regiment, GHAZNAVI force liberated Muslim
women and children from Indian military camps and police stations which had a
tremendous effect. (History of Azad Kashmir Regiment, Vol-II)
Formation of Revolutionary Council
After having won the support of local population in Rajouri-Budhil Region,
Major Munawar gave a call to the notables of the area for formation of
revolutionary council. He secretively presided a meeting of Kashmiri notables at
Bhar Jarian Marg. Following notables of Rajori-Budhil attended the meeting:from Darhal Malkan Malik Naimat Ullah, from Kandi Sardar Jalal Ud Din,
Sardar Jamal-Ud-Din, Sardar Faqeer Mohammad Khan, Sardar Hashim Ali,
Raja Niaz Mohammad Thakar, Mohammad Faqeer Thakar, Mohammad Jameel
Thakar, Mohammad Naseeb Thakar and from Budhil Sardar Hussain Bakhsh,

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Sardar Noor Wali Khan from Dandot, Sardar Eid Bakhsh and Raja Sohbat Ali.
During the meeting Revolutionary Councils of Poonch, Rajouri, Kandi, Budhil
and Mehndar were formed. Another active member from Parori Gujran Haji
Fazal Hussain Rana though did not attend the conference but remained active
supporter of the GHAZNAVI force in Thana Mandi only. Most active members
were Sardar Jalal Ud Din, Malik Naimat Ullah, Sardar Hashim Ali, Sardar Eid
Bakhsh and Sardar Jamal Ud Din. These active members not only mustered the
support of their own areas but also visited and won the support of people from
Riasi, Poonch and Mandi town. Sardar Jalal Ud Din played a pivotal role in
inspiring the people from Riasi to Poonch to fight for freedom against
Indian Security Forces (thousand salutes to Sardar Jalal Ud Din). Major
Munawar took the oath from nominated Chairmen / members of Revolutionary
Council. He also appointed the local area commanders of Poonch, Rajouri,
Kandi, Budhil and Mehndar down to village level. In this conference very few
representatives / notables from Poonch and Mandi town were present. However,
after few days a considerable number from these towns met Major Munawar in
Kandi area.
Establishment of Intelligence Network
For planning and executing affective operations against Indian security forces,
Major Munawar felt a dire need to have his own intelligence network. Just after
the formation of Revolutionary Council he called notables from Riasi, Ramban,
Budhil, Rajouri, Naushera, Jhangar, Bhimber Gali, Thana Mandi, Mendhar,
Poonch & Mandi. He emphasized upon the need of having an efficient
intelligence network to defeat the Indian security forces. He assigned a task to
each notable to have at least two males and one female source in each village to
keep a track of Indian security forces in their area and report as soon as possible
to the nearest GHAZNAVI commander.
Indian Version:
Since the area was isolated, the locals started cooperating with them. They were
issued with weapons and clothing and given weapon training. Each village was
issued 20 rifles. (Honour Redeemed. By Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch, Page 42)
Change in the Strategy of Normal Guerrilla Warfare:
Major Munawar appreciated that normal tactic followed by guerrillas Hit &
Run was not going to deliver favorable results in Indian Held Kashmir. He had
observed that where ever local population supported or gave refuge to the
infiltrators, Indian Security Forces dealt ruthlessly with the locals of that village
or area. This modus operandi of Indian Security Forces had tremendous
demoralizing affect and locals were hesitant to support the guerrillas. At the
same time the policy given to GIBRALTAR forces by the Formation
Headquarters was to avoid casualties in a pitched static encounter with enemy

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troops and resort to Hit & Run tactic. He instructed his under command officers
and junior commissioned officers to provide security to the friendly locals and
at no cost leave them at the mercy of Indian Security Forces. One of his officers
and few junior commissioned officers showed resentment to his orders, which
were apparently against the policy of Formation Headquarters. But Major
Munawar ensured strict compliance of his orders. In his address to the local
notables at Bhar Jarian Merg, he assured them that locals and guerrillas of
GHAZNAVI force will live and die together. Which he subsequently proved
and when ever Indian Security Forces attacked any village on the pretext of
search for infiltrators, GHAZNAVI guerrillas instantaneously struck that Indian
unit vigorously as a revenge. This distinct policy given by GHAZNAVI force
commander won complete local support which other forces / groups of
Operation GIBRALTAR lacked. Local population was all out to support the
GHAZNAVI guerrillas with men and material. All Imam Masjid (Mosque)
delivered motivation sermon in their towns and villages to join this Jihad e Fi
Sabeelillah (Struggle in the way of ALLAH). A large number of locals attended
training camps and many were in the waiting list. Similarly according to Capt
Maqsood Hussain Shah (later Retd as Major) who was one of the company
commanders of GHAZNAVI force, locals provided 230 ponies for
transportation of stores from Drop Zones to companies of GHAZNAVI force. A
black beautiful horse named Bijli (the lightning) was dedicated as a good will
gesture for the conveyance of GHAZNAVI force commander. Above all their
love and emotional spirit for GHAZNAVI guerrillas was commendable.
The Ghaznavi force commander, Lion hearted Major Munawar Khan, the
great grandson of Hazrat Abbas Alamdar(The first martyr of Karbala) bin
Ali bin Abi Talib, when joined by the roaring mountainous tigers of Jammu &
Kashmir; once again reminded the Indians of great invasions led by Sultan
Mehmood Ghaznavi.

6. Conduct of Operations
a. Naushera Bihmber Gali Sector
In the first week of August 1965, GHAZNAVI Force headed for Naushera,
Narian, Galuthi and Jhangar areas. It conducted raids on Headquarters 80
Brigade at Naushera, Headquarters 120 Brigade at Galuthi and ammunition
dump in Narian. It laid ambushes on road Bhimber Gali Surankot & road
Rajouri Mehndar.

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(1) Attempt to Raid Headquarter 80 Brigade at Naushera & Encounter


with J&K Malitia
During an attempt to raid at Headquarter 80 Brigade and a workshop at
Naushera , the raiding parties could not achieve success and were forced to
retreat towards Rajouri town astride Naushera - Rajouri road under the pressure
of J&K Malitias company plus strength placed under command 80 Brigade as a
Quick Response Force to react against infiltrators. Quick Response Force of
J&K Malitia was pursuing the raiding parties with a view to chase them up to
their base camp and then eliminate the force completely. Within half an hour
remaining J&K Malitia Battalion also joined in this venture and tried to envelop
the raiders from 3 directions. The raid commander contacted Major Munawar
and informed him regarding the situation. Major Munawar who was a man of
iron nerves and knew how to change an unfavorable situation to his own favor,
consoled the raid commander and told him that it was a wonderful opportunity
to destroy the enemy, rather it was far better than raiding 80 Brigade
Headquarters, keep withdrawing with the slow pace towards Rajouri astride the
road well spread towards North & South and he would soon reach with two
platoons at a suitable ambush site for annihilating J&K Malitia Battalion
completely. J&K Malitia Battalion in a hot pursuit reached the ambush site
where Munawar was waiting for their warm reception by the elite GHAZNAVI
guerrillas. J&K Malitia Battalion was encircled and wiped off. The vast area of
ambush site was sealed off from all directions. Enemy suffered very heavy
casualties of men and material. The ambush site was teemed with the dead
bodies. Fortunately many Muslim Kashmiri soldiers surrendered and joined
GHAZNAVI guerrillas with arms and ammunition. A large number of weapons,
ammunition and equipment were also captured. Indeed it was a great shock to
the Indian Security Forces at the very outset of infiltration campaign.
Indians immediately moved 1st Madras to rescue the J&K Malitia Battalion and
eliminate the infiltrators. On arrival of 1 st Madras near ambush site some
exchange of fire took place. GHAZNAVI guerrillas made use of mortar fire to
impede the enemy advance and disengage safely for withdrawal to their hideout.
After this grave incident Indians decided to use regular troops against well
trained GHAZNAVI guerrillas.
Indian Version:
The timely intelligence set into motion a series of counter measures by the
Indian Army. The only troops readily available in the valley to counter this

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action were the Jammu and Kashmir Militia battalions. Two infantry battalions
were rushed in as reinforcements. Intense and hectic combing operations were
launched throughout the J&K Theatre. When columns came face to face the
fighting was intense, bloody and merciless. (Remembering Operation Gibralter
by Simrit Kahlon on Monday, September 7th, 2015)
1 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel CPA Menon was engaged from
early August itself in the search-and-destroy operations against the infiltrators in
the Rajouri Sector of J&K, where it did a commendable job of rounding up
scores of infiltrators, before being shifted to Naushera by the end of the month
to throw defensive piquets along the Ceasefire Line. (Indo-Pak War 1965:
Stalemate? by DP Ramachandran, 21 Sep, 2015)
(2) Raid on Ammunition and Supply Dump Narian:
Ammunition and supply dump at Narian was raided and completely blown up
which was established for immediate replenishment of ammunition to the Indian
troops deployed on Fire Control Line. Besides capturing a large number of arms
and ammunition heavy casualties on the Indian army were also inflicted.
Unfortunately an officer of GHAZNAVI force Capt Ghulam Hussain was
seriously wounded during the raid and taken prisoner by the Indian army.
According to history of Azad Kashmir Regiment, Indian Supply Depot at
Narian Maira was raided, inflicting 152 casualties on the enemy. Capt Ghulam
Hussain was wounded and taken prisoner. (History of the Azad Kashmir
Regiment, Vol-1I)
Indian Version:
Gen Harbakhsh Singh writes: In 25 Infantry Division Sector, the infiltrators
fired on Petroleum, Oil and lubricants DUMP NARIAN NR 3906 but caused no
damage. (War Despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965) Available on Internet
The Pakistani intention stood fully corroborated on August, 08, when two
Pakistani Officers, Captain Ghulam Hussain and Captain Mohd Sajjad, were
arrested in Kashmir. Documentary evidence on their person revealed that a
Mujahedeen force had been formally embodied for this purpose through a
Presidential Ordinance in January 1965. (Remembering Operation Gibralter by
Simrit Kahlon on Monday, September 7th, 2015)
D.R. Mankekar writes, This group (GHAZNAVI force) operated in the
Mendhar-Rajouri Chingas-Jhangar area. They signalled their entry with an
attack on the ammunition dump in Narian (about six miles North of
Naushahra), but were beaten back by our troops. (Twenty two Fateful Days for
India) Available on Internet

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Another Indian author writes: There was a dangerous gap of about 10 km


unoccupied territory between 80 and 120 Inf Bdes, which led to the Divisional
Administrative Area at a place called Narian, where two second lines of
ammunition, a detachment of a field hospital and some ordnance stores were
stocked for two brigades and divisional troops. It would have been an easy task
for an enemy company or a battalion to infiltrate at night and blow up the
ammunition. During the war 1965 this gap was used by one of the infiltrating
columns. (Behind the Scene: An Analysis of Indias Military Operations, 19471971 by Joginder singh). Available on Internet
(3) Raid on Headquarter 120 Brigade at Galuthi:
While during the reconnaissance for raiding Headquarter 120 Brigade on 5th
August the reconnaissance parties were detected by the Indians and a Quick
Reaction Force of a company size led by an officer, encircled the
reconnaissance parties of GHAZNAVI force and attacked them in the evening.
GHAZNAVI guerrillas were asked to surrender but they preferred to fight back.
Major Munawar when learnt about the siege of his reconnaissance parties
immediately rushed to rescue them. He attacked the Indian Quick Reaction
Force from its flank and its rear with a platoon size force. In this encounter Capt
Chander Narain Singh and 3 soldiers were killed (later Capt Chander Narain
Singh was awarded Indian 2nd highest gallantry award Mahavir Chakra) and
two soldiers seriously wounded. One of the GHAZNAVI guerrillas was
seriously wounded. However GHAZNAVI guerrillas managed a safe
withdrawal to their base camp. Major Munawar after debriefing by the
reconnaissance parties planned a raid on Headquarter 120 Brigade on 7th
August. But a Captain and few other ranks opposed the idea of raiding 120
Brigade Headquarters and suggested that after this recent encounter with the
troops of 120 Brigade, enemy would remain extra vigilant and there were no
chances of success. But Major Munawar a hard task master, decided to lead the
raid himself. Leading this raid by Major Munawar himself had a tremendous
moral affect on GHAZNAVI force which lasted till the end of war. A swift and
successful raid was conducted, killing 4 sentries, destroying 3 vehicles,
capturing large number of small arms and ammunition. Few Indian writers
claim that during reconnaissance for raid on 120 Brigade Headquarter when
GHAZNAVI guerrillas were encircled and attacked by the Indian troops, the
operational plans of GHAZNAVI Force were captured. They also claim that
GHAZNAVI while withdrawing left behind 6 dead. Their claims are absolutely
incorrect because the documents found by the Indian troops were just the
nominal roles of one of the companies of GHAZNAVI force and a small

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personal diary of a Havildar. If they had captured the GHAZNAVI plans, the
GHAZNAVI force would not have successfully reached as deep as Ramban
undetected. Moreover there were no death casualties during reconnaissance on
5th August and raid on 7th August, however there was only one GHAZNAVI
soldier on machine gun during the withdrawal of reconnaissance parties, who
received two bullets on his right shoulder and he was also evacuated during
withdrawal.
Indian Version:
According to Indian Maj Gen Raj Mehta while narrating an act of gallantry by
Capt Chander Narain Singh of Headquarter 120 Infantry Brigade during an
encounter with the GHAZNAVI force writeslet us get back to 5 August 1965,
the day Gibraltar Force began its operations across the CFL. At about 1800
hours, HQ 120 Infantry Brigade was informed by friendly locals that a few
raiders had been seen moving in area Dhabhot, near Galuthi, in Mendhar
Sector, very close to the Brigade HQ location. Captain Chander Narain Singh
volunteered to lead a patrol to locate and liquidate them. In the hills, it gets dark
sooner than in the plains and in the gathering darkness, the patrol drew accurate,
intense small arms and automatic fire nearing the summit of the hill where the
raiders had been reported. In that opening burst, Chander lost one of his men.
This did not deter him from moving to a flank to get behind the enemy. This
resulted in the successful silencing of two of the enemys automatic weapons.
By now it was pitch dark. Chander planned and then executed his final attack,
leading his patrol to within 50 metres of the enemy. He lost two more men in
closing up. Wounded in the arm, he continued undeterred, rallying his men to
go for the kill instead of withdrawing; a show of rare leadership under fire,
courage and fortitude whose roots went back to his early grooming in 2 Garhwal
Rifles. Some reports suggest that his final, desperate charge ended 10 meters
away from the enemy where he succumbed to a burst of machine gun fire.
Hugely inspired by their wounded leader, his men carried on with the attack till
it ended entirely in their favour. The mujahideen, in running away across the
CFL, left behind six dead and large quantities of arms and ammunition. Of far
greater importance however, they left behind key documents that, for the first
time, revealed to the Army, the true nature of Operation Gibraltar and, in
specific, the operational plans and locations of Ghaznavi Company
operatives who were charged with causing mayhem and insurrection in the
Mendhar-Rajouri area. This find led to focused Army operations based on
high grade intelligence.
For his stellar follow me leadership and inspirational heroism, Capt Chander
Narain Singh was decorated with the MVC posthumously; the only MVC to be

