1

People vs. Purisima

Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar. Several
informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the acc used of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the
defense filed motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed
their own orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not
allege facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential
element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accuseds residence of a bladed,
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks
to maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms
of lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished
from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in
particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the
weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not
necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an
action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of
statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is
enough.
Issue:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of Illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?
Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it
must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is
to penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness,
rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies
the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts
or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
The petition is DISMISSED.

US vs. Hart (GR 8848)

Intrinsic Aid - PUNCTUATION EMPLOYED
FACTS:

Hart, Miller, and Natividad were found guilty in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on a
charge of vagrancy. All appealed. Evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows
that he pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge about 2-3 weeks before his
arrest on the vagrancy charge. Hart had been conducting two gambling games, one in his
saloon and in another house. Each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or
business.
Sec. 1 of Act No. 519 divided into 7 clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause
enumerates a certain calls of person who, within the meaning of this statute, are to be
considered as vagrants. Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the
physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling housed, or tramping or
straying through the country without visible means of support;
ISSUE:
Whether or not without visible means of support" apply to every person found loitering about
saloons or dram shops
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to
ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that the construction of the statute
which will give it effect. The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more
substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of the statute
gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be
used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as
thus punctuated.
But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not
hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the Act thee ffect intended by the
Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where
necessary.
HELD:
A most important step in this reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the
consequences flowing from such a construction of the law.
1. What is loitering? It is idling or wasting ones time. 2. The time spent in saloons, dram shops,
and gambling houses is seldom anything but that. 3. If visible means of support does not apply
to every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, practically
all who frequent such places commit a crime of vagrancy. 4. Vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519
is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and harmful parasites of the
society. 5. That the visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under these
statutes to a conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not
even negatived by the punctuation employed. For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted.
Paras v. COMELEC
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall
election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election
was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be
considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.
(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the
phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there
will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court
assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.
ACTING COMM. OF CUSTOMS v. MERALCO
SUMMARY: CTA reversed the determination of the acting Customs Commissioner
that Meralcos importation of insulating oil shall be subject to special import tax. CTA ruled that
under Sec 8 of RA 1394, and Par 9 Part 2 of Meralcos charter, it is expressly excluded from the
imposition of all kinds of taxes. SC held that it is in no position to review the findings of fact of
the CTA as it recognizes the expertise of the same.
DOCTRINE: Only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of evidence, are reviewable by the
Supreme Court
FACTS:
1. Acting Commissioner of Customs, Noberto Romualdez Jr, determined that the respondent
MERALCO is not exempt from the payment of the special import tax under RA 1394 for the
shipment of its insulating oil.
2. This was brought to the Court of Tax Appeal where it reversed the determination of
Romualdez. It held that it is exempt from the special import tax by virtue of Sec 8 of RA 1394
which exempts equipments and spare parts for the use in industries, and also under Par 9 Part
two of Meralcos franchise there it expressly states that insulators, among others, are exempt
from the imposition of taxes. Effectively, the said paragraph 9 exempts it from all taxes of
whatever nature, and by whatever authority, with
respect
to
its
insulators
in
consideration for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross earnings.
3. Thus review was filed.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Supreme Court is bound by the findings of fact of the Court of tax appeal - YES
RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. It is a well-settled principle that the Court is bound by the finding of facts of the CTA, only
questions of law is open to it for determination. The facts ascertained above cannot be
disturbed. There is a categorical assertion that where the question is one of fact, it is
no longer reviewable. It is a recognition of the wide discretion enjoyed by the CTA. It is
unadvisable to the Court to set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the CTA
which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration
of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has
been an abuse or improvement
exercise of its authority.
SUBSTANIAL PART:
1. It is true that in construction of tax statutes, tax exemptions are not favored in the law as the
principle of strictissimi juris applies, HOWEVER, it is equally a recognized principly that where
the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the courts
seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.

2. It is explicitly expressed in the law that insulators of Meralco is exempted from any kind of
taxes. CTA also shows that insulating oil falls under the classification of insulators as the
purpose is the same, which is: for cooling as well as for insulating machines.
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village vs
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO
G.R. No. 109404, January 22, 1996
Facts:
Prospero Palmiano on installment basis from Eugenio, the petitioner, and his coowner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. He started
to default on amortization payments beginning May 1975 due to the petitioners nondevelopment of the said lots. Further, the petitioner sold one of the two lots to Rodolfo and
Adelina Relevo upon Palmianos cease of payment.
Eugenio then filed a petition to set aside the decision of the respondent which affirmed the order
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to immediately refund to the complainantappellant Prospero Palmiano all payments made thereon, plus interests c omputed at legal rates
from date of receipt hereof until fully paid." Petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in
applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village
justified private respondent's non-payment of his amortizations. Further, the petitioner avers that
inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of
P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the transaction.
Issue:
WON Executive Secretary Drilon showed a grave abuse in discretion when he applied P.D. 957
and concluded that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified private
respondent's non-payment of his amortizations.
Held:
The respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be
given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976 given that the intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. Moreover, the preamble
of the law clearly expresses that the laws intent is to protect helpless citizens who may fall prey
to the manipulations and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers,"
suggesting that to remedy the said alarming situations, P.D. 957 should operate retrospectively
even upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment.

