Book Reviews

Hellmut Flashar, editor. Die Philosophie der Antike. Band 3. ;4ltere Akademie AristotelesPeripatos. VOllig neubearbeitete Ausgabe. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie
begriindet von Friedrich Ueberweg. Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co AG Verlag,
:.983 . pp. xxii + 645. DM x48.
For many generations of European scholars Ueberweg's Outline of the History of Philosophy has been one of the major reference works in the field of philosophical
historiography. First published in three volumes between x862 and 1866, it was
immediately perceived by critics as an alternative to the manuals written under the
influence of Hegelianism such as the one by Johann Eduard Erdmann (Berlin, 1866),
which, as one of those critics said, had a tendency to press the historical- material into
the "trilogy of dialectic" (XI). Ueberweg's intentions (as reported by Dilthey, "Zum
Andenken an F. Ueberweg," Preussische Jahrbuecher 28 (x87x): 3o9-*~, quoted on
X I - X I I I ) were to follow the steps of Schleiermacher and Trendelenburg in renewing "the objectivism of Aristotle" and thus to foster a peculiar brand of "empiricism"
which matched his own philosophical convictions. The result was a work that was
universally acclaimed for its impartiality, thoroughness, balance, and wealth of material. Philosophical systems and schools were presented as objectively as possible and,
above all, with carefully documented references to the sources.
When Ueberweg died at the age of 45 in June of 187a three editions of the
Grundr/ss had already appeared and a fourth one, prepared by Rudolf Reicke, was
forthcoming. Between 1876 and x9o6 Max Heinze assumed responsibility for the 5th
through 9th editions, which now appeared in four volumes. By xgo7 the publisher
(E. S. Mitder & Sohn, Berlin) realized that, given the principle of thoroughness
which the Grundriss was supposed to represent, it was no longer realistic to expect
that a single scholar could assimilate and give a balanced exposition of the results of
the mass of new research in the different periods of the history of philosophy. Thus,
the Grundr/s, was entrusted to one or two specialists in each period. Ancient philosophy was assigned to Karl Praechter, who was then professor at the University of
Halle. Praechter radicalized the use of the philological-critical method and produced
in a sense a new work with merits of its own. He saw through the press the loth,
1 lth, and x~th editions 09o9, 19x9, 19~6, respectively)of Vol. I (Die Philosophie des

Altertums).
The book discussed in this review is part of the
Praechter's volume. Indeed, the need for a new edition
been felt for some time. Paul Wilpert of the University
crete proposals for such a project before his death in
[403]

work designed to replace

of the whole Grundr/ss had
of Cologne had made con1967 ("Editionsbericht. Die

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Neugestaltung des 'Ueberweg'," Archiv fm, r Geschichte der Philosophie 43 (1961): 8599). When the present editor of the section on ancient philosophy, Professor Hellmut
Flashar of the University of Munich, took over the task in 1968 it still seemed
possible to compress it into one volume, but in keeping with the spirit of thoroughness of the old Ueberweg the final result will be a four volume Philosophie der Antike
written in collaboration with more than eleven specialists.
If one carefully observes the list of collaborators, it immediately strikes the eye
that, naturally enough, Flashar has enlisted the help of K. Gaiser and H. J. Kraemer,
two scholars whose names are associated with the research carried on at the University of Tiibingen in the fifties and sixties into Plato's unwritten doctrines. It should be
noted, however, that their thesis that there was a body of secret, esoteric Platonic oral
doctrines involving a highly elaborate philosophical system different from what appears in the dialogues has been received with scepticism or simply rejected by wellknown specialists. See, e.g., G. Vlastos's scathing review of Kraemer's book, Arete bei
Platon und Aristoteles: Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie (Heidelberg, 1959) , in Gnomon 41 (1963): 641-55 (reprifited in Vlastos, Platonic Studies
[Princeton, a973], 379-98). Whether the new Ueberweg will remain indissolubly
finked to the early thesis of the Tiibingen School is a matter to be decided once the
second volume, the volume on Socrates, the Socratics, and Plato, is in print. The
third volume, the one here under review (which is also the first to appear) permits us
to make only a few, limited remarks on this issue.
For the present work Flashar serves both as editor and as author of the central
portion, i.e., the chapter on Aristotle (177-457). Kraemer writes the chapter on the
Academics (3-174) and F. Wehrli, the editor of the writings of the school of Aristotle
(Basel, ~d. ed., 1967-1978), is responsible for the Peripatetics (461-599).
The book is divided into 33 paragraphs, each dealing with one philosopher (or
the introduction to the old Academy and the Peripatos), with the exception of Aristotle whose treatment covers seven paragraphs. With the necessary allowance for variations according to the importance of the philosopher and the amount of information
available on him, the treatment of each of them starts with a report on the present
state of research on his work followed by a bibliography of the primary sources. Ai
biography and a detailed description of the works of the philosopher is followed in
turn by a "doxography," i.e., an expositoin of his doctrines. A paragraph typically
ends with some words on the influence of the philosopher's thought and an extensive
list of secondary literature.
There can be no doubt that in giving us an accurate overview of the primary
sources the authors have rendered us an invaluable service. The descriptions of the
works of ancient authors are also extremely helpful in that they allow quick answers to
questions that typically arise in the midst of research: would there have been, e.g., in
Theophrastus' De Animalibus any material which could lead to a better understanding
of Aristotle's zoological writings? How would his De Beatitudine have related to the
Nicomachean Ethics? Although there is room for doubt with regard to the contents of a
work which is now lost, the authors invariably display both caution and weU-founded
judgment in this area, doubtless the result of years of familiarity with the material.

