BPI vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court GR# L-66826, August 19, 1988

Facts:
Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso
current account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager
of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the
amount was to be charged to the dolar savings account of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication
of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of
Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaiton from
the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty.
Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for
P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation payable to Ernesto.
Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?
Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the
bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was
really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus,
Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:Art.
1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with
the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is
not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

ROMAN

CATHOLIC

vs

DELA

PENA

FACTS PETITIONER-APPELLEE: The Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT: Gregorio de la Pea (administrator of the estate of Father Agustin de la
Pea
Facts:
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro brought action against the appellant, Gregorio de la Pea, who
was the administrator of the property of the deceased Fr. Agustin de la Pea (deceased- 1900), to
recover the sum of P6,641 (Mexican currency) in the Court of First Instance in Iloilo.
The amount of money in question, was collected by the deceased priest, as an authorized
representative to collect fees for the construction of a leper hospital. The appellee was a trustee of
such charitable bequest. The same amount was deposited, along with Fr. de la Peas personal funds,
in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank of Iloilo.
During the war of the revolution, Fr. de la Pea was arrested by the military authorities as a political
prisoner. His bank funds were confiscated as the military authorities thought that the funds were for
revolutionary purposes.
The CFI of Iloilo awarded the plaintiff P6,641 with interest at the legal rate from the beginning of action,
thus this appeal.
ISSUE/S Whether Father de la Pea is liable for the loss of the bequest money by placing it in his
personal bank account?

LAWS Article 1094 (The Civil Code of the Philippines): A person obliged to give something is also
bound to preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a good father of a family.
Article 1163 (The New Civil Code of the Philippines): Every person obliged to give something is also
obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family, unless the law or the
stipulation of the parties requires another standard of care. (1094a)
Article 1105 (The Civil Code of the Philippines): No one shall be liable for events which could not be
foreseen, or which having been foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases expressly
mentioned in the law or those in which the obligation so declares Article 1174 (The New Civil Code of
the Philippines): Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
(1105a)
HOLDINGS
No. Fr. de la Pea and his trustee (or estate administrator), Gregorio de la Pea is not liable for the
loss of the bequest money.
Fr. de la Peas liability is determined by portions in the Civil Code that relate to obligations (Book 4,
Title 1.) and the New Civil Code (Book 4, Title 1.)
Although Article 1094 of the Civil Code, now, Article 1163 (The New Civil Code) discusses that a
person obliged to give something is also bound to preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a good
father of a family, it also states that no one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or
which having been
foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or those in
which the obligation so declares (Article 1105, the Civil Code and Article 1174, The New Civil Code).
The precise question is not about negligence as we cannot measure nor say if Fr. de la Pea was
indeed negligent by depositing the donated funds in his bank. We cannot also do the same if he just
left the funds in his home or if he deposited the amount in a separate account as a trustee. No law
prohibited him from depositing the amount as he did and no law changed his responsibility because of
that act. While one who is under obligation to give a thing is obliged, when he foresees events which
may be dangerous to his trust, to exhaust all means and measures to elude or, if unavoidable, to
mitigate the effects of those events, the Supreme Court held that in choosing between two means
equally legal, with two possible same repercussions, making him negligent in selecting either, Fr. de la
Pea was not responsible for the loss of the amount in question.
The judgment was reversed.

CA Agro-Industrial vs CA G.R. No. 90027 March 3, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner (through its President) purchased 2 parcels of land from spouses Pugao for P350 K with a
downpayment
of
P75
K.
Per agreement, the land titles will be transferred upon full payment and will be placed in a safety
deposit box (SBDB) of any bank. Moreover, the same could be withdrawn only upon the
joint signatures of a representative of the Petitioner and the Pugaos upon full payment of the purchase
price.
Thereafter, Petitioner and spouses placed the titles in SDB of Respondent Security Bank and signed a
lease contract which substantially states that the Bank will not assume liability for the contents of the

SDB.
Subsequently, 2 renter's keys were given to the renters one to the Petitioner and the other to the
Pugaos. A guard key remained in the possession of the Respondent Bank. The SDB can only be
opened using these 2 keys simultaneously.Afterwards, a certain Mrs. Ramos offered to buy from the
Petitioner
the
2
lots
that
would
yield
a
profit
of
P285K.
Mrs. Ramos demanded the execution of a deed of sale which necessarily entailed the production of
the certificates of title. Thus, Petitioner with the spouses went to Respondent Bank to retrieve the titles.
However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's representative, the SDB yielded no such
certificates.
Because of the delay in the reconstitution of the title, Mrs. Ramos withdrew her earlier offer to
purchase the lots; as a consequence, the Petitioner allegedly failed to realize the expected profit of
P285K.
Hence, Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Respondent Bank. Lower courts ruled in
favour of Respondent Bank. Thus, this petition.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the disputed contract is an ordinary contract of lease?
2.

Whether

3.

Whether

or

not

or

not

the

provisions

Respondent

of

the

Bank

cited
is

contract

liable

for

are

valid?

damages?

Ruling:
1. No. SC ruled that it is a special kind of deposit because:
the full and absolute possession and control of the SDB was not given to the joint
renters the Petitioner and the Pugaos.
The guard key of the box remained with the Respondent Bank; without this key, neither
of the renters could open the box and vice versa.
In this case, the said key had a duplicate which was made so that both renters could
have
access
to
the
box.
Moreover, the renting out of the SDBs is not independent from, but related to or in
conjunction with, the principal function of a contract of deposit the receiving in custody of funds,
documents
and
other
valuable
objects
for
safekeeping.
2.

NO. SC opined that it is void.

Generally, the Civil Code provides that the depositary (Respondent Bank) would be
liable if, in performing its obligation, it is found guilty of fraud, negligence, delay or contravention of the
tenor of the agreement.
In the absence of any stipulation, the diligence of a good father of a family is to be
observed.
Hence, any stipulation exempting the depositary from any liability arising from the loss
of the thing deposited on account of fraud, negligence or delay would be void for being contrary to law
and public policy (which is present in the disputed contract)
Said provisions are inconsistent with the Respondent Bank's responsibility as a
depositary
under
Section
72(a)
of
the
General
Banking
Act.
3.

NO. SC ruled that:

no competent proof was presented to show that Respondent Bank was aware of the
private agreement between the Petitioner and the Pugaos that the Land titles were with drawable from
the SDB only upon both parties' joint signatures, and that no evidence was submitted to reveal that
the
loss
of
the
certificates
of
title
was
due
to
the
fraud
or
negligence
of
the
Respondent
Bank.

YHT vs CA
FACTS

Maurice Peaches McLoughlin is an Australian businessman-philanthropist who used to stay at

the Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984. He met Brunhilda Mata-Tan who
befriended him and showed him around. Tan convinced Mcloughlin to transfer to the Tropicana from
the Sheraton where afterwards he stayed during his trips from Dec 1984 to Sept 1987.

On 30 Oct 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a
safety deposit box as his usual practice. The box required two keys, the guest had one and one from
the management. He placed US $10,000 in one envelope and US$5,000 in another , AU$10,000 in
another envelope and other envelopes with his passport and credit cards. On 12 Dec 1987, he took
from the box the envelope with US$5,000 and the one with AU$10,000 to go to Hong Kong for a short
visit, because he was not checking out. When he arrived in HK, the envelope with US$5,000 only
contained US$3,000, but because he had no idea if the safety deposit box has been tampered, he
thought it was just bad accounting.

After returning to Manila, he checked out of the Tropicana on 18 Dec 1987 and left for Australia.
When he arrived he discovered that the envelope with US$10,000 was short of US$5,000. He also
noticed that the jewelry he bought in Hong Kong which he stored in the safety deposit box upon his
return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.

He went back to the PH on 4 Apr 1988 and asked Lainez (who had custody of the management
key) if some money was missing or returned to her, to which the latter answered there was not. He
again registered at the Tropicana and rented a safety deposit box. He placed an envelope containing
US$15,000, another of AU$10,000. On 16 Apr, he opened his safety deposit box and noticed that
US$2,000 and AU$4,500 was missing from the envelopes.

He immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit
box with the key assigned to McLoughlin. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and
confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key and was able to open the safety
deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan
stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.

McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez got in touch
with Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive,
Lopez and Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana and thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of
paper a promissory note.

He made Lopez and Tan sign a promissory note for him for the loss. However, Lopez refused
liability on behalf of the hotel, reasoning that McLoughlin signed an "Undertaking for the Use of Safety
Deposit Box" which disclaims any liability of the hotel for things put inside the box.

On 17 May 1988 McLoughlin went back to AU and consulted his lawyers. They wrote a letter
addressed to Pres. Cory Aquino which was pushed back to the DOJ and the Western Police District.
He went back from the PH to AU several times more to attend business and follow up but the
matter was only filed on 3 Dec 1990 since he was not there to personally follow up.
McLoughlin filed an action against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin. The CA modified only the amount of damages
awarded.

 Tan and Lopez, however, were not served with summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez,
Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.
(a) whether the loss of money and jewelry is supported by the evidence. YES.
Where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great respect is accorded to
the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. The trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
(b) whether there was gross negligence on the part of the innkeepers
Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the
management when the loss took place. They even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate
occasions in opening McLoughlins safety deposit box.
The management contends that McLoughlin made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for
she was always with him most of the time. The evidence on record is bereft of any showing that
McLoughlin introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Mere close companionship and intimacy
are not enough to warrant such conclusion. They should have confronted him as to his relationship
with Tan considering that the latter had been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a
number of times at the early hours of the morning.
Art 2180, par (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Given the fact that the
loss of McLoughlins money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas employees both
the employees and YHT, as owner of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Art 2193.
Issue:
WON the "Undertaking for the Use of the Safety Deposit Box" is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes, it is null and void. Art. 2003[1] is controlling. This is an expression of public policy that the hotel
business like common carriers are imbued with public interest. This responsibility cannot be waived
away by any contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
The CA (former case) even ruled before that hotelkeepers are liable even though the effects are not
delivered to them or their employees, but it is enough that the effects are within the hotel or inn.
Pars. 2 and 4 of the undertaking manifestly contravene Art. 2003 of the NCC. Meanwhile, the defense
that Art. 2002 exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of the guest, family or
visitors falls because the hotel is guilty of negligence as well. This provision presupposes that the
hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the
occurrence of the loss.
dispositive

Damages awarded by the lower court sustained

US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment;

