People Vs.

Santiago
FACTS:Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy by striking
himwith an automobile that he was driving. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime
of homicide by reckless negligence, Santiago does not agree with the courts
sentence,questioning the constitutionality of act no. 2886 amending order no. 58
stating thatall prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the U.S... Act
no. 2886stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of
thePhilippine islands.
ISSUE:Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution
of thestate?
HELD:NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of
thestates, but it is left in the hand of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm
of public statutory law.It is limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give
to its provision theeffect of law in criminal matters.In pursuance of the constitution
of the US each state has the authority, under itspolice power rule to define and
punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminalprocedure. The delegation to our
government needs no demo, the crimes committed w in ourterritory even before
sec 2 of general orders no.58 was amended, were prosecutedand punish jurisdiction
.Act no. 2886 (feb 24 1920) criminal complainant was filed may 10 1920. The
silenceof congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said general orders must
beconsidered as an act of the approval
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
March 8, 1922
G.R. No. 17584
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
Romualdez, J.:

Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with
automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime
of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one
day of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court
below committed four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was
being prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and
that the Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of
the evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is
unconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Act
constitute a prosecution of appellant without due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of
the accused and over the subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in
sentencing him to one year and one day of prison correccional and to the payment
of costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the
record and find that the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his wellwritten decision, are sufficiently sustained by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a
highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space
between a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the
other side where the were two young boys, the appellant did not take the
precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and did not
proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent
man would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as
unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who
was instantly killed as the result of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a shade of
doubt about them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal with the
fundamental questions as to whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the
complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General
Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not

authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law. Said section 2
provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against
the persons charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine Island
is made the plaintiff in this information, contains the following provisions in section
1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen
hundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense.
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the
Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls
within the realm of public statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public.
(MCulloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each
State has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to
lay down the rules of criminal procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in
creating and defining criminal offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws if it prescribes a different procedure in the case of persons in like situation.
Subject to this limitation, however, the legislature has large measure of discretion in
prescribing the modes of criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins
vs. Johnston, 237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S., 57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs.
Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its
territories such as the Philippines:

The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories and
possessions of the United States may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is
much more often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a
legislature, the organization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in the
several States or in Congress, which is often taken as a model, and whose powers
are limited by the Organic Act; but within the scope of such act is has complete
authority to legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within the
police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress. By act of
Congress their power extends to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States; and this includes the power to
define and punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the army of
occupation, functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish
new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No.
58, the preamble of which reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the inhabitants of
these Islands, the criminal code of procedure now in force therein is hereby
amended in certain of its important provisions, as indicated in the following
enumerated sections. (Emphasis ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to
give to its provisions the effect of law in criminal matters. For that reason it provides
in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in criminal matters in
the Philippine Islands from and after the 15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on
the same subjects shall remain valid except in so far as hereinafter modified or
repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this General Order
do not the nature of constitutional law either by reason of its character or by reason
of the authority that enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its
own by the Congress of the United States for, as a mater of fact, this body never
adopted it as a law of its own creation either before the promulgation of Act No.
2886, herein discussed, or, to our knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the
power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is
considered only on principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No.

2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as
a legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the legislative
branch of our government has undergone transformations and has developed itself
until it attained its present form. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army
of occupation which, in accordance with international law and practice, was vested
with legislative functions and in fact did legislate; afterwards, complying with the
instructions of President McKinley which later were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of
the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military Government were
transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it
functioned as a colegislative body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue
of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as
the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the
Philippine Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was formed
the present Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted the aforesaid
Act No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No.
58. The Philippine Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment
of laws among which we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation,
Act No. 440 relating to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary
investigations by justices of the peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before
the enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, the Legislature had also
amended this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding
appeals to the Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace
courts and by Act No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from
the information in order to be utilized as states witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by
our present Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said
legislative bodies as the successors of the Military Government that promulgated
General Orders No. 58.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had, and had, the
power to enact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to
legislate on criminal matters is very evident from the wording of section 7 of the
Jones Law which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not
inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any
law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see
fit.

It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty.

This assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of the principle of
territoriality as applied in the supression, of crimes, such power is delegated to
subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. As we have seen in the
beginning, the territorial legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes, a
power also possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of
sections 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments are local
agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the
territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it
does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the
Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several States of
the Union and incorporated territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the
case with the Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated
with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a matter of
fact, the crimes committed within our territory, even before section 2 of General
Orders No. 58 was amended, were prosecuted and punished in this jurisdiction as is
done at present; but then as now the repression of crimes was done, and is still
done, under the sovereign authority of the United States, whose name appears as
the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes and in other judicial papers and
notarial acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of section 784 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; in criminal causes the constant practice followed in this
jurisdiction established its use; and in notarial matters its use is provided by section
127 of Act No. 496. This long continued practice in criminal matters and the legal
provision relating to civil cases and notarial acts have not been amended by any
law, much less by Act No. 2886, the subject of the present inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing
the name to be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a
transitory stage, is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is no positive
provision in our constitutional law regarding the use of the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the
case in the respective constitutional charters of the States of the Union and
incorporated territories a situation which must not be understood as depriving the
Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute public
crimes. The fact is undeniable that the present government of the Philippines,
created by the Congress of the United States, is autonomous.

