forum shopping did not authorize the RTC to dismiss the proceeding
without motion and hearing. Specifically, the submission of a false
court, for Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, has
been clear and forthright.
FACTS:
No. 303169 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, and for the
On December 29, 1998, Lim filed in the RTC his petition for judicial
reconstitution of TCT No. 303168 and TCT No. 303169 of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City, and for the issuance of owners duplicate copies
soon as practicable.
of land covered by the TCTs, and that he was filing the petition for the
beneficial interest of all the registered owners thereof; that the original
copies of the TCTs kept in the custody of the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City had been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the fire that
had burned certain portions of the Quezon City Hall, including the Office
June 1, 2011
of said Registry of Deeds, on July 11, 1988; that the originals of the
owners duplicates of the TCTs kept in his custody had also been lost or
destroyed in a fire that had gutted the commercial establishment located
FACTS:
at 250 Villalobos Street, Quiapo, Manila on February 24, 1998; and that
no co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees TCTs had ever been issued.
The RTC dismissed Lims petition on the basis of the LRA Report stating
that the subject titles are also applied for reconstitution of titles under
and documents including the owners copies of the titles of real properties
shopping. Lims motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Nellie and her late husband, Benjamin, from the PNB, Vigan Branch.
Hence, this appeal directly to the Court via petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismiss the petition of Lim on the
ground of forum shopping.
RULING:
No. Lim was not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual bases of
his application for the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his
petition for their judicial reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought
The RTC rendered its decision in favour of petitioner but denied their
were not identical. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve
the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must
raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does
not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.
The motu proprio dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by the
RTC although the Government did not file a motion to dismiss grounded
damages. They reasoned out that they could not then file a motion for
required certification was yet another glaring error of the RTC. A violation
1 | Page
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it dismissed
the petition stating that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by only one (Malacaba) of the many petitioners
which was contrary to the rules provided by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all the petitioners must sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping in a petition for certiorari wherein only
questions of law are involved.
HELD:
filing a petition for review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give
In the case at bench, the petitioners claim that the petition for certiorari
that they filed before the CA substantially complied with the requirements
provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules
when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do so.
Despite the opportunity given to them to make all of them sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to
comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the
earlier resolution.
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
FACTS:
Respondent Manfred De Koning obtained a loan from Metrobank worth P
2.19M. As a security, he issued a promissory note and a real estate
mortgage in favour of Metrobank over a condominium unit in Makati City.
When De Koning failed to pay despite demands, Metrobank instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the REM, where Metrobank
was the highest bidder. De Koning failed to redeem the property within
the prescribed redemption period but he nevertheless refused to turn
over the possession of the property. Metrobank then filed an ex parte
petition for a writ of possession over the foreclosed property. De Koning
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Metrobanks petition violated
Section 5 Rule 7 of the RoC which requires the attachment of a
2 | Page
pleading.
ministerial function.
Since a petition for a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
mere incident in the transfer of title over the real property which was
Metrobank attached to its petition is thus a superfluity that the lower court
RULE 7
The RTC and the CA agreed with De Koning. The CA explained that Sec
5 Rule 7 is not limited to actions, but covers any initiatory pleading that
asserts a claim for relief. Since Metrobanks petition for writ of possession
is an initiatory pleading, it must perforce be covered by this rule. Thus,
Metrobanks failure to disclose in the verification and certification the
existence of the two cases filed by De Koning rendered the petition
dismissable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is an initiatory pleading asserting a claim.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a piece of land situated in Pasig City.
Petitioner, through its chairperson and president, and ECRM Enterprises
by its proprietor, Tablante executed agreement whereby the former would
HELD: NO.
lease to the latter an area (1hectare) for period of 3 months. On the date
sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled
There are three instances when a writ of possession may be issued: (a)
in land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (b) in
judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit,
had intervened; and (c) in extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
The present case falls under the third instance.
a writ of possession may issue either (1) within the one year redemption
period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption
period, without need of a bond. In order to obtain a writ of possession, the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale must file a petition, in the form of an ex
parte motion, in the registration or cadastral proceedings of the registered
property.