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There are, of course, no descriptions of works by the older Academics. A glance at the
secondary literature, especially in the Aristotle section, initially gave the present writer
the impression that, although such a listing cannot aim at being exhaustive, important
titles seemed to be missing. Let me mention just two German works one would expect
to find in Ueberweg: J. Walther, Die Lehre yon der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen
Philosophie (Jena, 1874 ) and R. Loening, Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles (Jena, x9o3).
T h e explanation of their absence is to be found on XXII, where Flashar tells us that in
bibliographical matters the last edition of Praechter is to be presupposed, i.e., only
titles published after x926 are listed unless an earlier piece is still considered to be
important today. This is doubtless a weakness of the present work because it forces you
to consult the old edition with its cumbersome and typographically abstruse way of
listing secondary sources, yet it is the outcome of an understandable decision in the
design o f a book which had already reached massive proportions.
Difference of opinion is bound to arise above all in the "doxography" sections of
each paragraph. It is here that the authors display their own understanding of the
philosophical systems; it is here, therefore, that the conflict of interpretations takes
place. I will limit myself to voicing disagreement in two domains which should be of
interest to readers in general, viz., the domains of Aristotelian ethics and metaphysics. I trust that these objections will not obscure the fact that we are dealing with a
work of the highest quality.
Within his admirable exposition of the writings and doctrines of Aristotle, Flashar
offers an interesting and original interpretation of the procedure followed in the
ethics (337-38). In his opinion its subject-matter is determined by the need to "delimit the h u m a n domain" (337)- This leads to "eliminations and retrictions" which
culminate in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics where "in a large-scale elimination
procedure (Eliminationsverfahren) all things are left out which are not capable of
directing human action." Thus, episteme, dianoia, sophia, are excluded until only
phronesis, i.e., the intellectual capacity that shows the way to right action is left (/~br/g
bleibt). It is interesting to observe that ths whole approach seems to follow an opinion
expressed by Kraemer in the doxography of Xenocrates (47-48) and could easily be
interpreted as an effort to understand Aristotle from the perspective of the old
Academy. Kraemer calls E.N. VI "the Aristotelian treatise Peri phroneseos" and goes
on to say that it totally separates sophia and phronesis "but according to tradition it still
(noch) also deals with the former."
What reasons lie behind Kraemer's view that E.N. VI is a treatise On prudence? As
far as I can see, there are no references to it in the Aristotelian corpus under this
name, hence the only plausible a r g u m e n t seems to emerge out of the conjunction of
two points that Kraemer makes elsewhere: that in the ethics of Xenocrates there is "a
pervasive thematic coicidence with the Aristotelian ethics" and that Xenocrates wrote
a Peri phroneseos (63). But, do the contents of E.N. VI justify the suggested title and is
Flashar right in his interpretation of Aristotle's procedure? I think not. First, in his
description of the E.N. in the Werkbeschreibung section (~45) Flashar righdy indicates
that Book VI deals in general with the intellectual virtues and not just with one of
them (his rendering there of orthos logos by richtige Planung after Dirlmeier seems to