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awarded to the Garhwal Rifles during the 1965 operations. Observers feel that a
better written, nuanced citation which had taken key assets of Chander's
operational conduct on record, including his urging his men on even when he
was seriously wounded, may have resulted in his being considered for the
highest award; the coveted Param Vir Chakra (PVC).(South Asia Defence &
Strategic Review, The Final Charge by: Maj Gen Raj Mehta (Retd), AVSM,
VSM, Dtaed: 11/17/2013). Available on Intenet
On 7th August 1965 the infiltrators made a daring raid on Headquarter 120
Infantry Brigade. There were however no causalities that night for the first time
the whole CFL in 25 Division Sector erupted into life with intense and
continuous fire. (War Despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965) Available on Internet

(4) Conduct of Ambushes on road Bhimber Gali-Suran Kot & RajouriMehndar road:
Subsequently in the 2nd & 3rd week of August 1965, three enemy convoys were
ambushed on road Bhimber Gali-Suran Kot & Rajouri-Mehndar road. 122
Indian soldiers were killed and 15 vehicles destroyed. (The Dawn News, dated
23rd August 1965). Available on Internet. (These ambushes were laid in
conjunction with disintegrated elements of groups G, H, J, K & L of NUSRAT
force and BABER force).
Indian Version:
According to Gen Harbakhsh Singh the infiltrators were first contacted 6 miles
west of Rajouri on 6th August and in area Bhimber gali on 7th August. They
succeeded in ambushing several of our convoys, on road Bhimber GaliSurankot between 13th and 15th August 1965 but inspite of these interruptions
the Road was kept open by our troops throughout. (War Despatches Indo-Pak
Conflict 1965) Available on Internet
According to D.R.mankekar This group (GHAZNAVI force) was also
responsible for the incidents in Rajouri, Mendhar, Surankot, Galuthi and
Bhimber Gali. Indeed, by the middle of September, this region was swarming
with infiltrators who shot at our posts and convoys, raided villages, carried out
sabotage activity and clashed with our security forces. One company of this
force spread out to Poonch and Mandi. (Twenty Two Fateful Days for India by
D.R.Mankekar) Available on Internet
According to Ex Chief Minister of Indian province of Punjab: In 1965, Pakistan
made the first move on July 24. It pushed five self-contained columns across the
ceasefire line. Their task was to infiltrate into the Kashmir Valley, to create an
insurrection by provoking local Kashmiris. All but one of the columns were
either eliminated or withdrew to Pakistan. The one (the GHAZNAVI force) that

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remained continued to operate in the Mendhar-Rajouri-Naushera sector till the


ceasefire. Pakistan also sent raiding parties to attack gun positions and supply
dumps along the ceasefire line. (Men of Valour by Amrinder Singh New
Delhi, December 15, 2011 | UPDATED 18:09 IST in India Today). Available
on Internet
During raid on ammunition dump and Brigade Headquarters GHAZNAVI
guerrillas captured 108 rifles, 7 machine guns, 300 anti personnel mines and
over 5000 bullets of small arms.
(5) On 11th August GHAZNAVI fighting patrols had successful encounters at
following Indian positions:(a) Chingas 3609 (map sheet 43 K/7 & 8)
(b) Area 2312 (map sheet 43 K/3)
(c)

Patrata 3527 (map sheet 43 K/7)


b. RAMBAN SECTOR
Battle of Ramban

One of the important tasks assigned to the GHAZNAVI force was destruction of
a strategically important bridge over Chenab River. Unfortunately due to
detection of GIBRALTAR forces on the very outset of their infiltration in
INDIAN HELD KASHMIR by the Indian security forces, state of high alertness
prevailed all over the important installations and bridges. Force made a hasty
effort to reach the target area as soon as possible but was detected near
Dhamkund by the Hindu locals and on receiving this information Indian army
promptly reacted and moved a battalion 3 Kumaon Regiment with artillery
battery to block the force. Major Munawar also learnt through his sources
regarding advance of Indian security forces towards Dhamkund. After assessing
his forces inability to reach the target before 3 Kumaon Regiment, he decided
to deal with the Indian security forces first. In the mean time he moved N/Sub
Mehrban Khan of SSG with his 9 other ranks to Dhamkund for the destruction
of Bridge. Another Infantry section was also provided to him for assistance.
N/Sub Mehrban Khan was able to capture home side of the Bridge after
exchange of some fire, killing one Indian guard and wounding other two Ex
company of 3 Kumaon Regiment. In haste and under the pressure of enemy
guards firing from the far bank of the Bridge, demolition charges could be laid
to two pillars of the Bridge only and unfortunately only one charge exploded

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which could cause partial damage to the Bridge. However, soon the company of
3 Kumaon was able to re capture the bridge intact.
Major Munawar, who was known for his ambush skills against British since
Battle of Imphal, adjusted his marksmen in a Nullah who ambushed the moving
column of 3 Kumaon and forced the entire body of Troops into Nullah in a hot
Pursuit against Munawar's men. Meanwhile, Munawar had laid a death trap at
the mouth of Nullah with his elite members on three sides on the rocks where he
expected 3 Kumaon. The movement 3 Kumaon and artillery battery entered the
trap, Munawar's men opened up with fire. In a state of shock 3 Kumaon could
not react to the unexpected situation. This battalion and artillery battery were
wiped out, artillery guns were rendered ineffective for future use. Remnants fled
away leaving behind weapons, ammunition and equipment (including wireless
sets). Later a large number of Muslim locals gathered to witness the scene of
Indian massacre. The local Muslims at the scene raised the slogans of ALLAH
O AKBAR and appreciated Major Munawar and his force for having done this
wonderful job. Major Munawar taking this opportunity asked the local Muslims
to contribute in this jihad and with our joint efforts we will eliminate the Indian
security forces from Jammu & Kashmir. Muslim locals narrated him the
incidents of oppressions and illegal detention of women and children by the
Indian army and police. Freedom lover locals provided them 13 mules for
carrying arms/ ammunition and equipment captured from Indian army to their
base camp. Sardar Jalal-Ud-din and Sardar Hashim Khan of Kandi tribes who
had joined GHAZNAVI force from the very outset of its infiltration, told the
locals of Dhamkund and surrounding areas to wait for a call for training within
a week at pre decided places.
According to Gen Mahmud Ahmed Having saved the bridges and blocked
GHAZNAVI Forces path from the eastern side, the Indians mounted an
operation from the west along the road Rajouri-Budhil with a battalion group
supported by a battery of artillery. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi,
Major Munawar trapped them in a gorge and inflicted heavy casualties on the
enemy forcing them to withdraw. (History of Indo-Pak war 1965 by Gen
Mahmud Ahmed)
Indian Version:( Quote from The History of Kumaon Regiment):
While mentioning about the GHAZNAVI force they wrote, Its depredations
caused the maximum worry to our security forces. While narrating about

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the activities of GHAZNAVI force in Ramban Dhamkund areas they wrote,


Elements from the GHAZNAVI Force were reported to be heading for the
bridge at Ramban. This strategic bridge on the Udhampur-Srinagar road was
guarded by five policemen at that time. Speed was essential to save it, and
Lieutenant Colonel Sinha was ordered to rush one of his companies to Ramban
and take the remainder of the battalion to Srinagar. It was 6 p.m. by the time the
battalion arrived in Udhampur. Telling them to follow him at once, the
commanding officer took the road to Ramban. When he arrived there, he found
a crowd gathered near the bridge; it included some civil officials. They told him
that the enemy was approaching fast. Just then a Truck-full of Hindu refugees
arrived from Dhamkund, 15 miles west of Ramban, with the news that the
enemy was nearing the Dhamkund bridge on the Chenab..The battalion
arrived at Ramban around 10.30 that night. A platoon from C Company was
then deployed at the bridge and the remainders of the company were ordered to
push off to Dhamkund. They arrived just in time to save the bridge there.
(History of Indo-Pak war 1965 by Gen Mahmud Ahmed)
c. POONCH SECTOR
One of the additional tasks assigned to GHAZNAVI force was to assist
SALAHUDIN force in demolishing the tunnels at Banihal Pass. Though
GHAZNAVI force had based itself at Sundar Top, yet Major Munawar
appreciated that it was necessary to establish a foot hold in Mandi valley to
block any reinforcement/intervention by the Indian Security forces from
Poonch, Baramula and Srinagar during his future operations. Moreover groups
F, G H & K of NUSRAT force who were to carry out fixation of enemy
deployed from Naushera to Poonch had failed to accomplish the assigned task
and had either retreated under enemy pressure by the end of 1 st week of August
or were disintegrated. In the absence of fixation force Major Munawar felt the
necessity of securing his base, his routes of supplies and denial of reinforcement
routes to the enemy. Man power of disintegrated groups of NUSRAT force
which were operating in this area (mainly from group G and few from group F
H & K) had already joined GHAZNAVI force. He decided to secure and
dominate the area from Naushera to Poonch and Mandi.
(1)

Capture of Mehndar bridge and attack on Mehndar camp:

on night 7/8th August, a company of GHAZNAVI Force under Capt Khurshid


(later Major and embraced martyrdom during 1971 war) which was to operate
in conjunction with NUSRAT force was launched by Major Munawar to
capture/secure Mehndar bridge and raid Indian administrative camp in the same
area. Bridge was attacked with the lightening speed and simultaneously, Indian

24/66

army camp near Mehndar was attacked inflicting heavy casualties. Though the
Indians were alert but were totally surprised by the unexpected direction of
attack. Those who survived escaped leaving behind 20 dead, 50 small arms and
ammunition. Later these arms and ammunition were distributed among the
locals. Administration was established in this area. Number 2 Company of
Group K of NUSRAT force under Capt Mohammad Din which was already
operating in this area merged itself with GHAZNAVI force. After capture of
Mehndar Bridge and Camp by Capt Khursheed, another company of
GHAZNAVI force under a junior commissioned officer (whose company
commander Capt Ghulam Hussain had been captured by the Indians during a
raid at Narian ammunition dump on 8th Aug) was following the company of
Capt Khursheed. Major Munawar ordered this company to relieve the company
of Capt Khursheed and take over the Mehndar Bridge & Camp. Capt Khursheed
was ordered to advance towards Mandi and operate in conjunction with group G
of NUSRAT force. Capt Mohammad Din was asked to exercise control in
Mehndar sub sector
(2) Encounters At Mandi Town & Isolation Of Poonch City:
The company, under Capt Khurshid with one additional platoon from the
company of Capt Ghulam Hussain and man power approximately 70 personnel
from NUSRAT groups F, G(A company of Gp G was already there at
Ammarnath)& H including an officer from group G were moved towards Mandi
town. This joint venture paid and here they attacked Indian army (company of 7
Sikh) which had two pickets and five administrative barracks. The soldiers on
these pickets were killed and about 30 to 40 persons in the barracks got alerted
by the fire, managed to escape. Simultaneously the police station was also
captured at the cost of one martyred and one wounded (officer). After about 2
hours a battalion size force of Indian army attacked in two layers but was beaten
back with heavy casualties including officers of Indian army. After this
unsuccessful attack Indian army made no attempt to regain the lost position till
11th August. By capture of this position, the town of Mandi and Poonch came
under the administrative control of GHAZNAVI Force and 93 Indian Infantry
Brigade Headquarter near Poonch virtually became ineffective to regain the
control of Mandi and Poonch town. Now this brigade Headquarter was more
worried about Poonch Air Strip and its own protection and security. The locals
of area extended full support to the force.
(3) Battle of Mandi:
th

On night 9/10 August, Capt Khurshid conveyed a message to Major Munawar


that counter attack on Mandi by Indian troops had been repulsed but troops of

25/66

group G (Ex 7AK Regiment) were insisting to withdraw and evacuate their
officer Capt Abdul Manan Qureshi who was seriously wounded, across the Fire
Control Line. The junior commissioned officer of this group had received
orders for withdrawal from battalion Headquarter. Moreover, the state of
ammunition was not enough to repulse any further attack by the Indians.
Therefore permission may be granted to withdraw from Mandi area and join the
company of GHAZNAVI force at Mehndar. At the same time the locals from
Poonch and Mandi who had rendered us their full support during attack at
Mandi town were fearing ruthless and revenge full reaction from the Indian
Security Forces after our withdrawal from Mandi and junior commissioned
officer of Group G had told the locals that his role was not to stay there and
indulge in pitched static battles. Major Munawar responded through a special
local courier that they should stay port there as Indians were not likely to attack
Mandi before 24 hours and he would be able to make arrangements for
replenishment of ammunition and make himself available at Mandi to deal with
any further counter attacks. After defeating and massacring 3 Kumaon
Regiment near Dhamkund, expecting a brigade size attack of Indians to
recapture Mandi town after 24 hours, Major Munawar along with two platoons
of locals (Ex army and Ex J&K Malitia personnel) rushed towards Mandi town
with captured arms and ammunition from 3 Kumaon and Artillery battery. In
the mean time he requested Headquarter 12 Division for an immediate air sortie
to drop the ammunition at a given point between Mehnder & Mandi and also to
convey the company of group G to stay at Mandi till the arrival of
reinforcement moved from Dhamkund. After traversing a long distance in
hazardous terrain, Major Munawar reached just in time at Mandi and learnt that
company of group G of NUSRAT force while evacuating its seriously wounded
officer had withdrawn from that area.
On 11th August Indians launched 52 Mountain Brigade to recapture the town of
Mandi. Heavy artillery shelling was brought on the heights dominating the town
of Mandi. Major Munawar deployed his force on the reverse slopes of heights,
ordered his men to wait for his signal to come on the forward slopes to engage
the Indian assaulting troops. This artillery shelling lasted for about one and a
half hour. During this shelling Major Munawar took along 15 soldiers and 2
locals through a narrow gorge to disrupt the enemy which was sitting in assault
formations in the base of the mountain. The moment enemy troops ascended
half of the feature; one of the two locals was rushed back from the gorge to give
a pre decided signal to the GHAZNAVI soldiers waiting on the reverse slope.
The men of GHAZNAVI hiding in the gorge, opened fire from the flank on to
the assaulting troops, while GHAZNAVIS waiting at the top also started
engaging the enemy. Enemy started retreating in hap hazard manner. The
second layer of enemy was also fired upon from the gorge. They were also
taken aback and started retreating. Indian commanders lost their command and

