Petition for prohibition and mandamus moth a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg.
51 providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. Section of the statute
provides:
where
they
are
11. Mandaue
2. Bais
12. Manila
3. Canlaon
13. Naga
4. Caloocan
14. Ormoc
5. Cebu
15. Oroquieta
6. Cotabato
16. Ozamis
7. Dagupan
17. Pasay
8. Davao
18. Quezon
9. General Santos
(Pangasinan)
10. Iloilo
19.
San
Carlos
20. Zamboanga
providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers,
functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of local government units," 5 and empowered
local government units "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, subject to limitations as may be provided by law." 6 Art. XI, Section
4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the
supervisory power of the province where they are geographically located.
This is as it should be because of the complex and varied problems in a
highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity
which require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to
participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective
provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any
governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city. Thus, in the case
of Teves vs. Commission on Election 7 this Court, in holding that the
registered voters of the City of Dumaguete cannot vote for the provincial
officials of Negros Oriental because the charter of the city does not expressly
allow the voters in the city to do so, ruled:
The creation of Dumaguete City has made it a political entity
separate from and independent of the province of Negros
Oriental. The purpose of an election is to enable the
electorate to choose the men that will run their government,
whether national, provincial, municipal or city. It so, no useful
end will be served by allowing in the absence of express
legislative preference the voters of a city to ceased to
have any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said
city.
To confirm our view that the city of Dumaguete has been
segregated from the province of Oriental Negros for
purposes of provincial elections, we should point to the
penultimate section of the charter providing that "until
otherwise provided by law, the City of Dumaguete shall
continue as part of the first representative district of the
Province of Oriental Negros." This is an express exception to
the general effect of separation an exception that serves
to reiterate or even establish the rule. In other words, the
Congress meant that the inhabitants of the city may not vote
for provincial officials, but may vote for their representative in
Congress.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities
on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial
distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of
individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while
granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of
suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for
the provincial officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is
limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the
questioned statues neither withdraw nor restrict.
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for
elective provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the
exercise of suffrage and would violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to
the provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition
contemplated in the Constitution, however, has reference to such
requirements, as the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board
of Elections, 9or the New York requirement that to be eligible to vote in a
school district, one must be a parent of a child enrolled in a local public
school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621,
which impose burdens on the right of suffrage without achieving permissible
estate objectives. In this particular case, no such burdens are imposed upon
the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their
rights without any other requirement, save that of being registered voters in
the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of
republicanism as it would deprive a citizen his right to participate in the
conduct of the affairs of the government unit through the exercise of his right
of suffrage. It has been pointed out, however, that the provincial government
has no governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. These cities
are independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such
being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of
the provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally
affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for
not having been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This
contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city,
municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected 10 is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is
prospective 11 in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City
of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were
behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of
Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and
historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716
registered voters in the province, 234,582 are from Cebu City and 44,358
come from Mandaue City, so that 278,940 electors, or close to one-third (1/3)
of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu. Such charge has no factual and legal basis.
"Gerrymandering" is a "term employed to describe an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the
party in power. 12 The questioned statutes in this particular case do not
apportion representative districts. The said representative districts remain the
same. Nor has it been shown that there is an unfair advantage in favor of the
candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed out, it may
even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of the
administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes
will work to their disadvantage.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein
petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives
beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant
to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor
a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo
Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the
former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency
has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered
as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
October 7, 2013
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C.
Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint
that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein
respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does
forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate
No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally
parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier
rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly
removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its
owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to
complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping fee ofP500.00 were
not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against
each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery
under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an AffidavitComplaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and
three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent
Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary investigation took
place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a
case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's
employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 20031935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of
his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was
parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel
of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the
vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not
to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family
could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with
him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the
Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando
City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable
cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner.
Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez
stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for
the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain
and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing
the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their
failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations
of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the
law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the
respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged
into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered
owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No.
003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations
against them in Court.6
Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a
January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2,
2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the
two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action
or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that
charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more
than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1.
x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed
[sic] after two months."
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a
Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding
the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution
on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal
action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being
alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and
not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law
prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or
"AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition 16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the
ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled
erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged
against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the
Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities,
the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the
institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable
Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action
in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered
by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on
Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for
violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the
petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure,
these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These
criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the
assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in
Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint
should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old
Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated,
"shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month
prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did
not gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation
and punishment.
Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did
not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents
raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to
Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that
respondents were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by
the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no
legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the
civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was
contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the
private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense
and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004
only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but
did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner
also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No.
3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the
National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a
Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified
petition"26 before the court.
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases
shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section
451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall
not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly
urbanized cities or component cities. An independent component city has a
charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as
early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of
the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as
the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of
an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is
involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied
the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez,
Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that
case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was
received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled
that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1
of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such
courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced
only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred
to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission
of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As
a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
December 8, 2008
ROGELIO
Z.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1
to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.5
BAGABUYO, petitioner,
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1 with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No.
7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 9371 2 - the law that Resolution No.
7837 implements - is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G.
Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De
Oro."3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. 4 It
increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the
election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts - The lone legislative district of the City of
Cagayan De Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next
national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua,
Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang,
Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an,
Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and
Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig,
Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan,
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del
Mar v. PAGCOR,9 the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the
immediate exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City's
reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities
under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator - the material change in the political
and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well
as of the people therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power to decide on who
should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced
by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed
him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a
voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the
members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6)
government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the
sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.10
THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be
limited to the following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should
the instant petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative
reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the
division and conversion of a local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation
doctrine?
OUR RULING
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition
totally without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, andhabeas corpus.11 It was pursuant
to this original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals 12 and the RTCs,13 a
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set
out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an increasingly
overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our
exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise known as the
"principle of hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, the principle requires
that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.14
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be
exceptions
to
the
rule,
are
petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our nation's
lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed. 15 The present
petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised
- among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of
Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit - are reasons enough for
considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally,
the petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to
implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an
action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65
petition for certiorari.16For these reasons, we do not see the principle of
hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of the present
case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of
Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for
the City's legislative apportionment. This argument essentially proceeds from
a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of apportionment of
legislative districts and division of local government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or
other subdivision may send to a legislative body.17It is the allocation of seats
in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting
(since a new local government unit will come into being), provided that a
division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the unit
affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code. 25
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section
10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local
Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government
unit.26 In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment
or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case that arose from
the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the
fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The
plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for
Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city,
while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the
Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the
objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government
Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a
consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not
call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a
reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of
requirement for one under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a
consideration of the historical roots of these two provisions, the nature of the
concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and their areas of
application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC,28 we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the
American roots of our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the
Fourteenth Amendment29 of the U.S. Constitution and from the constitutions
of some American states. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the
Philippine Assembly,30 the body that acted as the lower house of the
bicameral legislature under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission
acting as the upper house. While the members of the Philippine Commission
were appointed by the U.S. President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate,
the members of the Philippine Assembly were elected by representative
districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of 1902
pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a
plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or
reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite
was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of
legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense,
be called a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member
of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It
is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government
are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as
a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a
province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate
unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will
choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has
a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief
executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the
voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the
affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it
has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no
capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation,
dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political
and corporate units. They are the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state.35 They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution
and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities
that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose
boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the
Constitution and the Legislature.36 A local government unit's corporate
existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and
a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.37
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the
state in carrying out the functions of government." 38 As a corporate entity with
a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises
special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency
of the community in the administration of local affairs" 39 and the mediums
part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in
the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country
has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two
congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a
quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in Congress.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is
unequal. District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has
127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is
composed mostly of urban barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the
principle of equality of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not
the number of registered voters therein. We settled this very same question
in Herrera v. COMELEC44 when we interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of
Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the number
of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the
official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa,
Administrator of the National Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual
population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the
August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows
thatbarangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total
population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts.45 The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation.46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one
representative," while ensuring representation for every province regardless
of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district
should comprise,as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are
found and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the
numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some
numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far
as practicable.
The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of
Cagayan de Oro City into two districts because the barangays in the first
district are mostly rural barangays while the second district is mostly urban, is
largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot
question the division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of
development or developmental focus as these are not part of the
constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a
matter for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence
of any grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal
parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies. 47
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2000"), this fell short of EO 135s requirements that (a) for intercensal years,
the certification should be based on a set of demographic projections and
estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board
(NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the
middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates
must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Further, using Mirandas own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos
Citys population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the
constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos Citys population
as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification
"by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable
as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrators designated certifying
officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use
demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or
make the projection as of the middle of 2010.1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration
Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July
2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008,
reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative population indicator
under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress
Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the population
census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual
population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos Citys
population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), adopts Malolos Citys claim that the 2007 census for Malolos
City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year 2010, the population
count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement." 8 This
unbecoming attack by the governments chief counsel on the integrity of the
processes of the governments census authority has no place in our judicial
system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called
data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the
performance of its functions.
The Certification of the City of Malolos Water District fares no better. EO 135
excludes from its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally
in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate the water districts so-called
population census to the level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to
render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population data
incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to
enter into legislative processes even though these private entities are not in
the business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training,
experience and competence to handle, collate and process them.
Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a
legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First
Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the
geographic mass of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement in
Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to
say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a
district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city
lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of
the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making
compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional
mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient
representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the
municipality of Bulacan in Malolos Citys legislative district. Although
unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the
constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring
efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents.
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent
Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH
FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.
SO ORDERED.
April 7, 2010
2nd District
3rd District
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action,
petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo,
as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the
respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of
Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took
effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In substance, the said
law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was
estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, 2distributed among four (4)
legislative districts in this wise:
District
Municipalities/Cities
Population
1st District
Del
Ragay
Lupi
417,304
Gallego Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
4th District
Sipocot
Cabusao
Pasacao
San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
San
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
474,899
Jose 372,548
429,070
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
a new second legislative district. The following table 3 illustrates the
reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District
Municipalities/Cities
1st District
Del
Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
2nd District
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
Population
176,383
San Fernando
Gainza
276,777
Milaor
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
439,043
Sangay
372,548
San
Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both
parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing
of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen
(13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step,
marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as
well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning
the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is
required by the Constitution for such new district. 4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval
of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga
City, which was a part of the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new
second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the
representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation
of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis
for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the
application of procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus
standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching
significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original
cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The
Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved
in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being
of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination
is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to
name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking
judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held
that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed.
This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez
v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing
principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the
determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared
considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly
created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as
of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati
as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall
be
entitled
to at
least
one
congressional
representative.28(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is
not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere
fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto
Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the
distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of
75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns
would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for
the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the
northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan
before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are
more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City
and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less
candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in
politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or
the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of
amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in
the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including
the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population
of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the
Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the
Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns
comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed
transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would
only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City
before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved
by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of
Region I, particularly Benguet.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further
narrates:
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet
with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the
municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod,
Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second
District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of
Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City
and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the
idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the
summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City
so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be
transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however,
pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower
during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase
the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and
professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio
would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters,
transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and
Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the
place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the
Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr.
Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the
fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many
government offices and functions.
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with
the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the
utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of
discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of
the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of
inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our
ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in
accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very
clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented
by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID
LAW.
SO ORDERED.
AURELIO
M.
UMALI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
BAUTISTA, Petitioner,
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No. 203974,
assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 1 and Minute Resolution No. 1209252 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, respectively, both
promulgated by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
and Petition for Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel
public respondent to implement the same.
The Facts
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed
Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into
a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code
of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed
Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that
for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City
in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu,
where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed
to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a
Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed
conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province
of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be
interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues
that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new
or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision
calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to
vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the
LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units
directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan Citys conversion
and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic
rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar
Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground
that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the
matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as
couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the
plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City
was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent component city
pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the
registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012, 3 the COMELEC En Banc
on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-2 4 ruled in
favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925.
The dispositive portion reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels
including the Reply-memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM regional elections
as per Resolution No. 9563.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as
G.R. No. 203974, on substantially the same arguments earlier taken by
petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other hand, public respondent
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component
city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion
will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be
created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that
no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the
powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political
units probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance
with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the
voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the
COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a calendar of activities and periods of
prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an
HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1, 2012.
Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in
Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan prayed that Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree that all
qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite,
and that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public
respondent from implementing the questioned resolution. On October 19,
2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.
On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 120989 suspended the preparations for the event in view of the TRO issued by
the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the plebiscite was once again rescheduled
In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position
by arguing that mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts surrounding the case, it cannot
be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautistas entitlement to the
relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the
Omnibus Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of
violence that ensued in the locality during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued
Resolution No. 1353 scheduling the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However,
a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in G.R. No. 203974 to
suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan Citys conversion.
Given the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court,
both cases were consolidated on March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the
qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those
in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the
Petition for Mandamus moot and academic for ultimately, the public
respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The only variation will be as
regards its participants.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.
Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should
be the basis for determining the qualified voters who will participate in the
plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected"
necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province
of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are qualified
to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their
claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the
voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty
of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days
after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as
referring only to the registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in
the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two
provisions, it is but proper that we ascertain first the relationship between
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power
cannot be delegated. Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation is
subject to certain exceptions allowed in the Constitution, namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution; and
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of
the LGC quoted earlier, which states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty
of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days
after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change
in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly
affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional
requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was
borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10,
Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local
government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of
the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the
consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was
required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the
people as opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This
plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. 12
It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the
conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the plurality of
those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the
constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes
in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given
the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that
the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally
apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 8528 13 was declared unconstitutional
in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela
without submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a
component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and
necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local
government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be
limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the
LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the
the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the
voters in the "political units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite.
Such construction should be avoided in view of the supremacy of the
Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed
to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly
affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a
vacuum. Their interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly requires that all residents in the
"political units directly affected" should be made to vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the
conversion of Puerto Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where
the ratification was made by the registered voters in said cities alone. It is
clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said plebiscites
was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on
who will vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel
issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to resolve the question.
As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality
or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of said
cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any
manner following the operative fact doctrinethat the actual existence of a
statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.18
We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose
boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are
entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is
thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of
Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed
new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate
than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. 21
xxxx
After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the
meaning of the phrase "political units directly affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.
To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and
eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros
Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square
kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will
be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the
consequent effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will
affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province
as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political
groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in
Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the
plebiscite contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the
plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or
units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. To
interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC19 and Padilla v. COMELEC20 are worth
revisiting.
The
entire
province
of
Nueva
affected by Cabanatuan Citys conversion
Ecija
will
be
directly
Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X,
we affirmed our ruling in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal
of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain the earlier finding that what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the
journal of the Constitutional Commission:23
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I
would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present
Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units."
However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe
there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee
about this.
Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr.
President, belong to one municipality?
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be
no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words
"unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the
units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is
affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)
Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged,
abolished, whatever, would the rest of the municipality not participate in the
plebiscite?
The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 155the predecessor of the LGCthus:
Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the
territorial boundaries of the province itself, it will have to be altered as a result
of the two municipalities that the Gentleman mentioned. 24
Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and
that is the reason we probably have to involve the entire province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two
municipalities which are being merged, but the entire province will now have
to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire
municipality have to vote? There are two barangays being merged, say, out
of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to participate in the
plebiscite?
In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was
modified to include not only changes in economic but also political rights in
the criteria for determining whether or not an LGU shall be considered
"directly affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be
participated in by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the
downgrading of an LGU from an independent component city to a component
city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby necessitating the
conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner
Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan Citys conversion to the
province of Nueva Ecija to justify the provinces participation in the plebiscite
to be conducted.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan Citys conversion into an HUC and its
severance from Nueva Ecija will result in the reduction of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC. The
law states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local
government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the
following manner:
IRA Share of
Nueva Ecija
Actual IRA
Share
Estimated IRA
share excluding
Cabanatuan
City
Reduction
Based on
Population
P800,772,618.45
P688,174,751.66
P112,597,866.79
Based on Land
Area
P263,470,472.62
P250,517,594.56
P 12,952,878.06
Total
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial
reduction of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view
of the economic impact of Cabanatuan Citys conversion, petitioner Umalis
contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also adverse,
deserves merit.
P125,550,744.85
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes
imposed in Cabanatuan City is well-founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of
the LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. Except as otherwise provided in
this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province
or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and
charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent
component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. (emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to
this, the province enjoys the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as
those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources, 26 professional taxes,27 and
amusement taxes28 over the component city. While, it may be argued that this
is not a derogation of the provinces taxing power because it is in no way
deprived of its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory,
the conversion will still reduce the provinces taxing jurisdiction, and corollary
to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in shares in local tax
collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a
material and substantial change to the provinces economic rights, warranting
its participation in the plebiscite.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a)
and 461(a) of the LGC is in order, viz:
Province of
Nueva Ecija
Cabanatuan
City
Province of
Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City
1,843,853
259,267
259,267
No. of Population
CY 2007 Census
Land Area
(sq. km.)
5,751.33
282.75
5,468.58
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation
to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
A component citys conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from
the province is a threat to the latters economic viability. Noteworthy is that
the income criterion for a component city to be converted into an HUC is
higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The
ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling
effect on the provinces operations as there would be less funding to finance
infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs. Moreover, the quality of
services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline in
ROBERTO
LACEDA,
SR., petitioner,
vs.
RANDY L. LIMENA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
From this Court's June 10, 2008 Resolution 1 dismissing his petition for
certiorari, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr. filed the instant motion for
reconsideration,2 insisting that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolutions dated
January 15, 20083and May 7, 20084 in SPA No. 07-028 (BRGY).
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private respondent Randy L. Limena
were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, West District,
Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007, Limena filed a petition for
disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate 5 against Laceda
before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served as
Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three consecutive terms since
1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the fourth time under Section
2 of Republic Act No. 91646 which provides:
SEC. 2. Term of Office.-The term of office of all barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be
three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the
term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected.
Limena likewise attached the following certification from the Department of
the Interior and Local Government:
SO ORDERED.11
Laceda moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
COMELEC in a Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, Laceda filed a
petition for certiorari before this Court.
On June 10, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently
show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in
rendering the assailed Resolutions of January 15, 2008 and May 7, 2008.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
basing its decision on the requisites enunciated in Lonzanida v. Commission
on Elections12 for the application of the three-term prohibition in Section
4313 of the Local Government Code.14 Laceda argues that said case is
inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the instant
case concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he
served his third term in a new political unit and therefore he should not be
deemed already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for
purposes of applying the three-term limit.15
For reasons hereafter discussed, the motion for reconsideration cannot
prosper.
inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters
who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive
terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong
Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,17 which involved a similar question,
this Court held that where a person has been elected for three consecutive
terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such threeyear term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the
city charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the
prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city
mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the terms.
Thus, conformably with the democratic intent of Rep. Act No. 9164 and this
Court's ruling in Latasa v. Commission on Elections, we hold that the
prohibition in Section 2 of said statute applies to Laceda. The COMELEC did
not err nor commit any abuse of discretion when it declared him disqualified
and cancelled his certificate of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, petitioner
Roberto
Laceda,
Sr.'s
Motion
for
Reconsideration18 dated July 25, 2008 assailing this Court's Resolution dated
June 10, 2008 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government
Code from which it was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of
the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new
blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same
office after a term of nine years. This Court has held that for the prohibition to
apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
(2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms. 16
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of
Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby
abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it
cannot be said that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the
SAADUDDIN
M.
ALAUYA,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SHALIMAR H. TAMANO and USMAN T.
SARANGANI, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to
nullify the Orders of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for
brevity) en banc dated January 2, 2002 and February 19, 2002 in SPA Nos.
01454 and 01455 (ARMM). The January 2, 2002 Order directed the
Provincial Board of Canvassers not to proclaim the winning candidates for
regional assemblyman in the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur, while the
February 19, 2002 Order denied the motion to dismiss SPA Nos. 01454 and
01455 (ARMM).
1. MENOR
47,729
2. SARANGANI
47,603
3. ALAUYA
46,737
4. BALINDONG
41,773
5. TAMANO
40,849
The Facts
Regular elections for regional governor, regional vice-governor, and
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao ("ARMM" for brevity) were held on November 26, 2001.
The first three (3) candidates for assemblyman of the ARMM receiving the
highest number of votes in each legislative district of the province were to be
proclaimed winners.
The 2nd District of the province of Lanao del Sur is composed of 21
municipalities. There was a failure of election in the municipality of Lumbatan
necessitating the holding of special elections in Lumbatan on January 7,
2002. Nevertheless, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Alexander Menor ("Menor" for brevity), who garnered the highest number of
votes based on the results of the 20 other municipalities. Considering the
number of registered voters in Lumbatan, the special elections would not
affect Menor's election as regional assemblyman.
On December 21, 2001, private respondent Shalimar H. Tamano ("Tamano"
for brevity) filed two (2) petitions, docketed as SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455,
to declare a failure of election in the 5 municipalities of Madalum, Madamba,
Sultan Gumander, Bacolod Kalawi, and Bayang of the province of Lanao del
Sur. Tamano claimed there was massive substitute voting in these 5
On January 7, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued the order directing "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers NOT to proclaim the alleged or supposed
winners and to continue and complete the canvass of election results in the
Second District of Lanao del Sur."
On January 9, 2002, Alauya filed a Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation
with the COMELEC. Sarangani followed suit with a similar motion on January
28, 2002. Alauya filed three (3) motions on January 24, 31, and February 6,
2002, praying for the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss and the Motions to
Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
In its order dated February 19, 2002, the COMELEC resolved to assume
jurisdiction and to continue hearing SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455. The
COMELEC also considered the motion to lift suspension of proclamation
submitted for resolution.
Alauya filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order on March 1,
2002. On March 5, 2002, the Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition.
On March 12, 2002, Alauya filed a motion reiterating the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. On March 19, 2002, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC "to CEASE and
DESIST from implementing the order of January 7, 2002 in SPA No. 01454
and SPA No. 01455 which suspended the proclamation insofar only as the
petitioner (Alauya) is concerned."
Meanwhile, Sarangani filed his comment joining Alauya in his petition praying
for the setting, aside of the subject COMELEC orders. Specifically, Sarangani
prays that the order suspending proclamation be extended to him so he may
also take his oath and assume office as regional assembly member.
The Solicitor General, for his part, maintains that the petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit for the following reasons: (1) there was no
violation of due process since Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code
empowers the COMELEC to motu proprio suspend the proclamation or annul
the proclamation if one has already been made as the evidence shall
warrant; (2) Alauya confuses a pre-proclamation controversy with a petition
to declare a failure of election or to annul election results; and that (3) the
COMELEC has the constitutional authority to declare a failure of election
pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and in
accordance with Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4 of
R.A. 7166.
The Issues
First issue: whether the order dated January 7, 2002 was issued in violation
of due process of law.
Alauya claims that the COMELEC did not notify him of any hearing
conducted prior to the issuance of the order dated January 7, 2002 in
violation of Section 242 1 which requires notice and hearing prior to the
suspension of proclamation.
1. MENOR
47,729
2. SARANGANI
47,603
3. ALAUYA
46,737
4. BALINDONG
41,773
5. TAMANO
40,849
Alauya argues that the above results of the 5 municipalities do not affect his
election as the No. 3 winning Regional Assemblyman of the ARMM. Without
the 5 municipalities, the results are:
MUNICIPALI
TY
MENOR
SARANGANI
ALAUYA
BALINDONG
TAMANO
1. MENOR
42,548
2. TAMANO
37,959
MADALUM
301
4,970
691
1,931
465
3. ALAUYA
36,680
S.
GUMANDE
R
470
4,197
871
6,358
533
4. SARANGANI
30,915
MADAMBA
968
6,106
515
1,384
598
B. KALAWI
406
252
2,428
1,352
196
BAYANG
3,036
1,163
5,552
1,022
1,098
TOTAL
5,181
16,668
10,057
12,047
2,890
5. BALINDONG
29,726
Alauya invokes Section 20 (i) 8 and Section 21 9 of R.A. 7166 which provide
that a winning candidate must be proclaimed if the issues raised do not affect
the results of the election. Moreover, he contends that the proclamation of
the winning candidates will not deprive the COMELEC of its authority to
continue hearing the petitions to declare a failure of election in the 5
municipalities.
These figures are not controverted by Tamano or the Solicitor General acting
on behalf of the COMELEC. However, simply deducting the election results
of the 5 municipalities from the election results of the other 16 municipalities
does not necessarily establish Alauya's theory that the over-all election
results will not change. In case the COMELEC declares a failure of election
in the 5 municipalities, special elections will have to be conducted. We
cannot discount the possibility that the results of the special elections may
still change the standing of the candidates. There is no allegation as to how
many registered voters there are in the 5 municipalities. The number could
". . . For even without the express constitutional prescription that only
this Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand why no
interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on
Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from
this Court. The observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in point, indicates the proper
approach. Thus: 'It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if
the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to
arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict
any order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body
would be speedily reduced to impotence."26
The COMELEC further argues that ". . . if a Regional Trial Court does not
have jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of government like
the ones cited above [referring to the former Court of Industrial Relations,
Philippine Patent Office, Public Service Commission, Social Security
Commission, National Electrification Administration and Presidential
Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such
jurisdiction over the Commission on Elections, a constitutional independent
body expressly clothed by the 1987 Constitution with, among others, quasijudicial functions and tasked with one of the most paramount aspects of a
democratic government. . . ."27 Finally, the COMELEC contends that the
temporary restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot
and academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined. 28
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
"SECTION 7. . . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within this days from receipt of a copy thereof."
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas
Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer(135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found
occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise:
". . . What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and
decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved
party may appeal to this Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed
COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of "final orders, rulings and
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
In view of the foregoing, public respondent's other contentions deserve scant
consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
Order dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The Regional
Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the
plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the
outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.
SO ORDERED.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside Resolution No. 2950
promulgated on November 3, 1997 by respondent Commission on Elections,
which amended its Resolution Nos. 2379, 2396 and 2778 on the districting
and adjustment of Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Panglungsod seats in
connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, on the alleged ground of grave
abuse of discretion tainting the same. In particular, petitioners, as taxpayers,
assail the portion of subject Resolution dividing the Province of Guimaras
into two provincial districts and apportioning eight (8) elective Sangguniang
Panlalawigan seats therefor.
In view of the addition of the two (2) new municipalities, San Lorenzo and
Sibunag, to the Province of Guimaras, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Guimaras decided to have the province subdivided into two provincial
districts. Conformably, on March 25, 1996, it passed Resolution No. 68
requesting the Commission on Elections to bring about the desired division.
Acting upon the said Resolution, the Provincial Election Supervisor in the
Province of Guimaras conducted two consultative meetings on August 21,
1996 and on October 2 of the same year, with due notice to all elected
provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads,
representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. Through
secret balloting, a consensus was reached unanimously in favor of a division
as follows:
(3 seats) (5 seats)
1. Buenavista 37,681 1. Jordan 25,321
3. Sibunag 17,773
Resolution No. 2950 of the Commission on Elections is the subject of the
present Petition for Certiorari brought by the petitioners, as taxpayers and
residents of the Province of Guimaras.
Petitioners question the manner in which the province was so divided into
districts, pointing out that: 1) the districts do not comprise a compact,
contiguous and adjacent area; 2) the "consultative meeting" upon which the
districting was based did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the
Sec. 3 (b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district,
the Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for
purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, as nearly as practicable according to the
number of inhabitants, each district comprising a compact,
contiguous and adjacent territory, and the number of seats of
elective members of their respective sanggunian shall be
equitably apportioned between the districts in accordance
with the immediately preceding paragraph;
xxx xxx xxx
A province with only one legislative district, such as Guimaras, should
therefore be divided into two provincial districts.
It must be noted that on April 30, 1997, the Province of Guimaras was reclassified from a fifth class to a fourth class province under Memorandum
Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance. Hence, the Province of Guimaras, having only one
legislative district, has to be divided into two provincial districts with an
allotment of eight elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by
virtue of its reclassification into a fourth class province.
The rules and guidelines to be followed by the Commission on Elections in
the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district is
provided for by law. Under the above cited R.A. 7166, division of provinces
into districts shall be done in a manner: (1) as nearly as practicable, (2)
according to the number of inhabitants, (3) each district comprising a
compact, contiguous and adjacent territory, and (4) the number of seats of
elective members of the respective Sanggunian equitably apportioned
between the districts.
clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of inhabitants of the
Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of
Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National
Statistics Office.
Petitioners' next contention is that the consultative meetings upon which the
districting was based did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the
province as the inhabitants were not properly represented during the said
meetings.
Again, this contention of petitioners is bereft of any basis. As duly certified to
by Mr. Romulo L. Lequisia, Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of
Guimaras, two consultative meetings were held by the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, one on August 21 and another on October 2,
1996, in order to arrive at a consensus on the matter of the proposed
districting of Guimaras into two Sangguniang Panlalawigan districts. And, as
shown by the documentary exhibits, all interested parties were duly notified
and represented during the two consultative meetings as required by
Comelec Resolution No. 2313. Appended to respondent Comelec's
Comment are the attendance sheets where the names and signatures of
those who attended the consultative meetings and the corresponding
barangay and/or group which they represented appear and which belie
petitioners' allegation that there was no valid representation.
Finally, petitioners maintain that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued Resolution No. 2950 because thereunder, the
municipalities which comprise each district do not embrace a compact,
contiguous and adjacent area.
Petitioners' asseveration is equally erroneous. Under Comelec Resolution
No. 2950, the towns of Buenavista and San Lorenzo were grouped together
to form the first district and the second district is composed of the
municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag. R.A. 7166 requires
that each district must cover a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory.
"Contiguous" and/or "adjacent" means "adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a
common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for
considerable distances." 3 Not even a close perusal of the map of the
Province of Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners' stance. On its face,
the map of Guimaras indicates that the municipalities of Buenavista and San
Lorenzo are "adjacent" or "contiguous". They touch along boundaries and are
connected throughout by a common border. Buenavista is at the northern
part of Guimaras while San Lorenzo is at the east portion of the province. It
would be different if the towns grouped together to form one district were
Buenavista and Nueva Valencia or Buenavista and Sibunag. In that case, the
districting would clearly be without any basis because these towns are not
contiguous or adjacent. Buenavista is at the north while Nueva Valencia and
Sibunag are at the southern and southeastern part of the province,
respectively.
Premises studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court is of the
irresistible conclusion, and so finds, that the respondent Comelec did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 2950.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the petition under consideration is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the
suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of
boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No.
128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims
these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta
claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that
they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz,
City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to
be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and
approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan
in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set
for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig
City. 2 Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas
covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo.
Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. 8 Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the
way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Indeed,
in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 9 we held that
The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the
territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to
state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is
far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final
determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays
are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held
in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality
of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised
by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the
holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending
determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections, 10 we struck down the moot and
academic argument as follows
JUANITO
MARIANO,
JR.
et
al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No.
7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It
was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents
of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following
grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the
land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the
"three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig
River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay
three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56
Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument
of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means
that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same
rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue
as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city
will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues
exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of
Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of
section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a
highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at
least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond
to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission
on Elections to commence at the next national elections to
be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first
district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form
part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2)
the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and
(3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias
v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts
may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more
than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish,
however, to add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the
local government unit to be created or converted should be properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe
the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make
R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not provide
for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause " as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is
unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a
cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It
pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the
local government unit to be created or converted should be properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe
the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make
R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not provide
for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause " as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is
unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a
cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It
pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish,
however, to add a few observations.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component
city, it follows that regional trial courts have the power and the authority to
hear and determine such controversy.
The Case
"(3) That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been
complied with[.]"5
Issue:
Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the authority to hear
and determine a cause.7 It is a question of law.8 As consistently ruled by this
Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. 9Because it is "a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court."10
Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the
Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), 11 which
provides:
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly
urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its
charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a
city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a
highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg.
