International
Journal
of
Philosophy
Study
(IJPS),
Volume
3,
2015
www.seipub.org/ijps
doi:
10.14355/ijps.2015.03.001
1
Approaching
Minoritarian
Ethics
from
Deleuze’s
Theory
of
Assemblage:
A
Proposed
Framework
Jae
Eon
Yu
*
,
Department
of
Business
Administration,
Keimyung
University
1095
Dalgubeol
‐
daero,
Daegu,
South
Korea
*
9070yu@hanmail.net
Abstract
This
paper
aims
to
propose
and
evaluate
Deleuze’s
perspective
on
social
change
in
relation
to
understand
‘humanities’
and
ethics
(what
we
refer
to
as
‘minoritarian
ethics’)
that
characterize
a
critical
discourse
on
the
nature
of
modern
civilized
society.
We
develop
a
proposed
framework
for
understanding
“control
society”
in
order
to
bring
about
changes
in
“control
society”
using
Deleuze’s
theory
of
assemblage
and
propose
Deleuze’s
theory
of
assemblage
to
map
the
process
of
social
transformation
in
terms
of
the
metaphor
of
rhizome
and
Deleuze’s
notion
of
events
as
a
new
type
of
open
system.
We
see
social
change
and
organizational
transformation
through
the
unfolding
process
of
problematization
that
allows
researchers
to
be
‘critical
thinkers’
within
‘critical
systems
practices’.
To
be
critical
thinkers,
what
is
important
for
the
process
of
problematization
that
aims
to
find
out
possible
new
assemblages
through
the
appreciation
of
minoritarian
ethics.
We
argue
that
our
proposed
framework
is
useful
towards
understanding
the
continuity
of
the
‘vitalism’
of
new
social
systems,
which
are
evolved
from
what
Foucault
terms
as
the
“critical
ontology
of
ourselves”.
Keywords
Social
Change;
Minoritarian
Ethics;
Deleuze’s
Theory
of
an
Assemblage;
Problematization
Introduction
The
paper
is
based
on
a
post
‐
structural,
theoretically
based
account
of
a
vitalist
holism.
We
explore
a
vitalist
holism
from
a
systems
science’s
perspective
and
post
‐
structuralist’s
works,
particularly
Foucault
and
Deleuze’s
works.
On
the
one
hand,
our
systems
research
is
valid
where
the
‘critical
systemic
practice’
becomes
an
issue
within
Foucault’s
critical
project
which
is
distinct
from
the
transcendental
search
for
formal
structures
of
how
social
systems
are
evolved
during
the
process
of
specific
historical
events,
which
he
calls
‘practical
systems’
(Tsouvalis,
1995:
223).
On
the
other
hand,
our
research
is
based
on
Deleuze’s
thoughts
about
the
nature
of
social
change
in
terms
of
his
theory
of
assemblage,
which
investigates
the
unfolding
process
of
how
social
systems
generate
new
assemblages
through
the
process
of
differentiation.
Deleuze’s
understanding
of
the
process
of
differentiation
is
to
appreciate
how
open,
nonlinear
and
rhizomatic
networks
or
‘meshworks’
operate
and
evolve
within
social
systems
(Deleuze
and
Guattari,
1987;
DeLanda,
2006;
Colebrook,
2010).
A
ccording
to
Deleuze
(1995),
vitalism
is
a
thought
that
seeks
to
invent
“possibilities
of
existence”
through
the
creation
of
novel
concepts.
Based
upon
Deleuze’s
thought
of
vitalism,
we
explore
the
meaning
of
Deleuze’s
theory
of
assemblage
and
how
we
can
raise
critical
ethical
questions
that
seek
out
new
values
or
‘becoming’
for
new
life
that
allows
us
to
“free
life
from
what
imprisons
it”
(Deleuze,
1995:
143).
This
is
our
proposal
as
we
investigate
the
recent
phenomena
of
social
and
organizational
complexities
from
process
‐
based
methodology
or
assemblage
‐
based
explanation
in
the
social
science
(Latour,
2005:
DeLanda,
2006).
We
understand
social
complexity
from
post
‐
structuralists’
perspective
and
recent
works
in
realist
social
ontology
(Deleuze
and
Guattari,
1987;
DeLanda,
2006).