This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial actions, the
case at bar being one of them; as an example of such autonomy, this Government,
the same as that of Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo
[1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without
its consent. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S.
Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.) The doctrine, laid down in these cases,
acknowledges the prerogative of personality in the Government of the Philippines,
which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its own name
unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in law, to
give that government the right to prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever
violates within its territory the penal laws in force therein.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in
criminal matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of
the criminal complaint as long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in the
constitutions of the various states, the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him . . .
It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional provision to
prescribe the form of the indictment or information, and such form may omit
averments regarded as necessary at common law. (22 Cyc., 285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by the important
reason disclosed by the following fact that the Congress has tacitly approved Act
No. 2886. Both the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86, and the Jones Law,
last paragraph of section 19, provide that all the laws enacted by the Government
of the Philippines or its Legislature shall be forwarded to the Congress of the United
States, which body reserves the right and power to annul them. And presuming, as
legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have been complied with, it is
undisputed that the Congress of the United States did not annul any of those acts
already adverted to Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine Commission), and 2677,
2709 and the one now in question No. 2886 (of the present Legislature) all of
which were amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act now under discussion
(No. 2886) took effect on February 24, 1920, and the criminal complaint in this case
was filed on May 10, 1920. The silence of Congress regarding those laws
amendatory of the said General Order must be considered as an act of approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial legislation the reasonable
inference is that it approves such act. (26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht,
13 Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585;
57 [L. ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)

Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of
the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the information constitutes a vice or
defect, the same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to in
the court below.
An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or constitutional
provision, show by its title or by proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the
prosecution is in the name and by the authority of the state, the commonwealth, or
the people of the state, according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions; but
omissions or defects in this respect may be supplied or cured by other parts of the
records, and the omissions of such a recital or defects therein, even when required
by the constitution or by statute, is a defect of form within a statute requiring
exceptions for defect of form to be made before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by
Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a
constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any
constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors
assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore
sentenced to the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of
the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur in the result.

PEOPLE VS. ASTORGA

G.R. No. 110097; December 22, 1997
FACTS:

Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the courts decision on Criminal Case No. 8243
wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor.
Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecutions
witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the accusation
weakened the case. Furthermore, Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the 8year-old Yvonne Traya which shouldve been apparent and proven upon conviction.
Ultimately, Astorga claimed that the court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he
had not detained nor locked Yvonne up which is an important element in kidnapping.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the prosecutions witnesses were credible.
2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the courts decision.
3.) Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.
RULING:
1.) The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the
credibility of the witnesses especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the case, one
week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in Binaungan and that the case was
filed in Tagum, Davao.
2.) The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since motive is not an element of
the crime. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the appellant himself admitted having taken
Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
3.) The court agreed with the appellants contention. The evidence does not show that
appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellants
forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual
confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no lock up. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.

People vs. Mangulabnan

Facts: During the robbery, one of the accused climbed ona table and fired at the
ceiling, where the victim washiding. The shots caused the victims death.
Held: It is immaterial that death supervened by mereaccident. By reason or on
occasion of means it is

onlythe result obtained, without reference to or distinction asto circumstances,

causes, modes or persons intervening inthe commission of the crime, that has to be
taken intoconsideration.
- In the construction or interpretation of the provisionsof the RPC, Spanish text is
controlling because it wasapproved by the Philippine Legislature in its Spanishtext
(People vs. Mangulabnan)
Robbery withaccidental homicide. Spanish text which states thatrobbery with
homicide is a criminal act even if homicide is a mere accident even though the
RPCconveys the meaning that homicide should beintentionally committed [Under
the Spanish text, it issufficient that homicide resulted, even if by accident]
PEOPLE vs. MANGULABNAN, et al. [1956]
Facts: Nov. 5, 1953: reports of gunfire awaked sps Vicente Pacson & Cipriana Tadeo,
their 4minor children & Monica del Mundo, Ciprianas mom. Several persons were
going uptheir house w/c prompted Pacson to hide inside the ceiling. The malefactors
wereable to enter the house by breaking the walls in the kitchen & living room. Only
oneintruder was recognized by Cipriana whom she identified as Agustin
Mangulabnan.The intruders were able to take a necklace (P50), P50 in bills and P20
in coins fromCipriana while they were able to take P200 in cash and a gold necklace
(P200) fromMonica, who was struck in the face twice w/the butt of a gun for failure
to produce adiamond ring. One of the children, perhaps terrified of the whole event,
called ontohis mother w/c irked one of the intruders who made a move to strike the
boy. Monicawas able to ward off the blow. One of the intruders then went up a table
& fired hisgun at the ceiling. Mangulabnan & his 2 unidentified companions left.
Cipriana thencalled her husband however she didnt receive any answer.
She climbed up theceiling & found him dead.
According to the autopsy Pacsons death was caused by a gunshot wound.
Mangulabnan was arrested & he admitted his participation in the robbery & killing
of Pacson.
A complaint was filed w/the Justice of Peace against Mangulabnan & several
othersfor robbery w/homicide. Mangulabnan was found guilty as charged while the
otherswere either acquitted or the case against them was dismissed.
Issues & Ratio (not related to the topic):
1.Court ruled that a new trial cant be granted since Mangulabnan failed to show
thathis evidence was discovered after trial, that such could have not been
discovered & produced at the trial even w/exercise of reasonable diligence, that it is
material & of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
2.The post-mortem report is admissible as evidence even if its only a carbon
copysince it was signed by the physician who executed the original.

