Reconceptualizing Populism

Reconceptualizing Populism (as a Mode of Political Practice)
Robert S. Jansen
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Sociology
University of California, Los Angeles
rjansen@ucla.edu
http://rjansen.bol.ucla.edu/
Prepared for presentation at the
2007 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association
(WORK IN PROGRESS: please do not cite or distribute without authors permission)
ABSTRACT:
Decades after the demise of Latin Americas classic populist movements, a wave of
neo-populism has recently swept the region. Existing theories of populismmost of
which are fragmented, cut off from political sociology, and beset with conceptual
difficultieshave not been able to account for this resurgence. This paper is meant to
facilitate the study of both new and old populisms by drawing on recent innovations in
political sociology to provide a conceptual foundation for empirical research. It argues,
contra the existing literatures, that populism is not reducible to a developmental stage, an
expression of class struggle, an ideology, a generic collective action problem, or a mode
of political incorporation. Rather, it is most productively treated as a particular type of
political mobilization. Reconceptualizing populism as a mode of political practice
resolves old difficulties and suggests new directions for empirical research. It also draws
populism studies into dialogue with political sociologya relationship from which both
parties stand to benefit.
Reconceptualizing Populism
Ever since the classic cases of Argentinas Juan Domingo Pern and Brazils Getlio
Vargas, populism has drawn the attentionand judgmentof scholars, journalists, politicians,
and ordinary citizens alike.1 In recent years, observers of Latin American politics have been
caught off guard by a resurgence of populist activity throughout the region. Alberto Fujimoris
dramatic electoral victory in 1990 and subsequent autogolpe (self-coup) in 1992; Abdal
Bucarams stunning 1996 election and the equally impressive popular support for his removal
from office just six months later; Hugo Chvezs successful mobilization of urban supporters
despite the intense opposition of elite groups; these and other unexpected flare-ups of neopopulism have highlighted the inadequacy of existing theories, most of which have treated
populism as a thing of the past.2
Unfortunately, there has been little systematic scholarship on populism. In fact, to grace
the existing bodies of assumptions and assertions with the label theories is generous
overstatement. The few attempts to theorize the phenomenon have not coalesced into a coherent
approach and come up short in a variety of ways. For the most part, the populism literature is not
made up of theoretical statements but of historical case studies. To the extent that these studies
have been explicit in their definitions of populism (most have not), these have varied widely. In
The agrarian movements that swept the U.S. and Russia in the late 19th century are sometimes referred to as the
original, classic populisms. I use the term classic to designate those early Latin American cases that, until
recently, have dominated the literature.
2
Modernization and Marxist theories, for example, had linked populism to a particular developmental stage and so
had consigned the phenomenon to the dustbin of history. (On modernizationist and Marxist accounts, see below.)
Other scholars, transfixed by the promise of third wave democratization, had overestimated the power of new
democratic institutions to curb the populist tendencies in Latin American political culture and to smooth the
exploitative social relations that time and again have fueled populist movements. (On recent transitions to
democracy, see Geddes 1999, Huntington 1991, and ODonnell and Schmitter 1986.) On Perus Fujimori, see
Cameron 1994, Grompone 1998, Kenny 2004, and Weyland 2000; on Ecuadors Bucaram, see de la Torre 2000:
Chapter 3; on Venezuelas Chvez, see Ellner 2003, Ellner and Hellinger 2003, and Gott 2000.
the end, most historical studies use the concept as little more than a case label; and most cases
are treated as exceptional and are studied in isolation. This stresses the uniqueness of individual
populist experiences and suggests their incomparability.3 The resulting body of scholarship is
highly fragmented and insulated from currents in the cumulative development of social scientific
knowledge.
Given populisms widespread incidence and the dramatic ways in which it is implicated
in processes of social and political change, it is surprising that the phenomenon has received so
little attention from political sociology. The most likely explanation for this silence is the fact
that populism stands alongside nationalism and fascism as notoriously difficult to
conceptualize.4 As Laclau (1977:143) explains, few [terms] have been defined with less
precision. We know intuitively to what we are referring when we call a movement or an
ideology populist, but we have the greatest difficulty in translating the intuition into concepts.
Populism is often identified, at the most basic level, as a regime or movement in which leaders
claim some affinity with the people (Knight 1998:226). Indeed, this is the journalistic sense of
the word. But as this definition might apply to virtually any modern regimeever since the idea
that legitimacy ascends from the people superseded the notion that it descends by divine or
natural right (Calhoun 1997:70)it is hardly a sufficient conceptual foundation. The term has
been used to describe a wide array of historical phenomena, from Maoism to fascism to
Peronism. It has been used to describe movements, regimes, leaders, policies, ideologies,
3
While there have been a good number of edited volumes that bring together a variety of cases, these tend only to
set cases side by side and to leave the comparison to the reader. (Three of the better volumes for Latin America are
Conniff 1982, Conniff 1999, and Mackinnon and Petrone 1998. Ionescu and Gellner 1969a takes a more global
perspective on populism, but it concludes with just as few answers.)
4
Minogue (1969:199) writes of nationalism that, in the course of two centuries, a great variety of radically
different movements have come to shelter under the broad conceptual umbrella; and Brubaker (2004:132) describes
how nationalism has been marked by deep ambivalence and intractable ambiguity. Mann (2004:x, 4-5) similarly
notes that fascism has often been used in a loose sense and that conflicting idealist and materialist accounts have
failed to produce an adequate theory. On the difficulties of conceptualizing populism, see for instance de la Torre
2000: Chapter 1; Ionescu and Gellner 1969b: 1-3; Laclau 1977: 143; and Stein 1980: 9.
rhetorical styles, modes of incorporation, and state structures. Often the term is used as a
pejorative label, implying that the accused is corrupt, undemocratic, or cynically opportunistic.
Increasingly, it is applied to politicians who refuse appropriate (i.e., neoliberal) economic
measures and instead pander to the cries of the poor for basic necessities (Crandall 2004).
Given this conceptual slipperiness (Taggart 2000:1), it is no surprise that political sociology
has shied away from engaging the topic.
This paper is an attempt to move toward a more consistent and productive approach to
populism. It begins by reviewing and evaluating the existing populism literatures. Next, it draws
on recent innovations in political sociology to reconceptualize populism as a mode of political
practice. It then discusses the advantages of such a reconceptualization for concrete empirical
research. Finally, the paper concludes by noting how political sociology stands to benefit from a
better understanding of populist phenomena.
Competing Approaches to Populism

