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Persons CASE 1

Case Digest | Ralph Gonzales


Tanada v. Tuvera (1986)

Facts:
Due process was invoked by petitioners demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidental Decrees which have they claimed had not
been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication is necessary, as a rule, it is not so when it is otherwise provided such that the decrees
themselves require their express effectivity upon approval.
Issues:
1. What is meant by publication vis a vie the unless otherwise provided clause in Art. 2. Of the Civil Code
2. Where is the publication to be made?
3. When is the publication to be made?
Arguments:
Petitioner argued that there is no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. Therefore, all laws must be
published in the Official Gazette.
Respondents counter argument that the unless otherwise provided clause in Art. 2. Of the Civil Code provides that publication is not
always imperative
Decision:
The Supreme Court rules that the unless otherwise provided clause in Art. 2. Refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself.
Therefore, publication is indispensible in every case but the legislature may provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or
extended.
Respondents argument that publication may be dispensed with altogether is wrong because such omission would offend due process as it
would deny the public the knowledge of laws. The public would therefore be prejudiced.
The court orders that publication be made in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws.
The court also listed down the following that must be published:
Presidential Decrees
Executive Orders
Administrative Rules and Regulations when the purpose is implementing an existing law pursuant to valid delegation
Charters of a City
Circulars issued by the Monetary Board when they fill in the details of the Central Bank Act
Note:
Internal rules of agencies need not be published.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Persons CASE 2

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Case Digest | Ralph Gonzales

Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Vega (2001)

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Facts:
In 1985, the Central Bank filed with Branch 39 of the RTC of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liqudation
of the Philippine Veterans Bank.
After filing the petition, the PVB Union filed for claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages
Payments of the sums were made but due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits many remain unpaid
March 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the case for bias and hostility
January 1992, Congress enacted RA 7169 providing for the Rehabilitation of PVB
May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of the PYB, respondent judge (Vega) continued
the liquidation proceedings.
Petitioners, therefore, argue that RA 7169 made the liquidation court defunct.
On June 1992, the Supreme Court issued a TRO mandating the RTC (Vega) to stop the liquidation proceedings
September 1992, PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention prayer for the issuance of the writs of Certiorari and
Prohibition for respondent judge (Vega) to stop orders involving acts of liquidation.
Note: Section 10 of RA 7169 states:
Sec. 10 Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Issues:
Respondent judge argued that RA 7169 was not effective and his actions in continuing the Liquidation court was
valid for the 15 day completion of the publication of the law was not yet done.
Decision:
In an Obiter Dictum the Supreme Court rules that the law was effective immediately upon approval as signed by
President C. Aquino on January 1992 pursuant to Section 10 of the aforementioned law.
Notes:
Such Obiter Dictum is seen in this portion of the ruling Assuming for the sake of argument that publication
is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date
when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by
respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

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Persons CASE 3

Case Digest | Ralph Gonzales


Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles (1996)

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FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the RTC by
respondent Judge Angeles.
The assailed decision upholds the Prohibition and Mandamus of Remington Industrial Sales Corproration and
Firestone Ceramics Inc. as well as Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 Dated Agust 30, 1989 (Annex
A, Amended Petiton) as well as the Memorandum of amendments for AO SOCPEC 89-08-01.
The Administrative Order was never published in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation
However, its amendments were filed with and published in the UP Law Center in the National Administrative
Register.
Issues:
Does an Administrative Order which is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative power need publication in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation?
Decision:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court reiterated its decision in Tanada v. Tuvera that all statues including those of
local application and private laws shall be published as a condition for their effectivity.
The Supreme Court also ruled that this same rule covers President Decrees, Executive Orders, Administrative
Rules and Regulations if their purpose is to enforce or impelement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Therefore, AO No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is one that needs publication for its effectivity since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law.

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Persons CASE 4

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Case Digest | Ralph Gonzales
Roy v. Court of Appeals (1998)

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Facts:
A firewall of a burned-out building owned by Petitioner (Roy) collapsed and destroyed a tailoring shop occupied
by the family of private respondents.
Such caused the death of the daughter of respondents.
Respondents have been warned to vacate the shops proximity due to the weakened wall
The RTC ruled that there was gross negligence in part of the petitioners awarding damages to the respondents of
the case at bar.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling. Such ruling was received by the petitoners on the 17th
of August 1987.
On September 9, the last day for filing of Appeal (15 day period), petitioners asked for an extension of the
appeal. This was denied by the CA on September 30.
However, on September 24, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration and was denied by the CA on
October 27.
Issues:
The CA argues that it did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration as it applied the rule laid down in the Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon
case of 1985.
Petitioners contend that such ruling was never published in the Official Gazette therefore took no effect.
Decision:
The Supreme Court rules that there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding as a condition to their becoming effective
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

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Persons CASE 5

Case Digest | Ralph Gonzales


Victoria Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission (1962)

