PATROL TIPS III; AUSTRALIAN

AUSTRALIA

MILNE BAY, NEW GUINEA, WWII

In the early stages of WWII, the Japanese seemed utterly unstoppable, steam rolling over
Allied forces seemingly at will...Pearl Harbor, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Dutch East
Indies, Wake Island, Burma, the Philippines. During the wicked, bloody, clawing jungle
fighting on New Guinea, it was the Australians who disproved the myth of the Japanese
“Jungle Superman” and showed that he could be stopped and defeated. These are some of
the lessons learned from those battles in hellish conditions.

Patrolling

“The side which wins the patrolling encounters wins the battles.”
(Quotation from Report on Milne Bay Operation)

General: Patrolling is a very wide term. In jungle warfare, where the lack of
communications forces the use of smaller bodies of troops, patrolling has a wider
application than ever. It is in effect the technique of moving and fighting over long
distances and for periods which may extend up to ten days or even more, of bodies of
troops up to one company. It is essential that on every occasion you must produce
superior forces against the enemy, so that you can destroy the enemy, dominate the
battlefield, however small this may be, and remain masters of it.

Therefore, if experience shows that the Jap patrols are normally 5 or 6, then yours should
be 15 or 20; if the Jap send 30 or 40, send a company. These fighting patrols have the
object of gaining “ground superiority” and this they will achieve most quickly by always
being the first to surprise the Japs.

Strength of Patrols: The strength of the patrol depends on its task. If it is a

reconnoitering patrol it should be just as big as is required and no more. It is seldom
likely to be less than one leader and two men. If, however, the patrol is likely to meet the
enemy when on the move and is likely to have to defend itself it should obviously be in
sufficient strength to do so.

Japanese Patrols are normally 30-50 men strong with a mortar detachment, i.e., a strong
Platoon. It follows that our patrols must be as strong or stronger, or else they should be so
small they can “fade” and evade the action while keeping the enemy under observation.

Planning: A patrol commander on being given his orders for his patrol must appreciate
the situation and make a plan the same as for any other operation of war. He must have
his object clearly fixed in his mind. He must remember that it is his duty to bring his
patrol fresh to the sphere of operations.

Miscellaneous: Never send a man out from a patrol on his own more than a few yards. It
is extraordinary how men get lost.

The Jungle Craft

General: The term jungle craft implies the ability of a soldier to live and fight in the
jungle; to be able to move from point-to-point and arrive at his objective fit to fight; to
use ground and vegetation to the best advantage; and be able to “melt” into the jungle
either by freezing or intelligent use of camouflage; to recognize and be able to use native
foods; and possess the
ability to erect rapidly temporary shelters to ward off tropical downpours.

Movement: There is a technique for moving in the jungle. Go slow and watch you step.
The aim should be to move silently without causing any commotion of the animals. Part
the jungle, don’t try to push through it. Use game trails wherever possible; take care to go
where you want to go, not where the game wants you to go.

Halts and Meals: Wake at dawn, drink tea and walk a couple of hours before having a
morning meal; thereafter walk until an hour before sundown, halt and cook the evening
meal. Put out the fire and then move off a mile or so and rest for the night. Do not sleep
near a track, game trail, stream, or on a ridge. These are jungle highways at night and you
may be disturbed.
Shooting: The rifle is the infantryman’s primary weapon. It is with this that he will
achieve victory. Quick decisions and timing are as important as accuracy of aim. To exert
self-control, to know when to hold one’s fire, to shoot calmly and accurately at the right
moment, are matters of great importance under conditions where a second shot is most
unlikely to be obtained after a miss. In the jungle 50-75 yards is a long shot.

For automatic weapons the general principles for employment are normally use single
shot fire, save ammunition and don’t disclose the location of your automatic weapons;
NEVER use automatic fire, unless you have a really worth while target or in the final
stages of the assault; once you have disclosed your position by the use of automatic fire,
take the first opportunity of moving to an alternative position to the flank or forward.

Jungle Infantry: It goes without saying that the men who fight in jungles must be well-
trained and well-led and must be jungle-minded. They must move in single file but must
be ready at all times to deploy and drop noiselessly out of sight. Every man must be
capable, if the need arises, of acting as an individual and being able to support himself.
Jungle warfare should be regarded as a game, healthful, interesting and thrilling; the men
should feel at home in the jungle and regard it as a friend. They must realize the absolute
necessity for jungle training as a means to defeat the Japanese who come from one of the
most highly industrialized countries in the world and have no natural advantages as
Jungle Infantry.

THE DESERT RATS, TOBRUK, WWII

During WWII German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel was running amuck with his Afrika
Korps throughout North Africa, heading for the Suez Canal, driving a battered British
army retreating before him. The only nut the combined German and Italian forces could
not crack was the port of Tobruk, held primarily by the Australian 9th Infantry Division.
Tobruk was besieged for 242 days but did not fall.