While the existing populism literature is fragmented, it is nonetheless possible to sketch a
rough map of three generations of scholarly thinking about populism, containing five distinct
theoretical approaches (see table 1).5 These vary widely in their motivating questions, their units
of analysis, their definitions of the explanandum, and their explanatory frameworks. The first
generation consisted of modernization theorists and structural Marxists, both of which focused
While populist activity has been noted in a variety of contextsfrom late nineteenth century Russia (Walicki
1969) and the United States (Goodwyn 1978, Hicks 1961, and Hofstadter 1969) to mid-twentieth century Africa
(Marx 1994; Saul 1969) to contemporary Europe (Berezin 2004; Betz 1994; Held 1996; Taggart 1995)this review
draws primarily on studies of Latin America. It is for good reason that the existing literature has focused mainly on
Latin America. Characterized by infrastructurally weak states (Centeno 2002), weak democratic institutions (Linz
and Stepan 1978; ODonnell 1979 and 1999 [Chapter 8]), and high levels of social inequality (Hoffman and Centeno
2003), Latin America has consistently provided conditions ripe for populist mobilization. I do not assume from the
outset that all insights generated from the study of Latin America will be mechanically applicable to the rest of the
world, although the point of comparison will doubtless be useful.
on the economic determinants of populist class coalitions. The second generation included both
an ideational and an agentic corrective to the previous structuralist approaches. The third
generation focused on how the failures of democratic institutions continue to render populist
strategies useful to politicians.
TABLE 1
THREE GENERATIONS OF POPULISM SCHOLARSHIP
Generation
Theoretical Approach
Modernization
First
Marxist
Discourse
Second
Instrumentalist
Third
Political Institutional
Generation 1: Modernization and Marxist Theories

A first generation of populism scholarship developed in the 1960s and 70s and was
intent on understanding the classic Latin American populisms of the 1930s through the 50s.
Propelled by currents in modernization theory and structural Marxism, scholars of this
generation attempted to understand the social bases of support for leaders like Pern and Vargas.
Most of the early populism scholars drew heavily on modernization theory (including
mass society theories).6 Typically, they attempted to discover the developmental conditions
that produce populist class coalitions, as embodied in populist parties. That is, they defined the
6
Classic statements of modernization and mass society theories include Deutsch 1954 and 1963, Kornhauser 1959,
and Lipset 1960. For examples of the modernization vein of the populism literature, see Di Tella 1965 and 1990;
Germani 1963 and 1978; Hennessy 1969; Ionescu and Gellner 1969a; Skidmore 1979; van Niekerk 1974.
explanandum as different types of populist parties, which were taken as a proxy for class
coalitions. Torcuato Di Tella (1965; 1990:17-34), for example, saw populism as a
mobilizational coalition between a socially mobilized yet politically unorganized mass and an
elite class fraction that takes on a leadership role.7 Scholars in this tradition tended to focus on
populist parties that had gained control of the statei.e., populist regimes.
Di Tellas 1965 article is the most commonly cited foundational work.8 The basic
argument is that populist coalitions are a by-product of peripheral late development. Di Tella
argues that peripheral development creates a demonstration effect that impacts social groups in
different but parallel ways. On the one hand, intellectual elites become so fascinated by examples
of developed countries that they develop an anti-status quo disposition (48). The masses, on
the other hand, experience a revolution of rising expectations in which their expectations
surpass the possibility of their satisfaction in an underdeveloped setting (49). Populist coalitions
result from the alignment of the psychological states of social sectors by such mechanisms. This
process varies according to case-specific conditions to produce different types of populism. In
general, modernization theories depict populism as corresponding to a particular developmental
stage and as integrally linked to the import substituting industrialization (ISI) policies that
typically accompanied this stage.
Di Tella and others of this tradition drew heavily on the concept of social mobilization, especially as developed by
Deutsch (1954 and 1963). According to this perspective, a mobilized population becomes available for relatively
more intensive communication and new patterns of socialization and behavior through the erosion of major
clusters of old political, social, economic, and psychological commitments, all of which results from modernization
processes such as urbanization, industrialization, and infrastructural development (Deutsch 1954:100; 1963:585).
8
Laclau (1977) has argued that the ideas of Gino Germani were prior to and more well developed than those of Di
Tella. Germani (1978:13-41, 85-88, 95-97), who also stressed processes of social mobilization, focused more than
Di Tella on the manipulability of newly mobilized lower class populations.
A smaller but significant number of studies in the first generation were motivated by
trends in structuralist Marxism.9 These studies maintain much of modernization theorys
explanation for the emergence of populism, although sometimes couched in different language.10
Often, Marxists rely on the concept of Bonapartism (drawn from Marxs [1977] Eighteenth
Brumaire) to describe populism.11 As Stinchcombe (1968:49-50) explains, simply substituting
one term for the other,
Marx argued that Bonapartism (populist dictatorship, we would call it today)
was caused by a predominance of a petty bourgeois mode of production. He
thought a petty bourgeoisiewas both equalitarian and had great difficulty
organizing as a class, needing therefore a democratically oriented dictator.
As Stinchcombes description makes clear, the substitution of Bonapartism for populism
maintains many of the coalitional emphases of modernization theories, but it insists more
forcefully on the class make-up of these coalitions while downplaying somewhat factors such as
mass psychology. All in all, Marxists still take the explanandum to be a particular alignment of
social classes; and they explain this alignment by changes in the mode of production taking place
at a particular developmental moment.
Where Marxists theories differ from modernization theories is in that they tend to
emphasize the effects of populism. That is, they want to know whether populism (which in such
analyses is often equated with nationalist economic policies) is progressive or conservative
9
For examples of this vein of scholarship, see Grompone 1998; Klarn 1973; Quijano 1968; Spalding 1977; and
Waisman 1982 and 1987. I include Marxist approaches in the first generation because they initially emerged at the
same time as and share many similarities with modernization theories. However, this periodization is to a certain
extent artificial, as Marxist approaches have reappeared from time to time throughout the history of populism
scholarship.
10
In many respects, the line between the two approaches is blurred in that many modernization theories were built
with thinly veiled Marxist concepts of social structure and in that many Marxist approaches maintained stage-like
approaches to development reminiscent of modernization theories.
11
Although Di Tella (1965:49) has stated that modern day populists in Latin America enjoy a disposable mass of
supporters that is larger and more demanding than any Louis Napoleon would have dreamed of.
whether it is in the end good or bad from the perspective of the historic class struggle. Whereas
Di Tella (1965) and others saw populist movements as forces for reform (although this was not
their analytic emphasis), Marxists have been more likely to view populism as fundamentally
conservative (Spalding 1977: Chapter 4; Waisman 1987). They have seen them as the
cooptation of viable labor movements and have been disheartened by the repressive response
that populist leaders have often had to more revolutionary movements.
Modernization theorists and Marxists share a great deal in common. They more or less
agree on the importance of defining populism in class terms, rooted in relations of production
and market conditions. In this, they see populism as specific to peripheral development in the
mid-twentieth century. While they have often been derided as functionalist, materially
reductionist, or as denying the rationality and agency of populist followers, these theories
deserve renewed attention for a number of reasons. First, their close specification of the
phenomenon avoids overly-extensive conceptualizations that suffer diminished analytic utility.
Second, they highlight that populism is neither simply a quality of the masses nor reducible to
the characteristics of a single personalityit exists in the relations between leadership and bases
of support. Third, their emphasis on the disruptions produced by large scale social change is
crucial and should be kept close at hand.
At the same time, this generation has its weaknesses. A first limitation is that it tends to
take classes and social groups for granted as natural, assuming group formation to be an
unproblematic process. This forecloses the possibility that populist mobilization itself might play
a role in constituting the social bases of support on which it relies. Second, the leap from
objective conditions to political action is all but absentthe roles of consciousness, organization,
and mobilization are hardly discussed. All of this serves to reinforce a simplistic view of the
masses as a pool of easily manipulated individuals and leads to an impression of politics as

epiphenomenal of social dynamics.12 Third, both approaches tend to identify populism as limited
to a particular stage in a developmental trajectory from tradition to modernity, or from
feudalism to capitalisma teleology that coincides with a functionalism that sees populism as a
breakdown in the organic workings of society at a particular developmental moment. Finally,
there is a downside to having such a tightly circumscribed definition and theory of populism.
Although both modernization and Marxist theories are universalizing, their focus on social
structural conditions encourages, in practice, the production of overly narrow typologies. That is,
if populism is the political manifestation of social relations, and if social relations are country
specific, then the particular brand of populism must be defined by the structure of society at
the moment that it takes place (i.e., Peronismo, Varguismo, Nasserism, etc.). Thus, first
generation theorists are inclined to develop typologies that, as they become progressively more
detailed and better, become simply a list of countries.13 This approach sometimes provides
suitable explanations for single cases, but at a certain point these explanations cease to depend
upon the concept of populism at all, because the populism of each case is unique. This inhibits
possibilities for comparison and for noticing what seemingly different cases have in common.
Generation 2: Discursive and Instrumentalist Approaches

In the 1970s and 80s, a second generation of populism scholarship emerged in response
to the first and with reference to a new set of historical developments. These scholars continued
12
Some scholars, such as Quintero (1980), have even gone so far as to argue that the term populism is of no use at
all. The rationale behind this response is that class theories of politics (that rely on concepts such as Bonapartism
or Caesarism [Gramsci 1971:219-23, 227-8]) are sufficient and that more expansive political definitions of
populism threaten to obscure the social nature of the phenomenon. That is, to focus on populism is to (mis)place
attention on the political superstructure rather than to understand the (more important) relations of production that
constitute the base.
13
Mann (2004:11) notes a similar tendency regarding fascism.
Reconceptualizing Populism 10
to focus primarily on the classic cases, but they increasingly devoted attention to the labor
parties that outlasted these earlier periods. In an attempt to uncover the impetuses to action
driving populist mobilization, they explored the ways in which populism consists of more than
top-down manipulation and at the same time is not simply given by social structure. One set of
scholars attempted to do this with discourse, another with rational agency.
One line of scholarship that attempted to shift attention from social structure did so by
focusing on populist discourse.14 This approach has found its strongest reception among those
sympathetic to the cultural turn. It identified populist discourse as the explanandum and was an
attempt to explore an unanswered question of the first generation: what is so compelling about
populism to its followers?
Some, such as MacRae (1969), were already thinking in discursive terms at the height of
the first generations prominence; but it was only with Laclaus groundbreaking work in 1977
that this approach took hold and produced a flurry of empirical scholarship. Relying on an
Althusserian view of ideology, Laclau argued that populism is discourse that articulates a
traditional antagonism between the people and the power bloc with class distinctions. That
is, the mapping of the concepts of the people and the elite onto specific class locations is an
act of hegemonic struggle over ideological form and is the crux of populist ideology. Laclaus
work was followed by a rash of studies emphasizing populist discourse and rhetorical style that,
for the most part, reverted to the less sophisticated notion that populism is any discourse that
invokes the people. Discursive studies focus on the production and reception of the
personalities, propaganda, and speeches of populist leaders. Relatedly, those focusing on style
14
See for example Alexander 1973; Allahar 2001; Alvarez Junco 1987; de Ipola 1979; Green 1996; Hurtado 1989;
Leaman 1999; Navarro 1982; Wolfe 1994; and Zabaleta 1997.
argue that it is the populists style, their confrontation of the elite, and their rejection of the elite
manner of behavior that sets them apart from other movements (Horowitz 1999:23).
But this was only one way in which populism scholars attempted to deal with the
deficiencies of first generation scholarship. A smaller group of scholars emphasized the rational
bases of grassroots populist support.15 These scholars defined populism not as class coalitions or
as discourse, but rather in terms of collective action. Responding in particular to the proposition
that populism was an irrational response to economic change, instrumentalist scholars attempted
to discover the interests of populist followers and to asses their options for political action. These
researchers argued that the choice made by adherents to follow populist leaders made sense
according to a rational accounting of interests and that this choice was a politically savvy one
given the options. This approach paints a picture of populist movements as empowered, agentic,
rational, and as a force for change, rather than as irrational and conservative.
Both the discursive and instrumentalist approaches to populism were responsesalbeit
quite different onesto the previous generations failure to specify the steps that lead from
objective conditions to the actions of populist followers. Each has its own strengths. The
discursive approach usefully focused attention on populist ideas, subjectivities, and culture.
These elements are key to populist practice and ought to be taken more seriously than the first
generation had. The instrumentalist approach was correct in noting the rationality of the actions
of populist adherents. Populist participation cannot be explained away as the emotional
exuberance of irrational cretins unmoored from traditional controls. While indeed filling in some
of the gaps of earlier theories, however, neither of these approaches provided a sufficient
alternative to them.
15
See for example Auyero 1999; Ianni 1973 and 1975; Murmis and Portantiero 1971; Spalding 1977; and Weffort
1998.
First of all, neither the discursive nor the instrumentalist approach deals adequately with
the concrete material and organizational issues that must be understood if one is to explain
mobilization to action. The discursive approach assumes that ideas are the key to mobilization.
The implicit logic goes something like this: discourse forms the basis of (self)consciousness;
action is expressive of consciousness; therefore, discourse explains action.16 But decades of work
on political action show this to be an overly simplistic model. To understand the role of
discourse in political action, it is necessary to discuss the material conditions of its possibility
and the mechanisms by which it is realized and has its effects. Likewise, the instrumentalist
approach fails to go far enough in explaining the actions of populist adherents. It assumes that
preference structures and rational decision making will produce populist movements
unproblematically. But the social movements literature has shown that subsequent questions
include those of resources, organizational capacity, and opportunity (Jenkins 1983:530; Tilly
1978:55).
Second, both the discursive and instrumentalist approaches are too general. The
discursive approach subsumes too many cases, often relying on only the lowest common
denominator of an invocation of the people to classify a case as populist.17 In its efforts to
