Executive clemency

What are the powers of the Executive when it comes to granting clemency? What
is the difference between pardon and amnesty? Here are six cases on executive
clemency that define what pardon is and how it is different from amnesty, and
what the effects of pardon and amnesty are.
Barrioquinto vs Fernandez, G.R. L-1278
On October 2, 1946, the President issued Administrative Order no. 11, creating
Amnesty Commissions which were authorized to hear and investigate cases of
those who should be given amnesty for alleged crimes committed during the
Japanese Occupation.
Barrioquinto and Loreto Jimenez applied for amnesty, but deny having committed
the crime of murder with which they were charged. Barrioquinto was at large, (but
was later apprehended) Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the
period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8,
which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy and committed from December 8,
1941, to the date when each particular area where the offense was committed
was liberated from enemy control and occupation.
On January 9, 1947, the Amnesty Commission issued an order returning the
cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without
deciding on the case saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having
committed the crime, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The respondents and the dissent say that the amnesty courts must not decide on
cases where the defendants have not pleaded guilty to the offense charged. But
the Court said that that would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty
commissions were established. Since there is no law which gives immunity to a
person for whatever offense admitted before the amnesty commission in case
the offense does not come within the terms of the proclamation and he is not
given amnesty, few would take the risk of submitting their cases.
Besides even if it were true that Agapito Hipolito was the one who killed the
victim, the accused could still be found guilty of being principals or accessories
who may be entitled to the benefits of amnesty if it could be established that they
were members of the same group of guerillas who killed the victim in furtherance
of resistance.
HELD: Respondents 14th guerilla amnesty commission members ordered to
proceed to hear and decide applications for amnesty.
This case differentiates between amnesty and pardon.
Vera v People, 7 SCRA 152
Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and 92 others (97 in all) were charged
with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes. They
invoked the benefits of the amnesty proclamation of the president and the case
was referred to the 8th guerilla amnesty commission. none of the petitioners

admitted having committed the crime. Vera was the only one who took the
witness stand and denied having killed lozanes. The commission said it could not
take cognizance of the case because the benefits of amnesty could only be
invoked by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting commission of the
crime, plead that the said crime was committed in pursuance of the resistance
movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the
Japanese occupation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied the appeal, adding that
the facts of the case showed that the victim was a member of another guerilla
group and that the murder seemed to have stemmed from a rivalry between the
two groups.
Vera brought the case to the Court of Appeals, asking the CA to also rule, one
way or another, of the murder case. But the CA ruled that amnesty applies only to
those who had admitted the fact but said they should not be punished for the
crime done was in pursuance of resistance to the enemy. It also said it could not
take cognizance of the murder case because that came from the amnesty
commission, which had no jurisdiction over the murder case.
The case was brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People vs Llanita,
which said that it was inconsistent for an appellant to justify an act or seek
forgiveness for something which he said he has not committed.
Held: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused
maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for
amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this
case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions.
The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance,
which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims
liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the
crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.
Cristobal vs Labrador, 71 Phil 34
Cristobal vs Labrador is a petition for a review of the lower courts decision on an
election case.
On March 15 1930, Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and sentenced to 6
months imprisonment and the accessories, and to return the amount taken.
Despite this, Santos continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal, and
between 1934 and 1937 even served as municipal president. On August 22 1938
the Election Code was approved, which had a provision that disqualifies Santos
from voting, having been declared by final judgment guilty of a crime against
property. Santos applied with the President for an absolute pardon, which was
given him on December 24 1939. The pardon said that his full civil and political
rights were restored except that his right to hold public office was limited only to
positions which involved no money or property responsibility.
On November 16, 1940, Cristobal filed a petition to have Santos excluded from
the voters list on the basis of sec 94 of the Commonwealth Act no. 357. The
court ruled that the pardon given Santos excluded him from the disqualification
created by the New Election Code.

Cristobal appealed, arguing that the pardoning power does not extend to the
enjoyment of political rights, for that would allow the President to encroach on the
powers of the legislature, in effect exempting some people from the effects of the
law. Cristobal said the pardoning power of the Executive does not apply to
legislative prohibitions and would amount to an unlawful exercise of the
Executive of a legislative function.
The Court ruled that the Constitution imposes only two limits on the power of
clemency: that it be exercised after conviction, and that it does not extend to
cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action.
Held: Saying that paragraph b of section 94 of Commonwealth Act no 357 does
not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive would
lead to the impairment of this power.
Pelobello vs Palatino, 72 Phil 441
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced
to imprisonment for 2 years, four mos and one day, disqualified from voting and
being voted upon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor General
and on Dec 25, 1940, an absolute pardon by the President.
Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings questioning his right to hold office
as mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque province. It was based on sec 94 (a) of
the Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from the
disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph a of sec 94 of the
Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the
date fixed by law for assuming office.
Ratio: Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning power is only
subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, and cannot be controlled or
restricted by legislative action.
HELD: thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of
Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal
president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally
elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December,
1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him
absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the
popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned
hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for
assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.
We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a
technical objection. JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AFFIRMED.
In Re Lontok, 43 Phil 293
Marcelino Lontok, a lawyer, was convicted of bigamy and sentenced to 8 years
imprisonment on February 27 1918. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court

on September 18, 1919.

On February 9, 1921, he was pardoned by the Governor General on the
condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct.
A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred because he has
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Lontok however argued that pardon reaches the offense and blots it out so that
he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
Ratio: When proceedings to strike an attorneys name from the rolls are founded
on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after
the pardon has been granted.
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional
misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of
felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the
penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment
proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that
the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper
person to retain his license to practice law.
Ex parte Garland was cited, in which a lawyer pardoned by the president being a
member of the confederate congress during the secession of the South was
allowed to practice law, although lawyers were supposed to take an oath saying
they have never aided any government hostile to the US.
It was held that the exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense
would be to enforce a punishment for the offense, when he has already been
pardoned for it. This the court had no right to do.
HELD: Petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and the proceedings
must be dismissed.
Torres vs Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273
Wilfredo Torres was convicted of a crime in 1979 and sentenced to serve a
prison term of 11 years, 10 mos and 22 days to 38 years, 9 mos and 1 day. He
was given a conditional pardon on April 18 1979 on the condition that he would
not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
On May 21 1986, the Board of Pardons and parole resolve the recommend the
cancellation of the pardon, having found out that Torres has been charged with
20 counts of estafa at the Quezon City Trial Court, convicted of sedition by the
QC Trial Court on June 26 1985 and had been accused of other crimes such as
swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, etc. He
was arrested and recommitted on October 10 1986, and confined in Muntinlupa
to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Issue: Whether or not a conviction is necessary to revoke a conditional pardon
Ratio: Torres argued that he has not violated the conditional pardon given him
because he has not been convicted by final judgment. At the same time, he said
he was denied his right to due process as he was not given the opportunity to be
heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison.

Citing Tesoro, the Court however said that the since the pardon was extended by
the Executive, the determination of whether or not it has been breached is up to
the Executive, not to the Courts.
This Court in effect held that since the petitioner was a convict who had already
been seized in a constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers and the
witnesses against him -, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to
punishment therefor, he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial
determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by
committing a subsequent offense.
The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it,
and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may
withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor
shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict,
with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted
and agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated
the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to
prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up
in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon,
and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive
act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in
order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in
his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned,
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
The Court however noted that Torres must still be convicted by final judgment of
the crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty can be
imposed upon him.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision
correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted

conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of
such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
Judgment: Petition dismissed. The decision to take back the pardon is valid.
** Sec 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code: To grant to convicted persons
reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to
suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any
convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and
to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon,
parole, or suspension of sentence.
ART. 159, RPC. Other Cases of Evasion of Service of Sentence. The penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict
who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the
granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the
unexpired portion of his original sentence.