From the official Australian unit history: “…this operation order decreed that active
infantry patrolling should be carried out in all sectors with the utmost vigour, so
inaugurating that aggressive patrolling policy pursued relentlessly throughout the siege.
The garrison at once asserted its mastery over no-man’s land during the night hours and
never lost it, keeping the besiegers’ frontline infantry continually on the defensive.”
Another unofficial source described the patrolling a bit more colorfully:

“Tobruk patrols were of two types - fighting and reconnaissance. The job of the
reconnaissance patrol was to gather information and, if possible, to secure prisoners for
identification. Its members used all their bushcraft to avoid being discovered. Like
stealthy shadows, they saw without being seen. But the fighting patrol went out to fight.
Its aim was to do as much damage and to kill as many of the enemy as possible. Its
members would creep up on an enemy post, surround it and then, at a given signal, rush
in with the bayonet and kill-soundlessly. A few brief minutes of bloody, sinew-straining
work and the foray would be over, with not a shot fired.

Two typical examples of AIF offensive patrols are quoted. In the first, the raiders
crawled in single file for two miles through a minefield to attack an observation post, the
position of which had been revealed by reconnaissance patrols on the previous day.

The patrol started on its journey after midnight and was preparing for the final assault
when Very lights lit up the scene, and the enemy post opened fire with rifles and machine
guns. Five of our men then charged in with bayonets, Tommy guns, and grenades.
Despite a volley of hand grenades from the enemy, the patrol stormed on, killing 15 and
wounding many of the estimated 50 enemy before crossfire from supporting posts forced
a withdrawal. The patrol regained its own lines, suffering only slight casualties.

The second classic patrol won for its leader, Lieutenant William. Horace Noyes, the
Military Cross. With an NCO, Lieutenant Noyes stalked and destroyed three light tanks
and led a bayonet attack against the enemy garrison. His unit captured the post and
killed or wounded the garrison of 130, as well as the crews of seven machine-guns and
11 anti-tank guns and their protective infantry. It also damaged a heavy tank.”
This in-your-face, deep, and constant patrolling not only took the initiative away from the
Axis forces and kept them off-balance, it kept the Allied command precisely informed of
the identity and location of the enemy forces, while at the same time denying the
Germans and Italians any firsthand ground reconnaissance of the Allied forces, their
strength, composition, and positions. The Axis had to rely on out-dated inaccurate old
Italian maps which proved of little use. The aggressiveness of the diggers led them to
believe the defenders were stronger than they really were. Between the Aussie patrols and
the need for probing attacks to try to determine the defenses, the Germans telegraphed
every punch, and the defenders were ready and waiting for them.

Once again, the Aussies had shown the Allies that the Axis juggernaut could be stopped,
earning the respect of friend and foe alike.

Rommel himself called them, “...immensely big and powerful men, who without question
represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a fact that was also evident in
battle."

A German battalion commander wrote:

“The Australian is unquestionably superior to the German soldier:

1. in the use of individual weapons, especially as snipers
2. in the use of ground camouflage
3. in his gift of observation, and the drawing of the correct conclusions from his
observation
4. in every means of taking us by surprise. . .”

VIETNAM

Due to its unique size, location, and population, at the time of the Vietnam War,
Australian military forces operated under a strategic and tactical doctrine consisting of
five characteristics. Those characteristics sounded as if they were right out of “Proverbs
of the Light Infantry”. They were: self-reliance, mobility, logistic support, austerity and
resilience.
In Vietnam, the Aussies used the jungle counter-insurgency techniques they had learned
in Malaya and Borneo and which had proven so successful there. Their light infantry
tactics concentrated on as patrolling, searching villages without destroying them (with a
view to eventually converting them), and ambush and counter ambush.

In 1966 journalist Gerald Stone described tactics then being used by Australian soldiers
newly arrived in Vietnam:

The Australian battalion has been described …as the safest combat force in Vietnam… It
is widely felt that the Australians have shown themselves able to give chase to the
guerrillas without exposing themselves to the lethal ambushes that have claimed so many
American dead…

Australian patrols shun jungle tracks and clearings… picking their way carefully and
quietly through bamboo thickets and tangled foliage…It is a frustrating experience to
trek through the jungle with Australians. Patrols have taken as much as nine hours to
sweep a mile of terrain. They move forward a few steps at a time, stop, listen, then
proceed again."

One captured Viet Cong leader commented on the effectiveness of the Australian
approach to jungle fighting. "Worse than the Americans were the Australians. The
Americans style was to hit us, then call for planes and artillery. Our response was to
break contact and disappear if we could…The Australians were more patient than the
Americans, better guerrilla fighters, better at ambushes. They liked to stay with us
instead of calling in the planes. We were more afraid of their style.”

No-nonsense maverick officer Lt. Col. David Hackworth greatly admired the Australian
light infantry methods and thought the American Army could have learned something
from them. “The Aussies used squads to make a contact, and brought in reinforcing
elements to do the killing; they planned in the belief that a platoon on the battlefield
could do anything, including get out.”

Appropriate for light infantry who don't and won't have the industrial military hardware
to go about "re-arranging contour lines".