subsume the totality of these cases, this approach participates in what Sartori (1970:1035) has
termed conceptual stretching, wherein extensional coverage tend[s] to be matched by
losses in connotative precision. The instrumentalist approach also lacks analytic specificity,
although in a different way. For this approach, it is not clear that the theory is a theory of
populism at all. Populism is reduced to a generic collective action problem. While it is useful to
16
For Laclau (1977), it is by ideology that individuals are constituted as self-conscious subjects and by subjectivities
that actioni.e., the activities of populist followerscan be explained.
17
Knight (1998:240) acknowledgesand in fact flauntsthis looseness, seeing it as an asset because it allows him
to be inclusive of the wide and eclectic range of cases that history has agreed to call populist.
consider the ways in which problems of collective action are implicated in populism, the latter is
not reducible to the former. The instrumentalist approach is an outside critique of the first
generation, but it does not provide an alternative theory of populism.
Generation 3: Political Institutional Approaches

The two tendencies within the second generation, while responding to similar concerns
with first generation approaches, were at odds with each other. In this context a third generation
reoriented the field yet again.18 Focusing on cases of neo-populism that appeared in the 1990s,
this generation took a political view of the phenomenon and located its determinants in weak
democratic institutions. In this way, third generation scholars have brought the focus back from
movements to regimes, but this time with a political focus rather than a developmentalist, classcoalitional lens.
The third generation has attempted to decouple populist politics from specific economic
policies. The supposed paradox posed by neo-populism has been this: populism has
traditionally been associated with a particular stage of development and with nationalist ISI
policies; but recent figures such as Perus Alberto Fujimori and Mexicos Carlos Salinas de
Gortari seem to bear a striking resemblance to classic populists, even though they have
implemented neoliberal reforms and distinctly avoided ISI policies. From this apparent paradox,
third generation scholars have concluded that populism should be seen as a political activity that
can be coupled with different types of economic policies, so long as such policies do not
undermine mass support.
18
This generation of scholarship includes Castro Rea, Ducatenzeiler and Faucher 1992; Kenney 2004; de la Torre
2000; Ellner 2003; Huntington 1991; Roberts 1996; and Weyland 1996, 1998 and 2000.
The positive argument advanced by such scholars is that populism is a symptom of weak
democratic incorporationindividuals follow populist leaders when they are not firmly
incorporated into political life through strong and stable political parties. As the argument goes,
the population expresses grievances by supporting populists because weak democratic
institutions fail to represent their preferences in more stable ways. Because of this position, the
third generation tends to view populism as a pathology, but in a slightly different way from the
first generation. For the first generation, populism is a pathology of economic
underdevelopment; for the third, it is a pathology of weak political institutions.19 For this
generation, then, populism is something in need of a solution; and the proposed solution is
stronger, more stable, and more inclusive political institutions.
This generation has brought many fresh insights and infused the study of populism with a
new vigor. Its most important contribution has been the decoupling of populist politics and
economic policies. Another contribution is its insistence that the question of political
incorporation is of central importance.
But despite these advances, political institutional approaches are inadequate. The point
that populism relies on the support of the politically unincorporated is of profound importance,
but the idea that party strength is the appropriate measure of incorporation is one better reserved
for developed countries. That is, party instability is not the only route to political availability in
the developing world (although it is one possible route). It is conceivable that parties might be
strong and stable, but that characteristics of the population itself might change (e.g., through
migration that entails the breakdown of traditional political relationships). Or, parties might be
stable, but the states infrastructural capacity politically to incorporate different regions might
19
For the second generation, populism is not a pathology at all, but rather people making the most of limited options
within economically and politically oppressive settings.
change. A focus on political incorporation through stable parties misses the key point,
emphasized by the first generation, that so long as a country is characterized by economic
hardship and a lack of traditional control mechanisms (e.g., military or clientelistic), populist
politicians will always find an audience. Further, established parties are not themselves incapable
of operating on populist premises when it suites their requirements for support.
From Populism to Populist Mobilization
Although past approaches have unsatisfactory, they have increased our understanding of
populism considerably. In order to systematize a body of collective knowledge, however, and for
populism studies to be able to speak to political sociology, it is necessary to consolidate the
innovations of past approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. The first step in this direction is
to produce a clear definition of the thing to be explained.20 The definition presented here is not
meant to trump all others, but rather to identify a coherent set of phenomena that is amenable to
comparison and is likely to have patterned causes and effects (Stinchcombe 1968:40). If it is to
maximize its explanatory potential, it needs to be circumscribed at a middle range, between the
tightness of first generation definitions and the expansiveness of those of the second.
I hold that there is a discoverable unity to populism, but that it is not to be found by
reducing populism to a developmental stage, an expression of class struggle, an ideology, a
collective action problem, or a mode of political incorporation (as previous approaches have
done). Rather, populism is most usefully treated as a particular type of political mobilization. It
thus belongs in the conceptual domain of political practice.21 Accordingly, I identify the
20
It should be emphasized that what follows here is not a theory, but a definition of populism. Theoretical
statements specify the connection between one class of phenomena and another (Stinchcombe 1968:15). Given the
current state of disarray in which the populism literature remains, the project of definition must be prior to that of
theory building.
21
This emphasis resonates with recent work in political sociology that has called attention to the importance of
political organization and practice (among others: Abrams 1988; Clemens 1997; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol
1985; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Padgett 1981; Skocpol 1992; Tarrow 1998). Some populism scholars
explanandum as populist mobilization. Previous theories have missed the ways in which political
practices are crucial in linking political leaders with the groups they attempt to mobilize; the
reconceptualization presented here is an attempt to remedy this deficiency. It is first necessary to
define political mobilization more generally. Only then will it be possible to identify what is
specific about populist mobilization.
Defining Political Mobilization