To
do
so,
we
first
evaluate
and
appreciate
Foucault’s
research
methods
of
understanding
historical
research.
Following
Foucault’s
interpretation
of
the
nature
of
modern
society,
we
develop
Deleuze’s
theory
of
an
assemblage
as
it
operates
within
social
fields
from
social
ontological
perspectives.
Next,
we
discuss
Deleuzian
ethics
(what
we
refer
to
as
“minoritarian
ethics”)
in
order
to
make
sense
of
the
assemblage
theory
in
social
practice.
Finally,
we
conclude
with
the
usefulness
of
the
assemblage
theory
for
understand
social
change
in
the
mode
of
a
vitalist
holism
in
which
a
new
thought
for
www.seipub.org/ijps
International
Journal
of
Philosophy
Study
(IJPS),
Volume
3,
2015
2
understanding
social
complexity
is
developed
from
the
relations
of
people
and
material
world,
and
discourse
within
social
contexts.
Appreciating Foucault’s Research Methods of Understanding Historical Research
In
order
to
make
Deleuze’s
theory
of
an
assemblage
more
accessible
to
readers
who
are
not
familiar
with
his
work,
we
introduce
Foucault’s
works
on
research
methods
so
the
ideas
of
Gilles
Deleuze
can
be
facilitated
in
the
Foucauldian
sense.
Foucault’s
early
research
methods,
what
he
called
archeology
and
genealogy,
are
mainly
concerned
with
how
power
is
exercised
in
relation
to
knowledge.
Foucault
thinks
of
history
as
an
ongoing
struggle
between
different
forces
and
forms
of
power.
His
historical
research
is
concerned
with
how
subjects,
actions
and
meanings
are
shaped
by
discursive
and
non
‐
discursive
forces.
Foucault
(1977)
understands
historical
forces
with
his
interest
in
power/knowledge
relations.
It
is
interesting
to
note
that,
for
Foucault,
discourse
is
not
the
same
as
ideology.
The
term
‘discourse’
refers
to
the
way
in
which
communication,
information,
ideas
and
other
sequences
of
signs
are
exchanges
and
signified
(Schirato
et
al.,
2012:
33
‐
34).
Instead
of
using
the
term
‘ideology’
which
is
often
associated
with
what
Marxists
call
“false
consciousness”,
Foucault
is
interested
in
discursive
formation,
a
term
that
is
used
instead
of
science,
ideology
or
theory
(Foucault,
1972:
31
‐
41),
understood
as
a
set
of
shared
imperatives,
correspondences,
rules
and
relations
that
govern
the
appearance
of
statements
(énoncés)
(Schirato
et
al.,
2012:
35).
Foucault’s
later
research
methods
are
concerned
with
what
he
called
ethics
or
“the
problematizations
of
subjectivity”
(Pasquino,
1986:
102).
Foucault’s
project
of
ethics
aim
to
rebuild
the
forms
of
self
‐
reflection
of
human
behavior,
by
controlling
oneself
and
how
self
‐
control
is
integrated
into
the
practices
of
controlling
others
(Foucault,
1988a:
258).
In
this
sense,
Foucault’s
later
research
interest
shifted
from
the
relation
of
power
and
knowledge
to
ethics.
According
to
Schirato,
Danaher
and
Webb
(2012:
181),
Foucault
suggests
that
Western
society
is
civilized
through
the
Enlightenment
project.
During
the
process
of
civilization,
critique
and
ethics
function
as
the
politics
of
“humanity
in
the
minority
condition
makes
use
of
a
critical
sensibility
to
lift
this
minority
condition”
(Foucault,
2007:
48).
Foucault
understands
critique
as
a
form
of
ethical
behavior,
and
the
term
“ethics”
refers
to
the
“standards
by
which
a
community
or
particular
group
decides
to
control
its
behavior
in
order
to
make
sense
of
what
is
legitimate”
(Flew,
1983:
112).
Foucault
argues
that
the
processes
of
civilization
continually
play
through
a
constant
flow
between
the
order
or
power
and
“resistance”,
which
is
integral
to
power
relations,
and
the
domains
outside
of
power
domination.
Foucault
also
argues
that
forms
of
knowledge,
categories,
and
discourse
are
not
natural,
but
are
part
of
the
effects
of
power
(Schirato
et
al.,
2012:
49).
