BROCKA V.

ENRILE
FACTS: Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern
Police District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in
sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport
Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in
Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial Court,
NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal
Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were
released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered
only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7,
1985 were held. However, despite service of the order of release on February 9,
1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6,
Rollo). Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was
ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo). Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on
February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition. 1 They were released provisionally on
February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. Marcos.
ISSUE: W/N IT IS LEGAL TO ENJOIN THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF A
CASE?
RULING: NO. Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however
exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez
vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag,
70 Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil,
67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young
vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia,
109 Phil. 1140);

1 'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot
sa kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng
presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.'

"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo,
CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128
SCRA 577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February
18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
Also, the hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and
inoperational PDA (issued on 1-28-85 but used on 2-9-85; rule is it should be used
within 24 hours), certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to
pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al. "individuals against whom PDAs
have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original,
and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at
the time of the apprehension.
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of
criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only
from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134
SCRA 438-at p. 448).
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts
of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, Section 3(e); Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 46; and Criminal Case No. 91-94897 for libel (for unlawfully approving
the application for legalization of several foreigner for soliciting money and for
uttering derogatory remarks). A temporary order was issued by this Court on May
24, 1991 ordering the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, to
respectively cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Informations Nos.
11698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e) and 91-94555 for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 46. This Court, in issuing the said restraining order, took
into consideration the fact that, according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally
set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the
advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any
remedial right to meet said contingency.
Petitioner avers that in filing the aforequoted criminal informations, respondents
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner contends that the criminal
charges are meant and intended to harass her as a presidential candidate, in
violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona

fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination."
Petitioner likewise asserts that the Ombudsman violated the very essence of fair
play by choosing to file the informations at a time when petitioner was clearly
disadvantaged by the injuries which she sustained in a vehicular accident, and only
after three (3) years from the time the sixteen (16) charges were initially filed in
1988 by disgruntled employees of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID); and that in filing the criminal informations just a year before the presidential
elections, respondent Ombudsman in effect wants to detain petitioner by reason of
her political aspirations.
The Ombudsman on the other had contends that the filing of Criminal Cases No.
16698 and 91-94555 was already a settled matter as early as two days before
petitioner's unfortunate mishap. Their filing in court was in accordance with routine
procedure, and impelled in some way by media's impatient and irritating inquiries
as to what respondent Ombudsman had done in the petitioner's cases, induced no
doubt by premature persistent false reports that the cases against petitioner had
been dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman. With respect to the libel case
which was filed with the Manila Regional Trial Court on May 24, 1991, docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 91-94897, the record will also show that the
information in this case could have been filed as early as October 12, 1990 when
the resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner for libel was approved by
respondent Ombudsman.
ISSUE: W/N PETITIONERS CASE WARRANTS AN APPROVAL OF A MOTION OF
PROHIBITION?
RULING: NO.
It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie to
restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that
criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of
society, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights. 6
The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had authorized the
Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to file an information as
in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible official is vested with discretion
and is endowed with the competence to determine whether the complaint filed is
sufficient in form and substance to merit such referral.
There is nothing to show that the informations in question were filed with the
vindictive intention to oppress, harass and discriminate against her or to violate her
constitutional rights. It is significant that petitioner failed to impute, much less

prove, any ill-motive on the part of herein public respondents. Respondent

Ombudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why, he "has no
purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's aspirations for the
highest position in the land." This is made no more apparent than in the various
memoranda approved by respondent Ombudsman establishing that the admitted
facts of record are sufficient to engender a well founded belief that each of the
crimes charged has been committed, which parentheticaly, is the requisite quantum
of evidence at this posture of each of said cases.
ALFELOR SR. V. INTIA
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were congressional candidates for the province
of CamSur. Respondent won the elections. Such urged petitioner to file an election
protest. Respondent Fuentebella in turn charged his opponent and the other
petitioners in the municipal court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent
Judge, with falsification of public or official documents contained in the ballot box of
a precinct in Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged criminal act having taken place
in still another municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. There was on the part of
petitioners a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the situs of the
alleged falsification being in another municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. Respondent
Judge in the challenged order issued on April 29, 1967 denied the motion to dismiss
on the ground that falsification was a continuing offense (his station, was vested
with jurisdiction as it "is one of the intervening municipalities where the jeep
carrying the ballot box (the contents of which were allegedly falsified) passed
through). A motion for reconsideration was filed. It was denied. Hence this petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: W/N PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS ARE CORRECT?
RULING: YES. Justice Dizon, as ponente,restated the basic rule thus: "It is settled
law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not
only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction
(U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal
offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction."
-

When and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed

consummated or committed? The crime of falsification of a private document
defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2,
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document
is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such
falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
intended

UY V. CA

FACTS: Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company

owned by the husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosa's
employment she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking
employee. On 15 March 1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Rosa
resigned. In the meantime, she helped her husband manage their lumber business.
The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. The two later
agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for
the expansion of Rosa's lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various
sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by
Consolacion for the business; however, because of the trust they had for each other,
no receipt was ever issued.
Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan,
with the funds contributed by Consolacion evidence by various receipts. But,
unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the
partnership documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the
return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
PETITIONER
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
No misrepresentation was committed
Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining
and that the funds were utilized to
the amount of P500,000.00 from
construct the building in Bulacan,
complainant
Bulacan. With respect to the issuance of
the subject checks, petitioner did not
deny their existence but averred that
these were issued to evidence the
investment of complainant in the
proposed partnership between them.
TC: acquitted of estafa but convicted of violating BP 22
CA: affirmed TC decision
ISSUE: W/N RTC MANILA ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE VIOLATIONS
OF BP 22?
RULING: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore,

the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the

allegations in the complaint or information. In the case at bar, the complaint
for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of
Manila. She maintains that the evidence presented established that (a)
complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City;
(c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the
drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for
collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence
would only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in
Manila. Respondent People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the
one hand argues that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential
ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the
fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is
the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law are merely incidental to the estafa case. The crimes of estafa and violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different
elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the
essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in
a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various
charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no
scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg.
22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that
complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City;
that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon;
that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks
were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the
checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to
acquire jurisdiction over the offense.
Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing
eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is still
without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense
and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory
offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part
committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact
that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is
simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on
the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As

such, there would be no basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
offense.
Is petitioner estopped (AFTER 5 YEARS LANG INAASAIL YUNG JUR.)? NO. After a
careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the
jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum. (FAILED TO FILE A MOTION TO QUASH;
JURISDICTION CAN BE QUESTIONED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS,
EXCEPTION: LACHES; TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY IS INAPPLICABLE)

RIVERA V. CA