The political sociology literature typically understands mobilization more or less in the
sense captured by Tilly (1978:69), when he identifies it as the process by which a group goes
from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life. But this
definition is somewhat vague. A more specific understanding of mobilizationon which almost
all of the social movements literature reliescomes from the resource mobilization tradition,
which defines it as a collectivitys attempts to accumulate, control, and utilize resources toward
collective ends (Etzioni 1968; Jenkins 1983; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). In this formulation,
resources are construed broadly to include economic and military resources, information, labor
power, time, loyalties, and psychological states. The resource mobilization definition is useful
because it identifies mobilization as a deliberate project undertaken by leaders at a particular
point in time (Etzioni 1968:244). Unfortunately, the language of resources is misleading because
it obscures the fact that coordinated social actionsuch as picketing, voting, or attending
meetingscan be the most important resource to be mobilized (a point implicit in Tillys
initial formulation, above). A useful way to resolve this difficulty is to distinguish between the
mobilization of coordinated action and the mobilization of the supportive infrastructure for such
(Barozet 2003; de la Torre 2000; French 1989; James 1988a and 1988b) have begun to point in the direction of a
focus on mobilization.
action (which includes both the material and organizational means enabling action and the
ideational dispositionssuch as self-identification and loyaltymotivating it). Mobilization,
as I will use the term, includes both the action and resource elements: the latter undergirds the
former, which is the primary instrument of influence.22 There are two further problems with the
resource mobilization definition. First, it takes the collectivity for granted as the source of
mobilization rather than recognizing that one task of mobilization may be the formation of a
solidary collectivity.23 Second, it takes collective ends as unproblematic, failing to recognize
that the interests of the mobilizer might not be identical to the interests of the mobilized and that
the identification of interests might itself be a product of the mobilizing project.24 Fortunately,
there is no reason why a definition of mobilization must rely on such assumptions about the preexistence of a collectivity with easily identifiable interests. Accordingly, with these caveats, it is
possible to rely on the existing definition.
Mobilization is political when it is oriented toward political ends. It is useful here to
follow Weber (1978:54-56) in restricting the political to relations of domination, maintained
through force, threat, and legitimacy, over a given territory. Weber describes as politically
oriented such action that aims at exerting influence on the government of a political
organization; especially at the appropriation, expropriation, redistribution or allocation of the
powers of government (54). Politically oriented action includes those activities which are
likely to uphold, to change or overthrow, to hinder or promote political authority relations, as
22
This distinction is inspired by Rogers (1974:1425-1428) identification of instrumental resources, which are
directly used in attempts at influence, and infra-resources, which enable and condition the usefulness of
instrumental resources.
23
Although Oberschall (1973:102) notes elsewhere in his definitional discussion that mobilization is the process of
forming crowds, groups, associations, and organizations for the pursuit of collective goals. Recent work in political
sociology has warned against taking social groups and their interests as given (Ansell 2001; Bourdieu 1991;
Brubaker 1996: Chapter 2 and 2004; DiMaggio and Powell 1991:28; Katznelson 1985; Laitin 1985; Przeworski
1977:370; Putnam 1993:7-8; Skocpol 1985:20-27; Stepan 1985; Weber 1976). Recent scholarship on social
movements (epitomized by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) has taken this concern more seriously.
24
See references in footnote 23.
well as those of more peaceful groups that seek to influence a political organization (55).
Political mobilization, then, is mobilization oriented toward influencing the organized apparatus
of domination over a territory, which in modern times is typically the state.25 With this
understanding of the political in mind, I define political mobilization as: the coordination of
the political action of a set of constituents and of the material and organizational capacity for
and ideational bases of such action.26
Defining Populist Mobilization

