G.R. No.

189600

June 29, 2010

MILAGROS
E.
AMORES, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner)
challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009 and Resolution No.
09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively
dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto questioning
the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the
party-list organization Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) in the House of Representatives, and denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
In her Petition for Quo Warranto 1 seeking the ouster of private
respondent, petitioner alleged that, among other things,
private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the
youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his
certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31
years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the PartyList System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBACs
youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May
14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new
sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.

Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private

respondent was deemed to have entered a general denial
pursuant to public respondents Rules.2

on July 10, 2007, especially considering that he admitted

receiving his own Certificate of Proclamation only on
December 13, 2007.

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May

14, 2009,3 dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto,
finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations
which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at
least one seat in the House of Representatives through
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60
dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed
on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary
period being 10 days from private respondents proclamation.

In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that

petitioner has not substantiated her claims of grave abuse of
discretion against public respondent; and that he became a
member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector
years before the 2007 elections.

Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees

under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public respondent held that
it applied only to those nominated as such during the first
three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which
CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.
In the matter of private respondents shift of affiliation from
CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of
RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change
in party-list affiliation.
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009, 4 petitioner filed
the present Petition for Certiorari. 5
Petitioner contends that, among other things, public
respondent created distinctions in the application of Sections
9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject
provisions, fostering interpretations at war with equal
protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which
was a partial proclamation of winning party-list organizations,
was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office

It bears noting that the term of office of party-list

representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections will expire
on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot
and academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in this
case would still be of practical value.7
The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to
wit: (1) whether petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto was
dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2)
whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in considering
petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its
counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its
Rules8 from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on
July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially
proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007 elections,
along with other party-list organizations, 9 it was by no
measure a proclamation of private respondent himself as
required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Section
13. How
Party-List
Representatives
are
Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the

respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to

COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

the

to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis

and underscoring supplied.)

nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not

distinguish, we must not distinguish.13

AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No.

07-60 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. COMELEC10 after revisiting the formula for
allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

The Court finds no textual support for public respondents

interpretation that Section 9 applied only to those nominated
during the first three congressional terms after the ratification
of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector.

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find

even an iota of textual support for public respondents
ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private
respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to
its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there
was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15
reads:

Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the

exact date of private respondents proclamation, the Court
overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the
merits. Alternatively, since petitioners challenge goes into
private respondents qualifications, it may be filed at anytime
during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged.11
On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall
first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees
under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is

clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application.12
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the
youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it
must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day
is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this
mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System
Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in
March, 1995. There is thus no reason to apply Section 9
thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last
elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or
two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not
sound legislative intent, and could not have been the
objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondents
ratiocination that after the third congressional term from the
ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section
9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This
distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list

representative who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat:
Provided, That if he changes his political party orsectoral
affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not
be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under
his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers
changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the
latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral
party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the
Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes
his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be
eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the
change has been effected at least six months before the
elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning
rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi
sermo or speech is the index of intention.14
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No.
7941 apply to private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to
be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas

Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007

elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already
more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated
that he was born in August, 1975.15 Moreover, he did not
change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May,
2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to
CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families sector
only on March 17, 2007.161avvphi1
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose
victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A party-list
organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of
preference, their qualifications according to law are a different
matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was
eventually proclaimed as a party-list representative of CIBAC
and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the
compensation and emoluments provided by law for the
position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the
same.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6,
2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are
SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared
ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of
Representatives representing the party-list organization
CIBAC.
SO ORDERED.

Party-list Representatives:AMORES v HRETGR 189600,

6/29/2010SUMMARY:

Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as

representative of CIBAC for being overage to representyouth.
Change of affiliation must be made six months before
elections. Youth sector is represented by 25

Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral

representation should be changed SIX MONTHS priorto
elections.

FACTS:
5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption
of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva asrepresentative of
CIBAC in the HoR.

G.R. No. L-23607

Petitioner argues:

GO KA TOC SONS and CO., ETC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICE AND CORN BOARD, defendant-appellant.

Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond

the age limit of 30 which was the limitimposed by RA 7941 for
"youth sector".
Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW
and families not affected six months priorto elections.
Respondent argues:
RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative
only applicable to first three electionsafter the party list act.
There was no resultant change in affiliation.
ISSUE:
Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives
apply to respondent Villanueva
RULING Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of
HoR representing CIBAC
HELD: Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If
representative of youth sector, should be between 25to 30.