People v. Echavez G.R. Nos. L-47757-61. January 28, 1980

Facts:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court against 16 persons charging them with squatting, as
penalized in Presidential Decree 772. Respondent Echavez dismissed the case on the grounds
that 1) the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy and not with the use of force,
intimidation, or threat or taking advantage of the absence of the owner (as described in the
Presidential Decree); and 2) under the rule of ejusdem genernis, the decree does not apply to
the cultivation of a grazing land.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 penalizes squatting and similar acts also apply to
agricultural lands

Held: No.
Ratio:
The preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas. The complainant involves pasture lands in
rural areas. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind) does not apply to this case.
StatCon maxim:
A preamble may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law.
_______________________
Navarro v. Exec Sec
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is 120,813. Its land area
is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by
the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law
R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC
conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the
LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the
people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands
(Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of
office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R.
No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of
Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and
would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355
constitutional?
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable
Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking
into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of
its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more
than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of
basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking
at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.

Ortega vs. People

G. R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008
Facts:

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The
case was pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted
amending among others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old.
At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of majority.
Issue:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in
the resolution of the case.
Held:
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A.
No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is
evidently favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by
petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age
was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably,
petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A.
No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

Case Digest: Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Disierto

G.R. No. 146710-15
02 March 2001
FACTS:
After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the
petitioner of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and
former allies and members of the Presidents administration started resigning one by one. In a
session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed
by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate. The
impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the
President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally. On January 20, the President
submitted two letters one signifying his leave from the Palace and the other signifying his
inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioner resigned as President; and
Whether the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning

RULING:
For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long
as the resignation is clear. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged
the oath-taking of Arroyo as President; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace without the
mention of any inability and intent of reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the people; he
assured will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the
country. This is of high grade evidence of his intent to resign.
Petitioners contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court. The exact
nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against

the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against the
petitioner when he resigned.

IT IS A WELL ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WERE A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS, COURTS

MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL AS
THOSE EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE MEANING OF THE
STATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE REASONS FOR THE
PASSAGE OF THE BILL AND PURPOSES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC.,

FACTS:
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining
plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the
five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of
customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories,"
respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax (which it paid under protest).
Court procedures:
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to the
payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No.
2352, and dismissed the protest.
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the
Commissioner of Customs who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of
Customs.
On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for review of
the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30,
1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and ordered refund
of the amount of P775.62 to respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under protest.
Statutes subject of construction:
a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) title, Art. 103, Art. 102, Art. 104;
b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No. 2352 - title
ISSUE:
WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO from custom duties granted by
R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should embrace or include the special import tax
imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW).
HELD:
Yes. Petition denied.
The title of R.A. No. 1394 (Special Tax Law) indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior
statutes (all these laws dealt with the imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or
other form of levy on importation of goods into the country).
o On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387 (T he Petroleum Act), has not been
repealed (although this law had granted more concessions and tax exemption privileges than
any of the statutes that were amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394.

o The CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES saw fit to preserve the privileges granted under the
Petroleum Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to exploitation and development of the
petroleum resources of the country.
o The SC is convinced that R.A. No. 387 or the Petroleum Act of 1949 was intended to
encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources of the
country by giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d
etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources
towards the achievement of this national ec onomic goal.

MISAEL P. VERA v. HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED

MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY
(PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC. G.R. No. L-33693-94. May 31, 1979
FACTS:
Private respondents (the companies) are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
filled milk products throughout the Philippines. Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled
Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of
upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all
the other private respondents are members.
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary
injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in
relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.
The controversy arose when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue required the companies to
withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription
required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with a
warning of action if they failed.
Section of the Tax Code is as follows:
Section 169.
Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. All condensed skimmed milk and
all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or
put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers,
and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction which restrained the CIR from requiring private
respondents to print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words.
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and injunction with
a petition for preliminary injunction. Respondent-companied therein pray that the respondent
Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding from the action filed by the Philippine
Association of Nutrition for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding. That
petitoners' milk was not labeled as an imitation of cow's milk.
Both cases was heard jointly.
Respondent court held to perpetually restrain the CIR and the Fair Trade Board from requiring
respondent-companies to print on the labels on the filled milk products.
ISSUE: Whether respondent court was correct.
RULING:
Yes.
Section 169 of the Tax code has been repealed by implication. It was enacted together with
Sections 141 and 177, which were already repealed. Through it, Section 169 became a merely
declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.

It was also apparent that Section 169 does not apply to filled milk. Following ejusdem generis,
the provision specifically stated skimmed milk which implies a restriction in scope of the classes
of milk.
Cecilio de Villa vs. CA [G.R. No. 87416. April 08, 1991]
FACTS:
[P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to
Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). A
petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the
petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but the
same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and,
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is
covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
HELD:
YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
RATIO:
For the first issue: The trial courts jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be
questioned, as Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The
information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati,
Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a
criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is
that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion
on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co vs Gimenez GR No 17931 28 February 1963
Facts:
RA 2609 known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, fixed a uniform margin fee of 25%
on foreign exchange transactions. On November and December 1959 Casco Philippine
Chemical purchased urea and formaldehyde, the main ingredients in manufacturing glues, and
paid corresponding margin fees. Casco sought a refund pursuant to Section 2 RA 2609, shall
not be imposed urea formaldehyde The Bank Auditor of Central Bank did not honur the
vouchers for refund and was affirmed by the Auditor General. Respondent contend that urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product and distinctly different from urea and
formaldehyde.
Issue:
Whether or not there was error in printing of bill?
Decision:
Decision appealed from is affirmed. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill

10

before it was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation not by judicial decree.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill
would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175
SCRA 343), July 14, 1989
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on
the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229
should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due
process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O
No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far
not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of
Eminent Domain.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each
other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two

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classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it
appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform
program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both parties
agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner
agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then
it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even
so provided by RA 6657:

Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to
raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the
House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated
House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held:
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A.
No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio:

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To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can fi nd
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty
of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case
may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a
new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.