I define populist mobilization as: the enactment of political mobilization projects that are
oriented toward control of the state and that target large numbers of potential constituents by
invoking a unified people. This definition would include, for example, Perns mobilization of
workers in Argentina and Fujimoris mobilization of the informal sector and peasantry in Peru.
For reasons that will be discussed below, it would exclude, for example, the international
environmental movement, appeals to swing voters in the U.S., and the indigenous rights
movement in Colombia. This definition contains three core elements that distinguish it from
other forms of political mobilization.
First, populist mobilization is undertaken by political leaders in an attempt to achieve or
maintain control of the state. All three generations of populism theory agree on this point: that
populists attempt to do more than merely influence policy. This element of the definition
excludes the political mobilization undertaken by most social movements in modern
25
As political authority rests on a foundation of symbolic legitimacy (Bendix 1977:290-297; Loveman 2005),
political mobilization can be oriented toward undercutting the legitimacy of the state as well.
26
The mobilization described here is distinct from the sort discussed by Deutsch. Etzioni (1968:248-50) argues that
the term mobilization should be reserved for the specific version reviewed here and that modernization should
be used to describe the processes studied by Deutsch. For the purposes of this discussion, I will be less ambitious
and rely on a distinction between political mobilization (what is reviewed here) and social mobilization
(discussed by Deutsch).
democracies, which intend to alter political agendas or outcomes through their influence but do
not aspire to a position of control over the political apparatus.
Second, populist mobilization targets large numbers of potential constituents.27 This
element of the definition resonates with both modernization and institutionalist approaches to
populism. It excludes the mobilization of elites in oligarchical systems, in which political
influence is wielded by only a few; so long as the number of targeted supporters remains small,
such mobilization cannot be called populist.28 It also excludes mobilization that appeals to
swing voters in otherwise stable democratic systemseven if those appeals utilize populist
rhetoricbecause the pool of politically available potential constituents is likewise relatively
small.
Third and most importantly, populist mobilization invokes (and so attempts to forge) a
solidary people.29 Populist leaders develop arguments that the people includes workers, the
urban poor, the landed and landless peasantry, and indigenous populations, alongside
professionals and the middle class (though the specific categories vary by case). In so doing, they
adopt nationalist ways of speaking and framing situations, sometimes alongside tropes of
indigenism or mestizaje. This element of the definition draws on discursive approaches to
populism. But the solidarity-building activities of populists go beyond rhetoric. Populists attempt
to evoke solidary bases of support by invoking the idea of a national people.30 Further, populists
27
McCarthy and Zald (1977:1221) define constituents as those providing resources for [the movement]. If
resources are understood in the broad sense described above, this definition is sufficient.
28
This does not mean that mass politics is necessarily a precondition for populist mobilization. As will be discussed
below, a politician may attempt to mobilize large numbers of people even under an oligarchical system.
29
The question of solidarity is of classic sociological concern. In recent decades, scholarship on class (Fantasia
1988; Przeworski 1977; Thompson 1963), on race and ethnicity (Brubaker 2004; Hobsbawm 1983; Jenkins 1997;
Southall 1970), and on political cleavages (Laitin 1985) has (re)problematized the concept, questioning the
assumption that solidarity is a natural result of the relations of production, of market position, of rational decision
making, or of primordial biology. Rather, solidarities are made through complex processes and are contingent events
that happen and fluctuate (Brubaker 1996:18-22).
30
Brubaker (2004:10) makes a similar point regarding ethnicity.
are not only interested in self-identification, but also in patterns of interaction and sociability
identification instantiated in (and reinforced by) action. At the same time as invoking a solidary
national people, populists also construct the image (and often by unintended consequence, the
reality) of a solidary opposition to that people, which is typically identified as an economic or
political oligarchy.31 In this, populist mobilization is about building oppositional solidarities at
a national level. This element of the definition excludes many forms of mobilization that are
issue-based or specific to sub-national groups, including those that appeal exclusively to
solidarities based on class position or self-identification (including ethnicity). Only those
episodes of mobilization that invoke and attempt to build solidarities at the level of the people,
and that fulfill the other two requirements outlined above, should be classified as populist.
Definitional Implications
First, defining populism as a mobilizing project means that it is leader-driven. This
moves discussion away from organicist views that suggest populist movements embody a natural
confluence of interests or symbiotic relations between pre-political social groups.32 Instead, it
draws attention to the attempts of leaders to mobilize supporters. In this emphasis on leadership,
it is important to see the political sphere itself as a location of power and populist mobilization as
an attempt to gain or keep control over that sphere.33
Second, political projects are undertaken by specific actors within concrete organizational
settingsthey are not always all-pervasive or definitive. Many theories of the state argue that
31
This is not merely a concurrent process, but one that is integrally related to the first. The act of circumscribing a
national people by necessity involves an (understudied) exclusivist element, in that it defines other groups as unnationalor even anti-national. This often involves the identification of an internal enemy.
32
While populist leaders often utilize organicist rhetoric (Stepan 1978: Chapter 1; van Niekerk 1974:29), this does
not mean that their movements are organic.
33
This proposition is consistent with dominant approaches to leadership in the political sociology literature (Geddes
1994:7-14; Mahoney 2001:19; Skocpol 1979:165).
states should be seen as sets of organizations that do things (Skocpol 1985; Weber 1978
[1922]:55-6) and that may act in concert but that may also act in contradictory ways (Mann
1993:52-88).34 There is no reason why the study of political movements ought to be exempt from
this methodological precaution. This means that some elements of a state or movement may
engage in populist mobilization while others do not.35
Third, states are territorial entities (Mann 1993:55-6). Within their own territories, states
maintain variable degrees of infrastructural power (Mann 1984) and, for this reason and others,
state-led political projects are often geographically specific. While movements might be less
geographically widespread than states, this same point applies to them as well. This implies that
populist mobilization projects might target only certain geographical areas (regions, provinces,
cities, neighborhoods) while others areas remain unreached (or unreachable), ignored, treated via
traditional political channels, or even repressed with overtly authoritarian actions.
Fourth, focusing on populist mobilization as a political project emphasizes its temporal
boundedness and variability.36 Neither regimes nor movements persist through time as static
entities.37 This may be all the more true of those that pursue populist mobilization, since such
practice often occurs at moments of intense social and political change. Populist mobilization is
34
See also Poggi 1990:184; Tilly 1990:75, 117. This disaggregation ought to be taken not as a truism, but rather as a
methodological precaution not to extrapolate unreflectively from one domain within the state to the whole and to
examine the interests, composition, and practices ofand interrelationships amongthe various organizations,
bureaus, activities, and actors that constitute the state.
35
In fact, this precaution is particularly germane to populist mobilization because it often corresponds with
fractured or rearranged elite alliances, struggles for control over state functions, and the reorganization of social and
political institutions. Under such conditions, it is dangerous to assume regime or movement coherence.
36
My suggestions here are in keeping with a recent (re)emphasis on temporality in political and comparative
historical sociology. Recently, arguments have been made for the importance of events to structural transformation
(Sewell 1996a and 1996b) and the eventfulness of social group formation and dissolution (Brubaker 1996:18-21
and 2004: Chapter 1; Przeworski 1977). Studies and theoretical statements have also emphasized the significance of
event sequences (Abbott 1983; Haydu 1998), turning points and critical junctures (Abbott 1997; Collier and Collier
1991; Mahoney 2001), path-dependence (Mahoney 2000), and the temporality of historical processes generally
(Abbott 1992; Aminzade 1992; Katznelson 2003; Pierson 2003; McAdam and Sewell 2001).
37
While this may seem like an obvious point, it is one worth making given the lack of attention to historical process
in many cross-sectional and time-series studies of politics (Abbott 1988; Isaac and Griffin 1989).
undertaken at specific historical moments, is sustained for specific durations, and is subject to
fluctuation in its character and intensity over time.38 For this reason, it is important to be
sensitive to the ways in which putatively populist regimes and movements can vary
significantly over time in their propensity to enact populist mobilizing projects.
In sum, defining populism as a mobilizing project focuses attention on a political practice
that is leader-driven and organizationally, geographically, and temporally situated in concrete
ways. While these considerations are not unique to populist political projects, populist
mobilization is rarely treated with enough subtlety in these respects. Populist mobilization might
be undertaken by any number of actors located within any number of complex organizational
structures. What matters is whether the mobilizing practices are populist in the sense described
here. This carries the important implication that populist may not be an appropriate designation
for entire regimes or movements for extended periods of time. Instead, as others have noted in
somewhat different ways before, populist mobilization might better be thought of as an element
of, rather than definitive of, regimes and movements (Worsley 1969; Laclau 1977).
What Populist Mobilization is Not