For
Foucault,
throughout
the
processes
of
civilization,
the
question
is
not
“what
is
the
self
or
self
‐
reflected
individual
agent?”
but
“how
it
that
the
self
is
(re)created
and
emancipated
from
the
man
of
the
human
sciences
that
supported
to
advance
the
process
of
civilization?”
In
this
sense,
Foucault
defines
and
explores
a
fresh
domain
of
research
into
what
he
calls
‘governmentality’
(Foucault,
1988b).
According
to
Foucault
(1977),
from
the
sixteenth
century
on,
there
has
been
an
increase
in
the
institutionalization
of
different
aspects
of
government
in
Western
society,
and
of
the
productive
power
associated
with
sustaining
the
reason
of
state
and
of
the
security
of
the
emerging
nation
‐
state
of
Europe.
This
phenomenon
is
what
Foucault
views
as
modern
governmentality.
A
good
example
of
modern
governmentality
is
the
role
of
political
economy
that
functions
as
a
control
mechanism
for
governing
the
population
in
Western
societies.
Foucault’s
work
on
governmentality
adds
to
our
understanding
that
power
is
diffused
from
a
closed
space
of
disciplinary
institutions
(e.g.,
prison,
army
and
school)
to
a
more
open
space
of
general
society.
This
new
type
of
power
becomes
a
significant
factor
in
producing
what
Deleuze
(1992a)
calls
“control
societies”,
which
operate
through
continuous
control
and
instant
communication.
Within
such
control
societies,
one
governs
oneself
and
“becomes
detached
both
from
power
as
relation
between
forces,
and
from
knowledge
as
a
stratified
form
or
the
‘code’
of
virtue”
(Deleuze,
1988:
100).
By
telling
the
truth
about
their
sexuality,
individuals
became
the
object
of
knowledge
both
to
themselves
and
to
others.
Foucault
(1988b)
terms
the
conjoined
effects
to
these
two
‘technologies’
or
“techniques
of
the
self”
and
“governmentality”.
On
the
other
hand,
games
of
truth
are
the
discursive
conditions
that
determine
the
self
and
others
of
the
subject’s
relation
to
both
the
wider
socio
‐
cultural
field
(Schirato
et
al.,
2012:
185).
Foucault
(1997;
2007)
identifies
the
Enlightenment
project
as
the
‘civilizing
process’
whereby
what
he
calls
‘critical
attitude’
develops
from
the
creation,
dissemination
and
deployment
of
historically
specific
ideas,
imperatives
and
(ethical)
dispositions
that
come
to
contribute
or
constitute
a
particular
grid
of
International
Journal
of
Philosophy
Study
(IJPS),
Volume
3,
2015
www.seipub.org/ijps
3
intelligibility.
In
this
way,
Foucault
sees
that
discourses
(or
ideologies)
and
ethics
that
characterize
a
specific
discursive
regime
constitute
the
subject
who
questions
and
makes
a
‘problem’,
and
so,
to
question
norms
and
ethics
is
to
bring
challenges
to
the
truth
and
sustainability
of
the
self
(Schirato
et
al.,
2012:
187).
In
short,
Foucault’s
pursuit
of
ethics
presupposes
both
action
and
knowledge,
which
require
not
only
thought,
but
also
an
examination,
of
reflexivity
and
testing
of
the
self
in
relation
to
the
wider
context
of
the
socio
‐
cultural
contexts.
Understanding Deleuze’s Notion of Assemblage
Over
the
time
that
philosophy
of
social
science
has
progressed,
social
research
has
made
a
great
effort
to
think
about
the
nature
of
social
research
in
organizational
and
social
contexts.
Gilles
Deleuze
was
what
Foucault
(1970:
367)
described
as
“a
lightning
storm
was
produced
which
will
bear
the
name
of
Deleuze”,
and
what
Foucault
says,
“perhaps
one
day
this
century
will
be
known
as
Deleuzian”
(Foucault,
1970:
343).
Deleuze
was
a
philosopher
who
posed
the
question
of
what
is
thinking
or
what
is
to
think,
questioning
the
conventional
way
of
knowing
and
thinking,
the
‘images’
which
constitutes
our
thought
(Boundas,
1993:
1
‐
23).