May 23, 1967

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant

Solicitor General A. A. Torres, Solicitor C. S. Gaddi and
Atty. A. J. Gustilo for defendant-appellant.
Antonio C. Sanchez and Vicente Cabahug for plaintiff
appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Plaintiff-appellee Go Ka Toc Sons & Co. is a duly
registered partnership, not wholly owned by Filipinos,
engaged since 1958 in the manufacture, processing and
marketing of vegetable oil extracted from corn, rice, copra,
soybean, peanuts, fish, and other vegetable products.
1wph1.t

On August 2, 1960, Republic Act 3018 was approved,

Section 1 of which prohibited, among others, partnerships
whose capital was not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the rice
and/or corn industry. The law was to take effect on
January 1, 1951. However, Section 3 (a) allowed such
partnerships, upon registration with the municipal
treasurer, to continue business until two years from and
after January 1, 1961.

SEC. 3. All such persons, associations,

partnerships or corporations that have complied
with the requirements provided in Section two
hereof, if they so apply, shall be allowed to
continue to engage in their respective lines of
activity in the rice and to and/or corn industry only
for the purpose of liquidation, as follows:
(a) Those engaged in the retail, wholesale, culture,
transporting, handling, distribution or acquisition
for the purpose of trade of rice and/or corn and the
by-products thereof shall be allowed to continue to
engage therein for a period of two years from the
date of effectivity of this Act;
xxx

xxx

These two circulars have been duly published and

translated into the local dialect pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act 3018.
Plaintiff-appellee, having been required by agents of
RICOB to register in accordance with Section 2 of the law
and the latter's resolution, dated January 3, 1961, ruling
that manufacturers and/or dealers of bijon, noodle, corn
starch, gawgaw, rice wine, poultry feeds and other by
products of rice and corn are covered by the law, filed
action in the Court of First Instance to declare the said law
and RICOB Resolution No. 10, Nov. 21, 1960 and Gen.
Circular No. 1, July 10, 1961, as inapplicable to it. Pending
trial on the merits, the lower court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for.

xxx

On November 21, 1960, the newly created Rice and Corn

Board1 issued Resolution No. 10, pursuant to Section 6 of
the law, defining the term "by product" used in the law, as
follows:
By-product shall mean the secondary products
resulting from the process of husking, grinding,
milling, and cleaning of palay and corn, such as,
but not limited to "binlid," "darak," "tanop," "tiktik,"
"corn husk," "corn drips," and "corn meals."
And on July 10, 1961, the RICOB issued Gen. Circular No.
1, as amended, which defined the term "capital
investment" used in Section 3 of Republic Act 3018 which
limits the maximum amount of capital investments of alien
persons and entities engaged in the rice and/or corn
industry to the amount stated in their statement made
pursuant to Section 2 of the law.

To abbreviate the proceedings, the parties entered into a

stipulation of facts. Thereupon, the lower court rendered
judgment (a) declaring Republic Act 3018 not applicable to
plaintiff's business; (b) declaring null and void RICOB's
Resolution No. 10, dated November 21, 1960 and General
Circular No. 10, as amended, dated July 10, 1961 in so far
as they were and are being made applicable to plaintiff's
business and (c) making and declaring permanent and
perpetual the preliminary writ of injunction issued in the
case.
Not satisfied with the foregoing ruling, defendant RICOB,
through the Solicitor General has taken the instant appeal
to raise questions purely of law.
Admittedly, plaintiff-appellee has stopped from engaging in
the purchase and sale of rice and/or corn since the lapse
of the two-year period from the effectivity of the law. It has
limited its activities to
the trade, processing andmanufacture of corn and rice oil
from raw materials consisting of corn germ proper or
embryo ("sungo") and "tahup," as well as from rice husk it

secures from others who mill rice and corn. In the

processing and manufacture of coin oil, plaintiff also
produces a residue called "corn meal" or "corn meal germ"
which it sells and trades. Are these activities covered by
Republic Act 3018?
Section 1 of the law defines "rice and/or corn industry" as
including the handling of distribution, either in wholesale or
retail, and the acquisition for purpose of trade, of the byproducts of rice and corn.
SECTION 1. No person who is not a citizen of the
Philippines, or association, partnership or
Corporation, the capital or capital stock of which is
now wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
shall directly or indirectly engage in the rice and/or
corn industry except as provided in Section three
of this Act.
As used in this Act, the term rice "and/or corn
industry" shall mean and include the culture,
milling, warehousing, transporting, exportation,
importation, handling the distribution, either in
wholesale or retail, the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred and eighty to the
contrary notwithstanding, or the acquisition for the
purpose of trade of rice (husked or unhusked) or
corn and the by-products thereof:Provided, That
public utilities duly licensed and registered in
accordance with law may transport corn or rice.
(Emphasis supplied).
Now, "tahup," "sungo" and "rice husk," which plaintiffs
acquires from rice and corn millers and from which it
manufactures the vegetable oil and produces the "corn
meal" or "corn germ meal" that it subsequently distributes
and sells are clearly by-products of rice and/or corn.2