26/66

control and every Indian was trying to escape the death. They had left behind a
large number of dead, arms and ammunition. After this hard blow to the Indian
Army, Major Munawar left behind a company under Capt Khurshid with local
volunteers and personnel including remnants of NUSRAT Force to guard
against the enemy approaches. Sufficient arms and ammunition was dropped
through an air sortie, was made available to the men guarding Mandi town.
Deputy Commissioner of Poonch and other administrative personnel of Poonch
& Mandi were detained in their houses. In the words of a resident of INDIAN
HELD KASHMIR Mr Zafar Chaudhary, There is popular case of Poonch
Deputy Commissioner Mr Khanna who was under siege in his official quarter
for weeks together. How Khannas daughters were safely brought to Jammu by
the locals with approval of Razakaars (GHAZNAVI Force) is another
interesting story. (The Unwritten Story of 1965 War in Rising Kashmir)
Mandi & Poonch town (Excluding Poonch garrison) remained under the control
of GHAZNAVI Force until UN mandated Cease Fire was ordered. However
few half hearted attempts were made by the Indian troops before Cease fire to
recapture dominating features around Mandi town but failed.
This was an additional task performed by the GHAZNAVI Force. After this
campaign, Major Munawar ordered his two companies waiting in the base
camps near Sundarbani and Sunder Top under Capt Maqsood Hussain Shah and
Lt Khadim Hussain to advance towards Budhil while he himself rushed to join
them.
According to History of 7th Battalion the Azad Kashmir Regiment which
provided troops for group G of NUSRAT force, after dealing with the enemy
in area Amarnath, the party collected in Mandi town the same night and
effectively raided the Mandi bridge, police station and civil supply depot. In the
raid on police station Capt Abdul Manan Qureshi was seriously wounded and
seopy Mohammad Shaffi killed, but whole of Mandi area was cleared off the
enemy by 0900 hours on 10th August.
The enemy battalion (5 Gurkha), which had crossed the bridge earlier,
recaptured Mandi at about 1830 hours on 13th August after some fighting. Next
day, it moved towards Amarnath and recaptured it by the evening. The policy
followed by 7 AK, as instructed by the formation Headquarters, was to
avoid casualties in a pitched static encounter with enemy troops, owing to
lack of heavy weapons and artillery support. (History of the Azad Kashmir
Regiment, Vol-II)
According to Brigadier Gulzar Ahmed The Indian Brigade in Poonch had
remained on the defensive. The revolutionaries (GHAZNAVI Force & Locals)
had disrupted the Line of Control to Poonch very badly and Poonch had, at one
time, become very nearly a besieged garrison.

27/66

Indian Version:
The GHAZNAVI force inflicted considerable casualties on the Indian troops in
Poonch and Mandi. An all-out drive was launched against them after the
ceasefire, but most of them managed to escape across the border. Some
elements of Nusrat and Babar forces also operated in this area. (Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, Journal of Defence Studies, Operation Gibraltar:
An Uprising that Never Was (Reserch and Analysis by Maj Gen P.K.
Chakravorty and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal). Available on Internet
The Ghaznavi Force (Poonch-Rajouri) operated between Jhangar and Poonch
and according to reports Pakistan transport aircraft carried out some airdrops in
this area. The force operating in Thana Mandi succeeded in cutting off a
subsidiary of the Rajouri-Poonch road on the night of August 7/8. (The Rediff
Special/Major General Afsir Karim (retd), The 1965 War: Lessons yet to be
learnt, September 19, 2005). Available on Internet
A fresh task given to this force was to reach Topa Hill in Mendhar and carry out
guerrilla warfare. This force finally fetched up at Mandi after carrying out raids
and ambushes in the Poonch, Mendhar and Surankot areas, along with other
infiltrators. They exfiltrated on 25th September. (Honour Redeemed. By Maj
Gen Dhruv C. Katoch, Page 42-43)
Ghaznavi and Baber Forces operated in Poonch, Rajouri and Chhamb areas with
considerable success and established sanctuaries in Budhil, Darhal, Mandi and
Riasi areas. (Note: Baber force consisted of 34 men only, was disintegrated on
the very outset of GIRALTAR operation and its few stragglers who could not
retreat across the FCL merged themselves in a company of GHAZNAVI force in
Mendhar-Mandi area) They had success in Mandi, Budhil, and Darhal areas so
52 Infantry Brigade ex-Jammu area was moved on 9th August to clear the area
of infiltrators. (Missed Opportunities Indo-Pak War 1965 by Maj Gen
Lachhman Singh Lehl, page 133). Available on Internet
According to D.R.Mankekar: One company of this force (GHAZNAVI force)
spread out to Poonch and Mandi. (Twenty Two Fateful Days for India by
D.R.Mankekar) Available on Internet
Nawang Kapadia writes, In the area of Poonch they also hoped to cut off our
troops by interrupting the roads leading to it, unsettle them and later launched
an attack. After engaging our forward posts in fierce fighting on 8 August
1965, infiltrators for this purpose were slipped in from west of Mendhar and
through Sauji-Mandi. They were also tasked to create unrest in the villages. But
our population stood firm and in fact gave us information about their hideouts.
These raiders attacked our bridges and installations in the rear, occupied the
ridge overlooking Mendhar from the North. By 15 August Poonch had thus
been isolated. Maj Gen Amreek Singh, the then GOC decided to take
action against the raiders in Poonch. By 27 August, the features

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dominating Mandi town and areas around Sauji and Loran were cleared
off the infiltrators. In the process Capt. C. M. Singh of GARH RIF, who
displayed gallantry of the highest order was killed and awarded MVC
posthumously. Of the local population Shri Gulamuddin was awarded Ashok
Chakra . (Military Operations by Nawang Kapadia). Available on Internet
According to Gen Harbakhhsh Singh this menace posed a serious threat to the
line of communication to Poonch from Rajouri including the vital Kalai Bridge.
On 11th August 1965, 52 mountain brigade was rushed to Mandi In the
afternoon of that day (12th August), 8 GRENADIERS with a company of 7
SIKH under command launched an attack on Mandi under the overall direction
of Headquarters 52 Mountain Brigade. By the evening, the heights guarding the
approach to Mandi were secured and all was set for an assault on this important
town the next day.
Two companies from 6 DOGRA were moved to occupy CHOR PANJAL Pass,
DEVA HARI GALI and JAMIANWALI GALI to seal off these ingresses in the
PIR PANJAL range.
Further south, in the Poonch Sector, 1 MADRAS cleared Point 4007, killing 12,
wounding four and capturing 16 infiltrators. This was followed by the capture of
Mandi by 52 Mountain Brigade. And with that the first ray of light brightened
an otherwise dismal situation prevailing in the Poonch Sector where all
semblance of command and control was rapidly slipping through the
fingers of the local Brigade Commander (93 Infantry Brigade Poonch) for
want of initiative and offensive spirit.
One of the Indian battalions assaulted across the bridge over Mandi Nala in the
drive against the infiltrators occupying the town. Group G had kept the Bridge
intact in the hope of using it but when the situation deteriorated, it could not be
destroyed for want of sufficient explosives and was recaptured intact. Having
lost Mandi, Group G shifted to the area around Surankot, a town south-east of
Poonch on the road to Chandak- Bhimber Gali. Thereafter it confined its
activities to raids and ambushes although on 27th August and after a series of
tough fights Mandi valley was finally cleared by 27 th August 1965.(War
Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 by Gen Harbakhsh Singh). Available on
Internet
Analysis:
After going through the extract from the History of 7AK Regiment, having
compared the statement of Gen Harbakhsh Singh with Research & Analysis
carried out by Maj Gen Chakarvarty and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal and article
written by Maj Gen Afsir Karim, Nawang Kapadia and Brig Gulzar Ahmed one
can observe the following:

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a. Gen Harbakhsh Singh has credited Group G of NUSRAT force for


above mentioned venture, whereas later in September 2015, Research
& Analysis team of Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
and article by Maj Gen Afsir Karim, dated 19 September 2005 have
surfaced the fact that GHAZNAVI force captured the towns of Poonch
& Mandi and later defended them against Indian counter attacks.
b. Extract from the Regimental History of AK Regiment reveals that
group G ex NUSRAT force (7 AK) never fell in pitched static
encounters with enemy, moreover they withdrew on 13th August after
recapture of Mandi by the Indian troops. Whereas extracts of articles
and analysis by Indian authors reveal that Mandi town was recaptured
by the end of August and according to few after the UN mandated
Cease Fire.
c. Gen Harbakhsh Singh committing intellectual dishonesty, claimed
clearance of Mehndar, Mandi and Poonch areas by 27th August 1965;
whereas Research & Analysis team admitted that the area was cleared
after Cease Fire.
d. If we analyse the words of a resident of INDIAN HELD KASHMIR
Mr Zafar Chaudhary as mentioned in the above mentioned article,
There is popular case of Poonch Deputy Commissioner Mr Khanna
who was under siege in his official quarter for weeks together. It
reveals that Poonch & Mandi towns remained under the administrative
control of infiltrators for months. Whereas 7AK, according to its
history, captured this area on 10th August and withdrew on 13th
August. Then how the administrative control of these towns remained
in the hands of infiltrators ???
e. The revolutionaries (GHAZNAVI Force & Locals) had disrupted the
Line of Control to Poonch very badly and Poonch had, at one time,
become very nearly a besieged garrison. Lately the revolutionaries
had diverted their main attention to Rajouri and as a result the
Indian garrison in Poonch had got a little breathing space. The
capture of Mandi by the revolutionaries so closed to Poonch had
caused the Indians a great deal of concern but it had also helped
Poonch garrison indirectly by releasing pressure against it.
f. After analyzing the above extracts, the established fact is that
GHAZNAVI force with few elements of NUSRAT groups captured
Mandi & Poonch towns, repulsed all Indian counter attacks. Group G

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of NUSRAT force for evacuation of its seriously wounded officer


withdrew from this area before enemy brigade counter attack.
However GHAZNAVI force stood its ground, established its own
administration and withdrew after UN mandated Cease fire.
d. BUDHIL SECTOR
(1) Battles of Kandi
After the battle of Ramban near Dhamkund Major Munawar had moved his two
companies under Capt Maqsood Hussain Shah & Lt Khadim Hussain in base
camps near Sundarbani and SundarTop and were to wait for the orders to
proceed to Budhil while he himself left for Mandi to deal with the expected
enemy brigade size counter attack on Mandi. After repulsing the counter attacks
on Mandi, early in the morning on 14th August, Major Munawar left for Budhil
to join his two companies which had already moved from Sundar top and
Sundarbani to Kandi for carrying out operations in Budhil region. On night
14/15th August 1965 GHAZNAVI Force destroyed a bridge on River Ans (4423
(43/K/7) and Dak Banglow at Kandi (6127 (43 K/11). Destruction of this bridge
cut off the main route / supply line to Budhil region from Rajouri and Mandi
valleys. Indian security forces resorted to heavy artillery shelling on Kandi and
other villages in the area. This continued till 3 Oclock on 15 th August. After
artillery shelling Indian army entered into the villages in search of infiltrators of
GHAZNAVI Force. After the search of villages a battalion of Indian army
supported by Indian Air Force advanced towards Budhil. While they were
crossing River Ans and half of their strength had reached the far bank of the
river, guerrillas of the GHAZNAVI Force who were already deployed on the
heights, opened fire on the Indian battalion from North and West. The Indian
battalion was totally surprised by this sudden blow; they were shot like sitting
ducks. Majority of them were either killed or wounded and about 200 managed
to escape towards South West. Heavy quantity of arms and ammunition was
captured by the GHAZNAVI Force.

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On 31st August heavy fighting took place in Kandi area 6021. Enemy fired 120
Mortar shells. Enemy retreated with 40 Indians killed and many wounded.
On night 31/1 September Major Munawar was ordered by Headquarters 12
Division to deny road Rajouri Budhil to enemy at all costs due to own
Operation in Chamb Sector (Operation Grand Slam). GHAZNAVI guerrillas
ensured that no enemy column moves on Rajouri Budhil road.
Indian Version:
9th August there was intense activity in 25 Division and 191 Brigade Sector.
Approximately 250 infiltrators were seen in area Saranu moving to kandi. A few
raiders were also seen in village Guni near Sundar Bani. Our opposite
Daruchhian was engaged with 81mm mortars. (War Despatches: Indo-Pak
Conflict 1965 by Gen Harbakhsh Singh) Available on Internet
The GHAZNAVI Force under Brigadier Raza (code name of Major Munawar)
penetrated deep into the interior and set up a parallel Pakistani administration at
Budhil and kandi. Some elements of this group were operating as far as Ramban
bridge on the Jammu-Srinagar highway. (Pakistans Down Fall In Kashmir-The
Three Indo-Pak Wars by Col M.N.Gulati)
(2) Capture of Budhil
In the first week of August 1965, Major Munawar sent three small parties of 7
men each under the overall responsibility of Sardar Hussain Bakhsh Jagirdar of
Budhil, to discreetly carry out the reconnaissance of Budhil and surrounding
area and select suitable site for the base camp. Many Ex service men of Budhil
Battalion (British Army) had already met Major Munawar at Bhar Jarian Marg
and promised him to join hands with him for the liberation of Kashmir. A
discreet dumping of arms and ammunition for onword distribution to the Ex
service men of Budhil was also carried out within two weeks. After having
established administrative control over Mehndar, Mandi, Thana Mandi and
Kandi areas, Major Munawar moved 2 companies (in small parties of 4 to 5
men) of his force for capturing the town of Rajnagar Budhil. In the evening of
16th August, Major Munawar arrived in the town of Budhil, simultaneously his
companies also reached near Budhil. About 100 Ex service men with arms and
ammunition were also available in the town. Indian troops in the vicinity were
taken aback by sudden appearance of GHAZNAVI guerrillas in and around the
town. Indian troops fled away leaving behind 5 prisoners and 3 dead with small
quantity of arms and ammunition. Later after about three hours Indians mounted
a battalion attack but was conveniently repulsed by the GHAZNAVIS. From
the dawn of 17th August till dusk Indians launched series of attacks to re
capture the town of Budhil but were beaten back with heavy casualties. In the

