IPASJ International Journal of Management (IIJM)

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ISSN 2321-645X

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Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2013

Corporate Governance: Role of auditor and

auditing committee
Prof Hetal Pandya / Vyas
GLS institute of Computer Technology, Gujarat Technical University, Ahmedabad -380006. Gujarat

ABSTRACT:
The recent fall of the company SATYAM and the role played by its Auditor and auditing committee, has buzzed an alarm in the
Indian capital market. It has resulted into shaking the confidence of the public investing in the stock market. It has led to
drastic declines in share prices and substantial financial losses to minor shareholders. Both public and experts have
acknowledged primary cause of these scandals as failure of corporate governance. This article tries to highlight the significant
responsibilities of an auditor and auditing committee for protecting the interest of shareholders and investing community.

Key words: Auditor, Auditing committee, corporate governance and investing community

1. Introduction:
Doing right things and doing them in the right way is the essence of Corporate Governance Anonymous
Corporate governance refers to the relationship that exists between the different participants and defining the intention
and implementation of a corporate firm. The bodies like the CEO i.e. the management, the board of directors, the
shareholders and the auditors and audit committee work together and mutually run an organization for interest of all
the stakeholders.
Excellent corporate governance needs to include effective internal control systems, policies, procedures and group to
direct management to serve needs of all stakeholders. Corporate governance concentrates on management as well as on
shareholders wellbeing. Internal as well as external corporate governance helps organization in board culture, their
share price in market, future need for raising capital and the most important is to gain shareholders trust.
Corporate governance means acceptance of management as trustees on behalf of the shareholders and to secure their
rights as the true owners of corporation. It is about maintaining commitments to code and conduct, ethics and values in
organization, as corporate governance is nothing but ethics and moral duties.

2. Literature Review
As per the Organization for Economic corporation and development (OECD) documents (1999), Corporate Governance
(CG) is the system by which organization are directed and controlled. Corporate governance designed to keep intact
and disclose to shareholders in manner truly reflect the position of corporate.
Milton friedman (1962) suggested that corporate governance is to carry out the business in accordance with owners
(promoters) and shareholders aspiration, which generally will be to make as such money as possible, while in
compliance to the fundamental rules of the society embodied in law and local customs. He talked about shareholders
capitalism. Corporate governance means doing the whole thing superior, to get better relation between companies and
their shareholders, full disclosure of information to all stakeholders and to monitor executive management properly in
the interest of shareholders.
Cadbury Committee Report (1992) defines Corporate Governance as the system by which companies are intended for
and restricted. It is generally understood as the framework of rules, regulations, relationships, system and processes
within and by which authority is exercised and controlled in corporations.
Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report (1999) mentioned that corporate governance is essential intention to
enhance long term shareholders value and to protect interest of other stakeholders.
Aravanan (2001) suggested that CG is basically system of making directors accountable to the stakeholders for effective
management of the companies, with concerns of ethics and value. This is related to Board of directors who are
members of auditing committee too, whose role is to check transparency, integrity and accountability of the
management toward shareholders and investing community.
Shareholders value is enhanced by honest and transparent board of Directors. (Vepa Kamesam, 2006). Jyothi Dhawan
identifies the role of board of directors in CG, which inculcate a sense of accountability towards all stakeholders. The
audit committee would search for the integrity and reliability of financial statement and reassure shareholders. (AICPA,
1967; Auerbach, 1973 and FCCG, 1999).