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FACTS:
Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22. Providing for the rules in computing premiums due to the
system.
Victorias Milling Company, upon receipt of a copy, through counsel, wrote to the SSC that the aforementioned
circular is contraty to previous circulars.
Furthermore, the same company argued that the aforementioned circular needs approval from the President and
Publication in the Official Gazette such that the SSC lacks authority to promulgate it.
SSC ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation. Rather, that such circular is only the administrative
interpretation of the statute a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be
construed.
Not satisfied with such ruling, the petitioners came to the SC on appeal.
ISSUES:
What is the difference between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law
whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body?
Does an administrative interpretation require publication for its effectivity?
DECISION:
That an administrative rule or regulation has the force of law whereas a administrative interpretation is an
opinion or statement that interprets a pre-existing law.
That Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in light of the
amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon
which the social security contributions should be based.

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Persons CASE 6

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Case Digest prepared by: Justin Gular
G.R. No. L-65894 September 24,1987

THE MUNICIPAL OGVERNMENT OF CORON, PALAWAN, duly represented by MAYOR


RICARDO F. LIM, petitioner
vs.
JOSE CARINO, et. al., respondents
Facts of the case:
(1) Sometimes in 1976 an action was filed by the Municipal Government of Coron (the petitioner)
before the Court of First instance of Palawan and Puerto Princess City, Branch IV. the action sought
authority from the court to demolish the structures built by the private respondent alongside the rock
causeway of the petitioner's wharf.
(2) After a series of postponements the trial court on January 16,1979 reset the hearing of the case for
the last time for three consecutive dates March 20, 21, 22, 1979 with a warning to the private
respondent that no more postponements shall be allowed
(3) On March 20, 1979 the respondents and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
- The petitioner moved that the private respondents non appearance be considered a waiver on
their right to cross-examine the petitioners witnesses and their right to present evidence.
(4) On October 10, 1980 the lower court decided that:
- It defendants counter-claim be dismissed due to lack of merit
- That the plaintiff can now demolish the defendants structure
- ordering defendants to remove the structures in the area within 30 days
(5) On appeal on February 2, 1982 the private respondents were required to submit their record on
appeal to the appellate court's Acting Clerk of Court regarding their appeal.
- upon motion the appellate court granted extension of 60 days from April 7, 1982 for the
printed copy of their record on appeal. (Note: the respondents were not able to comply with the
requirement even with the extension)
(6) On August 32, 1982 the court dismissed the private respondents appeal for failure to file the
required record on appeal.

Persons CASE 6

- On December 6, 1982 the Acting Clerk of Court of the appellate court certified the
resolution dismissing the private respondents appeal had become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
(7) On February 1, 1983 a writ of execution was issued to enfore the October 10, 1980 decision of
the First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City
(8) The private respondents, in a motion, argued that appellate court should recall the records of the
case because under the present law (Section 39, Batas Pambansa 129) printed records on appeal are no
longer required, and that their right to be heard on appeal mist be upheld instead of the rule on
technicalities
Issue: Can the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 to implement the provisions of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 29 which does not require records on appeal to take an appeal be applied in the
case at bar?
Decision: the Interim rules of court as in the provisions of Bata Pambansa Bilang 29 cannot apply to
the case at bar for the simple reason that to revive or recall appealed cases which had been dismissed or
which had become final and executory would cause great great injustice to those in whose favor these
cases had been decided.
In re. to the retroactive application of section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court:
- Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that
sense and to that extent as emphasized.

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Note: The decision in this case digest is not the whole decision of this court but stand only in
regard to the subject matter which is, in this case, the extents of retroactivity of laws by virtue of
remedial or procedural nature.

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Persons CASE 7

Case Digest prepared by: Justin Gular


SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BENITO SALVANI
PE and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 97998 January 27, 1992
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENITO SALVANI PE,
respondents. Ruben E. Agpalo for Sps. Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan. Vicente R. Acsay for Benito
Salvani Pe. Thomas T. Jacobo for DBP.
"This is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained
the right of respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land foreclosed by petitioner
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to petitioners Gauvain and Bernardita
Benzonan."
Relevant facts:
(1) Benito Pe, a businessman in General Santos City, who owns extensive commercial and
agricultural properties acquired a parcel of land through the free patents and miscellaneous sales
from the Bureau of Lands on October 29, 1969.
(2) On February 24, 1970 (barely three months he acquired the land he mortgaged the land in
question together with a lot covered by TCT No. 3614 and some chattels to secure a commercial
loan of 978,920.00 pesos which was later developed into a commercial-industrial complex etc.
(3)When Benito Pe failed to pay the said loan after more than 7 years the DBP forclosed the mortgag
on June 28, 1977. It was then bought by the DBP afterwards with the certificate covering the
disputed lot was registered with the Registry of Deeds on January 1978 (Date of the foreclosure
sale)
(4) After one year period the respondent failed to redeem the property and on September 24, 1979
DBP sold the lot to the petitioner payable in quarterly amortizations over a period of five years.
(5) On July 12, 1983 (5 years and about 6 months after foreclosure sale) claiming he was acting
within the legal period given to him to repurchase (which is 5 years after the foreclosure sale; yes
he was wrong) respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for 327,995. This was
countered by DBP claiming that over the years a total of 3,056,739.52 had already been incurred in
the preservation, maintenance, and introduction of improvements.
(6) November 27, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment that DBP to reconvey the land to Pe,
ordering them defendants to vacate the presmises, to pay for Pe's attorneys fees, and to set an
example to government banking and lending institutions not to take borrowers for granted (note:
see full case for complete details)

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Persons CASE 7

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Issues: Can respondent Pe repurchase the disputed property
(a) without doing violence to everything CA No. 141 stands for?
Decision of the Supreme court:

As ruled in Simeon vs Pena *evidently the reconveyance sought by the plaintiff (petitioner) is
not in accordance with the purpose of the law (CA No. 141) that is to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader the portion of public land which the State gratuitiously given to him.
that under Simeon vs Pena the petitioner's proposed repurchase of the property does not fall within
the purpose, spirit, and meaning of section 19 of the Public Land Act.
Reiterated in Vargas vs. Court of Tax Appeals
that the petitioner in Simeon vs Pena was not allowed to repurchase because the lower court
found that his purpose was only speculative and for profit.
and as in the case of Santana et al. vs. Marinas that the plain intent of Section 119, C.A. 141
is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land
that the state gratuitously given to him as reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it"
However the respondent court disregarded their decision which chose to adopt a court of Appeals
ruling in Lim et. al., vs. Cruz et al., that the motives of the homesteader n repurchasing the land
is inconsequential and that it doesn't matter even what the obvious purpose is for selfish gain or
personal aggrandizement.
(Note: It was ruled that Pe cannot repurchase because his act of reconveyance is not within the
spirit of the law as mentioned above, furthermore, know that this is issue is not related to any civil
provisions)
(b) when counting the five-year period for repurchase by respondent Pe should it be (1) from the
date of the foreclosure sale or (2) from the expiration of the one year period to redeem the
foreclose foreclosed property.
Arguments:
Respondent court (not the supreme court) held that Pe exercised his right to repurchase
within five-year period provided since the one year period to redeem expired on January 24, 1979
and because he filed Case 280 on October 4, 1983 (4 years and 7 months) to enforce his right to
repurchase the property. --- this was cited in Belisario, et v. Intermediate Appellate Court et al. that
says "That the 5 years period of redemption begins to run from the day after the expiration of the
one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure"
the respondent court further argued that 1988 case of Belisario reversed previous rulings of the
Supreme court in Monge et al. vs Angeles and Tumpas vs Damasco which both said "that the five year
period of repurchase should be counted from the date of conveyance
or foreclosure sale."
The petitioners however urged that Belisario should only be applied prospectively or after
1988 since it established a new doctrine. The supreme court sustained the petitioners position.

Persons CASE 7

Decision of SC:
"We sustain the petitioners' position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on
February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18,
1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979. At that time, the prevailing
jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated inMonge and
Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these
decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our
decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961])."
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating
new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] ". . . when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof."
However note:
[There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will warrant a retroactive
application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans.
In the present petitions, however, we find no such equitable considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for
free agricultural land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble purposes behind the
law, he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property purchased by the petitioners in good faith for
P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which, because of improvements and the appreciating value of land must be worth more than
that amount now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the property
from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed
lot given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by
relying on the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already become vested as of that
time and cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Belisarioruling.]

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Persons CASE 8

Persons CASE 9

Case Digest | Prepared by Seane Aljas

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Case 9: People vs. Patalin, et al., G.R. No. 125539, 27 July 1999
Facts:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines,
Alfonso Patalin, Jr, Alex Mijaque, Nestor Ras and along with three (3) accused, with deliberate
intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working together, entered
the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with violence against, and/
or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch
worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00)
Pesos, against the will and/or consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named
three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their companions who are still at large, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Josephine Belesario,
against their will and consent.
On October 11, 1985, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were
charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 18305)
Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to both
crimes charged but was later on disposed by a joint judgment rendered after trial on the merits.
At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by
death.
Issue:
Whether or not the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited the
accused-appellants. (Answer: Yes, the accused-appellants are free from the fatal clutches of death
penalty)
Ruling/Decision:
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same."
The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to
be imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three
possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the
prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when
the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167,
citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).

Persons CASE 9

The abolition of the death penalty benefits the accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent
reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves
state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can
only have prospective application.
Wherefore, finding the conviction of accused-appellants, the Court AFFIRMS said judgment.