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morning of 18th August, Major Munawar hoisted Pakistani Flag on all official
buildings of Budhil town and surroundings.
On 19th August Indian approached from Rupari Shopian side to counter attack
Budhil with two battalions but their attack was repulsed with heavy casualties.
On 23rd August 1965 Indians moved two more battalions including a Gorkha
battalion and 7 Madras with Artillery battery and Jain Singh Jatha of 600 for
launching a deliberate attack on Budhil. Severe fighting took place between
GHAZNAVI guerrillas and Indian Security Forces on Budhil Rajouri road in
area 7527 43 K/11. This encounter lasted for 3 and half days. 33 Indians were
killed and many wounded. Indians fired 500 Mortar and over 50 artillery shells.
4 local Mujahids of GHAZNAVI deserted. However Indian Security Forces
started retreating under the pressure of GHAZNAVI guerrillas. On 26th August
7 Madras battalion was once again trapped and attacked by Maj Munawar near
Kandi where it suffered even more heavy causalities in men and material.
Artillery guns were rendered unserviceable for further use. The battalion was
forced to retreat under GHAZNAVI guerrillas pressure. Gorkha battalion also
withdrew back to its administrative camp without making any attempt to attack
the GHAZNAVI guerrillas. Later in retaliation Indians burnt following
villages:- SAMOT 7025, PHALNI 7225, DRAJ 6725, LARKOT 6623,
MOHRA 6426, KALLAR 5926, KANDI 6027 (map reference 43 K/11).
According to history of AK Regiment, 7 Madras along with 600 Jain Singh
Jatha with two 3.7 Howitzer guns attacked Ghaznavis in Rajouri area, but was
forced to withdraw with heavy losses. Another battalion column was beaten
back on 1st September which won them a great military prestige. (History of the
Azad Kashmir Regiment, Vol-1I)
On 31st August Indians made another attempt to recapture Budhil but Indian
troops started retreating without involving themselves in a pitched static battle.
From 9th September onwards enemy Helicopters with mounted Heavy Machine
Guns started strafing in Budhil area daily from 0900 hours to 1100 hours and
from 1500 hours to 1700 hours up to 14 th September 1965. GHAZNAVI force
commander requested Headquarter 12 Division for PAF sortie to intercept
enemy Helicopters in this area. PAF Combat Air Craft flew over this area on
14th September. After this PAF sortie no enemy Helicopter was ever seen flying
over Budhil region.
Gen Mahmud Ahmed writes, by August 18, he (Major Munawar) was in
complete control of Budhil. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi, for the rest
of the period, he was administering the area. He had his own police officials, he
had his own Tehsildar, he had his own government. The local population was
fully supporting him, providing whatever assistance they could. He was

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operating against the entire Rajouri valley.(History of Indo-Pak War 1965 by


Gen Mahmud Ahmed)
In Budhil, the infiltrators formed a Government of their own, set up revenue
department and established law and order like any other settled government.
(The Second Round In Kashmir by Brig Gulzar Ahmed)
Ghaznavi force was later to be deemed the most successful by the Pakistan
Army. It operated in the area of Budhil in North Kashmir and claimed by 18 th
August to be in control of the area having inflicted Indian military casualties.
Ghaznavi force claimed that local Kashmiries of this area joined it
enthusiastically and an air drop of rifles by the PAF meant that additional rifles
were available to the local population, making Ghaznavi force appear larger
than it was. The force was able to stay in place until 23 rd September when it was
ordered by GHQ to withdraw. (From Kuch To Tashkent, The Indo-Pakistan
War of 1965 by Farooq Bajwa, page 117) Available on Internet
Indian Version:
GHAZNAVI established its base camp in Budhil area by 6 th August. The
Indians attacked this force, but it stood its ground, inflicting heavy casualties on
the enemy. By 18th August, GHAZNAVI was in virtual control of Budhil and a
large number of locals inhabitants volunteered to join in. GHAZNAVI
continued to dominate the wide region in Western and South-Western Jammu
throughout the war and was not withdrawn until after the Cease Fire. (Low
Intensity Conflict in India: An Analysis by Lt Col Vivek Chadha). Available on
Internet
They created a safe area in Budhil and established their own administration.
This force was reinforced by 600 men of 21 AZAD KASHMIR Battalion on 2223rd August. (Honour Redeemed. By Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch, Page 42-43)
According to D.R.Mankekar, the raiders were milling around this area in
considerable strength from the very beginning. By August 18, they got virtual
control of Budil. They established their headquarters in Dudaruni, and by
September 7, as many as 1,500 raiders were reported to be concentrated in the
Dudaruni-Dana-Budil area. (Twenty Two Fateful Days for India by
D.R.Mankekar). Available on Internet
The GHAZNAVI force operated in this area. Initially, it comprised of six
companies but later swelled to 2000 personnel . . . . . had established a base at
Dudaruni with full control of Budhil. (Journal of Defence Studies, Operation
Gibraltar: An Uprising that Never Was (Reserch and Analysis by Maj Gen P.K.
Chakravorty and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal). Available on Internet

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(3) Attack on Indian Training Camp and Detention Camp:


On 4th September 1965 an Indian Army training camp at Tata Pani 4628, (map
sheet 43 K/7) in Budhil Region, where about 500 Hindus were being trained as
Para Military troops was attacked. In the vicinity of this training camp there was
yet another camp where about 2000 Muslim women and children were detained
by the Indian Army. These camps were being guarded by a company of Indian
Army and a Platoon of Central Reserve Police. Indian troops on security duty
were taken by surprise, they suffered heavy casualties including 70 killed and
many wounded. A large number of weapons and ammunition which were to be
issued to these trainees was captured. About 2000 Kashmiri women and
children were librated. An Indian battalion supported by Hindu Jathas advanced
from Riasi to recapture these camps but it was intercepted by Ghaznavi
guerrillas ahead of CHNAN SHIKARI where after suffering heavy casualties
Indians retreated. After this blow Indian Security Forces made three more
attempts in two days to recapture the camps but they were repulsed by the
GHAZNAVI guerrillas.
(4)

Encounter at Mohr, Capture of Arnas Bridge & Encounter at


Riasi:

After having established strong foot hold at Budhil & surrounding areas, Major
Munawar anticipated advance of Indian Security Forces minimum with brigade
strength from Riasi to Budhil. He immediately moved two small parties

consisting of one officer, one junior commissioned officer & local mujahidin of

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Budhil and Punji areas for reconnaissance. The parties came back after 2 days
and briefed the GHAZNAVI force commander about the area and dimensions of
bridge near Arnas. In the mean time Major Munawar received a coded message
from his source at Riasi through a messenger, that Indian army was moving a
large quantity of arms & ammunition on mules and about 400 Indian soldiers
were already camping on North of Arnas and another Indian battalion probably
Gorkhas was about to move towards Raj Nagar Budhil. Major Munawar
immediately moved a company of GHAZNAVI force under Lt Khadim Hussain
with additional 150 local mujahidin in small parties and ordered them to
concentrate in a suitable site, South of village Damni and await further orders.
On 8th September in the afternoon the GHAZNAVI force concentrated about 5
miles South-West of Damni. Leaving Capt Maqsood Hussain Shah at Budhil,
Major Munawar himself left for conducting an important operations at Rajori.
Lt Khadam was ordered to move towards Arnas by passing Mohr and be ready
for any encounter. Probably Indians had already come to know about the
presence of GHAZNAVI force near Damni heading towards Arnas. On 12th
September GHAZNAVI company under Lt Khadim Hussain attacked enemy
position at MOHR (9724) at 0300 hours. After fierce fighting enemy vacated
the position and withdrew towards Riasi leaving behind 27 dead and 15
wounded who were taken as prisoners. This captured position was held by 400
Indians. In this encounter a large number of mules loaded with arms,
ammunition and rations were also captured. After this encounter Major
Munawar ordered this GHAZNAVI company to immediately rush towards
Arnas bridge. Arnas bridge was captured with little resistance. Capture of
Arnas bridge and loaded mules by GHAZNAVI force compelled Indians to
postpone any further advance and attack on Budhil.
After repulsing all Indian counter attacks and consolidating his gains at Rajori ,
leaving behind Capt Maqsood Hussain Shah at Rajouri, Major Munawar
reached Budhil and then to Mohr Malai where Lt Khadim Hussain had
conducted successful operations on 12th September 1965. Hereafter two
companies (including a company of GHAZNAVI force and a company of locals
from Budhil region advanced towards Riasi. During an encounter with a platoon
of Punjab Armed police and a company of J&K Malitia near Tehsil
Headquarter, Punjab Armed police retreated and J&K Malitia voluntarily
surrendered and joined the GHAZNAVI force. After the capture of Tehsil
Headquarters and few villages South of Arnas, Major Munawar, after
establishing his own administration, leaving behind a company of locals went
back to Budhil.
On night 14/15th September GHAZNAVI guerrillas attacked CRP post MEKTA
5805 (map reference 43 K/8) and captured it without much resistance.

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On 16th September Indian Air Crafts bombed entire Budhil region up to Riasi
for 3 hours commencing at 1330 hours.
Indian Version
According to D.R.Makekar, the men of this group (Ghaznavi force) were also
sighted at Mohr, where they attacked an Armed Police post and otherwise did
considerable damage. Some also got to Arnas and Riasi, and others penetrated
as deep as Ramban. Right through the 22 days shooting war between India and
Pakistan, a wide region in western and south western Jammu was dominated by
the infiltrators. An all out drive against the raiders in this region could actually
be launched only after the cease fire. But a majority of the infiltrators managed
to retreat to AZAD KASHMIR during the nights of September 25 and 27.
(Twenty Two Fateful Days for India by D.R.Mankekar). Available on Internet
GHAZNAVI force, The Punjab Armed Police (PAP) at Mohr, around 40 km
West of Ramban was attacked on 13th September. Another company succeeded
in disrupting the line of communication along Aknur-Naushera-Rajouri and
carried out raids on brigade and battalion Headquarters and administrative units.
(Honour Redeemed. By Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch, Page 42-43)
According to Lt Gen B.M.Kaul, In some areas, such as Budhil, in the Riasi
Tehsil in the Jammu sector, it took us considerable effort to get rid of the
administration which the infiltrators had set up there. (The Untold Story by Lt
Gen B.M.Kaul). Available on Internet
e. THANAMANDI SECTOR
Encounters in THANAMANDI- DARHAL MALKAN:
On 12th August enemy wireless message was intercepted which revealed that
two Indian vehicles carrying 3 inch Mortar ammunition and petrol were
destroyed by the company of Capt Sher Ahmed. The same day Major Munawar
ordered Capt Sher Ahmed to attack enemy company in Patri and destroy
communication network at Patri and power channel at Darhal Malkan.
Communication network in area Patri was destroyed where the Indian troops in
company strength retreated without putting up much resistance. On the
following night company of Capt Sher Ahmed cut power channel to power
house Rajouri, guards at Darhal Malkan power house located north-east of
Rajouri were eliminated in a lightning attack. In another encounter a mortar
battery of the Indian Army at Chaudhri Narh was targeted by Capt Sher Ahmed
where inflicted 35 casualties. On 24th August Indian Battalion Headquarters at
Thanna Mandi was raided inflicting heavy casualties.

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On 31st August Indian Air Crafts bombed Parore Gujjran and Darhal Malkan
but luckily there were no casualties.
After establishing foot hold in Poonch and Mandi area Maj Munawar ordered a
local GHAZNVAI commander to relieve Capt Khursheed for conducting
operations in Thanamandi area in conjunction with the company of Capt Sher
Ahmed. Capt Khursheed raided Indian guards deployed on either sides of the
Thanamandi bridge. The company annihilated them with lightning speed.
During raid 78 Indian soldiers were killed and a sizeable amount of arms,
ammunition and equipment was captured. Brig Gulzar writes in his book: Lately
the revolutionaries had diverted their main attention to Rajouri and as a result
the Indian garrison in Poonch had got a little breathing space. (The Second
Round In Kashmir by Brig Gulzar Ahmed)
Capt Khursheeds company ambushed enemy company moving on Poonch
Rajouri road killed 10 Indians and one was taken prisoner, 7 small arms with
2000 rounds were captured.
On 5th September Major Munawar ordered Capt Sher Ahmed to attack 22
Rajputana Rifles which was reportedly concentrating in a Mughlia Saraey in his
area of responsibility. On 6th September 22 Rajputana Rifles was trapped by
company of Capt Sher Ahmed in Liran Wali Ban near village Saj Lah. This
Indian Battalion was to counter attack and regain a post captured by
GHAZNAVI force near Thana Mandi. 22nd Rajputana Rifles could not
accomplish its task and was forced to retreat with some causalities of men and
material (including 3 vehicles).
Capt Khursheed destroyed two small bridges and a culvert and occupied
dominating heights around Thana Mandi. Enemy launched two counter attacks,
but attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties. GHAZNAVI guerrillas own
administration was established.
Indian Version:
According to Gen Harbakhsh Singh force remained active on Roads RajouriMendhar and Rajouri-Thana Mandi and succeeded in damaging a few
unimportant bridges. This party also raided our administrative base near
Mendhar but without much success.
The raiders made a show of establishing administration in Area Kot Bhrote NR
2167, Darhal and Thana Mandi even at the best of times our civil administration
had made little impact on these remote areas, which had remained

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comparatively isolated from the main centers of government. (War Despatches:


Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 by Gen Harbakhsh Singh) Available on Internet

f. Rajouri Sector:
(1) Battle of Sohl Dhar
Major Munawar was planning to give a final blow to the 25 th Indian Divisional
Headquarter and Garrisons at Rajouri. He had established a base camp near
Suoil (locally pronounced as Sohl Dhar) on Rajouri Kandi Budhil road. On
29th August 1965 an Indian battalion consisting of selected Sikhs and
Gorkhas with Artillery battery was moved to destroy the GHAZNAVI
guerrillas base camp at Suoil. Major Munawar learnt about this enemy move
well before time. He ordered Capt Maqsood Hussain Shah to deploy two
platoons of his company in successive lines of Defense on the likely enemy
approach. And Major Munawar also moved a platoon of local GHAZNAVI
guerrillas under Mirza Hakim Din Jaral (Ex Budhil battalion) about 8 Kilo
Meters towards Rajouri to lay a blocking position astride Rajouri Budhil road.
Enemy battalion contacted the forward platoon which was under command
N/Sub Pehlwan Khan. Indian battalion was sandwiched between the platoon of
local GHAZNAVI guerrillas and the platoon of N/Sub Pehlwan Khan. Enemy
Artillery battery was assaulted from the rear by the local GHAZNAVI
guerrillas. This enemys selected battalion and Artillery battery were destroyed
and forced to retreat.
(2) BATTLE OF RAJOURI GARRISON:
Major Munawar planned to attack Rajouri Garrison on night 15/16th September
1965. For this venture he had sought the help of Sardar Jamal-Ud-Deen and
Sardar Hashim Ali Khan of Kandi (Budil Region). From 11th to 14th September
Major Munawar along with the locals reconnoitered the area of Rajouri
Garrison in the disguise of local Kashmiri. Thorough reconnaissance of
Phalianah Camp, Nagrota Camp, Palma Camp, Dhanni Dar, Air Landing Strip,
Police Station and Headquarter 25th Indian Infantry Division was carried out.
After reconnaissance it was planned to raid Indian Divisional Headquarter,
attack and capture Phalianah Camp, Palman Camp, Nagrota Camp and Rajouri
Police Station simultaneously with the total strength of 205 including locals and
GHAZNAVI guerrillas (Majority was from locals Ex service men of Budhil
Battalion and J&K Malatia.) No other officer was readily available for this
venture due to their employment in other areas. On night 15/16 th September the
GHAZNAVI Force went in hideout in a jungle near mountain Dannah over
looking Palma cantonment and cantonment across Tawi River, The Rajouri
Garrison of Headquarter 25th Indian Infantry Division, close to Rajouri city.
Major Munawar grouped the force into raid parties and attack formations under
Junior Commissioned Officers and Non Commissioned Officers and he himself
being overall commander of this extremely complicated and difficult venture.