643,14 which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, 15which
apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is
neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by
the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in
its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.16
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city,
not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality,
Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.
xxx
xxx
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions[."
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and
an independent component city of the same province, respondent court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
expressly withheld from their plenary powers. 21 They have the power not only
to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first
time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage.
Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 we held that boundary disputes
should be resolved with fairness and certainty. We ruled as follows:
the
challenged
MUNICIPALITY
OF
STA.
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO, Respondent.
FE, Petitioner,
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the September 30, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming in toto the August 27, 1992 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28, which dismissed Civil
Case No. 2821 for lack of jurisdiction.
On October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in the Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
28, Civil Case No. 2821 for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving
the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. As the parties failed to amicably
settle during the pre-trial stage, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial was almost over, with petitioners rebuttal witness already under
cross-examination, when the court, realizing its oversight under existing law,
ordered on December 9, 1988, the suspension of the proceedings and the
referral of the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. 3 In
turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed on the matter to its Committee on
Legal Affairs, Ordinances and Resolutions, which recommended adopting
Resolution No. 64 dated September 14, 1979 of the former members of its
Provincial Board.4 Said resolution previously resolved to adjudicate the
barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan as parts of respondents territorial
jurisdiction and enjoin petitioner from exercising its governmental functions
within the same. Subsequently, as per Resolution No. 357 dated November
13, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the Committees
recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further
proceedings and preservation of the status quo pending finality of the case.
Back in the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution No. 64 as final
and executory. In its Order dated February 12, 1991, 5 the trial court, however,
resolved to deny the motion ruling that since there was no amicable
settlement reached at the time the Provincial Board had exceeded its
authority in issuing a "decision" favoring a party. The court held that, under
the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an
opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the
Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court
proceedings shall be resumed.
Subsequently, respondent again filed a motion on June 23, 1992, 6 this time
praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. The ground relied
upon was that under the prevailing law at the time of the filing of the motion,
the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no longer with the trial court, primarily
citing the doctrine laid down by this Court in Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal.7
On August 27, 1992, the trial court resolved to grant the motion, thus:
A close study of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the
Municipality of Sogod case in relation to this case palpably shows that,
contrary to the claim of respondent Municipality of Sta. Fe, through counsel,
it involves boundary dispute as in this case.
As to the applicable law on the question of which agency of the Government
can take cognizance of this case or whether or not this Court should proceed
in exercising jurisdiction over this case, the same [had] been squarely
resolved by the [Honorable] Supreme Court in the Municipality of Sogod case
in this wise: "It is worthy to note, however, that up to this time, the
controversy between these two Municipalities has not been settled. However,
the dispute has already been overtaken by events, namely, the enactment of
the 1987 Constitution and the New Local Government Code x x x which
imposed new mandatory requirements and procedures on the fixing of
boundaries between municipalities. The 1987 Constitution now mandates
that []no province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.[] x x x Hence, any alteration or modification of the
boundaries of the municipalities shall only be by a law to be enacted by
Congress subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the barrios affected (Section 134, Local Government Code).
Thus, under present laws, the function of the provincial board to fix the
municipal boundaries are now strictly limited to the factual determination of
the boundary lines between municipalities, to be specified by natural
boundaries or by metes and bounds in accordance with laws creating said
municipalities."
In view of the above ruling, this Court can do no less but to declare that this
case has been overtaken by events, namely, the enactment of the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. The Constitution
requires a plebiscite, whereas the Local Government Code of 1991 provides,
as follows: "Sec. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local
government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the
case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the [s]angguniang [p]anlalawigan, or sangguniang
panglungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Code."8
The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been
denied,9 an appeal was elevated by petitioner to the CA. The CA, however,
affirmed in toto the assailed Order, holding that:
We are not unmindful of the rule that where a court has already obtained and
is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the case is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal or body. This rule,
however, is not without exception. It is not applicable when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character. As far as boundary disputes are
concerned, the 1987 Constitution is the latest will of the people, therefore,
the same should be given retroactive effect on cases pending before courts
after its ratification. It mandates that "no province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
On the other hand, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that "[a]
local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the
case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the [s]angguniang [p]anlalawigan or [s]angguniang
[p]anglungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its
territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed
in this Code (Book I, Title One, Chapter 2, Section 6, Local Government
Code).
Section 118, Title Nine, Book I of the same Code likewise provides:
duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by
the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior, whose decision
shall be final x x x."13
On June 17, 1970,14 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 612815 was approved amending
the afore-quoted section of the RAC, Sec. 1 thereof stated:
SECTION 1. Section Two thousand one hundred sixty-seven of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 2167. Municipal Boundary Disputes. How Settled. Disputes as to
jurisdiction of municipal governments over places, or barrios shall be heard
and decided by the Court of First Instance of the Province where the
municipalities concerned are situated x x x: Provided, That after joinder of
issues, the Court shall suspend proceedings and shall refer the dispute to the
Provincial Board x x x concerned for the purpose of affording the parties an
opportunity to reach an amicable settlement with the intervention and
assistance of the said Provincial Board x x x; Provided, further, That in case
no amicable settlement is reached within sixty days from the date the dispute
was referred to the Provincial Board x x x concerned, the court proceedings
shall be resumed. The case shall be decided by the said Court of First
Instance within one year from resumption of the court proceedings, and
appeal may be taken from the said decision within the time and in the
manner prescribed in Rule 41 or Rule 42, as the case may be, of the Rules
of Court x x x"
Subsequently, however, with the approval of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337
(otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983) on February 10,
1983,16 Sec. 2167, as amended, was repealed. 17 In particular, Sec. 79 of the
Code read:
SEC. 79. Municipal Boundary Disputes. Disputes as to the jurisdiction of
municipal governments over areas or barangays shall be heard and decided
by the sangguniang panlalawigan of the province where the municipalities
concerned are situated x x x in case no settlement is reached within sixty
days from the date the dispute was referred to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned, said dispute shall be elevated to the Regional Trial
Court of the province which first took cognizance of the dispute. The case
shall be decided by the said court within one year from the start of
proceedings and appeal may be taken from the decision within the time and
in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.18
Almost a decade passed and R.A. No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991 was signed
into law on October 10, 1991 and took effect on January 1, 1992. 19 As the
latest law governing jurisdiction over the settlement of boundary disputes,
Sections 118 and 119 of the Code now mandate:
SEC. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as
much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
xxx
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the
same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
xxx
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within
sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above.
SEC. 119. Appeal. Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of
Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to
the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute.
The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the
filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute
shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes. 20
This Court agrees with petitioners contention that the trial court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint when it was filed on October
16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section 2167 of the RAC, as
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6128, which granted the Court of First
Instance (now RTC) the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of municipal
boundary disputes. The antecedents of the Municipality of Sogod case reveal
that it dealt with the trial courts dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction
because at the time of the institution of the civil actions, the law in force was
the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the provincial
boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such cases.
The main point of inquiry, however, is whether the CA erred in affirming the
trial courts dismissal of the instant case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss the original jurisdiction to
hear and decide, the case had been vested on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and no longer on the RTC.
The Court rules that the appellate court did not err. The difference in the
factual setting notwithstanding,Municipality of Sogod still applies in the sense
that similar thereto the pendency of the present case has also been
overtaken by events the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the
enactment of the LGC of 1991.
As shown above, since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has been the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable
settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more
municipalities located in the same province. With the LGC of 1991, however,
a major change has been introduced that in the event the Sanggunian fails
to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification
to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the
reglementary period. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC of 199121 outlines the procedure for the settlement of boundary disputes
as follows:
ART. 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. - The following
procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary disputes:
(a.) Filing of petition The sanggunian concerned may initiate action
by filing a petition, in the form of a resolution, with the sanggunian
having jurisdiction over the dispute.
(b.) Contents of petition The petition shall state the grounds,
reasons or justifications therefore.
(c.) Documents attached to petition The petition shall be
accompanied by:
(1) Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the
LGU or any other documents showing proof of creation of
the LGU;
subject matter."22 Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of
the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was
duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the
choice of the proper forum was crucial for the decision of a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by
this Court as it would never become final and executory. 23 Likewise, the
standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action;24 otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make
the courts decision a "lawless" thing.25 As correctly pointed out by the RTC:
x x x It will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case concerning a
boundary dispute if its decision will not after all be followed by the people
concerned because the decision is totally unacceptable to them. How then
can the Court enforce its decision? x x x. 26
Petitioner, however, contends that the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
and the LGC of 1991 on the settlement of municipal boundary disputes
should be applied prospectively. The Court is not unmindful of the rule that
where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is
not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal.27 An exception to this rule, however, lies where the statute
either expressly provides or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate on actions pending before its enactment. 28 Hence, this Court has
held that a law may be given retroactive effect if it so provided expressly or if
retroactivity is necessarily implied therefrom and no vested right or obligation
of contract is impaired and it does not deprive a person of property without
due process of law.29
It is readily apparent from the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the
LGC of 1991 that their new provisions and requirements regarding changes
in the constitution of political units are intended to apply to all existing political
subsidiaries immediately, i.e., including those with pending cases filed under
the previous regime, since the overarching consideration of these new
provisions is the need to empower the local government units without further
delay.
Furthermore, the RTC can still review the decision of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan under the new set-up, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, so no substantial prejudice is caused by allowing retroactivity.
The Court, therefore, sees no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on
the part of the CA in affirming the trial courts dismissal of petitioners
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
For Our review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversing to a certain extent that3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between the
Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary
extended up "to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and
Kalinga-Apayao."4 By this extension of Marcos' eastern boundary, the CA
allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.
The Facts
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of
Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc,
Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each
of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial
government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the
township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated
September 30, 1916.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22,
1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No.
3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province
of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and
constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going
down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is
the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the
Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by
the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the
barrio of Biding.
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear
that Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely:
Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The
Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence,
if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be
considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named
only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however,
lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second
paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary."
It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase
refers to the present adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a single province.
Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was
enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14, 1995, the province of KalingaApayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao, was
further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant
to R.A. No. 7878.
The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the
province of Apayao. Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the second
paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary.
On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary,
Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its
eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the
fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos
Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained
by it.6
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after
almost 30 years,7 or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan
passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution
Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated
Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and
approval. The SP, on the other hand, required Marcos to submit its position
paper.9
In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern
boundaries under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos NorteMountain Province boundary, respectively, its eastern boundary should not
be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was
coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to
Marcos, its eastern boundary should extend further to the east or up to the
Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant to the description of its eastern
boundary under R.A. No. 3753.10
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that
Nueva Era was cut into two parts. And since the law required that the land
area of a municipality must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's
northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory but
that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the
middle portion11 of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern
portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Nio,
Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1993. It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land area was
an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It
argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos must be
protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12
According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras
only. And since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of
Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should
not go beyond the territory of said barrios.13
From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been
considered to be aligned and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the
adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, based on a re-survey in 1992,
supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A.
No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part
of Marcos.14 This was the area of Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era that
Marcos claimed in its position paper.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era.
The fallo of its decision15 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no
alternative but to dismiss, as it hereby DISMISSES said petition for
lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more
or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.16
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos,
but none of Nueva Era's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed,
applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of
Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos. 17
The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it
would encroach upon a portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern
boundary of Marcos is indeed Mountain Province, Marcos will then
SIMEON
M.
VALDEZ
2nd District
line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (KalingaApayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves
no room for equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:
"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary
going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by
the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos NorteMt. Province boundary; on the South by the Padsan River,
which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest by the boundary between the municipalities of
Batac and Dingras."
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern
boundary also of Marcos and refusing to go farther to the boundary
line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao)
is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone can do.
Both the SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of
Congress.
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any
part of Nueva Era and merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with
conclusive knowledge that when it provided that the eastern
boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision
was already Kalinga-Apayao), it would be cutting through a portion of
Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be applied. Dura lex sed
lex!29
The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos
and Kalinga-Apayao; and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of
Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao, to wit:
Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of
Marcos to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part of the
municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra is between
Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province is geographically erroneous.
From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1, which also depicts the
locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and
Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into
the provinces of Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and
Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the south of Kalinga
Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain
Province, which is farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern
boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-Apayao is the eastern
boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary
of the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra. 30
However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva
Era was denied. The CA ruled:
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio
that is separated from its mother town Nueva Era and now lies east
of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras and north of Marcos, it
bears stressing that it is not included within the area of Marcos as
defined by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio,
Marcos is laying claim to it to be integrated into its territory by the SP
because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.
We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the
claim, for it will necessarily substantially alter the north eastern and
southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined by law and unduly
enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True, the SP may
substantially alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction.
But this means the alteration of the boundary of a barangay in
relation to another barangaywithin the same municipality for as
long as that will not result in any change in the boundary of that
municipality. The area in dispute therefore remains to be a part of
Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva Era although separated by the newly
created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local
Government Code which states:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from
one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises
two or more islands or is separated by a local government
xxxx
Our Ruling
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not
explicitly grant the right of further appeal from decisions of the RTCs
in boundary disputes between or among local government units,
Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the adverse decision of
the RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental
legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive
dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action
for certiorari.32
Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues
Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review
under Rule 42.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes
involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The
dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the disputing
municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.34
The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties.
The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by
Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether the RTC
judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.
The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not
appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the RTC decision may be
made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code 35 which
provides:
At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to
create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without
conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in
Dingras, where it was derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. 44 It is the
basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given
prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive
application is so provided.45
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the
City of Mandaue, the Court has this to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as
unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents of the
city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration
of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be
subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It
is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of
the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21,
1969.47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).
Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely
interpreting the law that created it. Its creation was already a fait
accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further require a plebiscite.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution
should be given only a prospective application unless the contrary is
clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or
vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence
of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the
Constitution.48
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos
under R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its
territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province
of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and
constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of
territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute
enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must
necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the
rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.50
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part
of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by
interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. 51 The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 52
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the
enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set,
their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion
finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which
states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally.53
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by
the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of
Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother
municipality of Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the
explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent
of the statute.54
Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating
Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges
that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is
within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going
down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is
the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the
Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by
the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos NorteMt. Province boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory
because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos NorteMt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to
reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the
middle portion of Nueva Era.
Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva
Era but also to its northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated
from the major part of Nueva Era.
Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be
discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in
order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular
provision thereof, should be considered. 56 Every section, provision or clause
of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law, and every part
of the act is to be taken into view.57
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one
which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has
in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned
against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the
legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe
statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and
that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results."58
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for
its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.59
SO ORDERED.
(Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still
pending up to this date.
STA.
LUCIA
REALTY
&
DEVELOPMENT,
Inc., Petitioner,
vs.
CITY
OF
PASIG, Respondent,
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Intervenor.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision 1 and the January 27, 2005
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603, which affirmed
with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision 3 and October 9, 1998
Order4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, in Civil
Case No. 65420.
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, 9 docketed as Civil Case No.
65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including
penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,
599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements thereon (the
subject properties).
Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real
estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue
of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by
Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial
jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes
for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta. 10
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered
owner of several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in
Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig5 (Pasig).
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that
covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,
Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The two combined lots
were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the
proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for
the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a
"prejudicial question" to the resolution of the case. 12
TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869
and 92870.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial
building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate
corporation, was built on it.6
Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered
the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No.
39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.7
The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of merit.
Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and
location,13 the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of
Pasig:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of [Pasig], ordering Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:
1) P273,349.14 representing unpaid real estate taxes and penalties
as of 1996, plus interest of 2% per month until fully paid;
2) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land
boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City
The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case presented a
"prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x Pasig can collect
the realty taxes due over the subject properties." 19
Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition for Certiorari filed
before this Court on November 29, 2000, but this was denied on June 25,
2001 for being filed out of time.20
Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was raffled to the
(former) Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTCs judgment:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of P50,000.00 attorneys fees is DELETED. 21
In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no proper
legal basis to suspend the proceedings.22 Elucidating on the legal meaning of
a "prejudicial question," it held that "there can be no prejudicial question
when the cases involved are both civil." 23 The Court of Appeals further held
that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as alleged by Cainta
to be present, were not met.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated January 27, 2005.
Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions for Certiorari with
this Court. Caintas petition, docketed as G.R. No. 166856 was denied on
April 13, 2005 for Caintas failure to show any reversible error. Sta. Lucias
own petition is the one subject of this decision.24
In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of the Court of
Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING [WITH
MODIFICATION] THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN
PASIG CITY
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSPENDING
THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE PENDENCY OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE
WHICH WILL FINALLY DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF
CAINTA WAS VALID PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
IN THE MEANTIME THAT THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO
CITY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY RESOLVED, THE
PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD BE PAYING THE REALTY TAXES ON
THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH THE INTERVENOR CAINTA TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.25
Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts correctly decided
the case considering that the TCTs are clear on their faces that the subject
properties are situated in its territorial jurisdiction. Pasig contends that the
principles of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and res judicata are all
inapplicable, due to the absence of their requisite elements. Pasig maintains
that the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of the
complaint for collection of realty taxes which was filed before the Pasig RTC.
It avers that the doctrine of "prejudicial question," which has a definite
meaning in law, cannot be invoked where the two cases involved are both
civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there is no legal ground to preclude the
simultaneous hearing of both cases, the suspension of the proceedings in
the Pasig RTC is baseless.
Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal authority over the
subject properties, which fall within its territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims
that while it has been collecting the realty taxes over the subject properties
since way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for real property tax
purposes in 1990, 1992, and 1993. Cainta also insists that there is a
discrepancy between the locational entries and the technical descriptions in
the TCTs, which further supports the need to await the settlement of the
boundary dispute case it initiated.
The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down into two basic
issues:
1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding Pasigs
Complaint without waiting for the resolution of the boundary dispute
case between Pasig and Cainta; and
2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes
to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or to Pasig, as the
location stated in Sta. Lucias TCTs.
We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta
would determine which local government unit is entitled to collect realty taxes
from Sta. Lucia.26
The
Local
Government
To Collect Real Property Taxes
Unit
entitled
The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that the resolution
of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the
assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and bounds of their
respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of
Appeals27 wherein we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of
both its ownership and location.28 The Court of Appeals even referred to
specific provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act. No. 496 to
support its ruling that Pasig had the right to collect the realty taxes on the
subject properties as the titles of the subject properties show on their faces
that they are situated in Pasig.29
Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the "Real Property Tax Code," the
authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the locality where the
property is situated:
xxxx
Title
as
It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property taxes it
already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its boundary dispute with
Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently argued that the boundary
dispute case is not a prejudicial question that would entail the suspension of
its collection case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of
Pasig v. Commission on Elections,42 when it sought to nullify the COMELECs
ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of the boundary dispute case),
the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of Barangay Karangalan. We agreed
with the COMELEC therein that the boundary dispute case presented a
prejudicial question and explained our statement in this wise:
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case
No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays
may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where
both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general
rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in
the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case
pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the
first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas
covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo.
Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the
way for potentially ultra viresacts of such barangays. x x x. 43 (Emphases
ours.)
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in
abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that
the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will
undeniably affect both Pasigs and Caintas rights. In fact, the only reason
Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta.
Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another
local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the
contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy,
then there would be no controversy at all.