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Persons CASE 10

Case Digest | Prepared by Seane Aljas

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Case 10: Larga vs. Ranada, 164 SCRA 18 (1988)
Facts:
Petitioner Celso M. Larga, one of the owners and operators of the "Bistcor Diesel Calibration
Service," issued in favor of respondent Home Development Mutual Fund ("HDMF") Security Bank &
Trust Company Check No. 225466 in the amount of P3,840.00 as payment of the employer-employee
contributions to the Pag-Ibig Fund pertaining to the period from January to April 1984. The check
was, however, dishonored for being stale when it was presented for payment by the drawee bank.
Demand was made upon petitioner Larga to replace the dishonored check or otherwise to pay the
amount thereof in full, but he failed and refused to comply. However, it turns out that petitioner
Larga failed to remit to the Pag-ibig Fund considerably more employer-employee contributions than
just the P3,840.00.
On 23 February 1987, Special Prosecutor Luis B. Pangilinan, Jr. filed information against petitioner
Larga for violation of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752, known as "The Home Development
Mutual Fund Law of 1980.
On 10 April 1987, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash asserting as ground thereof that the criminal
liability for the offense with which he was charged was extinguished with the issuance of Executive
Order No. 90 dated 17 December 1986.
On 18 May 1987, private respondent HDMF filed an Opposition to the Motion to Quash, arguing that
Section 10 of Executive Order No. 90 had merely amended the portion of Presidential Decree No.
1752 dealing with the nature of contributions to the Pag-Ibig Fund by making such contributions
voluntary commencing from January 1987, and that non-remittance of contributions accruing before
January 1987 was still punishable under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752.
On 9 June 1987, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Quash.
On 10 June 1987, petitioner filed a Reply to the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, there arguing
that Section 1 0 (b) and (c) of Executive Order No. 90 and the Implementing Rules operated as an
absolute repeal of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752.
The Regional Trial Court treated the Reply to the Opposition as a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Order of 9 June 1987, which Motion the Court denied on 27 July 1987.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal liability for the acts with which the petitioner was charged has been
extinguished by virtue of the issuance of Executive Order No. 90.
Ruling/Decision:
It should be made clear, in the first place, that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90 had the
effect of modifying Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752. That modification consisted in rendering fund
coverage voluntary, ornon-mandatory, afterDecember 31, 1986.

Persons CASE 10

Executive Order No. 90, did not by its terms purport to eliminate the obligatory character of fund
coverage or more precisely, the consequences of obligatory coverage accruing prior to 1
January 1987.
Obligations under the statute already accrued as of 1 January 1987 did not lose their positive law
obligatory character. More specifically, the obligation to remit to the Fund previously accrued
employer-employee contributions continued to exist and be exigible.
Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90 amended Section 4 of P.D. No.
1752,notretroactively,but only prospectively.
Therefore, Executive Order No. 90 did not purport to "de-criminalize" all prior violations of P.D. No.
1752 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and did not modify or repeal, whether expressly
or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752.

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Persons CASE 11

Case Digest | Prepared by Seane Aljas

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Case 11: People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387
Facts:
The accused violated the election code and was sentenced by the lowercourt. He was asking for
reconsideration and filed a special motion alleging that the crime complained of had prescribed
under the provision of section 71of Act 3030, enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922.
Issue:
Whether or not penal laws provide not only penalty but also prescription (Answer: Yes).
Decision:
The court found the crime to have prescribed (in accordance with the new law) and set aside the
decision. The Election law contained in the Administrative Code and Act 3030 which amended and
modified the former, it is evident that the provision declaring that offenses resulting from the
violationsof said Act shall prescribe one year after their commission must haveretroactive effect,
the same being favorable to the accused. (An exception to give them retroactive effect when
favorable to accused). The exception applies to a law dealing with prescription of crime: Art 22
applies to a law dealing with prescription of an offense which is intimately connected with that of
the penalty, for the length of time for prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense. Penal
laws not only provide for penalties but also prescriptions.

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Persons CASE 12

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CASE DIGEST by Christine Claire A. Bontuyan
on

FERRER vs PECSON (G.R. No. L-5221, 27 October 1952)

Petitioner: Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez


Respondent: Potenciano Pecson, Judge of First Instance

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FACTS
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On February 2, 1949, Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez, a driver of as jeepney, operated along Dapitan Street,
City of Manila, in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner. As a result, the jeepney he was driving
sideswiped another jeepney, causing a collision, and inflicting physical injuries on a passenger
named Avelino Tiu. Tius injuries required medical assistance for 6 to 8 months and prevented him
from engaging in customary labor.

On March 1, 1949, Ferrer was accused before the Municipal Court of Manila of serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. After trial, the Municipal Court of Manila found Ferrer guilty and
sentenced him to 3 months of arresto mayor. The defendant appealed the case to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

On November 27, 1950, the petitioner through his counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over the oense, and consequently,
the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge
Potenciano Pecson, his order dated December 14, 1950.