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Blocking positions were also laid to stop any reinforcement to Rajouri from
Naushera, Mehndar and Budhil and to inflict causalities on escaping enemy
from Rajori. At about 11 Oclock the same night Major Munawar stealthily
crossed the jungle and deployed GHAZNAVI Force and local mujahidin around
the Garrison. After positioning his force in attack formations he assaulted the
Garrison. Initially due to surprise Indian troops could not respond well to the
attacking GHAZNAVI Force. However, after some time they came into their
senses and posed a very tough resistance. Palman, Nagrota and some part of
Phalianah Camps were overrun; however raid on Indian 25th Infantry Division
faced very tough resistance by the Indian guards. GHAZNAVI guerrillas
entered in the premises of Divisional Headquarter, inflicted heavy casualties yet
a company of 7 Sikh which was there for the protection of Divisional
Headquarter under Capt Sansar Singh with 2/Lt MS Punia retaliated gallantly,
and denied the raiders the control and capture of the buildings of Divisional
Headquarters. Gen Amreek Singh also displayed a high degree of courage,
despite the cruising pressure of GHAZNAVI guerrillas, did not move away
from the Divisional Headquarters. Divisional Headquarter had become very
nearly a besieged garrison. It was a great shock to the Indian Security Forces.
However an access from Naushera-Rajouri road remained opened to the
Divisional Headquarters. (The Divisional Headquarter remained isolated from
rest of the Garrison till the withdrawal of GHAZNAVI guerrillas after UN
mandated Cease Fire). Sounds of the explosions and fire were heard throughout
the night in Rajouri city and villages in its out skirts. The local population was
in a state of terror and harassment. Hindu and Sikh community of the area
started escaping on the trucks, Lorries and even on foot without bag and
baggage. The fighting continued till dawn and death toll of Indian soldiers was
very high. (According to few it was over 150 dead and a large number seriously
wounded whereas according to Rajourian migrant Shabbir Raja the death toll
rose to over 700). Still a large number of soldiers and officers of the Garrison
managed to escape leaving behind dead and wounded. GHAZNAVI force lost
Lnk Mohammad Akbar and 6 locals in this heroic action. This hard blow to the
Indian security forces motivated locals of Rajouri city and surrounding to
welcome the guerrillas. According to a Kashmiri author The Rajourian locals
came out on their roofs and in streets with white flags. (Gibraltar Operation ki
kahani by a Rajourian migrant Shabbir Raja published in Nawa-e-waqt on 23rd
September 2007)
After this attack when a truck and a jeep full of Sikh and Hindu refugees were
escaping on Rajouri-Budil road were stopped by the GHAZNAVI Force. Major
Munawar went close to the refugees and asked them as to why were they
escaping from Rajouri? An old Hindu lady using filthy abusive language
shouted at Major Munawar and said Tum Pakistani ghundon ne hamaray
Sainikon ki hatiya ki ha ore ab hamain be marna chahtay ho (You Pakistani

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rascals have killed our Army personnel and now you want to kill us). Major
Munawar said O mother we will kill each and every Indian soldier in INDIAN
HELD KASHMIR because they are suppressing Kashmiri Muslims, however
you civilians Hindus and Sikhs living in Rajouri-Budil Region, dont have to
fear and worry. I am a Muslim soldier and my Allah and Prophet Mohammad
(PBUH) do not permit me to kill any person particularly the women, the
children and the old ones who are not involved in fighting. Dont escape, go
back to your homes and stay there in peace. They felt so happy that an old Sikh
man prayed for the long life of Major Munawar and a Hindu lady wanted to put
a mark of Tillak on the forehead of Major Munawar but Major did not allow
that being an un Islamic practice.
On 16th September Indians mounted a counter attack to recapture Rajouri
Garrison. 22 Rajputana Rifles and Artillery Battery were moved from a camp
located in between Thanamandi and Rajouri to counter attack GHAZNAVI
Force holding Rajouri Garrison. (This enemy Battalion was initially located in
Thanamandi but after the capture of Thanamandi by GHAZNAVI force in 3 rd
week of August 1965, it had retreated to a camp North of Rajouri) 1 Madras and
another Battalion were to follow and launch the attack in case of failure of 22
Rajputana Rifles. Major Munawar received the information regarding move of
22 Rajputana Rifles towards Rajouri well before time. He immediately arranged
an ambush for giving a warm welcome to 22 Rajputana Rifles and other troops
heading for counter attack. The ambush was laid over a bottle neck and when 22
Rajputana Rifles and Artillery Battery completely entered into the ambush site
about 4 miles North - East of Rajouri, GHAZNAVIS opened up with small arms
fire and rocket launchers. Indians could not react to this sudden blow and started
running towards North leaving their artillery guns, vehicles and dead behind.
The death toll of Indians rose to over 150 including one officer & 2 junior
commissioned officers. However, 1st Madras Battalion was immediately rushed
to rescue 22 Rajputana Rifles within 30 minutes. This quick response of 1st
Madras saved their artillery guns from destruction.
In afternoon the same day, Indians moved 6 Madras and 1 st Madras Battalions
supported by Artillery Battery to counter attack Rajouri Garrison. Fully
conscious of the skill full ambushes of GHAZNAVI Force, Indians were now
moving bound by bound towards Rajouri. 6 Madras was responsible to clear the
bounds for 1st Madras and Artillery Battery while 1st Madras and Artillery
Battery were moving on the road Naushera-Rajouri. GHAZNAVIS took up
defensive positions around Rajouri with their main concentration/bias on West
of Rajouri. Patiently waiting for an assault by the Indians. About two hours
before sun set, Major Munawar sent two parties with automatic weapons. One
party to engage enemy artillery guns and another party to engage assaulting
troops from the flank after the commencement of enemy assault. The moment
enemy assault begun, their artillery guns were neutralized and assaulting troops

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were fired upon from the flank and front. In the absence of artillery covering
fire Indians suffered heavy casualties and the attack was effectively repulsed.
Indians retreated leaving behind 16 dead, 21 rifles and a large quantity of
ammunition. After beating back the Indian counter attacks, Major Munawar
established his own civil administration in Rajouri that lasted till the UN
mandated Cease Fire. After successfully repulsing all Indian counter attacks
Major Munawar left for Budhil to preside over a conference of notables from
Baramula, Srinagar and Jammu, leaving behind his deputy Capt Maqsood
Hussain Shah.
After capture of Rajouri Garrison road Rajouri Budhil was completely denied
to the Indian Security Forces. However Indian started using a new road
Akhnoor DharamShal Rajouri.
According to History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment Vol-II, Ghaznavis raided
military targets including Palman, nagrota Camps, Headquarters 25 Division
across the Rajouri Tawi and police stations in Rajouri. Ghaznavis set up civil
administration in Rajouri which functioned efficiently until, on orders, they fell
back to their base on 26th Septemer, 1965.
Renowned journalist Mr Hamid Mir writes: It was only the GHAZNAVI force
under command Major Malik Munawar Awan that successfully captured
Rajouri Garrison near Jammu because Muslims of Jammu fully supported
Pakistan army and Major Munawar received hundreds of volunteers. (Column
Ye Mazaq Band Karo by Hamid Mir published in Jang Newspaper).

After capture of Rajouri Garrison & Rajouri town a team of UN Observers visited
Rajouri Garrison in September 1965. In this picture at Rajouri Garrison (Dhani Dahr)
Maj Munawar Khan (in disguise of Kashmiri Revolutionary leader) briefing them
regarding capture of Rajouri Garrison & town. Hereafter he flew with the UN team to
Budhil to brief them regarding his gains in Budhil region. A UN Helicopter is also
visible in the background.

42/66

Indian Version:
Indian author writes in his article about GIBRALTAR operation: The
operation failed miserably. Intruders were reported to Indian forces by
Kashmiris. Only one of Gibraltar Forces 10 regiments Ghaznavi under
Munawar Khan managed some success by capturing the garrison at
Rajouri temporarily. However, Gibraltar did trigger full-scale war, which
Pakistan had not banked on. (National Security & Aerospace News Magazine
FORCE, 3rd Eppisode of InQuizitive Second Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 by
Gautam Basu, dated: April 2013 Issue). Available on Internet
Another Indian writer admitted that throughout the month of September there
was fighting in a wide region of Western and South-Western Jammu and the
Indian troops found it difficult to dislodge the infiltrators until after the ceasefire
following the end of the war (D.R.Mankekar, Twenty two Fateful Days:
Pakistan Cut to Size, Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967, 69).
7.

Establishment of GHAZNAVIES Administration/Government &


Training of Volunteers:

Major Munawar established his own administration in Tehsil of Riasi, Budhil


region, Rajouri, Thana Mandi, Mehndar, Poonch & Mandi areas. He appointed
his own DC, SP, Tehsildars, Revenue officers & Police officers. He had his own
government. He hoisted Pakistani Flag over all official buildings of the area.
Locals of Poonch, Rajouri & Budhil who migrated to AK (Azad Kashmir) &
Pakistan narrate that Major Munawar was dominating and governing a vast area
measuring 2000 Sq Miles and he organized training of local volunteers in
training camps at Budhil, Banah, Rajouri, Thana Mandi, Mehndar & Mandi.
Responsibility of training was given to SSG personnel attached to GHAZNAVI
force. By mid of September 1965 the total number of local volunteers rose to
about 2000. About 200 local volunteers belonging to Ex Budhil Battalion and
J&K Malatia were inducted in GHAZNAVI force in 2nd & 3rd week of August
1965 and they actively participated in Jihad against Indian Security Forces. But
Gen Mahmud writes Controlling a vast area now (500 square miles according
to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi uz Zaman), Major Munawar organized training of
the local volunteers and then let them loose against the Indian occupation
forces. It is perhaps for this reason that Indian sources credit GHAZNAVI Force
with much more strength than it actually had. In another paragraph Gen
Mahmud Ahmed writes, by August 18, he (Major Munawar) was in complete
control of Budhil. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi, for the rest of the
period, he was administering the area. He had his own police officials, he had
his own Tehsildar, he had his own government. The local population was fully
supporting him, providing whatever assistance they could. He was operating

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against the entire Rajouri valley. (The History of Indo-Pak war 1965 by Gen
Mahmud Ahmed)
Indian Version:
Brig Chitranjan Sawant writes, In Rajouri area many local Muslims joined him
(Maj Munawar) and his groups numbers swelled to almost 2,000. (Let
Pakistan Learn A Lesson In Peace And Eschew War, Op Gibraltar Total
Disaster by Brigadier Chitranjan Sawant,VSM). Available on Internet
Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh writes: Although the raiders did not meet with the
resounding success the Pakistani military planners had envisaged, the menace
persisted throughout the theatre, including the establishment of the invaders
administration in the Kandi Budil area of the Rajouri sector, and this continued
there till well after the end of the 1965 war. (Evolution of Indian Military
Concepts by Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh, Issue Book Excerpt: Indias War since
Independence, Date: 24 Aug , 2013). Available on Internet
An author from Indian Held Kashmir, Mr Zafar Chaudhary writes: As armed
Razakaars spread out across the region, the minority Hindu population rushed
towards the townships sensing imminent trouble. Razakaars with support of
locals (or may be locals with support of Razakaars) had total control of the
administration; at many places they had their own tehsildars and thanedars (the
Police Station House Officers) appointed and the government officials
terminated. In many cases the government officials voluntarily gave up the
services to join the new administration some out of duress and others for
romanticism. A number of living witnesses recall the hovering of Pakistani
helicopters and airdropping of ammunition and ration at many places. (The
Unwritten Story of 1965 War by Zafar Choudhary in Rising Srinagar).
Available on Internet
Infiltrators did get public support in Rajouri and Poonch that is a known fact.
They did not get such support elsewhere in Jammu and Kahmir. The Razakars
were able to establish local governments in the area and many government
employs gave up their jobs to join them. Hindus and Sikhs fled from rural areas
while the supporters of Razakars grabbed their properties. (Why it is senseless
to celebrate the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War by Bharat Bhushan, 3rd July 2015).
Available on Internet
Operations in Jammu division were carried out by GHAZNAVI force. The
infiltrators established their own administrative base in the Thana Mandi area.
Since the area was isolated the locals started cooperating with them. They were
issued with weapons and clothing and given weapon training. Each village was
issued 20 rifles. (Honour Redeemed. By Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch, Page 42)

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8.