Besides,Magulabnans objective is too late. He should have objected during the

hearing. 3.The lower court was correct in rejecting an affidavit issued by a Sgt.
Fernando of thePhil. Constabulary w/c claimed that Civilian Commando members
were responsiblefor Pacsons death. Such cant be given credence since its based
on hearsay and theother intruders were actually unidentified.
Crim Issue: WON Mangulabnan should be held liable for robbery
w/homicideeven if he was not responsible for shooting Pacson. YES
Ratio:
1.Mangulabnan himself admitted that he participated in the execution of the act.
Suchis supported by Ciprianas testimony. 2.Mangulabnan w/the other malefactors
came together & they also left the scene of the crime together. This shows
conspiracy among them w/c rendered each of themliable for the acts of the others.
(P v. Delgado) 3.Record shows that Mangulabnan participated in the criminal design
to commit therobbery w/his co-defendants. Since theres a unity of purpose & action
arising from acommon design, theyre all responsible for the results regardless of
their individualparticipation. (US v. Ramos) 4.Although Pacsons killing may have
been unpremeditated, a closer look at theSpanish version of the RPC Art. 294 No. 1
would show that robbery w/homicide
doesnot only punish the person guilty of robbery w/the use of violenceagainst/intimi
dation of any person. Its sufficient that homicide would result byreason or on the
occasion of the robbery. It is immaterial that death wouldsupervene by
mere accident as long as homicide be produced by reason or onoccasion of the
robbery, w/o reference/distinction as to the circumstances, causes,modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime

Malilin vs. People

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of
the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
In this Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y
Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January
2006 as well as its Resolution[3] dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for
reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the Decision [4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofSorsogon City, Branch 52[5] which found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug.
The antecedent facts follow.
On the strength of a warrant[6] of search and seizure issued by the RTC
of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of
petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was
headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2
Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the presence
of barangay kagawad
Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma
allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets
containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, [7] Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, in a criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads:
That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in
Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two
(2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu with an
aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing shabu
residue, without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

Petitioner entered a negative plea.[9] At the ensuing trial, the prosecution

presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.

Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the
circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed
entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant;
that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup,
whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to
conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside
the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the
search from about a meter away; that the search conducted inside the bedroom of
petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue
contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets
containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternona
discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner. [10] On cross
examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its
progress to petitioners mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were
fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon. [11]
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was
found behind the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then
found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called
on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked.[12] On cross, he admitted that
it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind
him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the
things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets
of shabu were kept;[13] that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station
for a true inventory, then to the trial court [14] and thereafter to the laboratory. [15]
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the
examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the
items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were
positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance.[16] She further admitted that all seven
sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same
day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain
Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory. [17]
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure
conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the
search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was
momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that
petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a

lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheilas body inside the same
bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the
room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by
the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that
nothing was found on Sheilas body. [18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other
bedroom together with her children.[19]
petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him
to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him
and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon
showed him sachet ofshabu which according to him came from a pillow on the
bed.[20] Petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects
by Norma, barangay kagawadLicup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and
Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration
of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy
cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. [21] Licup for his part
testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He
recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom
and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left
inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets. [22]
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to
prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine
of P300,000.00.[23] The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in
the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of
petitioners animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as
things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are
presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives
to the police officers to fabricate charges against him. [24]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. [25] In his Appeal Brief[26] filed with the
Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities
in the manner by which the search of his house was conducted. For its part, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary, the prosecution
evidence sufficed for petitioners conviction and that the defense never advanced
any proof to show that the members of the raiding team was improperly motivated
to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly
performed their duties should prevail.[27]
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming
the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an

indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as

maximum.[28] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
appellate court.[29] Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same
issues.