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me highly questionable because o f the difficulty in linking the general notion of planning with the spedfic identification of a particular mean or meson in moral choice:
an orthos logos is surely a true practical proposition). Second, the text itself shows no
signs o f the elimination procedure. After distinguishing the scientific and the calculative parts of the rational soul (1139 a 3-14), the question is raised: which is the
excellence o f eazh of them? (1139 a 15-17 and b 1~-13). A number of intellectual
virtues are examined and briefly analysed (they are by no means excluded or rejected) and the conclusion is reached that sophia is the virtue of one of the parts and
phronesis the virtue o f the other one 0 1 4 3 b 14-17, cf. 1144 a 1-3). Sophia tends
indeed to remain rather central: one of the last problems solved in Book VI is about
the contribution of wisdom to happiness and its relation to action (the problem is
posed at x 143 b 18-9o, partly quoted by Flashar on page 337, and is answered at
1144 a 3 - 6 with an additional comment on its relation to phrone~ at 1145 a 6-11).
Third, the passages just referred to show that Flashar's argument for applying to
Sophia the elimination procedure (which is based on the assumption that "all things
[sc. virtues] are left out which are not capable of directing human action") requires a
second premise ("sophia is not capable of directing human action") which is true if
taken to mean that it has no efficient effect on action but false if it denies sophia all
practical import. Indeed, sophia has the same kind of action-guiding capacity that
health has for medicine (1145 a 8-9). It is a human goal and, as we have seen,
Aristotle had systematic reasons to deal with it. He was not simply bound by (Academic?) tradition, as Kraemer suggests.
The area where Flashar seems to rely most heavily on Kraemer's views is in his
exposition of First Philosophy. There is a sense, of course, in which it is a truism that
Aristotle developed his own position in critical discussion with his friends from the
Academy, but the crucial question for the historian is how far emphasizing that
relationship helps or hinders the understanding o f Aristotle himself. Let me mention
at least one case where I doubt that we get a better grasp o f Aristotelian doctrine by
looking at it through the Academic lenses.
On page 378 we read that in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics sensible substances
and the conditions for their generation and corruption are studied not for their own
sakes, "but rather in view of, and in a step by step reduction (Redul~tion) to, an
'eternal, unmoved substance'." T h e term "reduction" suggests primarily some kind of
analysis (e.g., "reducing surfaces to triangles") and this seems to be confirmed when
Flashar adds: "That this procedure (Verfahrensweise) of a reduction reasoning step by
step towards the foundation o f being (b/s zum Se/mgrund h/n) corresponds to the
Platonic-Academic thought-pattern of the Anodos [i.e., the ascent] to the principles is
evident . . . . " Earlier (7-8) Kraemer had explained that these principles include
"most general kinds" and "most simple elements" (the latter down to mathematical
"simples" and their elements, "the one" and "the unlimited dyad"). To speak in this
case o f a "reduction" seems reasonable enough whereas in the case o f Aristotelian
theology it turns out to be, it seems to me, highly misleading. T h e reason for this is
that the Academic principles are---in some sense of the term--"abstract" entities; the
Aristotelian unmoved mover, on the contrary, is a particular of some sort which
provides the ultimate explanation of motion in the dimension of the series of effi-

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407

cient causes (although it itself is a final cause for the outermost sphere). It is true that
Aristotle sees Academic principles and the unmoved mover as competing for the
same position within a philosophical system (lo69 a 32-36, alluded to on page 378),
but this should not obscure the fact that they represent radically different solutions
to the problem. A "reduction" model could perhaps be justified by appealing to the
idea that sensible substances stand to the eternal unmovable substance in the pros hen
relation (Patzig, Owens cf. 377, 3 8 0 - 8 0 9 This possibility, however, has to be rejected
on the grounds that the focal meaning doctrine was developed by Aristotle to explain
the application of terms such as "healthy" or "medical" to particulars within different
categories and there is no indication that the predicate "substance" (ous/a) has to be
treated this way when applied to sensible and to non-sensible substances, i.e., to items
falling within the same category. Thus, we are left with the age old conviction that
Aristotle's metaphysics represents a drastic departure from the Academic approach
and Flashar's summary of the specific contributions of Aristotle to the theological
aspects o f First Philosophy (380) is more persuasive than the preceding efforts to
show coincidences between the conflicting positions:
Two examples have been given where there is room for legitimate doubt or
disagreement on the part of the specialized student, but there is much in this volume
that will command universal assent and agreement. Like its predecessors, it includes
such a wealth of accurate information that it will remain a major reference work
which any satisfactory library should own. Unlike its predecesors, the typographical
composition is clear and has sufficient variety to allow @ick orientation in the search
for specific items. T h e r e is no index return, but a handy index nominum renders useful
service especially in locating contributions by contemporary scholars.
One can only hope that volumes ~, ~, and 4 of this magnificent work on Ancient
philosophy will be available in print in the near future.
ALFONSO G O M E z - L o B o

Georgetown University
Alexander Broadie, George Lokert, Late-Scholastic Logician. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1983. Pp. viii +25~. $a7.5o.
George Lokert (c.x485-1547) is not a name known to most historians of philosophy.
He was nearly an exact contemporary of the better-known J o h n Major (x467/8155o) who was one of his teachers, and the careers of the two intertwined over a
forty-year period both in Scotland and in Paris. They shared the same Scottish
heritage and both labored in theology and philosophy at a time of immense intellectual and religious change. The fundamental formation of both was gained at Paris in
a context which was in some ways the very end of an old world and the beginning of
a new one. It was the Paris of Gaguin, Lef'evre d'Etaples, and Erasmus, when humanism was gradually---or, perhaps, not so gradually--replacing the scholasticism which
had been pre-eminent there since Abelard. It was also the time when the Reformation took hold, eventually conquering Scotland (John Knox was one of I~kert's
pupils), if only tinging Paris.