Supplies of Arms, Ammunition and Rations to the Force:

GHAZNAVI was the only force which asked and received a large number of
weapons, ammunition, other equipment and rations through air sorties and
ground routes. It received total of 4 air sorties, one in Mandi valley (2 nd week of
August 1965), two in Bhar Jarian Marg (2nd week of August 1965) & one near
Rajouri Town (3rd week of September 1965) and two heli drops. Two mule
convoys of 100 mules each were also received in Rajouri and Budhil areas in
September 1965. Safe arrival of mule convoys also reflect affective
administrative control of GHAZNAVI force over the area.
According to Gen Mahmud, a large number of local inhabitants of Budil
volunteered to join the fight for freedom. On Major Munawars request a sortie
of PAF C-130 Hercules dropped 500 rifles which Munawar distributed among
the new recruits. (The History of Indo-Pak war 1965 by Gen Mahmud Ahmed)
4x air sorties dropped rations, ammunition and arms to the GHAZNAVI Force
after 10th September. (History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment, Vol-1I).
Indian Version:
This is corroborated to some extent by an Indian account: In this region, the
raiders were often supplied by air-drops, and on one occasion, got 500 rifles air
dropped at Dana. In the first week of September a convoy of nearly 100 mules
infiltrated and delivered arms and ammunition and other supplies to the
group.(Twenty Two Fateful Days for India by D.R.Mankekar). Available on
Internet
Each force of (Operation GIBRALTAR) was commanded by a Pakistani Army
Major and was allotted a code name. (Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses, Journal of Defence Studies, Operation Gibraltar: An Uprising that
Never Was (Reserch and Analysis by Maj Gen P.K. Chakravorty and Brig
Gurmeet Kanwal). Available on Internet
Razas (code name of Major Munawar) column received regular airdrops, and
was further maintained by land convoys of about 300 pack animals a day on a
regular basis. (Indias Wars Since Independence by Major General Sukhwant
Singh)
While discussing GHAZNAVI Force Brig Chitranjan Sawant writes, their
supplies, arms and ammunition were airdropped by the Pakistan Air Force
planes at convenient times. Of course, when cease fire came into effect, he
(Munawar) returned to Pakistan. (Let Pakistan Learn A Lesson In Peace And
Eschew War, Op Gibraltar Total Disaster by Brigadier Chitranjan
Sawant,VSM). Available on Internt

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A number of living witnesses recall the hovering of Pakistani helicopters and


airdropping of ammunition and ration at many places. (The unwritten story by
INDIAN HELD KASHMIRs resident Mr Zafar Choudhary in Rising
Srinagar). Available on Internet
9. Announcement of Head Money:
Indian security forces in Rajouri, Poonch & Budhil regions felt absolutely
helpless and paralyzed in the CLAWS of GHAZNAVI force. And large number
of volunteers from these areas started joining the GHAZNAVI force. The
Puppet Government of INDIAN HELD KASHMIR on the behest of Indian
army announced a head money of Rs 10 lac for killing Major Munawar Khan
the GHAZNAVI force commander. But Kashmiri Muslims The men of strong
faith rejected this bribe.
According to Abdullah Abdul Wahab, an immigrant of Rajouri INDIAN HELD
KASHMIR India announced head money worth Rs 10,00000 for killing
Ghaznavi force Commander Maj Munawar. (India Today 26 December 2015
) Available on Internet
10.

Bearing of Operation GIBRALTAR on Operation GRAND SLAM &


Vice Versa and Role of GHAZNAVI Force in Both the Operations:

Majority of writers, term Operation GIBRALTAR as a total failure. But I think


it is unwise to discuss the Operation GIBRALTAR in isolation without coupling
it with operation Grand Slam. It was felt that Infiltration campaign alone would
not be able to wrest Kashmir from India. This lesson had been learnt in 194748, and suitably Imbibed as was evident from the planning for the war 1965. A
complementary operation in the grand design for the last ditch attempts to settle
the Kashmir question once and for all was therefore incorporated. It was codenamed Operation GRAND SLAM the aim of which was the capture of
Akhnoor by Pakistan Regular forces using armor and air power. This blitzkrieg
operation was designed to deal a disastrous blow to the entire logistic set-up of
not only the Indian Army in the valley, but also for the entire State of Jammu &
Kashmir.
Objectives of GIBRALTAR operation were to defreeze the Kashmir issue,
create uprising in Jammu & Kashmir, disable Indian administration and
establish own administration in the area, paralyze Indian security forces, disrupt
communications and force the Indians to commit and concentrate more strength

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on Fire Control Line in Jammu & Kashmir. After having achieved these
objectives by GIBRALTAR operation, the objective of operation GRAND
SLAM was to get hold of chickens neck. It was launched by Pakistan to
capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for
communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, the importance of
Akhnur to India having called it India's "jugular vein". In case of capture of
Akhnur town, the troops of Indian 25th Infantry Division sector would have been
bottled up and Indian troops North of the Banihal completely isolated. There by
cutting lines of communication to Jammu & Kashmir from India.
Capture of Haji Pir and committing more troops for capturing Bedori Bulge by
the Indians caused no anxiety to Gen Akhtar Malik as Indians were playing the
cards as Gen Akhtar wanted them to. The more the enemy committed himself in
the North, the less strength he was likely to have in the South to defend Akhnur.
Apparently the situation was desperate but victory was also within reach if only
Gen Akhtar was allowed to clinch it. Gen Akhtar Malik writes: Haji Pir did not
cause me much anxiety. Because of the impending Grand Slam, Indian
concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have
to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their
gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of
Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was
not to be!
With the launch of operations by India across the International Border on 6
September, Pakistan was forced to pull back the major component of its
offensive forces from the Chamb Sector and a stalemate developed in the sector
which was to continue till the declaration of the ceasefire. Undoubtedly,
Pakistan missed a golden opportunity to capture Akhnoor, which lay ripe for the
picking, had they moved with speed on day one itself, bypassing opposition en
route and making a breach over the Munawar Wali Tawi. That would have
turned the defences of 191 Infantry Brigade. A dash to Akhnoor on 2 nd
September would have met with no opposition, but the impact on India would
have been catastrophic. The entire defences of the sector streaching from
Poonch to Naushera were dependent on the single bridge across the Chenab
river at Akhnoor and would have been impossible to maintain. The National
Highway to Srinagar would have been threatened and Jammu would have
remained extremely vulnerable. Indeed, the course of the war would have
changed. Pakistan would have been able to justify the aggression, stating that it

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had been necessitated by Indias capture of the Hajipir Pass and world opinion
would largely have remained ambivalent to Pakistani aggression.
Although GIBRALTAR forces with the exception of GHAZNAVI force could
not achieve the above mentioned objectives of GIBRALTAR operation yet
GHAZNAVI continued to dominate the wide region in Western and SouthWestern Jammu up to Poonch throughout the war. Objectives achieved by the
GHAZNAVI alone would have sufficed to support the operation GRAND
SLAM for overall achievement of the aim.
Operation GRAND SLAM was rapidly progressing as planned and if the change
of command had not taken place, this operation would have linked up with
GHAZNAVI force, which was already controlling the vast area of Rajouri and
Mandi valleys.
Despite failure of GIBRALTAR forces & groups of NUSRAT force, the
success of GHAZNAVI force beyond expectations, had the potential to turn the
overall failure of GIBRALTAR operation to a dazzling success, if operation
GRAND SLAM had reached the stage of linking up with the GHAZNAVI
force. But unfortunately Gen Ayubs desire to glorify Gen Yahya, spoiled both
the operations before they could achieve the success.
According to Gen Mahmud: Operation GRAND SALAM did have the
potential to succeed; in terms of direction and objectives, it offered strategic
results. If restricted to attaining limited gains in 12 Divisions area of
responsibility only, Operation GRAND SALAM had the capability of
linking up with GHAZNAVI Force which had established itself in Budil
region and trapping all Indian forces operating in INDIAN HELD
KASHMIR south of Poonch. On the other hand, Operation GRAND SALAM
could have yielded far greater strategic effects if the forces grouped for it had
been directed towards Jammu after the capture of Akhnur, and combined with
15 Division ad 6 Armored Division from Sialkot to form the northern arm of a
giant pincer whose other arm would have been formed by the Striking Force
operating through the Ravi-Beas corridor. But in 1965, no plans existed for such
a grand manoeuvre. Operation GRAND SALAM itself was ruined by the
unnecessary intervention by General Musa who ordered a meaningless change
of command at an inopportune moment. (History of Indo-Pak War 1965 by
Gen Mahmud Ahmed)
A Pakistani thinker and writer Inayat Ullah commented on the Operation
Gibraltar Our forces (Note: It is an established fact that all forces had retreated
to AK on the very outset of Gibraltar Operation in 1/2 nd week of August. Only

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GHAZNAVI Force under Maj Munawar administratively controlled a wide


region of Jammu including Rajouri , Poonch ,Budhil & Riasi areas and had
won full public support and withdrew after UN mandated Cease Fire) prepared
the ground for us in Kashmir, the next stage was to launch attack by regular
army and capture Akhnoor. If General Akhtar Hussain Malik was not removed
then we could have had Akhnoor and 200,000 prisoners of war as well and
Kashmir would have been independent. But our dictator Ayub Khan gave
Kashmir to India on a tray, and went to Tashknet to get compliment from
America and Russia. (Kashmir and the 1965 war by Shabir Choudhry, page 38)
Available on Internet
Views of INDIAN HELD KASHMIRs citizen & Indian Version:
According to Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh, Significant gains in the Rajouri sector
could not be consolidated as the land operations (GRAND SLAM) launched by
the regular army could not affect a link up. (Indias Wars Since Independence
by Major General Sukhwant Singh)
Shabir Choudhry a writer and a politician of INDIAN HELD KASHMIR in his
book refers to Qudrat Ullah Shahab who had been an Information Minister and
Secretary, to the President Ayub, commented on the war: When General
Akhtar Malik was about to run over Akhnoor (an important town on the Indian
side of Kashmir), many generals including General Musa and President Ayub
Khan got alarmed that he would emerge as a hero, and this would make him a
stronger candidate for the highest post of the commander in Chief. President
Ayub Khan already had a suitable man, General Yahya Khan, for this position.
Before General Akhtar Malik could take over Akhnoor, he was replaced by
General yahya Khan, probably that he could stop Pakistan army to invade
Akhnoor, which he did successfully. (Kashmir and the 1965 war by Shabir
Choudhry, page 34-35) Available on Internet
Commenting on the change of command during operation GRAND SLAM, the
Indian GOC of Western Command said "The enemy came to our rescue".
A 24 hour lull ensued, which allowed the Indian army to reinforce/regroup in
Akhnur and oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan which
was bound to fail.
Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh commander Indian Westren command was one of the
few to have appreciated the full military value of Operation GIBRALTAR as a
part of GRAND SLAM rather than seeing the two in isolation. According to
him, The plan of infiltration was brilliant in conception, and as for GRAND
SLAM, he thought it was aptly named GRAND SLAM for had it succeeded, a
trail of dazzling results would have followed in its wake, and the infiltration
campaign would have had a fresh lease of life, and that it was only the last

49/66

minute frantic rush of reinforcements into the sector. . .that prevented this
debacle from deteriorating into major catastrophe.
The troops in 25 Infantry Division Sector would have been bottled up and
those North of the Banihal completely isolated. (War Despatches: Indo-Pak
Conflict 1965 by Gen Harbakhsh Singh). Available on Internet
11.

Achievements of GHAZNAVI Force During War 1965:

During war 1965 one of the most spectacular successes and the saga of those
operations conducted by Major Munawars GHAZNAVI force is by itself a
glorious chapter of heroism and courage. He had librated the largest tract of
territory in IHK during war 1965.

a.

It captured and dominated a vast area in Western and South-Western


Jammu upto Poonch throughout the war and was not withdrawn until
after the Cease Fire. It is a unique honor & achievement of
GHAZNAVI force that none from the Indo-Pak Armies during war
1965 could capture such a wide region in one theater of war.
Irrespective of the claims of capturing each others territory by
Pakistan & India factual or exaggerated, one fact remains un
challenged that GHAZNAVI force captured the maximum area
and established its own administration during war 1965.

b.

GHAZNAVI
force
had
established
its
own
government/administration and writ in Rajouri, Thana Mandi, Darhal
Malkan, Mendhar, Mandi, Poonch, Budhil and Riasi areas. Major

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Munawar appointed his own DC, SP, Judges, Tehsildar, Thanedar


(SHO) and revenue officers in the above mentioned areas.
The GHAZNAVI force commander Major Munawar Khan requested
Headquarter 12 Division to provide sufficient amount of money for its
onwards distribution to the locals of Rajouri, Thana Mandi, Darhal,
Mendhar, Mandi, Poonch, Budhil and Riasi areas where he had established
his own government, but unfortunately Headquarter 12 Division could not
arrange and provide the amount and in the mean time UN mandated
ceasefire was ordered.
While discussing the operations of GHAZNAVI force in Jammu Division,
Maj Gen Dhruv C. katoch and Maj Gen H.S.Kler write The Pakistani also
appointed civil officials like DC, SP and judges. When the Pakistani forces
exfiltrated under pressure from our troops, these officials also left with the
infiltrators. (Honour Redeemed. By Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch, Page 42)
(Note: the exfiltration was never under the pressure of Indian forces, it took
place on 27th September under the UN mandated ceasefire orders)
c. When in United Nations Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto refused to the request
of Security Council for withdrawing Pakistani troops to their preAugust 5th position because GHAZNAVI force was controlling a vast
area measuring approximately 2000 sq miles including Poonch,
Surankot,
Mandi,
Mehndar,
Balakot,
Thana
Mandi,
DarhalMalkan,Rajouri, Kandi, Budhil, Kalakot, Mohr, Arnas and
Riasi. It was indeed a major gain of Pakistan in war 1965. This
was not at all acceptable to Indian bargainers. Indians put their
foot down and refused to withdraw their troops from Lahore
Sector (where despite supreme sacrifices of our officers and other
ranks, Indians after having over run Pakistani Defenses at BRB
canal were occupying Pakistani territory up to Batapur village)
until Pakistan withdraws its force from Poonch-Rajouri areas.
Finally Pakistan had to withdraw from Poonch-Rajouri areas as a
result of the bargain.
This is corroborated to some extent by a Pakistani Daily Newspaper. On 25th
September 1965 PAKISTAN TIMES published the following two items:
I.