Upon motion for reconsideration by the counsel of Ferrer, the same judge (Pecson), in his order of
June 6, 1951, granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Upon motion for reconsideration filed by a fiscal, Judge Pecson, in his order dated August 29, 1951,
revoked his order of June 6, 1951, and declared his first order of December 14, 1950, denying the
motion to dismiss as in force.

The counsel of Ferrer filed a petition for certiorari to revoke the order of August 29, 1951 and reinstate
the order of June 6, 1951.

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ISSUES/HELD
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Whether or not the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the oense of Ferrer NO
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Whether or not the order of the respondent judge of June 6, 1951 be reinstated YES
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Persons CASE 12

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RATIO
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The jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law at the time of the
institution of the action. The complaint was filed on March 1, 1949, and at that time, the law
penalizing the oense of the petitioner was the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932). Section 67
of such Act provides that:

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SEC 67 (d). If, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving, any
accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person, the motor
vehicle driver or operator at fault shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than 15 days nor more than six years in the discretion of the court.

The criminal jurisdiction of a Peace or Municipal Court as defined in the Judiciary Act of 1948 states
that:

SEC 87 (b). All oenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not
more than six months ()

From this, it is clear that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over a case where a
maximum penalty of 6 years. Since the Municipal Court had no original jurisdiction, the Court of
First Instance presided by Judge Pecson had consequently no appellate jurisdiction.

Even though Section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932) was amended by Section 16
of Republic Act No. 587, eective January 1, 1951 stating that:

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SEC 16(d). If, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving any
accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person, the motor
vehicle driver at fault, shall, upon conviction be punished under the provisions of the
Penal Code.

As a rule, laws cannot be given retroactive eect. When the Municipal Trial Court of Manila tried
the case against the petitioner, the law that was in force was the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act.
No. 3932).

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June 6, 1951 decision of respondent judge is REINSTATED.
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Persons CASE 13

CASE DIGEST by Christine Claire A. Bontuyan


on

DBP vs COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. L-28774, 21 September 1982)

Petitioner: Development Bank of the Philippines


Respondent: The Court of Appeals

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Let it be noted that for this case, National Housing Authority shall be referred to as PHCC, Philippine Homesite and
Housing Corporation, its former name.

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FACTS
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On October 25, 1955, petitioner, Development Bank of the Philippines, purchased from the PHHC 159
contiguous lots located in the Diliman Estate Subdivision West Triangle, Quezon City, and paid them
the downpayment of PHP400,000.00 of the PHP802,155.56 stipulated purchase price. The purchased
land was for a housing project for its employees. The Bank itself was to build houses on the land
acquired and then sell it to their employees who do not yet own homes. Employees who acquire of
the homes was to pay for them in monthly installments over a period of 20 years.

However, lot nos. 2 and 4 which were part of the 159 lots were sold to spouses, Honesto and Elisa
Nicandro on October 14, 1958, the order of sale of which was approved by PHHC Acting General
Manager, Sergio Ortiz. Two deeds of sale were issued to the spouses on November 7, 1958.

On January 20, 1959, the Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion that the Banks resolution is
incongruous with, if not a clear violation of the prohibition contained in Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 85 which expressly bars any bank ocer or employee from borrowing or getting a loan from a
bank. Specifically, the provision states:

SEC 23. No ocer or employee of the bank nor any government ocial who may exercise
executive or supervisory authority over the said bank either directly, or indirectly, for
himself or as representative or agent of others shall borrow money from the Bank, nor
shall become a guarantor, indorser or surety for loans from the said bank to the others, or
in any manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the said Bank. Any such ocer
or employee who violates the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed by
competent authority and said ocer or employee shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than one year nor exceeding five years and by a fine of not less than one
thousand nor more than five thousand pesos."

On February 17, 1959, the Oce of the President required the Bank to revoke its resolution
authorizing the purchase of PHHC lots.

On June 17, 1961, Republic Act. No. 3147 amending Section 23 of Republic Act 85 was approved and
became eective. The amendatory act provides:

Persons CASE 13

No ocer or employee of the bank nor any government ocial who may exercise
executive or supervisory authority over the said bank, either directly or indirectly, for
himself or as the representative or agent of others, shall, except when the same shall be
in the form of advances appropriated or set aside by the bank itself in order to
provide for housing for the benefit of its ocials and employees, borrow money from
the bank, nor shall he become a guarantor, endorser, or surety for loans from the bank to
others, or in any manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the said bank. ()

On November 10, 1961, the Nicandro spouses sued for recission of the sale to the Bank of the two lots
in question, and the consequent cancellation of the Banks certificate thereto. After due proceedings,
the recission was ordered by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

However, on February 28, 1980 the Supreme Court decided otherwise on the ground that the passage
of Republic Act No. 3147 cured retroactively the lack of authority and violation of law relied upon by
the lower courts.