Thus, after the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the
3 | Page
The instant petition stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by herein
1)
Issue:
said parcels of land without any contract of lease nor are they paying any
shopping is fatal.
demanded that respondents vacate the house they are occupying, but
despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to vacate the
same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan,
Held:
to no avail
No.
alleged that Tong is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is
only a dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to
own the said lot and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void;
petitioners are the true and lawful owners of the property in question and
by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to anybody; a case
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52676 (RTC Civil Case No. 20181)
litigated; respondent should wait for the resolution of the said action
instead of filing the ejectment case; petitioners also claimed that there
that petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the
made.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent.
Aggrieved by the above-quoted judgment, petitioners appealed the
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to
In view of the developments which have rendered the issue of the right of
ISSUE:
possession over the subject property moot and academic, the main case
Whether or not RTC erred in holding that the law authorizes an attorney-
principal, and not Ong, should have executed the certificate against
forum shopping.
the rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is the attorney-infact who instituted the action. Such circumstance constitutes reasonable
FACTS:
4 | Page
violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the
MR denied.
same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually
filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the
ejectment suit.14 In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of
the parties authorized to institute the proceedings. In the present case,
ISSUES:
(1) Is the dismissal correct? (2) Did petitioner substantially comply with
verification?
HELD:
Petitioners also aver that the certificate against forum shopping attached
the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal
to the complaint in Civil Case No. 2000(92) falsely stated that there is no
right of the plaintiff; (b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c)
other case pending before any other tribunal involving the same issues
as those raised therein, because at the time the said complaint was filed,
inclusion of Theresas co-heirs does not fall under any of the above
Civil Case No. 20181 was, in fact, still pending with the CA (CA-G.R. CV
elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action
No. 52676), where the very same issues of ejectment and physical
FACTS:
The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina, during their lifetime,
bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian 2 lots. 1st lot
defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his
has an area of 1,632 square meters, while the 2nd 3,730 sq. m. Both are
the spouses Fian, their heirs denied that their parents sold the property to
Spouses Mesina. When the spouses Mesina died, their heirs repeatedly
demanded the Heirs of Fian to vacate the lots and to turn possession
affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
over to the former, however, the latter refused. Hence, on August 8, 2005,
an action for quieting of title and damages before RTC, Branch 14, Leyte
against the Heirs of FIan, naming only Theresa Fian Yray as the
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action and gross violation
2. The allegations herein are true and correct to the best of our
of Sec 1 and 2, Rule 3. Theresa claims that neither the Heirs of Mesina
knowledge;
nor the Heirs of Fian are juridical persons authorized by law to file an
action or to be defendants. Moreover, Theresa alleged that the failure to
individually name all the heirs of the spouses Fian makes the complaint
infirm. Hence, the complaint must be dismissed.
The RTC granted the MTD and held that the comlaint stated no cause of
action. It ruled that the Heirs of Mesina and the Heirs of Fian are
neither natural nor juridical persons as contemplated by the rules. Said
heirs being unnamed could not be real parties in interest. MR was
denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ruling that all heirs of
spouses Fian are indispensable parties and should have been impleaded
5 | Page
Both the RTC and the CA found said verification defective, since the
phrase "or based on authentic records," as indicated under the second
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 7 as afore-quoted, was omitted. The
verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on
authentic records" does not make the verification defective. Notably, the
provision used the disjunctive word "or." As such, "personal knowledge"
and "authentic records" need not concur in a verification as they are to be
taken separately.
Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is
a formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are
true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances
so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance
HELD:
with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served."
YES. It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special
power of attorney is a forgery was not made under oath. However, the
RULE 8
complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale
of the subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was
Bartolome
Further, Titan did not object to the presentation of Atty. Desiderio Pagui,
who testified as an expert witness, on his Report finding that the
signature on the special power of attorney was not affixed by Manuel
based on his analysis of the questioned and standard signatures of the
latter, and even cross-examined said witness. Neither did Titan object to
the admission of said Report when it was offered in evidence by Manuel.
Where a party acted in complete disregard of or wholly overlooked
Section 8, Rule 8 and did not object to the introduction and admission of
before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by
Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and
therefore void.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good
faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney
RULE 9
REBECCA PACAA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAA
vs.
ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL U KOKSENG, LILIA TORRES,
DALLA P. ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA
December 2, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners Rebecca Pacaa-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaa, children of
RTC and CA ruling: The property, being part of the conjugal property of
Lourdes Teves Pacaa and Luciano Pacaa, filed the present case
the spouses could only be sold upon the consent of both spouses. The
against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and
Deed of Sale was invalidated because the signature of Manuel in the SPA
damages.The petitioners claimed that their family has long been known in
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manuel validly denied the genuineness and due execution
of the SPA
6 | Page
interest. This cannot be done in the present ordinary civil case but in a
special proceeding for that purpose. The CA agreed with the respondents
the SEC documents that the family business was operated in a place
other than the Pacaa residence. Thereafter, the respondents used the
answer: 1) the petitioners are not the real parties in interest; and 2) that
Pacaa familys receipts and the deliveries and sales were made to
they had no legal right to institute the action in behalf of their parents.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
respondents motion to dismiss because the petitioners are not the real
parties in interest.
RULING:
No, the RTC correctly dismissed the motion of the respondents. The
to their amended complaint the sworn declaration with SPA, but the
the 1940, 1964 and the present 1997 Rules of Court Preliminarily, a suit
that is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is dismissible
and Luciano. They further stated that they would seek the dismissal of the
respondents alleged that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest
complaint because the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to
because: 1) the petitioners should not have filed the case in their own
prosecute the case. The pre-trial pushed through as scheduled and the
manifestation. The RTC issued a pre-trial order where one of the issues
and the present 1997 Rules of Court shows that the fundamentals of the
comply with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which requires that
drastically changed over time. Notably, in the present rules, there was a
every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
deletion of the ground of "failure to state a cause of action" from the list of
the grounds, among others, that the petitioners are not the real parties in
interest to institute and prosecute the case and that they have no valid
was totally absent in its two precedents, is the addition of the period of
respondents motion to dismiss. It ruled that, save for the grounds for
Section 1, Rule 16. Thus, jurisprudence governed by the 1940 and 1964
Rules of Court to the effect that the ground for dismissal based on failure
filed within the time for, but before, the filing of their answer to the
Court which took effect on July 1, 1997. As the rule now stands, the
the respondents are meritorious, their motion was filed out of time as it
result in its waiver. According to Oscar M. Herrera, the reason for the
parties to the case die, which is not what happened in the present case.
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA, invoking grave abuse of discretion in the denial of
cause of action was not timely filed and was thus waived
their motion to dismiss. They argued that the deceased spouses Luciano
Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for the grounds for
and Lourdes, not the petitioners, were the real parties in interest. Thus,
the dismissal of a civil case, the respondents grounds for dismissal fall
the petitioners violated Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the
under Section 1(g) and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, particularly,
substitution of parties. The CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC
Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
they are not the real parties in interest and cannot bring an action in their
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the
own names. Neither are the petitioners suing as heirs of their deceased
following grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
7 | Page
pendency of the case. Upon their death, however, their ownership and
waived in the event that they are not timely invoked. As the respondents
herein petitioners, pursuant to Article 774 in relation with Article 777 of the
invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within which
they were raised. Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to
present case and given the Courts authority to order the inclusion of an
dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer and after the pre-trial
had been concluded. Because there was no motion to dismiss before the
spouses Pacaa, except the petirioners who are already parties to the
filing of the answer, the respondents should then have at least raised
assailed orders did not touch on this particular issue but the CA ruled that
petition is GRANTED.
the respondents did, while the petitioners insist that the respondents did
not. Our examination of the records shows that the CA had no basis in its
January 7, 2013
certiorari that they alleged the subject grounds in their answer. However,
nowhere in the petition did they support this allegation; they did not even
attach a copy of their answer to the petition. It is basic that the
Facts:
payable in 6 months and secured by Real Estate Mortgage over their 202
sqm property located in Valenzuela and covered by TCT. When the debt
claim. Clearly, other than the respondents bare allegations, the CA had
filed with RTC a complaint on Sept 17, 1999. Respondents were served
no basis to rule, without proof, that the respondents alleged the grounds
with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public
the parties with the burden of proving that they timely raised their grounds
for dismissal, could have at least attached a copy of their answer to the
petition. This simple task they failed to do. The rules are clear and require
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to
present her evidence ex parte. On October 17, 2000, the RTC granted
petitioners Complaint.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution alleging that respondents did not
Motion to Set Aside Judgment claiming that not all of them were duly
served with summons. They had no knowledge of the case because their
co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the
RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision be set aside and a new trial be
inception of the present case, both the spouses Pacaa were not
conducted.