Rawalpindi 24th September


An official spokesman disclosed here today that in the operations
which ended yesterday morning the Pakistan Armed Forces have
seized 1600 square miles of Indian or Indian held territory. As
against this, India holds 450 square miles of Pakistan territory.

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Whosoever worked out the relative mathematics could not have worked out the
relative importance of terrain held by either side. The second item runs.
II.

United Nations 24th September


The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, said last
night that Pakistani troops would not be withdrawn to their preAugust 5th position as requested by Security Council.
Mr. Bhutto also indicated that this was because India was unwilling
to withdraw its troops.
Mr. Bhutto indicated that Pakistan would leave the United Nations
next 1st January, unless the Security Council took meaningful steps
to resolve the basic problem of Kashmir.

(Page 283, The Pakistan Army War 1965 by Major Gen Shoukat Riza)
Indian Version:
Though all GIBRALTAR forces & NUSRAT groups had withdrawn / retreated
from INDIAN HELD KASHMIR to AK by the end of 2nd week of August 1965,
yet the presence and control of GHAZNAVI force over Southern and Western
Jammu upto Poonch and Budhil caused much anxiety to the defenders and
politicians of India. Indians concern regarding withdrawal of troops including
infiltrators (GHAZNAVI force) is evident to a greater extant from the following
paragraph from a book of an Indian author:On 4 September PM sent a detailed reply to U Thant, the UN secretaryGeneral, stating that: Pakistan had launched a massive infiltration across the
Ceasefire Line. That aggression throws on us, a sovereign State,
responsibilities for defence which is our right and duty to discharge. Mr
Secretary-General, you have appealed for peace and we greatly appreciate your
anxiety and sincerity of your efforts. I trust that, in the first instance, you
will ascertain from Pakistan if it will accept responsibility for withdrawing
not only its armed forces but also the infiltrators and for preventing
further infiltration. (Note: All infiltration forces of Pakistani infiltration
campaign had withdrawn back to Azad Kashmir by 13th August 1965 except
GHAZNAVI force) This, in fact, we take it, is the basic assumption underlying
your appeal. (1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavans
Diary of India by R.D. Pradhan) Available on internet
A map released by the Indian Express in an article written by Sushant Singh
Big Picture: 1965, fifty years later reveals that GHAZNAVI force captured
490 sq km of Indian Held Kashmir in Western & South Western Jammu up to
Poonch.

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Pakistani writers credit Major Munawar for capture of 500 sq miles (750 sq km)
whereas few immigrants from Indian Held Kashmir who actually participated in
Jihad under the Flag of GHAZNAVI force against Indian Security Forces credit
Major Munawar Khan for capturing and establishing his own writ over 2000 sq
miles.
d.

It successfully created uprising in its areas of operations.

e.

It caused maximum depredations to Indian Security Forces during


war 1965.

f.

GHAZNAVI group kept up its pressure and was prepared to continue


even after the ceasefire but the higher political and military
considerations compelled their withdrawal by 26th September.
(Kashmir Battles of 1948, 1965 & 1971 And Ongoing Freedom
Struggle by Brig Asif Haroon)

g.

If war 1965 is taken as a match between India & Pakistan, Major


Munawar was rightly The Man of the Match.

h.

During war 1965 considering all theatres of war; GHAZNAVI force


was the most successful force of Pakistan Army which achieved the
maximum with minimum or negligible losses.

12.

Words of Appreciation for Major Munawar and His GHAZNAVI


Force by the Indian & Pakistani Authors:

a. Nine groups out of ten either disintegrated under the pressure of the
Indian Army or they mutinied and were disbanded by organizers of Op
Gibraltar.Over one thousand raiders of the Gibraltar Force were killed or

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executed by the Indian Army, the J&K plus Pumjab Police, Only one
group, Ghaznavis, showed their mentors what they had achieved in
the Rajouri-Mendhar sectors by giving tough time to the Indian
defenders. Major Malik Munawar Khan Awan, commander of the
Ghaznavi Force was a man of guts and he knew how to turn an
adverse situation to own advantage. As an officer of the Indian Army,
he became a POW in Rangoon, Burma where he learnt Japanese and
spoke it fluently. He was an officer in Netaji Subhash Boses Indian
National Army too. On return to India he was court martialled but
released as Indian Independence was around corner. On vivisection of
our motherland, Munawar opted for Pakistan and infiltrated into
Rajouri-Mendhar area as per plan. In Rajouri area many local Muslims
joined him and his groups numbers swelled to almost 2,000. Their
supplies, arms and ammunition were airdropped by the Pakistan Air
Force planes at convenient times. Of course, when cease fire came into
effect, he returned to Pakistan. (Submitted by sawant on Mon, 2015-0720 16:18. AUM, OP GIBRALTAR TOTAL DISASTER
By Brigadier Chitranjan Sawant,VSM)
b . Undoubtedly, the most successful of all the GIBRALTAR Forces
was GHAZNAVI Force. (History of Indo-Pak War 1965 by Gen
Mahmud Ahmed)
c. Indian Armys counter-infiltration operations in Rajouri sector did not
fare well. The Indian Army units in this Sector were totally
ineffective so much so that Raza (code name of Major Munawar) was
left alone till he decided to go back on his own. Raza held this area for
almost a month after the Cease-fire. (Pakistans Down Fall In KashmirThe Three Indo-Pak Wars by Col M.N.Gulati)
d. According to Ex Chief Minister of Indian province of Punjab: In 1965,
Pakistan made the first move on July 24. It pushed five self-contained
columns across the ceasefire line. Their task was to infiltrate into the
Kashmir Valley, to create an insurrection by provoking local Kashmiris.
All but one of the columns were either eliminated or withdrew to
Pakistan. The one (the GHAZNAVI force) that remained continued
to operate in the Mendhar-Rajouri-Naushera sector till the
ceasefire. Pakistan also sent raiding parties to attack gun positions and
supply dumps along the ceasefire line. (Men of Valour by Amrinder
Singh New Delhi, December 15, 2011 | UPDATED 18:09 IST in India
Today). Available on Internet

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e. While mentioning about the GHAZNAVI force they wrote, Its


depredations caused the maximum worry to our security forces.
(Quote from The History of Kumaon Regiment)
f. GHAZNAVI established its base camp in Budhil area by 6 th August. The
Indians attacked this force, but it stood its ground, inflicting heavy
casualties on the enemy. By 18th August, GHAZNAVI was in virtual
control of Budhil and a large number of locals inhabitants volunteered to
join in. GHAZNAVI continued to dominate the wide region in Western
and South-Western Jammu throughout the war and was not withdrawn
until after the Cease Fire. (Low Intensity Conflict in India: An Analysis
by Lt Col Vivek Chadha). Available on Internet
g.

While discussing the operations of GHAZNAVI force in Jammu


Division, Maj Gen Dhruv C. katoch and Maj Gen H.S.Kler write The
Pakistani also appointed civil officials like DC, SP and judges.
(Honour Redeemed)

h.

While discussing the areas of operations of GHAZNAVI force Brig


Gulzar Ahmed writes, It was only after 23rd September, when the whole
of the Indian Army was uncommitted, that the Indians dared enter
those areas. (The Second Round In Kashmir by Brig Gulzar Ahmed)

j.

Ghaznavi force was later to be deemed the most successful by the


Pakistan Army. (From Kuch To Tashkent, The Indo-Pakistan War of
1965 by Farooq Bajwa, page 117)

k.

An appreciation signal message (wireless message) of General


Officer Commanding 12 Division Major General Akhtar Hussain
Malik to GHAZNAVI Force Commander Major Munawar Khan is
appended below:Personal from GOC (.) Well done(.) Proud of your achievements and of
brave people of area in which you are operating (.) Prepare for
prolonged operation (.) recruit upto 5000 (.) will be paid as Mujahids in
Pakistan currency (.) organise training and employment (.) You are task
free and secure as much as possible with DARHAL MALKAN as base
(.) set up civil administration and intelligence network (.) drive
undesirable elements out of area (.) will meet your requirements of arms
, ammunition, equipment and clothing but you must procure supplies
locally to maximum and conserve whatever we send (.) Tell the brave
people of DARHAL MALKAN that they should stand firm (.) Insha
Allah we shall soon drive every single Indian out of JAMMU and

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KASHMIR (.) Hit hard and go on hitting (.) send recommendations for
awards (.)
13.

Withdrawal of GHAZNAVI Force to Azad Kashmir After UN


Mandated Cease Fire:

On September 22nd, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a


resolution that called for unconditional ceasefire from both Nations. The war
ended the following day. Both sides India & Pakistan agreed to withdraw to preAugust lines.
By mid of September 1965, Major Munawar had established his foot holds in
Rajouri & Mandi valleys, Budhil & Riasi areas. Motivated by his gains, a large
number of notables including 5 old ladies from Barahmula, Srinagar and Jammu
visited him at Budhil and offered him their full support for expanding his
operations to their areas. He at his own initiative planned his own visit to those
areas along with reconnaissance parties to commence on 25 th September 1965.
After meeting the collaborators and carrying out reconnaissance of those areas
he was to contact Headquarter 12 Division for permission and logistic support
for further operations. But it was not to be. On 23 rd September when he was
discussing his future plans with the local commanders of GHAZNAVI force, he
received the orders of withdrawal back to Azad Kashmir. According to an
immigrant of Kandi Raja Shams Ud Din who was present in the conference,
when Major Munawar received the orders from his higher Headquarters for
withdrawal, he showed his annoyance and responded them that he should not be
asked to withdraw as he was negotiating & planning for further operations
towards Jammu town, Srinagar and Barahmula moreover after the withdrawal of
GHAZNAVI force from this area, Indian security Forces will take revenge from
the locals for supporting the infiltrators. He further said he could nt leave the
Kashmiri locals alone at the mercy of Indian Security Forces and he was
ready to fight till the very end.


Gen Mahmud writes, By 23 September, GHAZNAVI Force had been ordered
to exfiltrate. But Major Munawar protested against the withdrawal arguing that
the people of Budil would have to pay a heavy price for their loyalty to his
Force. He and his men were ready to stay and fight to the very end. However,
the orders to withdrawal were firm and final. With a heavy heart Major
Munawar and men of GHAZNAVI Force began exfiltration by 27 September.
During nearly two months in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR, this force lost four

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killed, sixteen wounded; two were taken prisoners. There were no casualties
during exfiltration.
According to a senior journalist Mr Hamid Mir on 23 rd September 1965 Major
Munawar was asked to withdraw back to Azad Kashmir but Major Munawar
protested on the pretext that incase of his withdrawal Indian army will avenge
the Muslims of Rajouri & Jammu for cooperating with the GHAZNAVI force
but Gen Ayub Khan did not pay any heed to the protest of Major Munawars
message and GHAZNAVI being a disciplined force withdrew back to Azad
Kashmir. (Column Ye Mazaq Band Karo by Hamid Mir published in Jang
Newspaper).
According to another author, It was only GHAZNAVI group of GIBRALTAR
force which was able to conduct successful operations around Budhil/Rajouri.
While most of the groups got disintegrated and started exfiltrating prematurely,
the GHAZNAVI group kept up its pressure and was prepared to continue
even after the ceasefire but the higher political and military considerations
compelled their withdrawal by 26th September. (Kashmir Battles of 1948,
1965 & 1971 And Ongoing Freedom Struggle by Brig Asif Haroon)
A stage came when Presence of GHAZNAVI force in Indian Held Kashmir
become a night mare for the Indian security forces. Indian troops used to avoid
and escape encounters with the guerrillas of GHAZNAVI force. According to
Brig (Retd) Akbar (Ex commandant of the Azad Kashmir Regimental Centre)
During withdrawal of GHAZNAVI force under UN mandated ceasefire in the
last week of September 1965 when a small group of GHAZNAVI force was
passing through a mountain pass, the Sikh soldiers standing on the shoulder of
the pass told the GHAZNAVI guerrillas with the sigh of relief and with joining
their palms RUB DA WASTA HUNN SADI JAAN CHAD VEE DEO (For
God sake now please leave our area).
Indian Version:
Indian Armys counter-infiltration operations in Rajouri sector did not fare well.
The Indian Army units in this Sector were totally ineffective so much so that
Raza (code name of Major Munawar) was left alone till he decided to go back
on his own. Raza held this area for almost a month after the Cease-fire.
(Pakistans Down Fall In Kashmir-The Three Indo-Pak Wars by Col
M.N.Gulati)
Writes Major General Sukhwant Singh in his monumental work Indias Wars
Since Independence. Sukhwant Singh claims that Raza (Major Munawar) held
on to Budhil area for almost a month after the cease-fire.

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14.

