Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Air Transport Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jairtraman

A conceptual evaluation framework for organisational safety culture:

An empirical study of Taipei Songshan Airport
Yan-Kai Fu a, *, Tsung-Lung Chan b
a
Department of Business Administration, China University of Science and Technology, No. 245, Sec. 3, Academia Rd., Nankang, Taipei 115, Taiwan, ROC
b
Institute of Aviation Transportation, China University of Science and Technology, No. 245, Sec. 3, Academia Rd., Nankang, Taipei 115, Taiwan, ROC

a b s t r a c t
Keywords: This study included three phases. The first phase was to establish an evaluation hierarchy framework for
Organisational safety culture organisational safety culture in accordance with the fuzzy Delphi method (FDM) and including expert
Fuzzy Delphi method
perspectives. The second phase involved evaluating weight and rankings in order of importance using a
Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process
Airport
fuzzy analytic hierarchy process. In the third phase, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the Scheffe
multiple comparison test were used to compare the different evaluation constructs and criteria of the
airport’s various internal safety management units. The study results demonstrated that Taipei Songshan
Airport’s general management units believed that ‘Safety Supervision’, ‘Safety-oriented Working Envi-
ronment’ and ‘System of Incentives and Penalties’ should be considered implementation priorities to
improve overall performance in the airport organisational safety culture. In addition, the ANOVA results
revealed significant differences among the airport’s management units with respect not only to the
personal dimension, including ‘Safety Values’, ‘Safety Evaluation Standards’ and ‘Safety Management
Updates’, but also to the situational dimension, such as ‘Safety Communication and Commitment’ and
‘Injury Rate’.
Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Taipei Songshan Airport is a civilian-military airport. In addition
to various existing domestic routes, mainland ChinaeTaiwan routes
and international routes, it is used by a regular and increasing
number of business charter flights and has gradually become the
capital’s ‘business airport’ (Taipei Airport Station, 2012). Songshan
Airport is located in Taipei, which is the capital of the Republic of
China and possesses numerous factors that facilitate urban devel-
opment, such as economic and trade development, convenient
transportation and popular attractions. These factors have gener-
ated a significant increase in the population, public transportation
network expansion, numerous high-rise buildings, a rapidly
expanding urban area and a general boom in business activities.
Songshan Airport originally handled only domestic routes. How-
ever, later, the airport actively developed international routes in
response to the decline in the number of domestic airlines as a
result of the development of high-speed trains. Given its prime
location advantage, Songshan Airport developed charter flights
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ886 2 27821862x213; fax: þ886 2 27864984.
E-mail addresses: yankaifu@cc.cust.edu.tw (Y.-K. Fu), or.orz@hotmail.com
(T.-L. Chan).
between mainland China and Taiwan in 2008, which have been
popular with the public. Later, in response to the demands of a
substantial number of business passengers, flights to Shanghai
Hongqiao Airport were added in June 2010, to Tokyo Haneda
Airport in October 2010 and to Seoul Gimpo International Airport in
May 2012. With these additional flights, a northeast Asian ‘golden
quadrangle route’ was formed that connects the Taipei Songshan,
Tokyo Haneda, Shanghai Hongqiao and Seoul Gimpo airports.
Therefore, the number of passengers who use Songshan Airport
and the number of daily flights has greatly increased.
The total area of Taipei Songshan Airport is approximately 3.98
km2. This airport possesses only one runway (east-west), which has
a length of approximately 2605 m. All international, domestic and
military transport flights share the runways, taxiways and other
airport facilities of Songshan Airport. Thus, diverse airport safety
management units are present at this airport. Beginning in 2004,
the Taiwan Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) required Safety
Management System (SMS) implementation in all Taiwan airports
(Liou et al., 2008). Therefore, to comply with international trends in
airport safety and risk management, the Taipei International
Airport Station management immediately responded to the CAA
requirement. Currently, the airport management has established a
risk management team based on the SMS and a safety committee of
management (SCM) and has investigated the risk factors involved

0969-6997/$ e see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2013.08.005
102 Y.-K. Fu, T.-L. Chan / Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108
in airport safety through group discussions and decisions.
Furthermore, the management holds periodic meetings to assess
safety risks and to effectively develop relevant strategies for risk
reduction as well as to ensure the proper implementation of risk
management. In addition, the Air Force Songshan Base Command
and the Taipei branch of the Aviation Police Office cooperate to
provide systematic and modular training to support an aviation
safety culture of the highest standard and to achieve a flight safety
goal of zero risk.
Lee (2006) used numerous approaches, such as the fuzzy lin-
guistic scale method, failure mode and effects and critical analysis
principles, to construct a risk assessment model for aviation safety
management. Using a Fuzzy DEMATEL (Decision Making Trial and
Evaluation Laboratory) method, Liou et al. (2008) examined the
structural relationship between organisational and management
factors in the safety management systems of aviation enterprises.
Using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), Chen et al. (2009)
evaluated 23 criteria that influence aviation safety (such as signif-
icant threats and human errors) in Taiwan and ranked them in
order of importance.
In contrast to these studies, the purpose of this study included
three phases. First, in addition to the integration of evaluation
constructs and criteria proposed by experts, the specific safety is-
sues for Taipei Songshan Airport were considered in designing a
questionnaire based on the fuzzy Delphi method (FDM) for the
managers and senior personnel in the Songshan Airport adminis-
trative units. Using the triangular fuzzy number theory, a consensus
on evaluation indicators for airport safety culture was reached.
Then, the evaluation constructs and criteria used in the paper were
determined. During the second phase, an evaluation framework-
based questionnaire was designed in accordance with the fuzzy
analytic hierarchy process (FAHP). Using a fuzzy positive reciprocal
matrix to reconcile inconsistencies in the questionnaire and
combining this approach with triangular fuzzy number theory, the
weight distribution for each evaluation construct from the Song-
shan Airport administrative unit was investigated to rank safety
practices in order of importance and to estimate the evaluation
indicators for organisational safety culture. In the third phase, the
fuzzy weights obtained from the FAHP evaluation for airport safety
culture constructs and criteria were further analysed using analysis
of variance (ANOVA). The criteria with significant differences were
further examined using ex post multiple comparison tests to
compare the different situations with respect to evaluation criteria
among various airport safety management units.
2. Theory
In this study, using the research framework proposed by Cooper
(2000), the three dimensions of ‘Person’, ‘Situation’ and ‘Behaviour’
are briefly discussed to form a theoretical basis for creating
organisational safety culture evaluation constructs and criteria.
2.1. Person dimension
As Cooper stated, for the successful implementation of safety
programmes, employees must perceive organisational safety cul-
ture as valid and important (Cooper, 2000). If the organisation’s top
management displays a favourable attitude toward health and
safety, this outlook is reflected in the safety performance result.
However, only a small number of studies have been performed on
the perceptions and attitude of top management personnel
regarding safety (Gadd and Collins, 2002). This scarcity of research
is because the safety perceptions and decisions of the upper level of
management, for example, the president, the chief and the senior
executives, influence the organisational level (Molenaar et al.,
2002) Specifically, the safety climate, that is, the shared employee
perceptions and attitudes regarding safety, reflects the safety cul-
ture in a workplace and can be measured by a questionnaire
(Choudhry et al., 2007).
2.2. Situation dimension
According to the Federal Aviation Administration (2010), an SMS
is a systematic and comprehensive business approach to managing
safety risks. It includes organisational structures, accountabilities,
policies, procedures and other workplace safety elements. Con-
taining multiple safety components, an SMS typically has a broader
scope than a safety management programme. Safety programmes
are usually a core part of contractor SMSs. Such programmes can
improve job-site safety performance by reducing the number of
incidents and injuries, enhance the safety culture or climate, pre-
vent project delays and contribute to a positive company image
(Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000; Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008).
Nevertheless, the SMS will not be effective without support from
the senior leadership, who are considered a vital element of the
system (Muniz et al., 2007). Specifically, the situation dimension,
including all aspects of an organisation’s SMS, can be assessed by
audits or inspections (Choudhry et al., 2007).
2.3. Behaviour dimension
By encouraging managers and leaders to respect their human
capital, a system of incentives and penalties can be established that
encourages situational leadership and employee empowerment. In
this way, the organisation is responsible for establishing processes
that develop dynamic teams and participation in a dynamic team
often results in a motivated return (Blanchard and Bowles, 1998).
Jin and Chen (2013) suggested that the individuals responsible for
safety supervision, e.g., safety representatives, project managers,
field workers and other professionals on job sites, should be
required or encouraged to report any nonnegotiable violations they
observe. Contractors with a high number of violations should be
required to implement a correction plan and to hire an additional
safety specialist or other competent individual for the project at
their cost. Specifically, safety behaviour (safe or unsafe), which
indicates the degree of employee engagement in safety pro-
grammes, can be evaluated through behavioural sampling
(Choudhry et al., 2007).
The evaluation criteria were incorporated into this study after
considering the characteristics of the Songshan Airport manage-
ment units. Since the airport management units are government
organisations, the evaluation criterion of ‘Job Burnout’ was added
to this study at the personal dimension to account for the nature of
civil service positions and the service tenure characteristics of civil
servants. In the performance of their duties, all management units
must share the same runway, taxiways, apron, airport loop road
and other facilities instead of having their own independent and
separate facilities. Therefore, the evaluation criterion of ‘Division of
Areas of Responsibility’ was added at the situational dimension. At
the behavioural dimension, overall airport safety must be main-
tained through collaboration among all management units. Addi-
tionally, it is important for these units to share safety information
and resources. Thus, the evaluation criterion of ‘System Integration’
was added to this study.
3. Method
This study was designed as a group decision-making process,
which typically involves multiple criteria and decision-makers.
Since complex environmental factors must be considered and
 Y.-K. Fu, T.-L. Chan / Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108 103

Table 1
Background information for first-phase questionnaire respondents.

Unit Gender Education Marital status Years of work experience Position

Male Female High school/ College/ Graduate degree Married 6e10 11e15 16e20 21e25 26 or Officers Subordinates
vocational school university or above more (management) (aides)

A 9 1 0 9 1 10 1 4 3 2 0 4 6
B 9 1 0 7 3 10 0 2 3 2 3 4 6
C 7 3 1 7 2 10 0 2 3 3 2 3 7

A: The Air Force Songshan Base Command; B: Taipei International Airport Station; C: Aviation Police Office Taipei Branch.

certain criteria are significantly influenced by decision-makers’
experience and subjective opinions, the decision-making process in
an organisational safety culture is characterised as ‘fuzzy’ and thus
cannot be sufficiently and objectively evaluated using traditional
methods. Therefore, in this study, we evaluated airport safety cul-
ture constructs and criteria among the managers and senior
personnel with at least six years of airport management experi-
ence, and we applied the FDM and the FAHP to eliminate the se-
mantic uncertainty and thereby obtained more objective evaluation
constructs and weights for assessing the safety culture in Songshan
Airport.
First, we designed a FDM-based questionnaire using ‘Person’,
‘Situation’ and ‘Behaviour’ as three major evaluation constructs and
considered the characteristics of Songshan Airport based on a study
framework proposed by Cooper (2000). We distributed 30 ques-
tionnaires to the internal management units in Songshan Airport.
These management units include the Air Force Songshan Base
Command, which is primarily responsible for apron management,
fire safety, safety services and risk management, the Taipei Inter-
national Airport Station, which is primarily responsible for airfield
management, bird pattern surveys, aircraft scheduling and facility
maintenance, and the Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police Office,
which is primarily responsible for safety patrols, early warning
information, safety services and risk management. Ten question-
naires were distributed to each unit. Thirty questionnaires were
recovered. Using the scores for each construct provided by the
participating managers and senior personnel, the triangular fuzzy
method was used to calculate the fuzzy membership. Then, rela-
tively objective expert evaluation constructs were produced to
determine the appropriate evaluation criteria for this study. A
compilation of the basic data obtained from the questionnaire re-
spondents during the first phase of the study is presented in Table 1.
Next, based on the evaluation constructs established using the
FDM, we designed an FAHP-based questionnaire. A total of 47
questionnaires were distributed to the internal management units
in Songshan Airport, and 42 questionnaires were recovered. Next,
we used the fuzzy linguistic scale method successively to establish
triangular fuzzy numbers and calculated the weight distribution for
the fuzzy memberships, which enabled us to generate relatively
objective weight distributions. A compilation of the basic data ob-
tained from questionnaire respondents during the second phase of
the study is presented in Table 2.
Third, the three different airport internal safety management
units were regarded as a categorical variable, and the fuzzy weight
values of airport safety culture evaluation constructs and criteria
obtained using the FAHP were assessed with ANOVA. For constructs
and criteria with significant differences, the Scheffe multiple
comparison test was used to compare the observed differences in
the levels of importance that internal safety management units of
the airport assigned to various evaluation criteria.
4. Results
4.1. The FDM applied to screen the organisational safety culture
evaluation criteria
In this study, the organisational safety culture evaluation criteria
were divided into the following three constructs. ‘Person’ (C1) refers
to the level of importance and commitment that personnel attach to
safety. This construct represents the organisational safety climate. If
each individual can act in a manner consistent with safety behaviour
at free will, an invisible power will form and generate an invisible
constraint that subconsciously improves the overall organisational
safety culture. ‘Situation’ (C2) refers to the development of a safety-
oriented working environment by introducing safety policies and
using adequate safety equipment. In addition, an active safety
reporting system is established through comprehensive educational
and training programmes. Furthermore, when safety problems are
discovered, they are immediately addressed after an evaluation of
risk management to effectively reduce the work injury rate. More-
over, the safety model shaped by the environment is used to produce
a behaviour-restricting effect and significantly improve the overall
organisational safety culture. ‘Behaviour’ (C3) refers to the super-
vising system in an organisation, which is used to verify whether the
safety concept has been implemented. The personnel who violate
the safety rules should be punished, and those who obey the safety
rules should be rewarded and encouraged. The behaviour of each
individual in the organisation is observed, and review and self-
examination (periodic or non-periodic) through safety training
and practical work are used to develop a strong constraint, which
will improve the overall organisational safety culture.
The criteria examined in this study were selected from relevant
literature, and additional indicators were determined based on the
characteristics of Taipei Songshan Airport. The breadth of content and
the fullness of coverage of these criteria should be reasonably
adequate. Therefore, the expert opinions obtained through the
administered survey should exhibit a high level of content validity.
The criteria for the three constructs and references are listed in Table 3.

Table 2
Background information for second-phase questionnaire respondents.