But the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its
October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be
that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Their interest in
the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably
accordingly annotated.
intertwined with that of the other parties. Mindful of the differing views of
Aside Execution Sale dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties
did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely
sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. The RTC awarded
5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full
8 | Page
P652,000.00.
Displeased with the RTCs May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the
matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
sporting idea of fair play" and forbids the grant of relief on matters where
the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not
the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to declare that
portion as a nullity.
before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the
principal amount thereof. They only seek quittance from the 5% monthly
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought payment thereof. She
did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did
that Section (3)d of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is clear that when the
she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTCs award of
defendant is declared in default, the court cannot grant a relief more than
5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due
said rule, according to the respondents, is void for having been issued
were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly
Issue:
complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her
Complaint.
Ruling:
RULE 10
violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside
vs.
of Court.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest
FACTS:
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings
or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant
No. P-1436 issued in their names on January 15, 1989 by the Register of
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due
Case No. 371. Respondent alleged inter alia that "without any color of
evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules.
right and through dubious means," petitioners were able to obtain OCT
But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default
No. P-1436 in their names. On May 29, 1996, petitioners filed a motion to
because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of
limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been
in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
interest. In its Order dated August 30, 1996, the trial court granted the
The raison dtre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that
it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and
allow himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will
with motion for leave to file an amended complaint for quieting of title.
the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the
not cover the disputed lot. Thereupon, petitioners filed their opposition,
9 | Page
contending that the amended complaint does not also state a cause of
The Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid), B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), Pilar
modified. On November 18, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying
1996 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 371. Petitioners then
filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition. They alleged that the amended complaint does not cure the
defect in the original complaint which does not state a cause of action.
respondents PBAC and Solid; on April 24, 1985, the PNB called on the
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court
guarantees of petitioner, and so, the latter demanded from respondent PII
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not
respondents Solid and PBAC but they also refused to pay petitioner; and
RULING:
of counsel and incur expenses for the purpose of prosecuting its valid
No, the CA correctly upheld the ruling of the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule
in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served."
The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any responsive
pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless
contemplated by the Rule.3 Records show that petitioners had not yet
filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil Case No. 371.
trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. Respondent PII also filed a
plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint
action since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage,
was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet
final, as in this case. Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly held that in
issuing the assailed Order admitting the amended complaint, the trial
court did not gravely abuse its discretion. Hence, neither certiorari nor
corporation is barred from acquiring the subject lot, suffice it to say that
testified that the amount of P19,035,256.57 was paid on July 28, 1990 by
petitioner to the PNB; and, Exhibit "LL," a debit memo issued by the PNB.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to
FACTS:
constrained to pay the Philippine National Bank thru the account of the
10 | P a g e
Program; and which amount was deducted from the equity share of the
perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings are
incur expenses in the process of prosecuting its just and valid claims
jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff attorneys fees and expenses of
guaranteed obligations.
PRAYER
Acting on the motion to amend, the trial court, at that time presided by
Judge Joselito J. Dela Rosa, issued the assailed Order dated December
7, 1992, dismissing the case without prejudice on the ground of failure of
the complaint to state a cause of action.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner against the
Regional Trial Court with this Court. On June 23, 1993, the Court issued
a Resolution resolving to REFER the case to the Court of Appeals, for
disposition considering that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of
Appeals now exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions,
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, dismissing the
petition. On May 19, 1995, the appellate court denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration. Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower courts order
cause of action for not alleging loss or actual payment made by it to PNB
Verily, it was patently erroneous on the part of the trial court not to have
HELD:
It should be stressed that amendment was sought after petitioner had
already presented evidence, more specifically, the testimony of
petitioners Treasury Department Manager and a debit memo from the
PNB (Exhibit "LL") proving that petitioner had paid the PNB in the amount
of P19,035,256.57 pursuant to the guarantees it accorded to respondent
PII.
11 | P a g e
respondents. The trial court likewise patently acted with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when, acting on a mere motion to amend the complaint, it erroneously
dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in sustaining the trial court.