In its Comment,[30] the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly
performed its duties in the conduct of the search. [31] It points to petitioners
incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that the
discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licups presence. It likewise
notes that petitioners bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of the
prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima
facie existence of animus possidendi.
This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.

Prefatorily, although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under
appeal.[32] In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if properly
appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the
elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. [33] Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. [34] Be
that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in
a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More
than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in
the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding
of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. [35]
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. [36] It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and

what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. [37]
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical,
or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. [38] The same standard
likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination[39] and even substitution and exchange.[40] In other words, the
exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard
to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness
in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is
greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives.[41] Graham vs. State[42] positively acknowledged this danger. In that case
where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two police officers
prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and
whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded
from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It
ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of
police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible. [43]
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody
over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence
was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence,
in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if
only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.

A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who
came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified
for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to
whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and
marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the
seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in
court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject
items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested
and offered in court as evidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.
Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his
testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials
marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but
nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the
items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her
possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the
identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony
of Gallineraand Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect,
there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it
failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but
inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the two filled
sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.

Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the
search and seizure was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to be
so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers
from the commencement of the search of petitioners house until the submission of
the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of
the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to
the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he
posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of petitioners house in
order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic
can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an
errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that he
would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two
filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner

returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able to witness the
conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.
It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed
to him the items to be searched including the pillow from which the two filled
sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human behavior that
petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal
drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the search
of Sheilas body was brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises
serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police
officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the
attention of the members of petitioners household away from the search being
conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be
omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternons suspicious presence in the
bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of these
circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecutions
claim of regularity in the exercise of duty.
Moreover, Section 21[44] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165
clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a
language too plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the officer
acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the
photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the
warrant has been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited
from him that at the close of the search of petitioners house, he brought the seized
items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of making a true
inventory thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could
not be made in petitioners house when in fact the apprehending team was able to
record and mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure
receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity
to cause the issuance of the warrant which means that it has had as much time to
prepare for its implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules
would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same cannot benefit the
prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternons course of
action.
Likewise, Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a
departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be
immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the
same,[45] as required by Rule 126, Section 12[46] of the Rules of Court. People
v. Go[47] characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties. [48] Thus, as a
reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo[49] declared that the approval by the
court which issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain
the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain

possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency. [50] Mere
tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right
because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby
defeats the very purpose for the enactment. [51]
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and
normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure
custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly
misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth.[52] Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. [53] In the present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule
is invariable whatever maybe the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes
his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. [54] In dubio pro reo. When
moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006
affirming with modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court
ofSorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying
reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y
Lopez isACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately
released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and
to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.

ROSE AOAS Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated February 22, 2002,
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22439 affirming the conviction of petitioner of the crime of theft, and the
Resolution[2] dated September 3, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of October, 1992 in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another,
with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, eighteen (18) sacks of red and white beans, all valued
at P24,720.00 belonging to NATY MADON-EP, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the
aforementioned amount of TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (P24,720.00),
Philippine Currency.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: private complainant and barangay tanodGregorio Garcia. As
summarized by the Court of Appeals, the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
Private complainant Naty Madon-ep testified that she is a businesswoman engaged in the buy and sell of
assorted seeds such as white beans, red beans, black beans, mongo beans, peas, peanuts andmalagkit rice.
She owns four (4) stalls in the city market of Baguio. One of these stalls is located at no.1, mongo section.
The other three stalls namely: Stalls, A, B, and C are located at the muslim section of the said city market.
Stalls A and B with mezzanines are adjacent to each other. Upon the other hand, stall C which has also a
second floor is located at the back of the stall owned by Laila Saguid. She uses the mezzanines of stalls A, B
and C as storeroom/bodega for sacks of beans. The ground floor of stall B was being occupied/rented by
Henry Saguid. As to stall A, she occupied a portion of the ground floor thereof together with Miling and Janet
Gavino who were engaged in the buy and sell of gold and broken jewelry. Adjacent to her stall is the stall of
the accused-appellant which has also a mezzanine, and used by the accused-appellant as her business store
for selling and buying gold and broken jewelry. Sometime in 1992, the accused-appellant removed the
partition wall separating the mezzanines without her consent, claiming that she would convert her own
mezzanine floor to a restaurant. Despite demand to restore the said partition wall, the accused- appellant
refused. On October 16, 1992, when she arrived at her stall at the mongo section, she noticed that there
were red and white beans scattered in front of the stall of the accused-appellant and at the parking space of
the rice section. When she reported the matter to the authorities, it was discovered that there were also
scattered beans inside the ground floor and mezzanine of the stall of the accused-appellant. Later, she found
out that her 18 sacks of beans stored at the mezzanine of her stall A, worth P24,000.00, more or less, were
missing. Upon inquiry from the persons in the city market she was informed by a certain Gregorio Garcia
that the accused-appellant was the culprit.
Gregorio Garcia testified that he is a barangay tanod assigned at the rice section of the city market of
Baguio. On October 2, 1992, at around 8:30-9:00 in the evening, he saw the accused-appellant together
with her two daughters at the end of the rice section leading towards the buko section. The accusedappellant told him that they were going to fix their stall. Thereafter, he saw the accused-appellant open the
door of her stall and bring out one sack of beans and loaded the same inside the jeep with the help of its
driver. On October 12, 1992, at around 8:00 in the evening, while he was 10 meters away behind the jeep,
he again saw the accused-appellant, together with Brenda Sabado, bringing out five sacks of beans from her
stall and likewise loaded them in a vehicle with the assistance of a male driver. Thereafter, the accusedappellant and Sabado boarded the jeep and left, but before leaving, Sabado gave him P15.00 for his coffee.
On October 15, 1992 at about 8:30-9:00 in the evening, he again met the accused-appellant in front of the
Dimalanta Grocery, which is located at the right side of the rice section of the city market. The accusedappellant asked him if he saw a jeepney, to which he answered no. He then went and stayed at the side of
the Dimalanta Grocery and took a cup of coffee, while the accused-appellant walked towards the direction of
Tiong San Bazaar. After he finished his coffee and while walking towards the rice section opposite the
bakery, he saw a jeep leaving loaded with sacks of beans. Inside the said jeep he saw the accused-appellant
seated at the back thereof and another female companion seated in front with the driver. He knew that the