Unit Gender Education Marital status Years of work experience Position

Male Female High school/ College/ Graduate degree Unmarried Married 6e10 11e15 16e20 21e25 26 or Officers Subordinates
vocational school university or above more (management) (aides)

A 15 2 3 9 5 4 13 4 5 6 2 0 5 12
B 10 4 0 10 4 5 9 4 4 2 4 0 3 11
C 6 5 1 7 3 6 5 8 2 0 0 1 1 10

A: The Air Force Songshan Base Command; B: Taipei International Airport Station; C: Aviation Police Office Taipei Branch.
104 Y.-K. Fu, T.-L. Chan / Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108

The Delphi method-based questionnaire was used to investigate
the internal management of Songshan Airport. We distributed and
recovered 30 questionnaires (a 100% recovery rate). The following
results are provided sequentially in accordance with the data
analysis procedures.
4.1.1. Establishment of fuzzy triangle functions
Based on the expert estimates collected from the questionnaires,
the fuzzy triangular functions for each evaluation criterion were
established. Among the fuzzy triangular functions for each evalu-
ation criterion provided by the expert decision-making group,

Table 3
Description of the evaluation constructs.

No. Criteria Operational definition Reference source

Person (C1) C11 Attitude toward Safety standards will not be sacrificed to complete tasks. Ball and Scontney, 1998; Choudhry et al.,
Safety 2007; Diaz and Cabrera, 1997; Fleming,
2001; Gadd and Collins, 2002; Mearns et al.,
2013; Rundmo, 1994; Williamson et al.,
1997.
C12 Rewards and Personnel gain more attention from supervisors due to good
Recognition safety performance.
C13 Sharing Safety Members actively show their concern and provide suggestions
Knowledge regarding safety issues.
C14 Safety Values Safety practices are implemented even under the pressure of
completing tasks.
C15 Incident Investigation After an accident, the priority for investigation is focused on the
cause of accident, not on who should take the blame.
C16 Respectful Feedback The organisation cares about public opinion of its safety-related
issues.
C17 Safety Management All safety goals are updated and adjusted properly in accordance
Updates with current regulations.
C18 Organisation Type The organisation actively improves its safety issues
C19 Job Burnout Personnel will not have an attitude that promotes job tardiness
because they work for government agencies.
Situation (C2) C21 Safety Education and The annual safety training frequency is sufficient and meets the Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000; Aksorn and
Training employees’ needs; the training content is adjusted appropriately Hadikusumo, 2008; Choudhry et al., 2007;
in accordance with safety issues at hand. Fleming, 2001; Mearns et al., 2013; Muniz
et al., 2007.
C22 Safety Working The organisation has sound equipment and measures to protect
Environment employees from work-related injuries and prevent human error;
moreover, the organisation develops a good work climate and
relationships.
C23 Safety Safety issues, policies and procedures can be relayed to employees
Communication through normal channels in a timely manner, and the
and Commitment organisation actively promotes safety reporting systems, such as
‘voluntary reporting’ and ‘actively reporting’.
C24 Employee Internal members of the organisation actively suggest safety
Engagement issues and report potential safety risks. Safety meetings are
periodically scheduled and safety suggestions are proposed with
appropriate feedback provided after the issues are examined.
C25 Resource When safety is a concern, the organisation has adequate resources
Improvement for improvement.
C26 Safety Policy/ A safety handbook provides clear and detailed descriptions for
Procedure/Rules members. Safety regulations and procedure development fully
considers the actual practice.
C27 Injury Rate The injury rate is effectively reduced due to the need to improve
the safety performance of an organisation.
C28 Risk Management The organisation establishes a system to develop response
procedures for emergencies, and the members of the incident
investigation team have received professional training.
C29 Division of Areas of The areas of responsibilities in the airport are clearly delineated
Responsibility without confusion.
Behaviour (C3) C31 System of Incentives Members are rewarded for good safety work performance, which Ball and Scontney, 1998; Fleming, 2001; Jin
and Penalties motivates other members. There is a just system for salary and and Chen, 2013; Larsson et al., 2008;
promotion, which has a positive impact on the safety culture. Mearns et al., 2013.
C32 Safety Behaviour The safety awareness and behaviour of the members provide a
good climate with a positive feedback loop and is a good teaching
model for others.
C33 Safety Supervision The organisation periodically conducts internal safety supervision
and provides suggestions to correct shortcomings. Additionally,
the organisation conducts non-periodic surprise inspections to
determine whether the employees obey the safety regulations.
Moreover, If a supervisor discovers that employees are not
implementing the safety regulations and procedures, he or she
will immediately correct the error so that employees will strictly
follow the safety regulations.
C34 Employee Every internal member can participate in the safety training
Participation course and workshop as well as apply their education in practice.
C35 System Integration The organisation periodically assesses internal safety
performance, adjusts its safety policies in a timely manner, and
improves safety operations.
 Y.-K. Fu, T.-L. Chan / Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108 105

Table 4
Fuzzy triangular functions for each evaluation criterion.

Evaluation criterion C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 C18 C19
Max 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Geometric mean 2.301 7.026 7.991 8.034 8.056 7.622 8.036 8.203 7.099
Min 1 1 4 3 3 2 3 5 2
Evaluation criterion C21 C22 C23 C24 C25 C26 C27 C28 C29
Max 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Geometric mean 7.366 7.892 8.423 7.466 7.235 7.576 8.197 8.066 6.926
Min 2 3 5 3 3 3 4 4 2

Evaluation criterion C31 C32 C33 C34 C35

Max 10 10 10 10 10
Geometric mean 7.942 7.487 7.526 7.437 7.102
Min 5 3 3 3 3

‘MIN’ (the minimum value) represents the minimum possible value
of a criterion, ‘MAX’ (the maximum value) represents the
maximum possible value of this criterion and ‘geometric mean’
indicates the highest possible value of this criterion. The fuzzy
triangular functions are shown in Table 4.
4.1.2. Screening the evaluation criteria
Based on the fuzzy triangular functions established in the pre-
ceding step, the geometric mean for each criterion in the fuzzy
triangular functions was considered a membership function to
represent the consensus from evaluations by the decision-making
group. Finally, an appropriate threshold value (S) was determined
to select the appropriate evaluation criteria. In this study, S was 7.5.
4.1.3. Determining the evaluation criteria
After screening, the criteria with a geometric mean less than 7.5
(‘Attitude toward Safety’, ‘Rewards and Recognition’, ‘Job Burnout’,
‘Safety Education and Training’, ‘Employee Engagement’, ‘Resource
Improvement’, ‘Division of Areas of Responsibility’, ‘Safety Behav-
iour’, ‘Employee Participation’ and ‘System Integration’) were
excluded. A total of 13 evaluation criteria remained for the subse-
quent analysis.
In this study, the evaluation criteria were screened based on
the FDM and subsequently provided a framework for the FAHP.
For the ‘Person’ construct, six criteria, (‘Sharing Safety Knowl-
edge’, ‘Safety Values’, ‘Incident Investigation’, ‘Respectful Feed-
back’, ‘Safety Management Updates’ and ‘Organisation Type’)
were retained. For the ‘Situation’ construct, five criteria, (‘Safety
Working Environment’, ‘Safety Communication and Commit-
ment’, ‘Safety Policies/Procedures/Rules’, ‘Injury Rate’ and ‘Risk
Management’) were retained. Finally, two criteria (‘System of In-
centives and Penalties’ and ‘Safety supervision’) were retained for
the ‘Behaviour’ construct. The framework generated for the FAHP
is shown in Fig. 1.

Risk Management

Injury Rate

Situation Safety Policy/Procedure/Rules

Safety Communication and

Commitment

Safety Working Enviroment

System of Incentives and Penalties

Behaviour

Safety Supervision

Organization Type

Respectful Feedback

Safety Management Updates

Person
Incident Investigation

Safety Values

Sharing of Safety Knowledge

Fig. 1. Hierarchy framework of evaluation criteria for Songshan Airport safety culture.
106 Y.-K. Fu, T.-L. Chan / Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108

Table 5 Table 7
Rankings by order of importance using the evaluation criteria for the organisational Analyses of differences in personal dimension among the Airport’s Safety Manage-
safety culture in Taipei Songshan Airport. ment Units.

No. Evaluation criterion Weight Ranking Evaluation criterion/safety A B C F-value Scheffe multiple
order management unit comparison test(s)