Looking
at
the
nature
of
society
from
a
new
image
of
thought,
Deleuze
proposed
a
theory
of
an
assemblage
that
can
apply
to
a
wide
variety
of
wholes
constructed
from
heterogeneous
parts
or
entities
(DeLanda,
2006).
These
entities
range
from
molecules
to
biological
organisms,
interpersonal
networks,
institutional
organizations,
cities,
and
social
justice
movements,
all
of
which
are
“assemblages
of
several
networked
communities”,
and
even
biological
organisms
are
treated
as
assemblages
(DeLanda,
2006:
5
‐
11).
Deleuze
and
Guattari
(1987)
have
developed
a
theory
of
an
assemblage
that
is
applied
to
social
entities,
but
the
very
fact
that
“it
cuts
across
the
nature
‐
culture
divide
is
evidence
of
its
realist
credentials”
(DeLanda,
2006:
3).
Understanding
the
modern
society
as
Deleuze’s
notion
of
an
assemblage,
we
should
notice
that
individuals
are
controlled
by
the
society
in
the
way
in
which
Foucault
(1981:
94)
discussed,
power
conceived
as
a
strategy
or
network
of
relations
that
exercised
through
institutions.
Foucault
stresses
how
power
can
be
productive
and
positive
force
that
is
constantly
sustained
and
changed
by
social
and
discursive
practices.
In
discursive
practice,
knowledge
and
discourse
are
material
practices
in
which
power
relations
produce
reality
or
material
practices,
and
power
can
be
transformed
into
a
source
of
condition
that
influences
the
current
state
of
the
discursive
formation
in
local
and
contingent
contexts.
In
this
sense,
power
is
mobile
and
contingent,
and
it
is
not
a
property
possessed
by
an
individual
or
a
group.
Put
differently,
power
is
created
and
maintained
with
an
objective
form
of
knowledge
that
is
contingent
on
a
set
of
material
practices.
Power
can
be
conceptualized
as
a
commodity
which
circulates
and
functions
in
the
form
of
a
network
or
a
strategy.
Foucault
understands
that
power
is
always
both
productive
and
disruptive
in
the
sense
that
power
relations
produce
a
series
of
transformations,
movements
and
responses
that
are
sometimes
radical
and
dramatic.
The
French
and
Russian
Revolutions
are
good
examples
of
the
productive
and
disruptive
features
of
power
(Schirato
et
al.,
2012:
50
‐
63).
Interestingly,
Deleuze’s
theory
of
an
assemblage
is
based
on
the
“image
of
thought”
that
aimed
at
creating
a
life
that
takes
place
within
a
“metaphysical
surface”
or
“plane
of
immanence”
(Deleuze,
2005).
In
the
terms
of
Foucault,
it
is
like
the
virtual
existence
of
the
fields
of
statements
(énoncés)
(Foucault,
1972:
44
‐
55).
Upon
the
fields
of
statements,
the
life
of
the
individual
gives
way
to
an
impersonal
and
singular
life
that
transforms
into
a
pure
event
as
the
virtual
existence
of
an
individual
order
which
controls
the
space
of
discourse.
Then,
there
is
a
possibility
of
the
duality
of
things
and
propositions,
of
bodies
and
languages
through
the
existence
of
a
‘plane
of
immanence’
(Deleuze,
1990:
125).
During
the
process
of
making
or
becoming
an
assemblage
in
social
fields
through
nonlinear
causality,
casual
relations
must
be
characterized
as
productive;
that
is,
a
relation
in
which
one
event
(the
cause)
makes
or
produces
another
event
(the
effect)
within
a
metaphysical
surface
(DeLanda,
2006:
20).
In
short,
a
series
of
events
takes
place
to
make
an
assemblage
within
social
fields
(Deleuze,
1990).
Seeing the Process of Becoming Assemblage As An Open System
In
systems
sciences
and
sociology,
an
organismic
model
of
an
open
system
achieved
great
prominence
in
the
late
nineteenth
century.
The
basic
assumption
in
the
organismic
metaphor
is
what
we
may
call
relation
of
interiority,
which
means
“the
component
parts
are
constituted
by
the
very
relations
they
have
to
other
parts
in
the
whole”
Puaskan Keingintahuan Anda
Segala yang ingin Anda baca.
Kapan pun. Di mana pun. Perangkat apa pun.
Tanpa Komitmen. Batalkan kapan saja.