sacks loaded in the jeep were sacks of beans because he was just thirty (30) meters away and the place
was heavily lighted. He knew the size of the beans sacks. [3]
For the defense, petitioner and witness Imelda Bautista presented their evidence, as follows:
[Rose Aoas] testified that she is a businesswoman engaged in the buy and sell of gold and broken jewelry.
She was occupying stall No. 9 at the muslim section of the city market of Baguio adjacent to the stalls of
Anita Fermin and Janet Gavino. The second floor of her stall was being used as storage for empty bottles by
her friend Imelda Bautista who was engaged in selling mongo beans and peanut butter. While the ground
floor thereof was sometimes used by said Imelda Bautista in the afternoon for storing her goods, she
removes the same in the morning and sells them at her own stall. She admitted that the private complainant
Naty Madon-ep has a stall adjacent to her own stall and that she removed the partition wall dividing their
mezzanines thereof but with the consent of the private complainant. She removed the said partition because
she intended to convert her mezzanine/second floor to a canteen but the same did not materialize. She
admitted to have seen prosecution witness Gregorio Garcia thrice. First was on October 2, 1992, when she
and her son dropped by the city market to check on her stall. Second, on October 12, 1992, while she was
at the city market because she helped her friends Ronda Sabado and Noli Chamos transport the sacks of
mongo and peanuts which the latter bought from Imelda Bautista. The third time she saw witness Gregorio
Garcia was on October 15, 1992 at around 8:00 in the evening along Dimalanta, Magsaysay Avenue, while
she was on her way to Helens Restaurant located at Abanao Street to meet some of her friends.
Defense witness Imelda Bautista narrated that she was engaged in the business of selling mongo beans and
peanut butter. Every afternoon she kept her goods at the ground floor of the stall of the accused-appellant
located at the muslim section of the city market of Baguio. She was the one occupying the second
floor/mezzanine of the stall of the accused-appellant and uses the same as her storage/storeroom for empty
bottles of peanut butter. On October 12, 1992, she (witness) sold beans to Ronda Sabado, covered by an
ordinary handwritten receipt.[4]
On November 10, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused Aoas of theft and
hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 4 years,
9 months and 10 days of prision correctional medium, as minimum, to 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of
prision mayor, medium, as maximum, and to return to the complainant Madon-ep the 18 sacks of beans
stolen, or to pay the value of said sacks of beans in the amount of P24,720.00 if the same can no longer be
returned.
Costs against the accused.[5]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Hence, this petition for review raising the following assignment of errors:
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
SAID DECISION OF CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION THAN THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED
AND HER WITNESS.[6]

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are the following:
(1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things.[7] Petitioner contends that these elements of the crime of theft were not proven and, therefore, she
deserves to be acquitted.

We agree.
Considering that there is no direct evidence pointing to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the trial
court relied solely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact
or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience,
observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the
facts sought to be proved. In order that conviction be had, the following must concur:
1.

There is more than one circumstance;

2.

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

3.