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ISSUES/HELD
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Whether or not the contract between PHHC and DBP was valid NO
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Whether or not the amendment of Republic Act No. 3147 holds a retroactive eect NO
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Whether or not the Supreme Court should reconsider its decision YES
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RATIO
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It is a familiar rule in statutory construction that unless there are express provisions to the contrary,
all laws are intended to be prospective in their eect. Republic Act 3147 contained no provision
imparting to it retroactive eect. Thus, its application should be prospective in eect.

Without a retroactive application of Republic Act 3147; consequently, the contract entered into by
PHHC and DBP on October 25, 1995 was void because it was expressly prohibited by law as stated in
the unamended Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 85.

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The Supreme Court decision of February 28, 1960 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
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Persons CASE 14

Case Digest
Case 14: Zulueta vs Asia Brewery

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FACTS
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The petitioner, Perla S. Zulueta, is a dealer and an operator of an outlet selling the beer
products of the respondent, Asia Brewery, Inc., a company engaged in the manufacture,
distribution and sale of beer.

On March 30 1992, petitioner, Perla S. Zulueta, filed before the Iloilo Regional Trial Court a
complaint against the respondent, Asia Brewery, Inc., for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance and Damages on the grounds of the alleged violation of the Dealership
Agreement.

On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo case, Asia Brewery, Inc., filed with the
Makati Regional Trial Court a Complaint for the collection of a sum of money amounting to
PHP 463,107.75 which represents the value of beer products the respondent had delivered to
the petitioner.

In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved to dismiss the Makati case on the
ground that it had split the cause of action and violated the rule against the multiplicity of
suits. The motion was denied.

On January 3, 1997, the petitioner moved for the consolidation of the Makati case with the
Iloilo case. Judge Parentala, on February 13, 1997, granted the motion for the consolidation
of the two cases. The respondent filed for a Motion for Reconsideration, but such was denied
by the same judge on May 19, 1997.

On August 18, 1997, the respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
assailing Judge Parentalas orders of February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997 prescribed that
filing for the Petition of Certiorari is within a reglementary sixty-day period.

The records show that the respondent received the Order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration on May 23, 1997. Therefore, petitioner had sixty days or until July 22, 1997
to file for a Petition of Certiorari.

Respondent alleges that the Petition was filed on time because before the effectivity of the
1997 Rules on July 1, 1997, the reglemtary period was ninety days.

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ISSUES
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Whether or not the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure could be applied to the case on
hand YES

Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari filed by the respondent should have been given due
course NO

Persons CASE 14

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Whether or not the decision to consolidate the Makati and Iloilo cases was correct YES
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DECISION
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Article 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:
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Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
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However, there are exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is curative or
remedial in nature, or when it creates new rights.

Procedural laws (i.e. those statues relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights) may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even
without express provision to that effect.

The rule of filing of an original action of certiorari is clearly purely remedial or procedural in
nature because it does not alter or modify any substantive of the respondent. Although the
period for the filing of such petition was effectively shortened, still, respondent had not been
unduly prejudiced, considering he was not at all deprived of that right.

Hence, upon the effectivity of the 1997 Rules on July 1, 1997, the counsel of the petitioner still
had 21 days to file the petition for certiorari and to comply with the sixty day reglementary
period. Had the counsel be more prudent to the implications of the procedural changes,
respondents right of action would not have been foreclosed.

Given that the petition was filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period, the respondents
Petition for Certiorari should have been considered as not having been filed, and should not
have been given due course.

The petitioners obligation to pay for the beer products delivered by the respondent can exist
regardless of the alleged breach of Dealership Agreement. However, the obligation and the
relationship between the respondent and petitioner, as supplier and distributor respectively,
arose from the Dealership Agreement which is the subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case of 1992.
The petitioner claims that the obligation to pay was negated by the respondents contractual
breach. Thus, the non-payment of the petitioner to the respondent - the Makati case - is an
incident of the Iloilo case.

Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be
ordered consildated and jointly tried in court where the earlier case was filed. Thus, it would
be more practical and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their
consequences. The consolidation of the two cases becomes imperative to a complete,
comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related sources.

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Persons CASE 15

Case Digest | Vincent Tan


TAYAG VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992

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Facts:

Private respondent is the mother and legal guardian of her minor con, Chad Cuyugan, by the
father of the petitioner, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The petitioner is the known
administrartix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo,
who died intestate in Angeles City on September 29, 1983.

Private respondent has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years no
and during which time, she and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with
each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad
Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo.

Chad, the son of private respondent by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles
City on October 5, 1980, had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and
care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and
documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein private respondent.

The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to share the intestate
estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs. The
deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal
property, located in Baguio, Angeles, and in the province of Pampanga with approximate value
of several millions of pesos. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried
by the petitioner and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not
likewise been ascertained. The only knowing surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina
Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed. Private
respondent has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and
relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative
that said child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo.

Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for petitioner to grant Chas lawful
inheritance, but despite said demands, the latter failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo.

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Persons CASE 15

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Issues:

Whether or not Chad is entitled to inherit from Atty. Ocampos estate as his illegitimate child.