C32 Safety Supervision 0.205 1 Safety Values 0.060 0.086 0.052 12.667* (A,B), (C,B)
C21 Safety Working Environment 0.098 2 Safety Evaluation 0.020 0.021 0.041 9.221* (A,C), (B,C)
C31 System of Incentives and Penalties 0.087 3 Standards
C12 Safety Values 0.086 4 Safety Management 0.025 0.056 0.069 4.673* (A,C)
C25 Risk Management 0.077 5 Updates
C13 Incident Investigation 0.068 6
A: Air Force Songshan Base Command; B: Taipei International Airport Station; C:
C11 Sharing Safety Knowledge 0.062 7
Aviation Police Office, Taipei Branch.
C23 Safety Policy/Procedure/Rules 0.055 8 *
P < 0.05.
C22 Safety Communication and 0.051 9
Commitment
C15 Safety Management Updates 0.048 10
C16 Organisation Type 0.045 11 weights of the criteria. First, we conducted a separate consistency
C24 Injury Rate 0.041 12
test on the valid questionnaires. When the consistency index (CI)
C14 Safety Evaluation Standards 0.028 13
was 0.1 and the consistency ratio (CR) was 0.1, the question-
naire passed the consistency test. The questionnaires that did not
4.2. Weight estimations for the evaluation criteria in the pass the consistency test were returned to the respondents and
organisational safety culture using the FAHP revised by the respondents after an additional explanation of the
detailed definitions for the criteria in the three constructs. The
We contacted 42 participants from the airport’s different man- revised questionnaires were included in a subsequent weight
agement units. Among these participants, 17 questionnaires were estimation using the AHP only when they passed the consistency
distributed to the Air Force Songshan Base Command and recov- test.
ered (a 100% recovery rate). After excluding three invalid ques-
tionnaires that contained answers with logical errors, 14 valid 4.2.2. Fuzzy weight calculation
questionnaires remained. Fifteen questionnaires were distributed As a result of the differences in both the factors considered and
to the Taipei International Airport Station, and 14 were recovered (a the respondent operational environment, the estimations may
93.3% return rate). No questionnaire contained answers with logical generate a considerable degree of deviation for each criterion and
errors. Therefore, all 14 recovered questionnaires were valid. are therefore provided a certain weight range. To eliminate the
Fifteen questionnaires were distributed to the Aviation Police Office deviation, this study adopted the concept of triangular functions in
Taipei Branch, and 11 were recovered (a 73.3% return rate). No fuzzy theory to produce an unbiased and objective result.
questionnaire contained answers with logical errors. Therefore, the As shown in Table 5, among the 13 evaluation criteria for the
11 recovered questionnaires were valid. The following section in- organisational safety culture in Taipei Songshan Airport, ‘Safety
cludes detailed results, which are provided sequentially based on Supervision’ was ranked first, followed by ‘Safety Working Envi-
the data analysis steps. ronment’ and ‘System of Incentives and Penalties’. ‘Safety Evalua-
tion Standards’ had the lowest weight.
4.2.1. Consistency test Further investigation that focused on different internal man-
The relative weights among the 13 evaluation criteria (Fig. 1) agement units (Table 6) revealed that the decision-making group
screened using the FDM were calculated and used to evaluate the for the Air Force Songshan Base Command ranked ‘Safety Su-
pervision’ first, followed by ‘System of Incentives and Penalties’
and then ‘Safety Working Environment’. Furthermore, the crite-
Table 6 rion with the lowest weight was ‘Safety Evaluation Standards’.
Rankings by order of importance using the evaluation criteria from different orga-
The decision-making group for the Taipei International Airport
nisations in Taipei Songshan Airport.
Station believed that ‘Safety Values’ was most important, fol-
No. Evaluation criteria Air Force Taipei Aviation Police lowed by ‘Safety Supervision’ and ‘Safety Working Environment’,
Songshan Base international office Taipei
whereas ‘Safety Evaluation Standards’ was given the lowest
Command airport station branch
weight. For the decision-making group in the Taipei Branch of
C11 Sharing Safety 9 4 10
Aviation Police Office, ‘Safety Supervision’ was ranked first, fol-
Knowledge
C12 Safety Values 6 1 12
lowed by ‘System of Incentives and Penalties’. ‘Risk Management’
C13 Incident Investigation 7 5 5 was ranked third, whereas ‘Safety Evaluation Standards’ had the
C14 Safety Evaluation 13 13 13 lowest weight.
Standards
C15 Safety Management 12 7 8
Updates
C16 Organisation Type 10 8 11 Table 8
C21 Safety Working 3 3 4 Analyses of differences in situational dimension among the Airport’s Safety Man-
Environment agement Units.
C22 Safety Communication 5 12 9
and Commitment Evaluation criterion/ A B C F-value Scheffe multiple
C23 Safety Policy/Procedure/ 8 9 6 safety management unit comparison tests
Rules Safety Communication 0.060 0.086 0.052 8.699* (A,B), (C,B)
C24 Injury Rate 11 11 7 and Commitment
C25 Risk Management 4 6 3 Injury Rate 0.020 0.021 0.041 13.955* (A,C), (B,C)
C31 System of Incentives 2 10 2
and Penalties A: Air Force Songshan Base Command; B: Taipei International Airport Station; C:
C32 Safety Supervision 1 2 1 Aviation Police Office, Taipei Branch.
*
P < 0.05.
 Y.-K. Fu, T.-L. Chan / Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108
4.3. ANOVA-based comparisons of organisational safety culture
criterion weights
The study used ANOVA to assess the fuzzy weight values ob-
tained through the FAHP in the previous phase and compare the
differences in criterion weights among the airport’s various safety
management units.
4.3.1. Analyses of differences in the personal dimension among the
airport’s internal safety management units
The results obtained from one-way ANOVA revealed significant
differences among the safety management units with respect to
assessments of the three evaluation criteria of ‘Safety Values’,
‘Safety Evaluation Standards’ and ‘Safety Management Updates’, as
indicated in Table 7. In contrast, no significant differences existed
among these units with respect to the three evaluation criteria of
‘Sharing Safety Knowledge’, ‘Incident Investigation’ and ‘Organi-
sation Type’. Further analyses using the Scheffe multiple compari-
son test produced the following results: ‘Safety Values’ received
significantly greater emphasis from the Taipei International Airport
Station than from the other two units. ‘Safety Evaluation Standards’
received significantly greater emphasis from the Taipei Branch of
the Aviation Police Office than from the other two units. Finally,
‘Safety Motives’ received significantly greater emphasis from the
Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police Office than from the Songshan
Air Force Base Command.
4.3.2. Analyses of differences in the situational dimension among
the airport’s internal safety management units
The results obtained from one-way ANOVA revealed significant
differences among the safety management units with respect to
assessments of the two evaluation criteria of ’Safety Communica-
tion and Commitment’ and ‘Injury Rate’, as shown in Table 8. In
contrast, no significant differences existed among these units with
respect to the three evaluation criteria of ‘Safety Working Envi-
ronment’, ‘Safety Policies/Procedures/Rules’ and ‘Risk Manage-
ment’. Further analyses using the Scheffe multiple comparison test
revealed that the Taipei International Airport Station placed
significantly greater emphasis on ‘Safety Communication and
Commitment’ than the other two units and that the Taipei Branch
of the Aviation Police Office placed significantly greater emphasis
on ‘Injury Rate’ than the other two units.
4.3.3. Analyses of differences in the behavioural dimension among
the airport’s internal safety management units
The results obtained from one-way ANOVA revealed no signif-
icant differences among the safety management units with respect
to assessments of the two behavioural evaluation criteria of ‘System
of Incentives and Penalties’ and ‘Safety Supervision’.
5. Conclusions
The primary contribution of this study is that it represents the
only investigation to date that has addressed the safety culture of
the airport in Taiwan’s capital. The study used the FDM to deter-
mine the opinions of a group of experts from the airport’s internal
safety authorities, which facilitated the creation of a hierarchical
framework for evaluating organisational safety culture at the
airport. Subsequently, the internal airport authorities’ weight
rankings for the evaluation constructs and criteria were calculated
using the FAHP to provide a reference for the managers of internal
airport authorities. Finally, ANOVA was adopted to compare the
airport’s safety management units with respect to their level of
emphasis on each assessment criterion. Based on the findings from
these procedures, several managerial implications may be
107
proposed as a reference for the administrative units of airport
safety maintenance in their safety behaviour.
First, after screening using the FDM, the retained criteria
included the six significant personal evaluation criteria (‘Sharing
Safety Knowledge’, ‘Safety Values’, ‘Incident Investigation’, ‘Safety
Evaluation Standards’, ‘Safety Management Updates’ and ‘Organi-
sation Type’), the five significant situational evaluation criteria
(‘Safety-oriented Working Environment’, ‘Safety Communication
and Commitment’, ‘Safety Policies/Procedures/Rules’, ‘Injury Rate’
and ‘Risk Management’) and the two significant behavioural eval-
uation criteria (‘System of Incentives and Penalties’ and ‘Safety
Supervision’). In combination, these 13 evaluation criteria formed
the hierarchical evaluation framework of this study.
Second, FAHP results indicated that on the whole, the admin-
istrative units of safety management at Taipei Songshan Airport
regarded ‘Safety Supervision’, ‘Safety Working Environment’ and
‘System of Incentives and Penalties’ as the projects with the
highest implementation priorities. A more detailed analysis that
examined observations from individual management units of
Songshan Airport revealed that the surveyed decision-making
group from the Air Force Songshan Base Command regarded
‘Safety Supervision’ as the most important evaluation criterion for
the airport’s safety culture. In contrast, the surveyed decision-
making groups from the Taipei International Airport Station and
the Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police Office agreed that the most
important evaluation criterion for airport safety culture assess-
ments was ‘Safety Values’. Therefore airport safety management
units should regularly engage in safety-related supervision and
propose corrections for shortcomings. In addition, a system with
occasional unannounced inspections should be implemented to
verify employee compliance with safety standards. If officers or
managers discover that employees are not following safety sys-
tems or executing safety procedures, these authoritative figures
should immediately correct these errors and strictly enforce safety
discipline.
Third, the ANOVA results produced the following conclusions
with respect to the personal evaluation criteria. 1) The Taipei In-
ternational Airport Station placed a significantly greater emphasis
on ‘Safety Values’ than either the Air Force Songshan Base Com-
mand or the Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police Office. This
finding indicated that even in the face of mission-related pres-
sures, the Taipei International Airport Station would continue to
implement safety procedures. 2) Since the Taipei Branch of the
Aviation Police Office is responsible for airport safety, this agency
placed a substantially greater emphasis on ‘Safety Evaluation
Standards’ than either the Air Force Songshan Base Command or
the Taipei International Airport Station. This finding indicated the
significant concern of the Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police
Office regarding reviewing the safety-related problems generated
by external units. 3) The Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police Office
placed a significantly greater emphasis on ‘Safety Management
Updates’ than the Air Force Songshan Base Command, which
indicated that the former agency devoted more attention to
appropriately adjusting safety objectives to reflect updates of
existing regulations.
The following conclusions were obtained from the analyses of
the situation dimension. 1) The Taipei International Airport Station
placed significantly greater emphasis on ‘Safety Communication
and Commitment’ than either the Air Force Songshan Base Com-
mand or the Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police Office, which
indicated that the Taipei International Airport Station attached
great importance to various safety questions, policies, promotional
campaigns and safety reporting system requirements. 2) Since the
Taipei Branch of the Aviation Police Office is responsible for airport
safety features, this agency placed significantly greater emphasis on
108 Y.-K. Fu, T.-L. Chan / Journal of Air Transport Management 34 (2014) 101e108
‘Injury Rate’ than either the Air Force Songshan Base Command or
Taipei Songshan International Airport. Thus, the Taipei Branch of
the Aviation Police Office primarily targeted enhancing airport
safety performance, with the objective of reducing the incidence of
work-related injuries.
Finally, to address the limitations of this study, two suggestions
are proposed for future research. First, the study sample was
limited to official units within the airport and did not include air-
lines or contractors. This restriction was adopted primarily to avoid
the difficulties in obtaining data or the acquisition of insufficient
information to facilitate understanding. These difficulties could
produce abnormal noise that would be challenging to address in
the analytical process. Thus, one recommendation is for future re-
searchers to examine unofficial units of Songshan Airport and to re-
evaluate and re-analyse the data. Second, the study did not conduct
a sensitivity analysis to assess the weight values of the evaluation
constructs and criteria for Songshan Airport. Therefore, it is sug-
gested that future researchers could use sensitivity analysis to
identify the critical constructs and criteria that affect organisational
safety culture.
References
Abdelhamid, T.S., Everett, J.G., 2000. Identifying root cause of construction acci-
dents. J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 126, 52e60.
Aksorn, T., Hadikusumo, B.H.W., 2008. Critical success factors influencing safety
program performance in Thai construction projects. Saf. Sci. 46, 709e727.
Ball, P.W., Scontney, V., 1998. Approaches to Safety Culture Enhancement. Prepared
for British Nuclear Fuels Ltd on Behalf of the IMC.
Blanchard, K., Bowles, S., 1998. Gung Ho! William Morrow, New York.
Chen, C.C., Chen, J., Lin, P.C., 2009. Identification of significant threats and errors
affecting aviation safety in Taiwan using the analytical hierarchy process. J. Air
Transp. Manage. 15, 261e263.
Choudhry, R.M., Fang, D., Mohamed, S., 2007. Developing a model of construction
safety culture. J. Manage. Eng. 23, 207e212.
Cooper, M.D., 2000. Towards a model of safety culture. Saf. Sci. 36, 111e136.
Diaz, R., Cabrera, D., 1997. Safety climate and attitude as evaluation measures of
organizational safety. Accid. Anal. Prev. 29, 643e650.
Federal Aviation Administration, 2010. Aviation Safety: Safety Management System.
Fleming, M., 2001. Safety Culture Maturity Model. Report 2000/049. Health and
Safety Executive. Colegate, Norwich.
Gadd, S., Collins, A.M., 2002. Safety Culture: a Review of the Literature. Report No.
HSL/2002/25. Health & Safety Laboratory, Human Factors Group, Sheffield,
pp. 8e30.
Jin, R., Chen, Q., 2013. Safety culture: effects of environment, behavior & person. Saf.
Manage. 58, 60e70.
Larsson, S., Pousette, A., Torner, M., 2008. Psychological climate and safety in the
construction industry-mediated influence on safety behavior. Saf. Sci. 46, 405e
412.
Lee, W.K., 2006. Risk assessment modeling in aviation safety management. J. Air
Transp. Manage. 12, 267e273.
Liou, J.H., Yen, L., Tzeng, G.H., 2008. Building an effective safety management system
for airlines. J. Air Transp. Manage. 14, 20e26.
Mearns, K., Kirwan, B., Reader, T.W., Jackson, J., Kennedy, R., Gordon, R., 2013.
Development of a methodology for understanding and enhancing safety culture
in Air Traffic Management. Saf. Sci. 53, 123e133.
Molenaar, K.R., Brown, H.M., Caile, S., Smith, R., 2002. Corporate culture: a study of
firms with outstanding construction safety. ASSE J. Prof. Saf. 47, 18e27.
Muniz, B.F., Peon, J.M.M., Ordas, C.J.V., 2007. Safety culture: analysis of the causal
relationships between its key dimensions. J. Saf. Res. 38, 627e641.
Rundmo, T., 1994. Associations between safety and contingency measures and
occupational accidents on offshore petroleum platforms. Scand. J. Work Envi-
ron. Health 20, 128e131.
Taipei International Airport Station, 2012. The Exercise Manual of Venue Aircraft
Removal and Protection Group Mobilization.
Williamson, A.M., Feyer, A.M., Cairns, D., Biancotti, D., 1997. The development of a
measure of a measure of safety climate: the role of safety perceptions and at-
titudes. Saf. Sci. 25, 15e27.