EXAMPLE OF TEXT COMMENTARY

This commentary has been done in one hour and fifteen minutes, so it's not
expected that the students will be able to emulate it but that they can come as close as
possible to this model. It is highly recommended to devote a few minutes to reading the
text carefully and to making a draft of the argumentation to be developed after the
analysis of the text (the composition of this draft will be the "plan" part of the
introduction). We have to bear in mind the conclusion of our commentary since it is the
philosophical position we're going to hold, and our arguments and examples have to
take us there.
This text is difficult, this commentary aims to explain it, the students won't have
to face such complicated texts.
"Since we said that serenity follows suspension of judgment about everything, it would be
appropriate for us to say next how suspension of judgment is brought about. Speaking generally, it is brought
about by putting things in opposition to each other. [...] For every argument I have considered, which purports
to establish something dogmatically, it seems to me that there is another argument purporting to establish
something dogmatically, which is opposite to it, and which is equally plausible or implausible. And uttering
these words is not a piece of dogmatism, but the expression of a human feeling experienced by the subject.
[...] The Mode based upon regress ad infinitum is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a
proof of the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on ad infinitum, so that the
consequence is suspension [of assent], as we possess no starting-point for our argument We have the Mode
based upon hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being forced to recede ad infinitum, take as their starting-point
something which they do not establish but claim to assume as granted simply and without demonstration. The
Mode of circular reasoning is the form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter of
inquiry requires confirmation derived from the matter; in this case, being unable to assume either in order to
establish the other, we suspend judgement about both."

Sextus Empiricus (2d Century) Outlines of Pyrrhonism

In this text Sextus Empiricus deals with the problem of whether non dogmatic
knowledge is possible or not. The philosopher defines the pyrrhonian way as suspense
of judgment and provides an argument or "mode" which works as a reminder of the
dogmatic character of every assertion, thereby justifying the sceptic attitude.
In the following pages I will address the problem of the justification of
knowledge by confronting the arguments for scepticism offered by Sextus Empiricus.
First, after a thorough analysis of the text, I'll try to prove that pyhrronism is also
dogmatic according to its own definition of dogmatism and that, in order to avoid this
contradiction, pyhrronism should be more drastically sceptic or allow for a less radical
definition of "dogmatism". Secondly I will try to show that the first option is both
unsustainable and unbearable and that, therefore we have to choose a weaker definition
of "dogmatism". I will finally offer this new characterization of dogmatism arguing
thereby that there is much room for truth outside the reach of dogmatism and
scepticism.
The text has two clearly differentiated parts: the first paragraph offers an account
of Pyrrhonian scepticism as suspension of judgement and an overall view of how this
suspension might be reached, whereas the second paragraph describes more thoroughly
some of the reasoning techniques, called modes, which lead to it.
According to Sextus Empiricus the aim of scepticism is serenity, and this is the
consequence of a suspension of judgment which consists in refraining from any
dogmatic assessment, that is, any assessment which might be controversial. It is

precisely by showing the controversy that refraining from judgment is possible, that is,
setting against any argument () which purports to establish something dogmatically
another one opposite to it but nevertheless as plausible as the first one, proving
thereby the absence of foundation of both sides and refusing to assert any of them.
Next, Sextus Empiricus describes a three modes strategy to force the dogmatist
into scepticism. Those three modes appear as three possible patterns which any instance
of reasoning can take: a never-ending regress in the Mode based upon regress ad
infinitum, an arbitrary assertion in the Mode based upon hypothesis or begging the
question in the Mode of circular reasoning. Either the purported certainty established
by the dogmatist has no other foundation, but then this certainty has no justification
(unjustified hypothesis) or is self-justified (circular reasoning), or it has it, but then as
this certainty needs a further proof so will the thing adduced as a proof and so ad
infinitum. Any search for foundations takes reason to this three forked dead end and
thereby to suspension of judgement, to scepticism.
In the following lines I'm going to resist the conclusion of the text, trying to
bring to light a path between dogmatism and scepticism.
For scepticism every assertion is dogmatic except those uncontroversial, which
can not be subject of legitimate disagreement. Concerning this kind of propositions
there are two possibilities: either they require no further foundation or they do; if they
don't require some further foundation then they're accepted with no proofs or they're
their own foundation; if they do require some further evidence, then, wouldn't we have
to face the same problem concerning this more basic evidence and so on? It seems that
there's no limit for the application of the modes presented in Sextus Empiricus' text.
What does that imply? That if the sceptic admits some proposition, no matter
how evident the proposition seems to be then he's acting dogmatically, and if not he has
to live withholding assent to almost any possible proposition (we may exclude
propositions such as "I exist" or "I am doubting") which is absurd for we do need to
consider true that drinking would satisfy our thirst and jumping to a cliff would kill us.
I seems, then, that the sceptic has to state dogmatically a certain amount of
opinions if she wants to live long enough to suspend her judgment from time to time.
Nevertheless even the sceptic has the intuition that it is not the same to state something
like "there's a table in front of me" and "I ought to kill heretics because God desires it".
Therefore we may draw a distinction between statements easily verifiable and
statements which cannot really be falsified, and reserve the label "dogmatic" for the
latter. If this is so, then the impasse between scepticism and dogmatism looks like a
fallacy, a false dilemma, and we may stick to a use of reason respectful of verifiable
statements and suspicious of those which are not, leaving the sceptic suspension of
judgment for them.
In conclusion, scepticism as stated by Sextus Empiricus faces the same problems
of what he calls "dogmatism": unjustified hypothesis, begging the question or an infinite
regress. In order to avoid this conclusion, the frontier between scepticism and
dogmatism can be widened and allow for statements which can be tested and falsified,
reserving thereby the pyrrhonian doubt for those beliefs which claim immunity to
reason scrutiny and truly deserve the name of "dogma".