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The responsibility of audit committee in the area of corporate governance is to provide assurance that the corporation is
in rational compliance with relevant laws and regulations, is conducting its affairs fairly, and is maintaining effective
controls against employee conflict of interest and fraud.(Muhammad Faisal Siddiqui) An audit committee consisting
independent directors can have control over management and thereby acting as a sort of assurance to the shareholders
that they will have full disclosure of correct information. To have good corporate governance, audit committee needs
resource persons to act as independent director on whose shoulder lies the responsibility to take the company in the
right path, demand for more disclosures, transparency and accountability and performance standards for investors and
lender and protection for shareholders. (Abhas)
The shareholders of the company place very high trust on the auditors report, which apparently shows the true and fair
view of the accounts of the company. The auditor should perform their duties with extreme care and vigilance to ensure
that there is no illegal or improper transaction. (Harsh Gargani and Ritika Jhurani, 2009). Auditor independence would
be safeguarded if audit committee were made up of a majority of independent and non executive directors, and this
might signify that their independent status would contribute to auditors independence through bridging
communication network. (Zulkarnain Bin Muhamad Sori, Shamsher Mohamad and Mohd Saad. (2008). Knapp (1987)
found that an audit committee if is more likely to support the auditor rather than the management in audit differences
and the level of support is steady across members of the audit committee which will secure interest of shareholders too.
Department of Company affairs guidelines (2000) have recommended proper disclosure to the shareholders and
investing community, which is done by role and influence of auditing committee only. The problem in Indian
Corporate Sector is that of controlling the leading shareholders and safe guarding interest of minor shareholders, which
can be solved by board of directors who are accountable to all stakeholders; it would make governance more easy
(Jayant Rama Varma, 1997).

3. Objectives:
This article focuses on the role of auditor and auditing committee in corporate governance and securing interest of
shareholders and investing community. The assessment of what these two forces should do under statutory framework
for shareholders and what actually they are doing. The article discusses both above mentioned point by studying case
of Enron and the company SATYAM.

Source: Financial Management for Managers, the ICFAI University, November 2006

4. Audit Committee Composition:

Blue Ribbon Committee (2000) has recommended that audit committee should be independent, minimum in size and
members should be financially expert. Audit committee should have communication to auditor and shareholders too.
Chairman of SEC Levitt (1998) has stated Qualified, committed independent and though-minded audit committees
represent the most reliable guardians of the public interest. The Surbanes Oxely Act (2000), also provides that all
the members of the audit committee must be independent directors.
Under the provision of Companies Act 1956, an audit committee must consist atleast 3 members from the Board of
which 2/3rd members will be independent directors. As per Clause 49 of the listing agreement, such members must have
financial knowledge in terms of corporate clients and expert in accounting aspects
It has been supposed that audit committee can function effectively if its members are more independent. (Abbott et al,
2001; and Klein, 2002). The independent directors are liable to give a free and fair view which can add independence
to auditor (Anwar 2003).
Right blend of audit committee members is the most significant decision to execute corporate governance successfully.
Committee with qualified and committed members from all walks of life with knowledge on hand of the companys
business will be able to execute its tasks successfully. The capability of the audit committee to perform independently
and raise questions to management will stimulate auditor to work efficiently and their fair performance will facilitate
good corporate governance. (Zulkarnain Bin Muhamad Sori, Shamsher Mohamad, Mohd Sadd, 2008)

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5. Audit committee: Roles and responsibilities

The duties of directors may be classified into four categories fiduciary duties, duties of care, statutory duties and other
duties. Worldwide the company laws classify two important duties of the directors the duty of loyalty and duty of care.
It is observed that majority of corporate fraud have occurred on account of breach of these primary duties by directors.
However, present-day discussion is more on conflict on duties loyalty to the company and accountability to the
investing community.
As far as the India is concerned, the Security Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has been very serious about introducing
new rules intensifying the audit committee so as to guard the interests of the investors in a better manner than before.
In May 1999, the SEBI adopted several new rules based on the suggestion of the report submitted by Kumar Mangalam
Birla committee on improving the efficacy of audit committee. The audit committee as per these new rules was
supposed to perform following roles:

6. Role of Audit Committee

Oversight of companies financial reporting process
To recommend statutory auditor to Board, their appointment, re-appointment, substitution or elimination, terms
and amount of audit fees , approval for payment for any other services rendered by statutory auditors.
To review quarterly and annual financial statement with the management before put forwarded to the board for
sanction, with particular reference to :
o Matters required to be included in the Directors responsibility Statement to be included in the Boards reports in
terms of clause(2AA) of the section 217 of the Companies Act, 1956
o Changes, if any, in accounting policies and practices and reasons for the same.
o Major accounting entries involving entries based on the exercise of judgment by management.
o Significant adjustment made in financial statement arising out of the audit findings.
o Compliance in listing and other legal requirement relating to financial statement
o Disclosure of any party transactions
o Qualifications in draft audit report
To review the statement of uses/ application of funds rose through any issue and IPO proceedings.
To review performance of statutory and internal auditor and the adequacy of internal control system and function
Discussion with the internal auditor and any momentous conclusion and follow up there on and review finding of
any internal investigations by internal auditors where fraud and irregularity is suspected.

7. Audit Committee and Auditor:

By performing all above mentioned roles, auditing committee will be able to exercise power over management which
will give independence to the auditor and that will result into authentic financial reporting. This will meet the
expectation of all the stakeholders and mainly shareholders. But as per Jawaher Al- Madhaki and P L Joshi (2004),
concept of an auditing committee is not new in India but their development is slow and their constitution lacks
independence. Auditing Committee functions are still intense in the traditional areas of accounting and their role is not
varying fast enough to make the corporate governance more effective. Lam (1976) initiated that the manifestation of
independence of the committee would boost auditors independence and improves transparency in financial reporting.
The study shows that an audit committee with independent non executive director strongly influences auditors
sovereignty (Beattie et al.1999). Independent directors of audit committees are anticipated to boost the quality of
monitoring because they are not associated with the company either as bureaucrats or human resources; thus they would
act as the shareholders watchdog. Dezoort and Salterio (2001) and Raghunandan et al. (2001) revealed that audit
committee that consist of qualified independent directors are better able to contribute towards auditors independence
and audit will give true and correct picture of an organization which will guide shareholders and investing community.

8. Responsibilities of an auditor
The statutory responsibilities of the auditor fundamentally require the following:
1. Duty to make certain inquiries
2. Duty to make a report to the company on the accounts examined
3. Duty to make a proclamation in terms of the provisions set.
4. Detection and Prevention of Fraud
5. Duty to report fraud
6. Duty as to substantial precision

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Code of corporate governance enhances the effectiveness of audit in the interests of stockholders and stakeholders and
that is why they are relying on auditor heavily. Auditor has power to detect wrongdoer in management and report on
the company objectively. An independent auditor can play his role effectively and maintain good governance. They can
also remove bias from companys financial reports. But on the availability and effectiveness of quality auditors, some
argue that East Asian auditors lack expertise or willingness to supply quality audits. There is also some concern that
auditors monitoring role may be in conflict with their consulting activities with client firms, an issue not unique to
Asia. Also, the disciplinary mechanisms for auditors may be poor, which may have diluted the independence of
auditors in Asia. Furthermore, initiatives have been taken by drawing up the Code in ensuring that the Board of
Directors is responsible and accountable. So the independent directors in auditing committee can encourage auditor to
perform his role diligently and honestly.
Much more stress is placed on auditors in the perspective of corporate governance because in most of cases, auditors
will be the first person to spot corporate abuse. This is due to the nature of auditing function and the purpose of
auditing company accounts. It can also be a case of the only person who is aware of the misuse besides the wrongdoers.
Thus, in many cases the auditors prefer to fall short to discover the wrongdoing at the expense of their duties and
obligations. Auditor has to be bold enough to bring forth all the facts in his report and there should be no hesitation on
his part in disclosing the defects, defaults, irregularities, discrepancies etc., even if the management of the company is
involved in the same. He must perform his duties in right earnest and honestly. For the same, audit committee should
monitor auditors performance. The audit committee should discuss various matters with the auditor related to their
independence and what audit committee expects from auditor in interest of shareholders and other stakeholders except
management. But it is not only expected from auditor to do his duties diligently but also audit committee should have
guts to ask questions to management regarding any matter which is related to shareholders and investing community.