Given the specificity of this conceptualization, it is worth noting a few things often
conflated with populism that it excludes. First, populist mobilization is distinct from the rise of
mass politics, although the two have often occurred together in history. It is possible to conceive
of mass politics developing without the enactment of populist mobilization. The most obvious
example is the rise of mass politics in Western Europe, where strong labor parties incorporated
38
Approaches to populism based on temporally static (or conventionally periodized) typologies fail to capture this
variation. For example, Lipsets (1960: Chapter 5) labeling of Peronism as a leftist-fascist regime type
inadvertently gives the impression that Perns tenure was relatively undifferentiated in its nature over time. But
in fact Pern was in some respects considerably less populist later in his career, when he responded to a failing
economy and the loss of his bases of support with more overt and intense forms of repression.
and disciplined more potentially radical action (Przeworski 1995:54). It is also possible to
conceive of populist mobilization without mass politics. Peruvian presidential candidate
Guillermo Billinghurst is widely recognized as the first populist in Peruvian history for his
encouragement of election-eve street demonstrations by supporters that he had gained as mayor
of Lima (Stein 1980:32-5). Billinghursts mobilizing projects enabled him to circumvent a
fragmented traditional elite by showcasing both his own mass support and the threat of popular
upheaval, even though his supporters were not eligible to vote in the Peruvian system.
Second, populist mobilization is not the same as the rise of leftist, reformist, or popular
movements aimed at helping impoverished classes. This applies in Latin America equally to the
reformism of the mid-twentieth century and to the more recent coming to power of moderate and
more radical leftists and their parties. These shifts are important to explain in their own right and
should not be confused with populist mobilization per se, even if reformers sometimes rely on
populist mobilization to build support. There is substantial variation, for example, between
Venezuelas Hugo Chvez and Chiles Michelle Bachelet in the extent to which they have
enacted populist projects, although both might be equally situated within a broader trend of
recent leftist politics in Latin America.
Third, populist mobilization should not be confused with either traditional clientelism or
caudillismo. Both modes of political control are deeply entrenched in the political history of
Latin America and so form part of the cultural repertoires of Latin American politicians. Both
have also been used as easy ways to define populism. First, clientelism is emphasized by those
who see populism as an incorporation project of political control. But reducing populist
mobilization to clientelism misses the various ways in which it often results from the breakdown
of old clientelistic systems, even if new modes of incorporation indeed continue to have shades
of clientelism. Further, populist mobilization as I have defined it is not reducible to a mode of

incorporation. Second, caudillismo is emphasized by those who see populism as a personalistic
and charismatic mode of political control. But again, populist mobilization as I have defined it
involves much more than charisma, even if it is undeniable that the modern populist often cloaks
himself in the historical mantle of the virile caudillo. As with mass politics and reformist
governments, clientelism and caudillismo are important to explain in their own right and are
often related to populist mobilization, but they should be kept analytically distinct.
Advantages of a Focus on Political Practice