Although the term "by-product" is not particularly and by

specifically stated in the title of Republic Act 3018, its
inclusion in the body of the law is not invalid, as the lower
court held, since it is germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title of the law.3
Neither is the statutory inclusion of said term in the
definition of the phrases "rice and/or corn industry" an
invalid legislative usurpation of the court's function to
interpret the laws, as the lower court also ruled. This
definition is part of the law itself.
Finally, the lower court determined the purpose and
intention behind the law, thus:
x x x In the opinion of the Court, it was never the
intention of the Legislature in enacting Republic
Act No. 3018 to include in its purpose or scope the
processing of the by-products of rice and corn
because Filipinos do not depend for their survival
by eating the by-products of rice and corn. . . . .
Assuming, without admitting, that the law in
question really intended to include in its object the
nationalization not only of the rice and corn
industry but also the trade of the by-products just
mentioned above, the business in which the
plaintiff has been engaged and since December
31, 1962, as is at present, engaged, the Court is of
the opinion that in the trade, processing,
manufacture of corn and rice oil from the raw
materials of corn germ proper or embryo (sungo)
and tahup and from rice husk converting the
remaining parts into "corn meal" or "corn germ
meal" which is traded and sold and that it acquired
its raw materials from those engaged milling rice
and/or corn. the said Republic Act No. 3018 does

not cover the plaintiff's business activities just

mentioned.
This is a fair and reasonable interpretation and
application of said Republic Act No. 3018, because
to include in its control, limitation and prohibition
the business of the plaintiff mentioned above,
would be not only to render the said law
unconstitutional for not including in its title "and the
by-products thereof," but also to unreasonably
stretch out and expand the scope and intention of
the law to include in its context the processing and
extracting of oil from rice and corn and the
manufacture of corn meal or corn germ meal and
the selling and trading of the same.
As a logical result of this interpretation of the law
spelled out by this Court, it must necessarily follow
that the Resolution No. 10, Annex 1 and the
general circular dated July 10, 1961, quoted under
paragraph 3 of the parties' Stipulation of Facts are
hereby declared null and void in so far as they
attempted to include in the scope of said law the
defendant's business activities described above in
which it engaged since December 31, 1962, and in
which it has been engaged partly engaged since
its formation in 1959.
What the court a quo did was to resort to statutory
construction. But this was improper as well as incorrect.
The law is clear in enunciating the policy that only Filipinos
and associations, partnerships or corporations 100%
Filipino can engage even in the trade and acquisition of
the by-products of rice and/or corn. So the court's only
duty was to apply the law as it was.4 The purpose of the
Act, as expressed in the introductory note of the bill, can
control the language of the law only in case of
ambiguity.5 There is none here. Furthermore, the court

below's interpretation would render the statute nugatory

and defeat its aims, rather than apply and effectuate its
provisions,6 since it struck off the phrase "by-products
thereof" from the text of the law.
Since plaintiff-appellee is covered by the statute, there is
no necessity for an extensive discussion regarding the
validity of Resolution No. 10 of November 21, 1960. The
power and authority of appellant RICOB to issue such
rules and regulations implementing the law, proceeds from
the law itself.7 Said resolution, by enumerating some
specific examples of by-products of rice and/,or corn,
merely carried out the provisions of law. And the sole
reason why the lower court invalidated it, was its mistaken
stand that the term "by-product" ought not to have been
made a part of the statute.
The foregoing considerations render moot and academic
the question regarding the validity of General Circular No.
1 on July 10, 1961.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
the writ of injunction issued therein is annulled and set
aside. No costs. So ordered.

Go Ka Toc Sons and Co., etc. v. Rice and

Corn Board
G.R. No. L-23607
May 23, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE:
This case is about the selling of rice
and corn by-products by non-Filipino owned
and controlled corporation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Go Ka Toc Sons & Co. (Petitioner) is a
duly registered partnership not wholly owned
by Filipinos. It engaged in the manufacturing,
processing and Marketing of vegetable oil
extracted from different vegetable products.
On August 2, 1960, Republic Act 3018
was approved which prohibited partnerships
whose capital was not wholly owned by
Filipinos from engaging, directly or indirectly,
in the rice and/or corn industry. The law
takes effect on January 1, 1951, however
such partnerships, upon registration with the
municipal treasurer, are allowed to exist until
2 years after January 1, 1961 for the purpose
of liquidation.

also produces "Corn Meal" or "Corn Meal

Germ" which it sells and trades.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

According to Section 1 of the law:

"No person who is not a citizen

Petitioners filed an action in the Court

of First Instance (CFI) to declare the said law
and RICOB Resolution No. 10 and Gen.
Circulation No. 1 as inapplicable to it. The
lower court was in favor of the Petitioner and
thus issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for.

of the Philippines, or association,

partnership or Corporation, the capital
or capital stock of which is now wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines,
shall directly indirectly engage in the
rice and/or corn industry except as
provided in Section three of this act."