9. Governance in todays Parlance

Contrary to the legal status and various compliances to be followed for adherence of corporate governance, nationally
and internationally, there real spirit of this concept in current parlance is quiet difference. The study made on
compliance of forming Audit Committee by listed companies by Jawaher Al-Madhaki and P L Joshi (2002) reveals that
to the context of only 56% of companies formed Audit Committee, although it has been made compulsory to have AC.
Out of nearly 2/3rd companies are having either 3 to 6 members) as required 1/3rd of Board members). The study also
reveals that surprisingly, only 14% of such companies have independent non executive directors.
This shows a lack of on independent representation on the committee. The criteria for selection of member should be
familiarity and knowledge of business, experience of holding similar positions and accounting and finance proficiency.
But usually in India, board members are not selected but invited by corporate so that they can influence their decisions.
The independent directors, who are playing role of guardians for shareholders and stakeholders, are in true sense not
independent for any decision. Truly most of the independent directors are family members, friends, relatives or closely
known so that they can negotiate and compromise with management.
In case of Enron, Texas based energy company, the independence of Enron Board of Directors were negotiated by
financial ties between company and certain board members. Two directors have invested more than US $ 1 million
each in Enron stock and had a strong financial incentive to ensure that the company does not collapse. Even they did
not prevent them from doing along with Enrons management on many issues where they should have resisted.
Auditors are appointed by board of directors (auditing committee) with an intention to carry out auditing in an
impersonal, intentionally and professional manner. Auditor should be independent to secure interest of shareholders
and stakeholders but when board of directors is not independent then how they can ensure auditors independence.
Auditors independence is compromised due to close relationship between him and management. Many time
management obliged auditors by extending non- audit services and earned their favor in presenting false financial
statement.
In case of Enron, Board of Directors was not independent and thats why auditor failed to do his duties. Though
Arthur Anderson was external auditor of Enron, board permits him to be internal auditor and to provide consultancy
services. In 2001, Arthur Anderson earned US$ 55 million for non-audit service. Here, the duties of auditor and audit
committee are questionable.
Auditor has to depend on management for their livelihood and they keep good relations with management. If they
qualify the report or manage to spot the wrong doings of the management, it is doubtful that they will be appointed by
the management in the future.

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In Enron, Anderson was making report on the companys account and they did not report fraud to the shareholders and
stakeholders because it was committed by management. If auditors have reported, then perhaps they will not be
appointed in succeeding years. They made sure that they were in managements good book. Auditors of SATYAM
(PwC) were paid heavy amount by Raju (CEO), Srinivas Vadlamani (CFO) and other directors for window dressing the
companys account, and hiding frauds and lured the investors to invest their hard earned money by manipulating facts
and figures. By keeping himself into managements good book, PwC worked as SATYAMs auditor from 2000 to 2008.

10. Conclusion:
The role of audit committee and auditors in current scenario become very crucial. Stakeholders expect loyalty and trust
from auditor and auditing committee while resolving financial facts and exposing at all fraud and fault in organization.
The audit committee members experience, relevant exposures, qualification background and in depth knowledge need
to be highlighted and confirmed because if directors are experts, experienced, qualified, financial wizards, then they
can have vision and foresightedness to protect stakeholders. If a company has an active and strong audit committee
then independent auditors working will be supported. Further the system of selection and appointment of auditor on
their quality and experience need to be explored.
Over and above laws and regulations, being responsible professionals and representatives of shareholders and investing
community, Auditing committee and auditor should perform their role diligently and ethically to secure interest of not
only company and investors but all stakeholders. This is possible when independent directors will have their own
weight and right to ask questions to management, which in turn will give strength to auditor to be ethical.

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AUTHOR
Hetal Pandya / Vyas is Assistance Professor at GLS Institute of Computer Technology and research scholar at
Nirma University, Ahmedabad, Gujarat. She has received B.com and M, com degree from Gujarat University.
Her research interest areas are Corporate Governance, Corporate Social responsibility and Behaviour finance.

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