By treating populism as a mode of political mobilizationand thus emphasizing political
practicethe above definition has advantages over previous approaches. First, it moves beyond
some of the limitations of first generation scholarship by abandoning the assumption that
populism is necessarily linked to a particular developmental stage. Populist mobilization as
defined here does not reduce to the social content of populist coalitions, nor is it necessarily
tied to a particular set of economic conditions or policies.39 Second, the new definition is less
expansive than discursive definitions, providing better analytical leverage. A set of ideas can
float about in the ether of political discourse without ever being instantiated in concrete
mobilizing projects. By focusing on only those instances of populist rhetoric that figure into a
specific type of mobilizing project, the new definition limits the concept in a useful way.40 Third,
39
That the social bases of support that figure so predominantly in first generation definitions of populism are absent
from my definition should not be taken as an indication of their irrelevance. Instead, a political definition simply
shifts class or economic considerations from the definition of populism to the domain of explanation. The question
of the social conditions under which political leaders pursue populist mobilization is an empirical one and should
come after (and not be built into) a definition of the phenomenon.
40
To argue for an emphasis on practice is not to ignore discourse. The nice thing about a practical as opposed to a
discursive focus is that the former can subsume that latter (but not vice versa). That is, ways of speaking, although
by no means coextensive with, ought to be included as constitutive of ways of doing politicsthings that are said are
things that are done (Bourdieu 1991:221-2). Rhetoric, then, can be seen as one among many elements of populist
this definition goes further than instrumentalist perspectives in highlighting the specificity of
populistas opposed to genericcollective action. Fourth, it moves beyond the political
institutional focus of third generation scholarship by recognizing that subjects can become
available targets for populist mobilizing by many possible routes.
More generally, reconceptualizing populism as a mode of political practice is useful
because it maintains a distinction between the means by which politics is done and the ends to
which it is directed. This is important for two reasons. First, it leaves open the possibility that
populist ways of doing politics (political means) may have social or political impacts that are
independent ofand possibly unrelated tothe intended goals (political ends) of such politics.
This distinction makes it possible to explore whether the practice of populist mobilizing itself, as
a political means, has consequences that are independent of whether it is driven by leftist or
rightist agendas and of whether populist leaders are progressive or conservative. Second,
actual political practice cannot be deduced from the ends toward which that practice is oriented.
In the real world, political practice is often improvised, partial, and contingent upon the capacity
to act. Sensitivity to the disjuncture between intended ends and actual practice is all the more
important in developing countries (such as those of Latin America), where the state may be
infrastructurally weak, where the economy may be volatile and particularly dependent on foreign
trade and investment, where the military may have a history of intervention, where political
loyalties are fragile, and where powerful elite groups have the capacity to subvert (or block
entirely) state initiatives.
Most importantly, distinguishing between political practice and the ends to which that
practice is oriented renders moot a number of nagging questions about populism. For decades,
practice. Further, a practical emphasis puts flesh on (often disembodied) discourse, because practices are always
attached to material circumstances, apparatuses, actions, and receptions.
ill-conceived polemics have raged over whether populism is essentially left- or right-wing,
fascist or egalitarian, forward-looking and progressive or backward-looking and nostalgic
(Minogue 1969:200). Questions of whether populist mobilization is fascist or socialist, rightist or
leftist, reactionary or progressive, authoritarian or democratic, militarist or civilian are
misguided, because it can be undertaken in the pursuit of various ends, by different sorts of
politicians with a range of intentions.
For the purposes of cumulative research, this definition is useful because it identifies a
category of political action (populist mobilization) that is coherently bounded and repeated.
While this way of circumscribing populism may not capture every case that has ever been
called populist, it applies to a good deal of them while providing a more consistent basis for
their study. With such a foundation in place, the door is finally opened to pursue rigorous
comparative analyses that are loosed from old stalemates and open to new questions.
Specifically, four types of questions follow from reconceptualizing populism as a mode of
political practice: (1) What are the conditions under which political leaders are likely to pursue
populist mobilization as a political tactic? (2) What do populist mobilizing projects look like in
their concrete, practical details; and how are the dynamics of populist mobilizing different from
or similar to those of other modes of political activity? (3) Under what conditions does populist
mobilization succeed in securing the degree, type, and duration of political support that it is
meant to achieve? (4) What are the (intended and unintended) consequences of populist
mobilization (as a political means, regardless of the ends toward which it is oriented) on other
elements of social and political life?
Conclusion
With a few exceptions, populism studies have long been insulated from political
sociology. Research on populism has generally failed to utilize the concepts and theories
generated by political sociology; and political sociology has paid little attention to either
populism as a category of phenomena or to those historical cases typically labeled populist.
This paper is intended to initiate a dialogue between the two domains of scholarship.
Both parties stand to benefit from such a conversation. By now it should be evident how
what has long been an inconsistent and theoretically underdeveloped literature on populism has
much to gain by the systematic incorporation of recent innovations in political sociology. Indeed,
the bulk of this paper has been devoted to suggesting what a retooled approach to populism
might look like. This sort of advancement is necessary if theories are to be developed that have
any hope of explaining the recent upswing in populist activity in Latin Americaa trend that
shows no signs of abating. At the same time, political sociology has much to gain by taking
populism seriously. The study of populism stands to contribute to knowledge about the
relationship between the state and society, about social group formation, about political
mobilization (and other modes of political practice), and about the paths leading to
authoritarianism and democracy. Given political sociologys commitment to the study of social
movements, revolution, democracy, ethnic politics, class relations, and political economy, it
clearly has much to gain from the incorporation of populist phenomena into its body of theories
and ongoing research programmes.
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Reconceptualizing Populism

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Reconceptualizing Populism

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Reconceptualizing Populism (as a Mode of Political Practice)

Competing Approaches to Populism

Generation 1: Modernization and Marxist Theories

masses as a pool of easily manipulated individuals and leads to an impression of politics as

Generation 2: Discursive and Instrumentalist Approaches

Generation 3: Political Institutional Approaches

Defining Political Mobilization

Defining Populist Mobilization

What Populist Mobilization is Not

of clientelism. Further, populist mobilization as I have defined it is not reducible to a mode of

Advantages of a Focus on Political Practice

Marx, Cristoph. 1994. The Ossewabrandwag As a Mass Movement, 1939-41. Journal of

Rogers, M. 1974. Instrumental and Infra-Resources. The American Journal of Sociology

-----. 1987. Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Politics and

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