The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly
proved must be consistent with one other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with
accuseds guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.[8] The circumstances must be proved, and not
themselves presumed.[9]The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has
committed the offense.
To the appellate court, the following make up the web of circumstantial evidence against petitioner:
First, it was established that at around 8:30-9:00 in the evening of October 15, 1992, the accusedappellant was seen within the vicinity or in front of the Dimalanta Grocery located at the right side of the
rice section of the city market. The stall of the accused-appellant, as well as that of the private complainant,
are within the vicinity of the city market and near the rice section. Second, the accused-appellant asked the
prosecution witness Garcia regarding the whereabouts of a certain jeepney. Thereafter, the accusedappellant was seen seated inside the back portion of a jeepney which was loaded with sacks of beans leaving
the said city market. Third, at about 5:00 in the morning of October 16, 1992, it was found that beans were
scattered not only in front of the stall of the accused-appellant but likewise inside its ground floor and
mezzanine. Scattered beans which were similar to the beans owned and stolen from the private complainant
were likewise discovered at the parking space of the city market. Fourth, on two previous occasions the
accused-appellant was seen within the vicinity of the city market at around 8:00-9:00 in the evening taking
out sacks of beans. Finally, the prosecution witness positively identified accused-appellant during the trial
as the person bringing out, with the assistance of somebody, sacks of beans on three (3) evenings, and
while seated at the back portion of the jeepney loaded with sacks of beans. It need not be stressed that the
presence of prosecution witness Garcia in the vicinity and her having seen him were admitted by the
accused-appellant. She also admitted having removed the partition between her stall and that of the private
complainant at the mezzanine floor.[10]
After a careful review, we find that the aforesaid circumstantial evidence does not pass this test of moral
certainty as to warrant petitioners conviction. Complainant testified that 18 sacks of beans which she stored
in the mezzanine of her stall were missing. She discovered the loss in the morning of October 16, 1992
when she saw red and white beans scattered on the floor in front of her stall and that of petitioner.[11] She
accused herein petitioner as the culprit after being informed by barangay tanod Gregorio Garcia that he saw
petitioner in the evening of October 15 riding in a jeepney loaded with sacks of beans. [12] Garcia alleged that
he was only 30 meters away from the jeepney and the place was sufficiently lighted, enough for him to
recognize that the sacks loaded in the jeepney contained beans. [13]
It behooves the Court to see how petitioners guilt was logically inferred from Garcias testimony which was
not corroborated. Whether the sacks loaded in the jeepney contained beans, and if so, whether these beans
belonged to private complainant were not proven. Where the sacks of beans came from was not explained

since Garcia admitted that he did not actually see petitioner load the sacks of beans into the jeepney.[14] He
stated that he merely met petitioner in the evening of October 15 in front of the Dimalanta Grocery, when
petitioner asked him for the whereabouts of the jeepney. Thereafter, he saw petitioner seated inside the
jeepney as it was leaving the market vicinity. In pointing to petitioner, Garcia cited the two previous
occasions, October 2 and 12, 1992, when he encountered petitioner loading sacks of beans in the jeepney.
We do not agree with the appellate court that this circumstance should form part of the unbroken chain
and incriminate petitioner of the crime. Complainant testified that she bought her 18 sacks of beans from a
provincemate from Bontoc. The goods arrived on October 14 and were stored in the mezzanine, and
complainant noticed the loss 2 days thereafter or on October 16. [15] Obviously, the sacks of beans brought
out by petitioner on October 2 and 12 were not the objects of the alleged crime.
The defense proffered an explanation which, unfortunately, was not given credence. Defense witness Imelda
Bautista testified that she was also engaged in the buying and selling of beans. Her goods were also kept at
the second floor/mezzanine of petitioners stall. Petitioner testified that she brought out sacks of beans from
her stall because one Ronda Sabado bought them from Imelda Bautista. [16] There being no direct evidence of
petitioners culpability, this explanation could have sufficiently created reasonable doubt about petitioners
guilt.
The fact that beans were scattered on the floor inside and in front of the stall of petitioner and in the parking
lot does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that petitioner is the perpetrator of the crime. This cannot be
equated with the principle of law that a person in possession or control of stolen goods is presumed to be
the author of the larceny.[17] Absent proof of any stolen property in the possession of a person, as in the case
at bar, no presumption of guilt can arise. Instead, the constitutional presumption of innocence should prevail
in petitioners favor.[18] As to who caused those beans to be scattered inside and in front of the stall of
petitioner was not proven. Furthermore, it is not farfetched that those scattered beans could have belonged
to Imelda Bautista who also stored beans in the stall of petitioner. It must be noted that the place is a
market, a public place where people come and go. Presumably, the complainant is not the only vendor in the
market selling beans.
The removal of the partition wall in the mezzanine is also of no moment. Petitioner admitted that she
removed the partition wall in September 1992 because she intended to use the space to sell coffee.
[19]
Notably, the partition was removed much earlier than the date of the alleged commission of the crime in
October 1992, and it would simply be conjectural to suppose that this was part of petitioners alleged
scheme to stash away the sacks of beans. There should be more proof presented to show petitioners
alleged complicity in the crime. Conviction must rest on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and
not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [20]
The prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked completely discount the possibility that
persons other than petitioner could have perpetrated the crime. Thus, where the proven facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the
other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the
accused. [21]
We find that the conviction of petitioner does not pass the test of moral certainty. When inadequate and
uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. [22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of theft.
people vs. sara
Facts:
On August 2, 1930, Francisco Sara was out to shoot birds. At the sameGabriel Catapang and his wife
Ruperta Mendoza were out collecting bananas. Agunshot was heard and hit Gabriel Catapang. The gunshot
came from Francisco Sarahitting Gabriel in the right lower part of the abdomen. Death followed as a result
of the wound. The accused contended, seeing a bird sitting on the tree, raised his