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Decision:
Yes. Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely
alleged that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition.
Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition, and the other to claim inheritance,
may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
Also, the action has not yet prescribed. The applicable law is Art. 285 of the Civil Code, which
states that the action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases: 1) if the father or mother died during the minority
of the child, in which the case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority. The court holds that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by
the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to our ruling in the
recent case of Rep. of the Phils. Vs. CA, et al., where we held that the fact of filing of the petition
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced in impaired by
the enactment of a new law.

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Persons CASE 16

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Persons CASE 17
LICHAUCO & COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.

SILVERIO APOSTOL, as Director of Agriculture, and RAFAEL CORPUS, as Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, respondents.

G.R. No. L-19628 December 4, 1922

Facts

Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under the Phil. laws, engaged for several years in the business of
importing carabao and other draft animals, and was desirous of importing, from Pnom- Pehn, a shipment of
draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, respondent Director of Agriculture
refused to admit said cattle except upon condition that drafts be immunized. Petitioner however contends that
the respondent has no authority over the matter, invoking section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended
by Act No. 3052. On the other hand, relying upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code, Admin. Order No.
21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, and Dept. Order No. 6 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
respondent maintained its decision. Hence, the issue.

Issue

Issue: Whether or not section 1770 (and other similar acts) has been repealed by implication by Act 3052 and
hence cannot be applied with the case at bar?

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Section 1770 of Administrative Code:

SEC. 1770. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries. When the Department
Head shall by general order declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign
country, port, or place and that there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals
therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such
animal, animal effects, parts, or products from such place, unless the importation thereof shall be authorized
under the regulation of the Bureau of Agriculture.

First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine
Legislature:

SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It shall be
unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from
any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had,
authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign

Persons CASE 17


countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be necessary for the
improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director
of

Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle
for the manufacture of serum:Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation,
bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations
issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to authorizing its
transfer to other provinces.

Department Order No. 6, promulgated on July 28, 1922, by Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources:
DEPARTMENT ORDER

NO. 6.} }

Series of 1922.}



Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exist in Hongkong,
French Indo-China and British India, it is hereby declared, in accordance with the provisions of section
1770 of Act No. 2711 (Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands of 1917), that rinderpest prevails in
said countries, and as there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle, carabaos,
and pigs therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine
Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from Hongkong, French Indo-China and
British India, unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of
Agriculture.

The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.

Ruling

Held and Reasoning: No. The Court ruled that the contention of the petitioner is untenable for the reason that
the invoked section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature while 1770 is a particular one. Section
1770 is therefore not inconsistent with section 1762 and instead be considered a special qualification of the latter
provision. Moreover, the court emphasized that specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a
general law upon a same subject unless it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so
repugnant..xxx...The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular
subject and the other as the general law of the land. Therefore, Section 1770 of the Administrative Code
remains in effect and serves as a supplementary provision to section 1762, as amended.

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Persons CASE 18

PEOPLE v. PIMENTEL (supra)



[288 SCRA 542 (1998), G.R. No. 100210] Ponente:
Martinez, J.
Date:

April 1, 1998 Topic/Subject Matter:

Article 22 2 Retroactivity, Effect of Repeal of Penal Laws Facts:

In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under R.A.1700 (the Anti-Subversion
Law) as amended before the RTC of Manila, and a warrant of arrest was issued on July 29, 1983, but was not
carried out due to his disappearance. After seven years, on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was arrested on the basis
of the warrant of arrest in the subversion case, and was likewise found to possess an unlicensed .38 caliber
special revolver and six rounds of live ammunition. Because of this, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 before the RTC in Makati.

Contention of the People:

Antonio Tujan filed the motion to quash the charge under PD No.1866 on the ground that he has been previously
in jeopardy of being convicted for Subversion, based on Sections 3(H) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, Tujan contends that common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition should be absorbed in subversion. The present case is the twin prosecution ofthe earlier subversion
case, and therefore he is entitled to invoke the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

Contention of the State:

Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second time because: (a) he has not even been arraigned in
the subversion case, and (b) the previous offense charged against him is for Subversion, punishable under RA
1700, while the present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion,
punishable under PD 1866, a different law.

Issue/s to be Solved:

WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA
1700.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under RA1700, as amended, and the one for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under PD 1866, as amended, can co-exist,
the subsequent enactment of of RA 7636 on Sept. 22, 1992, totally repealing RA 1700, as amended, has
substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being favorable to
the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent, should be given retroactive effect. With the
enactment of RA 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent has no more legal basis,
and should be dismissed. It would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private
respondent for an offense that no longer exists. Subversion charge against Tujan was dismissed, illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion against the same accused is deemed
amended. Accused was ordered to be released immediately from detention, since he was already detained for
7years, whereas the amended charge has a penalty of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years.