RICOB, through the Solicitor General

has taken the instant appeal to raise
questions purely of law, hence the petition to
this court.
ISSUE:

The Rice and Cord Board (RICOB)

issued Resolution No. 10, defining the term
"by product", and General Circular No. 1,
which defined the term Capital Investment
which limits the maximum amount of capital
investments of alien persons engaged in the
rice and/or corn industry in pursuant to
Republic Act 3018.
Petitioner has stopped in the sale of
rice and/or corn since the lapse of the twoyear period from the effectivity of the law
and has limited its activities to the trade,
processing and manufacture of corn and rice
oil from raw materials consisting of corn
germ proper or embryo ("Sungo") and
"Tahup", as well as rice husk it secures from
those who produce rice and corn. Petitioner

included in the scope of Republic Act No.

3018.

Whether or not the Petitioner, not a

100% Filipino owned corporation, can
engage in the trade, processing and
manufacture of corn and rice oil from raw
materials.
RULING:
The Judgment is REVERSED
The lower court erred in the
construction of the in which it proclaimed
that the issue of by-products was germane
to the case at hand and on the interpretation
legislative intent of the makers of the law
with the remark that Filipino's do not depend
for their survival by the eating the byproducts if rice and corn, hence the error in
the decision that the Petitioners were not

Since the Law is clear and unambiguous,

there is no need for construction or
interpretation, but only implementation. Only
100% Filipino owned artificial persons may
engage in the rice and/or corn industry.
In regards to the validity of Resolution
No. 10 and General Circular No. 1 is is
rendered moot and academic.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed
from is reversed and the writ of injuction
issued therein is annulled and set aside. No
costs.
SO ORDERD.

G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez
for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of
conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent
to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient
defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense
in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows:
"The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a
violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by
Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about
the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and
control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without
serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first
having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963,

the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the
accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found
in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has
neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we
can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an
agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought
from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the
authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only
a question of law would be submitted for decision, he
explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a
secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license

of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine
the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the
fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit
that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
mentioned in the information was found in his possession on
August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the
corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant,
answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the
lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes,
and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically

allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess
any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines],
the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are
in possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties."6

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit

the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part
presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as
secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of
Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused
directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City
on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused
as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to
the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the
presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit
the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent
duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a

decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay
the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him
are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to
this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a

secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally
clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused
must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8

where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret
agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879."
Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this
Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision
conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no
longer speaks with authority.

andas further amended by RA 4 (home-maderevolver (Paltik),

Cal. 22, without serial number,with six (6) rounds of
ammunition, without firsthaving secured the necessary
license or permittherefor from the corresponding
authorities)Accused admits to possession of firearm on
ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste
of
Batangas.
On
27
November 1963, the lower court rendered a decisionconvictin
g the accused of the crime andsentenced
him
to
imprisonment for one year andone day to two years. As the
appeal involves aquestion of law, it was elevated to the
SupremeCourt.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Issue:Whether or not a secret agent dulyappointed

qualified as such of the governor is exempt
requirement of having alicense of firearm

People,plaintiff-appelleev. Mapa
defendant-appellantGR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA
1164)En
Banc,
Fernando
(p):
9
concur Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant andappellant.Solic
itor
General
Arturo
A.
Alafriz,
Asst.
Solicitor General F .R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C .Hernandez
for plaintiff and appellee.

and
from the

Held:The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person

to possess any firearm, detachedparts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or anyinstrument or implement used or
intended to beused in the manufacture of firearms, parts
of firearms, or ammunition
(Sec 878 RA 4 of theRAC)

Facts:
Mario
M.
Mapa
was
charged
for
illegalpossession of firearm and ammunition in aninformation
dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the
Revise Administrative Codein connection with Section 2692
of the RevisedAdministrative Code, as amended by CA 56

except when such firearms are inpossession of such

public
officials and publicservants for use in the performance
of their official duties; as those firearms andammunitions whic
h are regularly and lawfullyissued to officers, soldiers, sailors
or
marines,the Philippines Constabulary, guards in theemploym

ent
of
the
Bureau
of
Prisons,
municipalpolice, provincial governors, lieutenantgovernors, pr
ovincial treasurers, municipaltreasurers, municipal
mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails
(Sec 879)
It is thefirst and fundamental duty of courts to apply thelaw;
Construction and interpretation come onlyafter it has been
demonstrated that application isimpossible or inadequate
without them. The lawcannot be any clearer, there being no
provisionmade
for
a
secret
agent.Reliance in the decision in People v.Macarandang is mi
splaced, and the case nolonger speaks with authority to the
extent thatthe present decision conflicts with. It may benote
that
in
People
v.
Macarandang,
a
secretagent was acquitted on appeal on theassumption that
the appointment of the accusedas a secret agent to assist in
the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category
of a peace officer equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered bysection 879, Thu
s, in the present case,therefore,
the
conviction
must
stand.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment