OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
S.C. 19310
VINCENT J. BIFOLCK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF JEANETTE D. BIFOLCK
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.
PHILIP MORRIS, INC.
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE AMICUS ISSUE................................................................................ i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.................................................. vi
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................... 5
I.
B.
2.
3.
C.
D.
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 20
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo.1992)......................................................... 18
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978) .............................................. 18, 19
Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994).......................................... 9, 17, 19
Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5 (S.C. 2010)................................................ 18, 19
Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.W. 1995).................................................. 19
Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518 (N.J. 2000)........................................................... 19
Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E.2d 393(W.V.1989) ................................................................ 18
Comacho v. Hondo Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987).............................................. 17
Dart v. Weibe Mfq., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985)................................................................... 17
Delaney v. Deere and Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000)....................................................... 19
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248 (N.Y. 1995).................................................. 18, 19
DeWitt v. Evereadv Battery Co., 550 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. App. 2001) ................................... 18
Diluzio-Gulino v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 897 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super App. Div.
2006)............................................................................................................................... 18
Endresen v. Scheels Hardware &Sports Shop, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 225
(N.D.1997)...................................................................................................................... 18
First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enters., Inc., 686 N.W.2d 430 (S.D. 2004).......................... 18
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989)............................... 18
Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000)................................... 19
Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284 (1965)...................................................................... 1, 5
General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).................................. 17
General Motors Corp. v. Jernigan, 883 So.2d 646 (Ala. 2003)........................................... 18
Giglio v. Connecticut Light &Power Co., 180 Conn. 230(1980)..........................................6
Green v. Smith &Nephew AHP, Inc., 245 Wis. 2d 772 (2001)........................................... 19
expectation test; see Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (SC 19232)
(majority opinion); and adopt 1, 2(b), and 4 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, with or without the associated commentary? ... (concurring opinion).
CBIA accepts this Court's invitation and submits this amicus brief in favor of adopting the
analysis set forth in the Izzarelli concurrence for design defect cases.
~'~~_~~~I~ill~~~l~y_~~i+y
The following facts are relevant to CBIA's amicus position:
Connecticut manufacturing is a powerful economic force, employing 162,000
workers, paying $280 million in taxes, and adding $28 billion to the state's GDP annually.3
From power tools to roof racks, jet engines to fire alarms, products made in Connecticut are
sold throughout the United States and around the world.
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) reports that there are over 4,000
manufacturing
businesses in
Connecticut.4 Those
significantly to the Connecticut tax base providing $280 million in taxes.5 The
manufacturing industry also employs over 160,000 people in Connecticut.6 Manufacturing
at
4 See NAM, CT Data, March 2016,available at http://www.nam.orq/Data-and-Reports/StateManufacturing-Data/ (last visited June 7, 2016). The Connecticut data shows that there
were 4,152 manufacturing business in 2012 and 4,068 in 2013.
5 See Connecticut Department of Revenue Services FY 2014-2015 Report is available at
htt~://www.ct.gov/drs/lib/drs/research/annualreport/drs fy15 annual report.pdf (last visited
June 7, 2016).
6 See NAM, CT Data, March 2016, available at http://www.nam.arg/Data-andReports/State-Manufacturing-Data/ (last visited June 7, 2016). NAM collected this data
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau and reported
manufacturing employment numbers of 164,200 in 2014 and 160,700 in 2015 in
Connecticut.
accounts for 9.5% of the Connectiuct workforce. This accounts for approximately $13.6
billion in total manufacturing wages in this state.$ Connecticut manufacturers have added
$27.8 billion to Connecticut's gross state product.g in fact, manufacuring accounts for
10.5% of Connecticut's gross state product.10 In addition, Connecticut manufacturers
helped drive Connecticut's economy with $14.63 billion in manufactured goods exported
last year.'~
In short, manufacturing is the lifeblood of the Connecticut economy. Connecticut law
should not place companies that choose to locate in this state at a competitive
disadvantage compared to similar businesses in other states. By adopting the Restatement
(Third) in design defect cases, Connecticut's test for determining manufacturers' liability for
the design of products will be clear and will be in line with the test that is used by a majority
of states. This will allow Connecticut manufacturers to understand the standards by which
their products will be evaluated and to innovate in that context, without being subject to a
greater risk of liability than in other states.
See NAM, Manufacturing Employment by State, March 2016, available
http://www.nam.org/Data-and-Reports/State-Manufacturing-Data/State-ManufacturinqData/Manufacturing-Employment-by-State-March-2016/ (last visited June 7, 2016).
at
See NAM, Connecticut Manufacturing Facts, available at http://www.nam.orq/Data-andReports/State-Manufacturing-Data/State-Manufacturing-Data/March-2016/ManufacturinqFacts--Connecticut/ (last visited June 7, 2016).
/alt~1~J~il~l~~~
I.
In 1965, the American Law Institute issued the Restatement (Second) of Torts, with
section 402A addressing product liability claims. See V. Schwartz, "The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Product Liability The American Law Institute's Process of Democracy and
Deliberation," 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 743 (1998). The key language from this section created a
strict liability standard for manufacturers of products with defects that were "unreasonably
dangerous:"
"One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property.... [This rule] applies although ...the seller has exercised
a!I possible care in the preparation and sale of his product."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 746.
The same year that the Restatement (Second) was released, Connecticut issued its
decision in Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284 (1965), in which it became one of the first
states to adopt the principles contained in section 402A. In subsequent cases, the Court
reaffirmed its adherence to the Restatement (Second). See Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn.
496 (1970); Rossiqnol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549 (1967). The
Court adopted the elements of a product liability claim as set forth in section 402A.12 The
12 Under that standard, to prevail in a product liability action the plaintiff must prove: "(1) the
defendant was engaged in the business of selling the product; (2) the product was in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user; (3) the defect caused
the injury for which compensation was sought; (4) the defect existed at the time of the sale;
and (5) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial
~7
Court also adopted the "consumer expectation test" as the standard for determining
whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous." This test is set forth in comment (i) to
section 402A: to be unreasonably dangerous, "the article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." 2
Restatement (Second), supra, 402A, comment (i). See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool
Co., 241 Conn. 199, 214-15 (1997).
As product liability claims based on design defects and failure to warn developed,
courts struggled to apply the concepts of Section 402A, including the consumer expectation
test, in adjudicating those claims. See Restatement (Third) 1 cmt. a ("it soon became
evident that 402A, created to deal with liability for manufacturing defects, could not
appropriately be applied to cases of design defects or defects based on inadequate
instructions or warnings."). Some courts began using risk utility tests to evaluate product
design by considering several nonexclusive factors, including "the manufacturer's ability to
eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it
too expensive to maintain its utility." Potter, 241 Conn. at 213 (citing J. Wade, "On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products," 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)). Yet,
Connecticut continued to adhere to the "consumer expectation" standard as set forth in the
Restatement (Second). See Potter, 241 Conn. at 215-16.
In 1995, a tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts contained a requirement
that, to prove a design defect a plaintiff must prove in his prima facie case the availability of
change in condition." Giglio v. Connecticut Light &Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 233-34
(1980).
6
a "reasonable alternative design." Based on this draft, in 1997, the defendants in Potter,
241 Conn. at 215-1'6, argued that this Court should "abandon the consumer expectation
standard and adopt the requirement that the plaintiff must prove the existence of a
reasonable alternative design in order to prevail on a design defect claim." In considering
the defendants' argument, the Court in Potter took note of the Draft Restatement (Third)
alternative reasonable design requirement:
Specifically, 2(b) of the Draft Restatement (Third) provides: "[A] product is
defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe." The reporters to the Draft
Restatement (Third) state that "[v]ery substantial authority supports the
proposition that [the] plaintiff must establish a reasonable alternative design in
order for a product to be adjudged defective in design." Draft Restatement
(Third), supra, 2, reporters' note to comment (c), p. 50. We point out that
this provision of the Draft Restatement (Third) has been a source of
substantial controversy among commentators.
Potter. 241 Conn. 199 at 215-16.
The Court in Potter ultimately "decline[d] to adopt the requirement that a plaintiff
must prove a feasible alternative design as a sine qua non to establishing a prima facie
case of design defect." Id. at 219. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the
ordinary consumer expectation test, but also "recognize[d] that there may be instances
involving complex product designs in which an ordinary consumer may not be able to form
expectations of safety." Id. Thus, the Court adopted a "modified consumer expectation test"
for such circumstances, in which "a consumer's expectations may be viewed in light of
various factors that balance the utility of the product's design with the magnitude of its
risks." Id. at 220. The Court allowed the trial courts "to determine whether an instruction
based on the ordinary consumer expectation test or the modified consumer expectation
7
It has been twenty years since Potter was decided, and product liability law has
continued to evolve since that time. It is now widely accepted that design defect claims
should be evaluated under arisk-utility test, with consideration of evidence of a reasonable
alternative design
incorporates both concepts. Connecticut should join the majority of jurisdictions and adopt
the approach set forth in the Restatement (Third) for design defect claims by employing a
single risk-utility balancing standard based on proof of a reasonable alternative design.
1.
The Restatement (Third) was drafted in response to the difficulty courts were having
addressing claims for design defect and failure to warn using the standards in section
402A, which was intended to apply to manufacturing defects. The former two categories
are premised on a different concept of responsibility than the latter; manufacturing defects
are assessed by comparing the product to the manufacturer's own standards, whereas
design defects and warnings require an analysis of many factors. The standards in the
Restatement (Third) take into account the subtleties and factual nuances of each product at
issue in each case.
Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts sets forth distinct principles of liability
for the three major categories of product defect: manufacturing defects, design defects, and
inadequate warnings. With respect to design defects, Section 2(b) provides:
A product ... is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
E:3
in lieu of the current two-test system would clarify Connecticut law. It would eliminate the
confusion that now exists about "whether an instruction based on the ordinary consumer
expectation test or the modified consumer expectation test, or both, is appropriate in light of
the evidence presented." Potter, 241 Conn. at 223. Also, because "the risk-utility test is
neither a strict liability nor a negligence standard, but reflects a blend of the two, and thus
displaces those theories in design defect cases," Izzarelli, 321 Conn. at 233, adopting a
single standard risk-utility test would eliminate the threat of inconsistent verdicts due to
instructions on multiple theories of liability arising from the same product defect. These
important clarifications would create efficiencies in product liability cases, and ease the
courts' burden in administering them.
Clarifying and simplifying Connecticut product liability law would also fulfill the
purpose of the Connecticut Product Liability Act, which was intended to simplify product
liability actions by requiring plaintiffs to bring all product liability claims under a single
statutory cause of action.14 As the Izzarelli concurrence observed, "a single standard
tailored specifically to design defect claims would do away with the need to plead or prove
separate strict liability and negligence theories and avoids the confusing use of multiple
theories to address the same underlying issue whether the manufacturer chose a
reasonably safe product design." Izzarelli, 321 at 240-01. As a result, the CPLA and the
For example, during debate of the CPLA, Rep. Berman explained: "[I]t is a single cause
of action. It eliminates the complex pleading which we presently have involving, as I said,
warrantee and strict liability and negligence...." Transcript of House Floor Debate, May
10, 1979, 22 House of Representatives Proceedings, Part 20, 1979 Session at 7021-22.
This purpose was reiterated the following day: "We are now going with a single product
liability cause of action. Formally we had a concept of strict liability. We had negligence
and we had warrantee causes .... So now we are going with one single product liability
cause of action." Transcript of House Floor Debate, May 11, 1979, 22 House of
Representatives Proceedings, Part 21, 1979 Session at 7286-87.
14
10
Restatement (Third) are entirely consistent. Adopting the Restatement (Third) would fulfill
the Connecticut legislature's intent to simplify product liability law.
2.
11
comparison, leaving the jury with only vague guidance about whether a product design is
defective." Izzarelli, at 226.
This Court should adopt the reasonable alternative design requirement of the
Restatement (Third) to ensure that Connecticut factfinders are presented with evidence
from which they can reasonably determine whether a product at issue actually could
reasonably have been made safer at the time of design and manufacture, rather than
arbitrarily assessing whether there was some possible way their products could have been
made safer before they were sold without regard for feasibility, practicality, or cost.
3.
By balancing the risks and utilities of a product, and providing an objective basis for
factfinders to assess whether a product is reasonably safe, the risk-utility test of the
Restatement (Third) and its reasonable alternative design requirement create an
environment where manufacturers understand the standards by which their products will be
evaluated. This allows manufacturers to innovate and develop new products that may have
useful, but inherently dangerous characteristics that cannot feasibly be made safer.
Manufacturers will not be held liable for a product design without a plaintiff showing that
there was something that the manufacturer reasonably could have done to make a product
safer. This is consistent with the state's well-established policy that manufacturers are not
insurers of all injuries caused by their products. Potter, 241 Conn. at 210.
Having clear and fair standards will encourage manufacturers to innovate new
products from which consumers will benefit. It would avoid the concern of the Izzarelli
concurrence that "[i]mposing liability for a product, despite the absence of reasonable
12
alternatives, could deprive consumers of an otherwise useful product if the risk of adverse
verdicts prompts the manufacturer either to cease production or to significantly increase the
cost of the product, rendering it prohibitively expensive for some consumers." izzarelli, at
226-27. The Restatement (Third) presents a balanced approach to liability that takes into
account the practical and real-world considerations that go into developing, designing, and
manufacturing new products.
The risk utility test, and its reasonable alternative design requirement, is not just the
best, but also the most fair test for design defect cases. The risk utility test provides the
proper balance between encouraging innovation and development while holding
manufacturers responsible for designs that are not reasonably safe.
C.
Notably, in Potter, the plaintiffs presented evidence of design alternatives at trial. See
241 Conn. at 204-206, 225.
13
In declining to adopt the draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the Court
specifically identified two concerns with the alternative design requirement:
"Such a rule would require plaintiffs- to retain an expert witness even in
1.
cases in which lay jurors can infer a design defect from circumstantial
evidence;" id. at 217-18;
2.
"[I]n some instances, a product may be in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user even though no feasible alternative design
is available;" id. at 219.
These concerns, however, no longer apply. The final Restatement (Third) took these
concerns into account and squarely addressed them.
The first concern is addressed in Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
entitled "Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect." This provision
provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
Accordingly, section 3 dispenses with the requirement of proof of an alternative design in
these circumstances. Instead, it allows a jury to infer the existence of some product defect
from the nature of the product failure, along with evidence showing that the product's failure
was not caused by something other than a defect.
The Restatement (Third) also addresses the Potter Court's second concern by
eliminating the alternative design requirement when the product design at issue is
manifestly unreasonable. See Restatement (Third) of Torts at 2, cmt. (e). As the Izzarelli
concurrence observed, "[t]he Restatement (Third) acknowledges that, in rare and extreme
14
cases, a product design may be so obviously unacceptable that a manufacturer can fairly
be held liable for harm even if no safer alternative is feasible." Indeed, the Restatement
(Third) provides that in situations involving manifestly unreasonable designs, a jury may
"conclude that liability should attach without proof of a reasonable alternative design" when
"the extremely high degree of danger posed by [a product's] use or consumption so
substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully
aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product."
Restatement (Third) of Torts at 2, cmt. (e).
Moreover, the Reporters of the Restatement have noted that there is no substantive
difference between Potter and the current Restatement (Third) standard:
The Connecticut Supreme Court's analysis in Potter is, in actuality, perfectly
consistent with this Restatement," and it is recommended that, "when the
issue is next before [that] court, [it] may find it easier to accept the
Restatement as consistent with its position as articulated in Potter. Whatever
ambiguities in the earlier draft may have misled the court in this regard, those
ambiguities have since been eliminated.
Izzarelli, 321 Conn. at 231 (discussing Restatement (Third), supra, at 2, Reporters' Note
to cmt. (d), pp. 72-73).
One fundamental significance of adopting the Restatement (Third) would be
recognition of a reasonable alternative design requirement in all cases where no exception
applies. However, as a practical matter, the lack of such a requirement does not appear to
have had an appreciable effect on product liability cases in Connecticut. Empirical evidence
demonstrates that evidence of alternative designs is ubiquitous in Connecticut practice. As
the Izzarelli concurrence observed, "at least as of 2009," there were no reported cases
involving traditional design defect claims since Potter that have been submitted to a jury
without proof of a reasonable alternative design." izzarelli, 321 Conn. at 172 (emphasis in
15
original). Therefore, having a default rule where such evidence is required going forward
should not present a substantial change in the manner in which most design defect claims
are tried in Connecticut courts. See also Restatement (Third), 2, Reporters' Note to
comment (d), II, (C) (observing that the reasonable alternative design requirement is
consistent with Connecticut case law, including Potter).
The benefit of having a clear, single risk-utility standard for determining liability
would be a clear understanding that evidence of a reasonable alternative design is required
in all cases where no exception applies. As such, it makes sense to follow the Izzarelli
concurrence and:
"accept the invitation of the reporters of the Restatement (Third) to reconsider
the standard that this court employs in design defect cases and to adopt the
approach for resolving design defect claims described in 1, 2 and 4 of the
Restatement (Third). Doing so will bring our design defect law in line with
current product liability jurisprudence and eliminate our reliance on the now
outdated consumer expectations standard from the Restatement (Second),
which has proven' ill-suited for design defect claims.
Izzarelli, 321 Conn. at 242-43.
D.
"[A] consensus has emerged that design defect claims are best resolved by using
risk-utility balancing to compare the manufacturer's chosen design against safer
alternatives to determine whether it was feasible for the manufacturer to have created a
safer product." Izzarelli, 321 Conn. at 221-22. By adopting the Restatement (Third), the
Court will bring Connecticut in line with the majority of other jurisdictions and provide
consistency and predictability for parties in product liability suits. Forty states and the
District of Columbia use some form of risk-utility analysis in their approach to determining
16
Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 418 (Ala. 1994) ("plaintiff must
prove that a safer, practical, alternative design was available"); General Motors Corp. v.
Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Alaska 1998); Dart v. Weibe Mfq., 709 P.2d 876, 882
(Ariz. 1985) (en banc) ("Under strict liability
[t]he question is whether, given the
risk/benefit factors ...and any others which may be applicable, it was unreasonable for a
manufacturer with such knowledge to have put the product on the market"); Lee v. Martin,
45 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Ark. 2001); Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 310 (Cal.
1994) (holding that the Barker risk-utility prong is the appropriate standard for design
defect, and limiting the consumer expectations test to cases involving simple products);
Comacho v. Hondo Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Colo. 1987)(for complex products,
requiring a balancing of risks, utilities and other factors); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool
Co., 241 Conn. 199 (1997); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 532 (Del. 1998)
("manufacturer's failure to minimize risks, when it is reasonable to do so, will result in
liability for harm caused by the unreasonably dangerous nature of the product."); Warner
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995)(approving "some form of
a risk-utility balancing test" for complex products) (applying District of Columbia law);
Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983) (test "balances
the likelihood and gravity of potential injury against the utility of the product, the availability
of other, safer products to meet the same need," and more); Banks v. Ici Ams., 450 S.E.2d
671, 674 (Ga. 1994) ("we hereby adopt the risk-utility analysis"); Tabieros v. Clark Equip.
Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1311 (Haw. 1997); Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329,
352 (III. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. 34-20-2-2 (Although section 34-20-4-1 of the Indiana
Code adopts the consumer expectation test, the Code specifically provides that, for liability
to attach in cases where there is an alleged design defect or failure to warn, "the party
making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or in providing the
warnings or instructions."); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42 (Ind. 1990)
("Defectiveness" means "claimant should be able to demonstrate that a feasible, safer,
more practicable product design would have afforded better protection"); Wright v. Brooke
Group, Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002) ("adopt [ing] Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Product Liability sections 1 and 2 for product defect cases"); Toyota Motor Corp. v.
Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35 (Ky. 2004); Johnson v. Black &Decker U.S., Inc., 701 So. 2d
1360, 1363 (La. App. 1997); Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me. 1992)("To
determine whether a product is defectively dangerous, we balance the danger presented by
the product against its utility."); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 740 A.2d 102, 118 (Md. App.
1999) ("In design defect cases, Maryland courts employ the `risk/utility' balancing test to
determine whether a specific design is unreasonably dangerous."); Uloth v. City Tank
Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Mass. 1978) (case for jury if "the plaintiff can show an
available design modification which would reduce the risk without undue cost or
17
interference with the performance of the machinery"); Prentis v. Yale Mfc~Co., 365 N.W.2d
176, 185 (Mich. 1984) (adopting "risk-utility test in products liability actions against
manufacturers of products, where liability is predicated upon defective design."); Forster v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1989) ("In this state we use a
risk-utility balancing test to determine if a product liability claim will lie for a design defect.");
Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269, 1276 (Miss. 2006); Rix v. General Motors, 723 P.2d
195, 202 (Mont. 1986) ("[a] design is defective if at the time of manufacture an alternative
designed product would have been safer than the original designed product and was both
technologically feasible and a marketable reality"); Endresen v. Scheels Hardware &Sports
Shop, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 225, 233-34 (N.D.1997); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395
A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978)(adopting a risk utility analysis for design defect, "weighing utility
and desirability against danger"); Diluzio-Gulino v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 897 A.2d 438,
441 (N.J. Super App. Div. 2006) ("A plaintiff asserting a design defect in products liability
action `must prove, under risk-utility analysis, existence of alternate design that is both
practical and feasible,' and `safer' than that used by manufacturer."'); Smith v. Bryco Arms,
33 P.3d 638, 644 (N.M. App. 2001) ("Determining whether a product design poses an
unreasonable risk of injury also involves considering whether the risk can be eliminated
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive");
DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 550 S.E.2d 511, 517 (N.C. App. 2001); Denny v. Ford
Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995)(design defect test includes multiple factors of
"both risks and benefits"); Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio 1998);
McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320 (Or. 2001); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co.,
391 A.2d 1020, 1026-27 (Pa. 1978); Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5 (S.C.
2010); First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enters., Inc., 686 N.W.2d 430, 444-45 (S.D. 2004),
superseded by rule change on unrelated grounds 2006 S.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 341 as
recognized in In re Estate of DuebendorFer, 721 N.W.2d 438, 444 (S.D. 2006); Rav ex rel.
Holman v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tenn.1996); Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2
S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 1999) (discussing "risk-utility analysis" as a "requisite element of a
cause of action for defective design"); Wankier v. Crown Equip. Cori., 353 F.3d 862 (10th
Cir. 2003)(Utah law); Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 505 (Wash.
1999); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E.2d 393, 395 n. 6 (W.V.1989) ("`unsafe' imparts a
standard that the product is to be tested by what the reasonably prudent manufacturer
would accomplish in regard to the safety of the product,. having in mind the general state of
the art of the manufacturing process, including design, labels and warnings, as it relates to
economic costs, at the time the product was made").
~~ General Motors Corp. v. Jernigan, 883 So.2d 646, 662-63 (Ala. 2003); Armentrout v.
FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183-84 (Colo.1992); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671,
674-75 (Ga. 1994); Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002);
Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004); Jenkins v. Int'I Paper Co.,
945 So.2d 144, 150-51 (La.Ct.App.2006); St. Germain v. Husgvarna Cori., 544 A.2d 1283,
1285-86 (Me.1988); Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 329-30 (Mich. 1995);
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (Minn.1987); Williams v. Bennett, 921
So.2d 1269, 1273-75 (Miss. 2006); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d
~;~
Having Connecticut law in line with the laws of most jurisdictions would produce
many benefits. Courts and practitioners will have a clear understanding of the standards
applicable to product liability cases, and can use the Restatement (Third), its commentary,
and the well-developed case law interpreting it as guidance in Connecticut cases.
Manufacturers will also have a better understanding of the standards by which their
products will be judged.
standard in Connecticut as in most other states, there will be no greater risk of liability here,
and therefore no disincentive from either a jurisdiction or choice of law perspective for
manufacturers to develop or to continue developing products in this state.
195, 201-02 (Mont. 1986); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518, 522 (N.J. 2000); Brooks
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 61-62 (N.M. 1995); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662
N.E.2d 730, 735-36 (N.Y.1995); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026-27
(Pa. 1978); Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5 (S.C. 2010); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire
Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex.1998); Morningstar v. Black &Decker Mfg. Co.,
253 S.E.2d 666, 682-84 (W.Va. 1979).
~$ NAM fournd that, for 2015, the following states had the most manufacturing jobs in the
country: California, Texas, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Indiana, North Carolina,
and New Yor, available at http://www.nam.org/Data-and-Reports/State-ManufacturinqData/State-Manufacturing-Data/Z015-State-Manufacturing-Data-Table/ (last visited June 7,
2016). NAM further fround that, for 2015, the following states had the highest percentage of
their workers in manufacturing jobs: Indiana, Michigan, Iowa, and Alabama, available at
http://www.nam.orc~/Data-and-Reports/~tafie-Manufiacturinq-Data/State-Manufacturing=
Data/Manufacturing Employment-by-State-March-2016/ (last visited June 7, 2016).
19 These states are Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Kansas, Nebraska, and Wisconsin have expressly rejected the
Restatement (Third). See Delaney v. Deere and Co., 999 P.2d 930, 934 (Kan. 2000);
Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 837, 260 Neb. 552, 563 (Neb.
2000); Green v. Smith &NephewAHP, Inc., 245 Wis. 2d 772 (2001).
One state, Virginia, does not recognize a strict liability cause of action and instead uses a
negligence standard, which, for practical purposes, appears to be a hybrid between
risk/utility and consumer expectations.
19
Respectfully Submitted,
AMICUS CURIAE
CONNECTICUT
ASSOCIATION
BUSINESS
&
INDUSTRY
~~"~
By:
Jennifer M. DelMonico, Esq.
jdelmonico cC~.murthalaw.com
Proloy K. Das, Esq.
pdas(a~murthalaw.com
Terence J. Brunau, Esq.
tbrunau(a~murthalaw.com
Eric B. Miller, Esq.
emiller murthalaw.com
Murtha Cullina LLP
CityPlace I 185 Asylum Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3469
Telephone: (860) 240-6000
Facsimile: (860) 240-6150
Attorneys forAmicus Curiae
JOINED BY
New Haven Manufacturers Association
P.O. Box 3657
Woodbridge, CT 06525
Insurance Association of Connecticut
21 Oak Street, #607
Hartford, CT 06106
21
CERTIFICATION
The undersigned attorney hereby certifies, pursuant to Connecticut Rule of Appellate
Procedure 67-2, that on June 8, 2016:
(1)
electronically to the last known e-mail address of each counsel of record for whom an email address has been provided; and
(2)
the electronically submitted brief and appendix and the filed paper brief and
appendix have been redacted or do not contain any names or other personal identifying
information that is prohibited from disclosure by rule, statute, court order or case law; and
(3)
a copy of the brief and appendix has been sent to each counsel of record and
to any trial judge who rendered a decision that is the subject matter of the appeal, in
compliance with Section 62-7; and
(4)
the brief and appendix being filed with the appellate clerk are true copies of
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Practice Book 62-7 the undersigned certifies that a copy of the
foregoing was mailed this 8t" day of June, 2016, to:
David S. Golub, Esq.
Jonathan M. Levine, Esq.
Marilyn J. Ramos, Esq.
Silver Golub & Teitell LLP
184 Atlantic Street
Stamford, CT 06901
Tel:(203) 325-4491
Fax:(203) 325-3769
dgolub(a~sgtlaw.com
jlevine sgtlaw.com
mramosCa~sgtlaw.com
(Counsel for the plaintiff Vincent Bifolck, Executor of the Estate of Jeanette D. Bifolck, and
Individually)
Francis H. Morrison III, Esq.
John M. Tanski, Esq.
Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP
90 State House Square, 9th Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
Tel:(860) 275-8100
Fax:(860) 275-8101
fmorrison(a~axinn.com
jtanski(a.axi n n.com
(Counsel for the defendant Philip Morris USA Inc.)
John C. Massaro, Esq.
Anthony J. Franze, PHV
Arnold &Porter LLP
555 Twelfth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1206
Tel.: (202) 942-5000
Fax:(202) 942-5999
john.massaro(a~a~orter.com
anthony.franze(a~aporter.com
(Counsel for the defendant Philip Morris USA Inc.)