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Persons CASE 19

People v. Concepcion
G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)

FACTS:
Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion,a co-partnership. Defendants wife
was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747
which says that The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members
of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. This Section was in effect in
1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921.

ISSUE:

W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act
No. 2938.

HELD:

In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a punishment for any person
who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act
No. 2938 has served totake away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of
the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such
repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and
sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law.

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Persons CASE 20

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Persons CASE 21

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Persons CASE 22

CASE DIGEST: YNOT VS IAC


[G.R. No. 74457] March 20, 1987
By Bea Cadorna

!Petitioner: Restito Ynot

Respondents: Intermediate Apellate Court, The Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotic Nuevo,
Iloilo and Regional director, Bureau of Animal Industry Region IV, Iloilo City

!FACTS:
!Restituto Ynot, the petitioner, transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984 when the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, confiscated the carabaos due to the violation
of Section 1 of Executive Order No. 626 which read:

No carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order
as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

!The petitioner sued for recovery by filing a supersedeas bond of Php12, 000.00 which made the Iloilo city
Regional Trial Court issue a writ of replevin to recover the bond since the carabaos could no longer be produced.
!ISSUE: Is Executive Order No. 626 unconstitutional?
!ARGUMENTS:
! The petitioner claims that the penalty is invalid because his right to be heard before a competent and

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partial court was not exercised. Thus, there was no due process.
On the amendment of Executive Order No.626, the respondents affirmed that there is a need for such
measure to conserve and protect the carabaos and buffaloes for the benefit of the farmers who rely on
them for energy needs. They hold that the carabaos, as the poor mans tractor, have a direct relevance to
public welfare especially to food security. Thus, carabaos must be protected to prevent their improvident
depletion.
Executive Order No. 626, however, does not impose absolute ban on the slaughter but on their
movement. The prohibition of inter-provincial transport of carabaos is not seen as a prevention of their
indiscriminate slaughter since they can still be technically killed anywhere. As for the carabeef, it could
easily be circumvented by simply killing the animal. There is no reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved.
Executive Order No. 626 is also penal in nature, which means that the petitioner should have been
pronounced by the court of justice which has the authority to imposed the prescribe penalty only after
trial and not by the police.
There is also a question on the disposition of distributing confiscated property. There are no limitations
and guidelines stated to aid the officers in the distribution of seized property. Thus, this condition may be
an opportunity partiality, or worse, corruption.

Persons CASE 22

!RULING:
!The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the

carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. There is also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of seized properties. Therefore, the Executive
Order No. 626 promulgated by former president Ferdinand Marcos is declared unconstitutional.

!The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner.
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!CASE DIGEST: CUI VS ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

Persons CASE 23

[G.R. No. L - 15127] May 30, 1961


By Bea Cadorna

!Plaintiff: Emeterio Cui


Defendant-appellee: Arellano University
!FACTS:
!The plaintiff, Emeterio Cui, enrolled in the Arellano University College of Law from school year 1948-1849.

Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university from first year up to the first semester of fourth year.
During the second semester of his 4th year, he transferred to Abad Santos University College of Law because of
his uncle, Francisco C. Capistrano, who was also the incoming dean and chancellor of the said university that
time. When he was still in Arellano University, he was awarded scholarship grants for his scholastic merit,
wherein his tuition fees were refunded after every end of the semester. The total amount refunded by defendant
university to him from first year to the first semester of fourth year was Php 1,033.87.

!After graduating in Abad Santos University, the plaintiff needed to secure his transcript of records from the

defendant university for the former to be able to take the bar exams. The defendant refused until the plaintiff pay
back the said amount he incurred during his stay in Arellano University. Cui was also asked to sign a contract or
agreement stating that he is waiving his right to transfer to other schools unless he returned the total refund to the
defendant. According to the petitioner, he signed it under protest in order to acquire his transcripts and be able to
take the bar exams.

!On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private schools issued a memorandum No. 38 on the subject of
scholarship addressed to all heads of universities, schools and colleges. It states the following:
! Scholarships given to poor but gifted students should be encouraged. To stipulate the condition

that scholarships are only good if the students stay in the same school nullifies the principle of
merit of the award.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in school.
When the right of the student to transfer is being denied, it reserves the right to authorize such
transfer.

!ISSUE:
!The issue in this case is whether the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his

right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is
valid or not.

!ARGUMENTS:
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1. Defendant maintain that the said memorandum is null and void since the said officer has no authority to

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issue it, it was not approved by the department head nor was it published in the Official Gazette;
2. The provisions of the memorandum is also an advisory, not mandatory in nature;
3. Under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of
justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to
be prejudicial to the public welfare or good morals;
4. Scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine
but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest

Persons CASE 23

!RULING:
!The defendant is sentenced to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php1,033.87, as well as other costs amounting to

Php3,000.00 as moral damages, Php500.00 as exemplary damages, Php2,000.00 for attorneys fee and Php500
for expenses of litigation. The defendants counterclaim has been dismissed.

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