gunintending to shoot when Gabriel Catapang approached and asked that he bepermitted to shoot the bird,
at the same time seizing the barrel of the gun and pullingit around towards his own body. As the accused at
this moment has his finger on thetrigger, the weapon was discharge and Gabriel receives the load at his
abdomen.Upon seeing Gabriel fall, he seized with fright and ran away.
Issue:Whether or not Francisco Sara if guilty of homicide?
Held:No. The killing was not intentionally committed thus the Supreme Court heldthat the homicide should
be attributed at least to the reckless and imprudent act of the accused in handling and discharging the
weapon in his hands. Therefore,
theaccused is not guilty of homicide but instead guilty of homicide by recklessimprudence

October 17, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
Torres, J.:
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the
municipality of Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a
jueteng game which, according to the information lodged, was being conducted in
that place; but before the said officer arrived there the players, perhaps advised of
his approach by a spy, left and ran away; however, on his arrival at a vacant lot the
defendant there found Francisco Dato and, at a short distance away, a low table.
After a search of the premises he also found thereon a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37
bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material proof that
the game was being played, he refrained from arresting them, and on leaving the
place only arrested Francisco Daro, who had remained there.
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a
memorandum containing the following statement: In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a
jueteng na bilat game, seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the cabecillas Maximo
MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw the two
cabecillas escape.
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a
complaint in the court of justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and
Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a
result of this complaint the accused were arrested, but were afterwards admitted to
bail.
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two accused,
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial
the chief of police presented the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres
Pablo, who testified under oath that on the date mentioned he and Tomas de Leon
went to the said barrio to raid a jueteng game, but that before they arrived there
they saw from afar that some persons started to run toward the hills; that when
witness and his companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw Francisco Dato and a
low table there, and the table caused them to suspect that a jueteng game was
being carried on; that in fact they did find on one side of the lot a tambiolo and 37
bolas, but that they did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot, nor
did they see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these
latter were the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information
given him by an unknown person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who
made the arrest and of the other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted

the defendants Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco
Dato, as a gambler.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman Andres
Pablo had an interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the
house of Valentin Sioson. On this occasion he was instructed not to testify against
Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received through Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5.
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the
provincial fiscal, on December 1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury, under the
provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an extract from the
complaint:
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres Pablo, during the
hearing in the justice of the peace court of Balanga of the criminal cause No. 787,
entitled the United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, for violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga, did, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously affirm and swear in legal form before the justice of the peace court
as follow: `We did not there overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo
Malicsi, nor did we even see them run, the said statement being utterly false, as
the accused well knew that it was, and material to the decision of the said criminal
cause No. 787, United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi. An act
committed with violation of law.
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered judgment
therein sentencing the defendant to the penalty of two years imprisonment, to pay
a fine of P100 and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The defendant was also disqualified from
thereafter holding any public office and from testifying in the courts of the Philippine
Islands until the said disqualification should be removed. From this judgment he
appealed.
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen Andres
Pablo and Tomas de Leon arrived at the place where the jueteng was being played,
they found the defendant gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing
of the case in the justice of the peace court, Malicsi and Rodrigo ordered him to call
Andres Pablo, who, together with witness, went to the house of Valentin Sioson,
where they held a conference; that witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace
court, in fulfillment of his part of an agreement made between himself and his two
coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo, who promised him that they would support his
family during the time he might be a prisoner in jail; that Andres Pablo did not know
that they were gamblers, because he did not find them in the place where the game
was in progress, but that when witness was being taken to the municipal building by

the policemen he told them who the gamblers were who had run away and whom
Andres Pablo could have seen.
Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated that, on the
arrival of the policemen who made the arrest and while they were looking for the
tambiolo, he succeeded in escaping; that Andres Pablo had known him for a long
time and could have arrested him had he wished to do so; that prior to the hearing
he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and Dato, did in fact meet in the house of
Valentin Sioson, on which occasion they agreed that they would give the policemen
Andres Pablo P20, provided witness and Rodrigo were excluded from the charge;
and that only P15 was delivered to the said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. This
statement was corroborated by the latter, though he said nothing about what
amount of money he delivered to the policeman Pablo.
The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked by the
justice of the peace how he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo,
he replied that he did not see them at the place where the game was being
conducted nor did he see them run away from there, for he only found the table, the
tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco Dato; that he did not surprise the game because
the players ran away before he arrived on the lot where, after fifteen minutes
search, he found only the tambiolo and the bolas; that on arriving at the place
where the game was played, they found only Francisco Dato and some women in
the Street, and as Dato had already gone away, witness companion, the policeman
Tomas de Leon, got on his bicycle and went after him; and that he found the
tambiolo at a distance of about 6 meters from a low table standing on the lot.
From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres Pablo, who
pleaded not guilty, falsely testified under oath in the justice of the peace court of
Balanga, Bataan, in saying he had not seen the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi
and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where, according to the complaint filed, the game
of jueteng was being played and where the defendant and his companion, the
policeman Tomas de Leon, had found a table, tambiolo and bolas, used in the game
of jueteng, while it was proved at the trial that he did not them and did overtake
them while they were still in the place where the game was being played. But
notwithstanding his having seen them there, upon testifying in the cause
prosecuted against these men and another for gambling, he stated that he had not
seen them there, knowing that he was not telling the truth and was false to the oath
he had taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his agreement
with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a bribe of P15 which he
had received in payment for his false testimony he afterwards gave.
Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the policeman
Andres Pablo undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the
charge and from his testimony in consideration for P15 which he received through
Gregorio Ganzon.

Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted
under Act No. 1697, which (according to the principle laid down by this court in
various decisions that are already well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions
contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false testimony.
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the Administrative
Code, or Act No. 2657, there was repealed, among the other statutes therein
mentioned, the said Act No. 1697 relating to perjury, and the repealing clause of the
said Administrative Code does not say under what other penal law in force the crime
of false testimony, at least, if not that of perjury, shall be punished.
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony go
unpunished, and is there no penal sanction whatever in this country for this crime?
May the truth be freely perverted in testimony given under oath and which, for the
very reason that it may save a guilty person from punishment, may also result in
the conviction and punishment of an innocent person? If all this is not possible and
is not right before the law and good morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it
must be acknowledged that it is imperatively necessary to punish the crime of
perjury or of false testimony a crime which can produce incalculable and farreaching harm to society and cause infinite disturbance of social order.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by
a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common
will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the
necessity for its existence has been recognized even by the most backward peoples.
At times the criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous,
and atrocious; at other, that they are light and inadequate to the nature and gravity
of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is admitted to be just by the whole
human race, and even barbarians and savages themselves, who are ignorant of all
civilization, are no exception.
Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its
decisions, was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal
Code relating to false testimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not
expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code; and as the said final article of
the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly
provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed, the will of
the legislation not being expressly and clearly stated with respect to the complete
or partial repeal of the said articles of the Penal Code, in the manner that it has
totally repealed the said Act No. 1697 relating its perjury; and, furthermore, as it is
imperative that society punish those of its members who are guilty of perjury or

false testimony, and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go unpunished
or be freely committed without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded that
there must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or
false testimony.
There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7 et
seq. of Title 2, third Partida.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has
been punished under the said articles of the said Code, which as we have already
said, have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its
enactment, have not been applied, by the mere interpretation given to them by this
court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was repealed by the
Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said
articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative
Code, in repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that
the said articles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of
false testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book
3, of the Novisima Recopilacion which says::
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must
be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for the
Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in numerous laws, and so also have I
ordered on different occasions, and even though they were repealed, it is seen that
they have been revived by the decree which I issued in conformity with them
although they were not expressly designated. The council will be informed thereof
and will take account of the importance of the matter.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are
properly applicable to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in consideration of the
fact that in the case at bar the evidence shows it to have been duly proven that the
defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause prosecuted for gambling at
jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of favoring the alleged gamblers,
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravating circumstance of the
crime being committed through bribery, for it was also proved that the defendant
Pablo received P15 in order that he should make no mention of the said two
gamblers in his sworn testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we
hold that, in the commission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the
aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no
mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore
the defendant has incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from and
sentence Andres Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and one day of
prision correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed one-third
of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result .

People vs. Flores

Facts: Accused-appellant, Lyndon Flores did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
treachery assaulted and kicked the vital parts of the victim Manuel Lazarte y Malvar. He was
convicted of murder by the trial court after proving his guilt and sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua. The accused had an altercation with the victim's mother Emperatriz Lazarte regarding a
cassette belonging to the former. Afterwards, the accused kicked Ato Lazarte twice in his stomach as
the victim was lying unconscious in the pavement. The accused denied of having kicked the victim
as he asserts that he merely touched with his right foot. In his petition, accused-appellant that the
crime committed is homicide not murder.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed was murder?

Held: The crime was murder qualified by treachery. An attack upon a victim who was unconscious,
thus could not have put up a defense whatsoever is treacherous. Article 14 No. 16 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tends directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party may make. However the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed (Article 13 No. 3) should be appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant. His
intention was merely to inflict injuries on the victim. Hence the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
reduced to reclusion temporal in it's maximum period.
RTC decision AFFIRMED with modification