POST OPERATION PLIGHT IN INDIAN HELD KASHMIR

All infiltration forces except GHAZNAVI force had withdrawn back to Azad
Kashmir before and in the 2nd week of August 1965. But GHAZNAVI force
stood its ground and withdrew on 27th September 1965 after strict, firm and
final orders of GHQ as a result of UN mandated Cease Fire. Indians had
planned an operation to take revenge and punish the people of Jammu &
Kashmir who supported the infiltration campaign launched by Pakistan. There
were atrocities by Indian Army during the operation. This open, brutal massacre
of Kashmiri men, women and children was carried out during Operation
Clearance. Over 2000 Kashmiries were killed ruthlessly. Hands of those
Kashmiri women were chopped off who cooked food for infiltrators and even
many were made to sit on the burning stoves as a punishment. Large number of
young girls & women were raped by the Indian Security Forces. Many were
even raped to death. Their houses and crops were set on fire. Over 86000
refugees crossed over to Azad Kashmir and settled in Mirpur, Kotli, Bhimber
and Muzzafarabad. During the operations of GHAZNAVI force in Poonch and
Rajouri areas, over 9000 Hindus and Sikhs had shifted to Jammu and elsewhere.
These Hindus and Sikhs fell back to their homes during Operation Clearance
and fully supported Indian security forces in targeting and slaughtering Muslim
population.
It is worth mentioning that Operation Clearance was mainly directed towards
the areas of Poonch and Rajouri where GHAZNAVI force had operated with
full support of locals. Many refugees contacted Major Munawar at Kotli and
Rawalpindi and narrated him the stories of brutality, inhumanity and oppression
of Indian Army. Indian security forces had assaulted civilians during search
operations, tortured and summarily executed detainees in custody and murdered
civilians in reprisal attacks. Rape most often occurred during crackdowns,
cordon-and-search operations during which men were held for identification in
parks/ schoolyards while security forces searched their homes. Rape was used
as a means of targeting women whom the security forces accused of being
militants / infiltrators sympathizers; in raping them, the security forces were
attempting to punish and humiliate the entire Kashmiri Muslim community.
Major Munawar with tears in his eyes would curse the top military leadership
for spoiling operation Grand Slam and leaving alone the Kashmiri Muslims at
the mercy of cruel Indian Security Forces. He often used to sing this verse as a
tribute to Kashmiri Muslim warriors of Indian Occupied Kashmir:

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(Thousand salutes to the people of Poonch, Rajouri and Budhil regions for
their gallantry, stead fastness and supreme sacrifices). A large number of
refugees were living in the camps. Besides Govt support, Major Munawar
having special love and regards for these precious people, left no stone unturned
for their settlement and rehabilitation. He arranged single rooms and houses in
the towns of Kotli, Bhimber, Mirpur, Muzzafarabad and villages in their out
skirts, at his personnel liaison. One of the migrants of Kandi area of Rajouri Mr
Shabir Raja narrates that once in 1966, Major Munawar visited the refugees in
Mirpur AK, paid Rs 1600 to each family on behalf of the Government and in
addition gifted a cash bundle of Rs.10000 (ten thousand) to Sardar Jamal Din
from his own pocket as a good will gesture. Sardar Jamal Din being Imam
Masjid in Kandi area motivated a large number of people to join GHAZNAVI
force.(This was the total saving of Maj Munawar before war which he had
saved to construct a Havaily in his native village.) He remained in touch with
the notables and elders of refugees till his last breath.
Indian Version:
The arrival of the army was announced by with burning of crops and gutting of
houses. Along the road side from Bhimber Gali to Poonch every house was set
on fire. (Why it is senseless to celebrate the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War by Bharat
Bhushan on 3rd July 2015). Available on Internet
Based on evidence gathered from survivors many years later. It is estimated that
nearly 2000 people were killed during operation clearance in 1965. (The
unwritten story by INDIAN HELD KASHMIR resident Mr Zafar Choudhary in
Rising Srinagar). Available on Internet
Gen B.M.Kaul in his book The Untold Story and Gen Ashok Mehta in his
columns and interviews confirms the above mentioned atrocities by the Indian
Security Forces after GIBRALTAR operation in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR.
15.

Redress of Grievances:-

All GIBRALTAR forces and groups except GHAZNAVI force had retreated /
withdrawn back by the 2nd week of August 1965.but Major Munawar and his
GHAZNAVI force withdrew back to Azad Kashmir on 27th September 1965. In

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2nd week of October 1965 on reaching back in the cantonment Major Munawar
was shocked to know that many of his achievements had been enchased by the
officers of other forces and groups of Operation GIBRALTAR. And there were
even few officers who had not even crossed the Fire Control Line throughout
the war but were recommended for higher gallantry awards against Munawars
achievements. Fabricated and inflated citations of those officers had already
been forwarded to higher Headquarters. He also learnt that there was a strong
lobby intriguing against him and unfortunately one of his own under command
officer of GHAZNAVI force was also party to it. Major Munawar could not
tolerate encashment of his achievements by others and asked for the redress of
grievances to the Brigade Commander of Sector-III of 12 Division. He
requested the sector commander to order a court of inquiry as to how and why
fake citations against his actions and achievements had been forwarded by the
other officers to higher Headquarters. He got highly disturbed on the issues and
requested the sector commander to do away with the anomalies and not to let
the history of the Operation GIBRALTAR be spoiled, drop all fictitious
yearnings are earnings if found wrong. Sector commander paid no heed to his
request as he wanted to get rid of this ugly situation for the reasons best known
to him. However in order to defuse the situation he consoled Major Munawar by
saying that Dont you worry all those enchasing your achievements and
lobbying against you will be dealt with severely. The entire Nation appreciates
your acts of gallantry and achievements and you remained second to none. But
that was not the right time to hold court of inquires as that would create lot of
fuss. Major Munawar came out from the office of sector commander with a
heavy heart. A sector staff officer of sector-III, who was well in picture of the
entire situation being sympathetic, suggested Major Munawar to go for redress
of grievances to GOC 12 Division but Major Munawar told him that he would
not go for it and leave it to destiny. Later in 1971 in a private gathering when a
professor of Govt collage, Mr. Alvi arranged a gathering of intellectuals at his
residence in Islamabad , invited Major Munawar to comment on GIBRALTAR
operation and operation GRAND SLAM, he said beside other reasons (He
explained), Lust of Glory in our senior and junior Military leadership
spoiled both the operations. Many were more concerned to plan how to win
honors and awards and project themselves, than to plan operations and
battles. Leaving aside the junior leadership, take the example of Gen
Yahya Khan who took over the command during rapidly progressing
attack. His takeover was totally against the norms of tactic and strategy.

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But it was done because someone wanted to glorify someone. Moreover


later Yahya Khan was awarded with Hilal-e-Jurat which is meant for bold
planning and execution. Can someone justify what was Yahyas bold
planning and execution in operation GRAND SLAM? Fortunately from the
very beginning Pakistan Army stands at the top of the list of worlds
professional armies but unfortunately there have always been few black
sheep who have been tarnishing the image of Pakistan Army for their
personnel gains. Another professor asked him to draw a comparison between
Yahya and Akhtar Malik. Major Munawar said Yahya was a paper tiger and
used to achieve his objectives through flattery of his seniors, whereas
Akhtar Malik was a military genius and an exceptional General, had he
been given free hand to conduct operation GRAND SLAM, he would have
done wonders in achieving the objectives of GIBRALTAR operation and
operation GRAND SLAM. But unfortunately he was AHMADI by religion.
Alas he was a Muslim. (Professor Alvi was writing a book on Major Munawar
and his GHAZNAVI force but Alvis death did not allow him to complete the
job).
16.

A call from Headquarter 12 Division for debriefing & appreciation:

In the 3rd or 4th week of October 1965 two important commanders of


GIBRALTAR operation Major Munawar Khan and Major Mansha Khan were
called upon by Headquarter 12 Division Muree for debriefing and a meet with
Gen Akhtar Malik. It was a bright sunny day at Muree when at 1030 hours these
officers were asked to see the GOC. The Gen was sitting in a lush green lawn
outside his office with black glasses on his face. Major Mansha Khan and Major
Munawar Khan saluted him smartly. Gen stood up and shook hand with Major
Mansha Khan and then embraced Major Munawar Khan and kissed on his
forehead and while holding his hand walked towards his office, while Major
Mansha walked a step behind. Gen hosted them warmly and served Major
Munawar with a hot cup of coffee with his own hands while waiter served
Major Mansha.After formal debriefing, Gen admired Major Munawar for his
achievements and said Munawar you have done wonders, your
achievements were no less then miracles. Moreover you physically and
psychologically paralyzed the Indian security forces. The Nation is proud
of you. Taking this opportunity Major Mansha Khan pointed out that award of
Sitara-e-Jurat to Major Munawar was not the true recognition of his
achievements, dont you think it was injustice being done to Major Munawar

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and what role Headquarter 12 Division had played to provide the due justice?
Major Munawar interrupted and said Sir, I went for JIHAD-E-FISABILILLAH
I dont want any reward from Army or the Nation. I dont need this Sitara-eJurat or any other award. Major Mansha again pointed out that he had learnt that
Sitara-e-Jurat and even highest gallantry awards were being conferred on single
gallantry actions lasting for few hours and Major Munawar had many extra
ordinary gallantry acts to his credit throughout in the months of August &
September. Why you as GOC had not played your role Sir? The General burst
out with feelings of sorrow and anger, having tears in his eyes said, few people
think award of highest gallantry medals to Major Munawar would add to my
glory. Which they dont want at any cost. You people think I had not played my
role but let me share it with you now that I was convinced that Munawar should
have been awarded NISHAN-E-HAIDER by the Pakistani Govt and HILAL-EKASHMIR by the AK Govt as well. I had already pleaded Munawars case for
these highest gallantry awards. I spoke to Gen Musa who told me to directly
discuss it with Gen Ayub. Gen Ayub appreciated my stance but said Nishan-eHaider could only be awarded posthumously. I had little hard talk with Gen
Ayub when I told him; it was not a divine rule that could not be changed. I had
also talked to President Azad Kashmir for award of Hilal-e-Kashmir to Major
Munawar but unfortunately he regretted on the pretext that vast area captured by
Major Munawar in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR had been vacated by his force
after UN mandated Cease Fire, moreover there had been a massacre in INDIAN
HELD KASHMIR after the withdrawal of GHAZNAVI force in which
thousands of Kashmiri Muslims had been killed by the Indian security Forces,
in view of that AK assembly was not going to support the award of Hilal-eKashmir to Major Munawar. Munawar, I personally request you, dont refuse
Sitara-e-Jurat for my sake. Accept it in the ceremony and I promise you, let the
dust of war settle down, your case for both the highest awards will be evaluated
and you will not be treated unjustly. The Gen further added that he would write
a book on war 1965 in which he would disclose few secrets to the nation and
that he would include a chapter regarding Munawars fantastic operations,
wonderful achievements and open injustice in bestowing honors & awards.

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Major Munawar Khan being awarded with Sitara-e-Jurat by FM Ayub Khan after
Indo-Pak war 1965 on 23rd March 1966. It was here when FM Ayub Khan
addressed him as The King of Rajouri

Was it a loly pop given to Major Munawar by Gen Akhtar Malik? No later it
proved that Gen Akhtar Malik was a sincere and honest person because while he
was serving as Pakistani Ambassador in Turkey, wrote a Demi Official letter to
Major Munawar in which he assured him that he would soon come back as a
Corps Commander and not only his case for highest gallantry awards would be
re evaluated but he would also be promoted to the higher ranks. But it was not
to be. Gen never came back as a corps commander instead on 23rd August 1969
his dead body was received at Islamabad airport.
17.

Major Munawars Hard Talk with C-in-C Gen Yahya Khan:

Gen Yahya Khan chatting with the officers after dinner in Ojharee Camp Rwp on 2nd
May 1969. Major Munawar pointed with arrow.

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After war 1965 Major Munawar was posted to Azad Kashmir Regimental centre
Ojharee Camp Rawalpindi. On 2nd May 1969 C-in-C Gen Yahya Khan visited
the Regimental centre on annual commanding officers conference and he also
announced to bring AK regiment at par with Pakistan Army. At night after
dinner Gen Yahya in a pleasant mood was chatting with the group of officers.
Major Munawar was also present there. The chatting turned into a hard talk
between Major Munawar and Gen Yahya when Gen Yahya started criticizing
operation GIBRALTAR, operation GRAND SLAM and Gen Akhtar Malik.
Major Munawar could not tolerate this unjustified criticism and bluntly said
Sir, my GHAZNAVI force during Operation GIBRALTAR brought
Indian Security Forces to their kneels and operation GRAND SLAM was
about to achieve its objective, but you in the lust of glory managed to take
over the command of rapidly progressing operation, you wanted to eat the
cooked food but things reversed due to your involvement. Otherwise it was
a matter of hours only when Pakistan was about to cut off Indian Held
Kashmir from rest of India. Gen Yahya was shocked and did not say a word
from his mouth. Gen Shireen Khan GOC 12 Division who was also present in
the dinner, took Major Munawar away from the scene.
18.

Death of Conqueror

In 1st week of May 1981Maj Munawar was admitted in the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) of Military Hospital Rawalpindi due to severe heart attack. He was lying
unconscious and close to his bed were standing, the heart specialist Col Dr.
Zulfiqar (Later Major General), Sardar Jalal Ud Deen (a tall old man with dark
brown beard putting on Jinnah cap, a great freedom fighter, supporter of
GHAZNAVI guerrillas and a leader of Muslim conference) and two other
notables from INDIAN HELD KASHMIR. Sardar Jalal Ud Deen while talking
to Col Dr. Zulfiqar, narrated to him the extra ordinary gallantry acts and
supreme achievements of Major Munawar as commander of GHAZNAVI force
in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR. He also expressed his feelings of sorrow and
criticized the civil and military leadership of Pakistan and AK for denying
Major Munawar the true recognitions for his feat of velour and achievements
beyond expectations. Moreover he disclosed the names of few Army officers
who encashed the achievements of Major Munawar.
On 10th May 1981 at 1100 hours this unbeatable, gallant Muslim soldier flew to
the heavens to meet his Lord. He was buried in his native graveyard at village
Jhatla.

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Unfortunately our Military leadership, Journalists, Press and Media never ever
bothered to highlight the acts of gallantry and supreme achievements of the
commander of a most successful force of Pakistan army during war 1965. His
achievements are a legacy of velour and bravado for the Nation. He was a hero
amongst the war heroes of Indo-Pak Armies. None of the commanders from
Indo-Pak armies had captured, established their writ and administratively
controlled such a vast area in any one theater of war during 1965, which Major
Munawar had done. With best regards and tribute to all Shuhada and Ghazies of
war 1965 , without undermining their achievements and sacrifices, Owing to
the great achievements and feat of velour, as a matter of justice Major
Munawar Khan should have been the first awardee of NISHAN-EHAIDER as well as HILAL-E-KASHMIR after war 1965. But none had the
guts to highlight and review his case for justice. BUT IN OUR UNJUST
SOCIETY, WHO CARESAND WHO DARES

Now that in INDIAN HELD KASHMIR unarmed


Freedom Fighters are fiercely fighting against Indian
Security Forces, they look anxiously for some Major
Munawar Khan and his GHAZNAVI Force to join
hands with them in this sacred cause.
BIBLO GRAPHI
Indian Authors

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D.R.Mankekar)
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Mehta (Retd), AVSM, VSM, Dtaed:
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Delhi, December
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by Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh. Available on
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65/66

(9) Journal of Defence Studies, Operation


Gibraltar: An Uprising that Never Was
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(30)
From Kuch To Tashkent, The (31) Memoirs of Major (Late) Munawar
Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 by Farooq Bajwa, Khan (GHAZNAVI force commander war
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Interviews
(39) Brig (R) Sher Ahmed (Ex company (40) Brig (R) Mohammad Akbar Khan (Ex
commander GHAZNAVI force war 1965) commandant Azad Kashmir Regiment)
(Telephonic)
(41) Sub (R) Pehlwan Khan (Ex Platoon (42) A large number of immigrants from
Held
Kashmir
settled
at
commander GHAZNAVI force war 1965) Indian
Muzzafarabad,
Bagh,
Mirpur,
Kotli,
Bhimber
Telephonic
and Gujranwala