Air fares for a total of 11 trips + transpo expense

Hotel payments

Moral 50K

ED 10K

AF 200K

TRIPLE-V vs. FILIPINO MERCHANTS

Facts:
For review on certiorari is the decision[1]cralaw dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals.
Mary Jo-Anne De Asis (De Asis) dined at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant at 15 West Avenue,
Quezon City. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon Model 1995 with plate number UBU
955, assigned to her by her employer Crispa Textile Inc. (Crispa). On said date, De Asis availed of the
valet parking service of petitioner and entrusted her car key to petitioner's valet counter. A
corresponding parking ticket was issued as receipt for the car. The car was then parked by petitioner's
valet attendant, a certain Madridano, at the designated parking area. Few minutes later, Madridano
noticed that the car was not in its parking slot and its key no longer in the box where valet attendants
usually keep the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered. Thereafter, Crispa filed
a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. (FMICI).
Having indemnified Crispa in the amount of P669.500 for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as
subrogee to Crispa's rights, filed with the RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner
Triple-V Food Services, Inc., thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 98-838 which was raffled to Branch
148.
Petitioner argued that the complaint failed to aver facts to support the allegations of recklessness and
negligence committed in the safekeeping and custody of the subject vehicle, claiming that it and its
employees wasted no time in ascertaining the loss of the car and in informing De Asis of the discovery
of the loss. Petitioner further argued that in accepting the complimentary valet parking service, De Asis
received a parking ticket whereunder it is so provided that "Management and staff will not be
responsible for any loss of or damage incurred on the vehicle nor of valuables contained
therein", a provision which, to petitioner's mind, is an explicit waiver of any right to claim indemnity for
the loss of the car; and that De Asis knowingly assumed the risk of loss when she allowed petitioner to
park her vehicle, adding that its valet parking service did not include extending a contract of insurance
or warranty for the loss of the vehicle.
Trial Court Rendered judgment for respondent FMICI
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating its argument that it was not a depositary
of the subject car and that it exercised due diligence and prudence in the safe keeping of the
vehicle, in handling the car-napping incident and in the supervision of its employees. It further
argued that there was no valid subrogation of rights between Crispa and respondent FMICI.
CA dismissed.
Issue:
W/N Petitioners contention is tenable.
Ruling:
De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet attendant while eating at petitioner'sKamayan
Restaurant, the former expected the car's safe return at the end of her meal. Thus, petitioner was
constituted as a depositary of the same car. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a
contract of deposit nor that of insurance, guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was constituted
when De Asis availed of its free valet parking service.
In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with the obligation of safely
keeping it and returning the same.[3]cralaw A deposit may be constituted even without any
consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to
keep the item entrusted for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor.
The parking claim stub embodying the terms and conditions of the parking, including that of relieving
petitioner from any loss or damage to the car, is essentially a contract of adhesion, drafted and
prepared as it is by the petitioner alone with no participation whatsoever on the part of the customers,
like De Asis, who merely adheres to the printed stipulations therein appearing. While contracts of

adhesion are not void in themselves, yet this Court will not hesitate to rule out blind adherence thereto
if they prove to be one-sided under the attendant facts and circumstances.
Petitioner must not be allowed to use its parking claim stub's exclusionary stipulation as a shield from
any responsibility for any loss or damage to vehicles or to the valuables contained therein. Here, it is
evident that De Asis deposited the car in question with the petitioner as part of the latter's enticement
for customers by providing them a safe parking space within the vicinity of its restaurant.
A safe parking space is an added attraction to petitioner's restaurant business because
customers are thereby somehow assured that their vehicle are safely kept, rather than
parking them elsewhere at their own risk. Having entrusted the subject car to petitioner's
valet attendant, customer De Asis, like all of petitioner's customers, fully expects the security
of her car while at petitioner's premises/designated parking areas and its safe return at the
end of her visit at petitioner's restaurant.
Thus, having indemnified CRISPA for the stolen car, FMICI, as correctly ruled by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, was properly subrogated to Crispa's rights against petitioner, pursuant to Article
2207 of the New Civil Code

UCPB vs Spouses Beluso

Facts:
1.Petition for Review on Certiorari declaring void the interest rate provided in the promissory notes
executed by the respondents Spouses Samuel and Odette Beluso (spouses Beluso) in favor of
petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
2.UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit Agreement whereby
the latter could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum amount of P1.2 Million pesos
for a term ending on 30 April 1997. The spouses Beluso constituted, other than their promissory
notes, a real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Roxas City, covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title No. T-31539 and T-27828, as additional security for the obligation. The Credit Agreement
was subsequently amended to increase the amount of the Promissory Notes Line to a maximum
of P2.35 Million pesos and to extend the term thereof to 28 February 1998.
3.On 30 April 1997, the payment of the principal and interest of the latter two promissory notes
were debited from the spouses Belusos account with UCPB; yet, a consolidated loan for P1.3 Million
was again released to the spouses Beluso under one promissory note with a due date of 28 February
1998. To completely avail themselves of the P2.35 Million credit line extended to them by UCPB, the
spouses Beluso executed two more promissory notes for a total of P350,000.00. However, the
spouses Beluso alleged that the amounts covered by these last two promissory notes were never
released or credited to their account and, thus, claimed that the principal indebtedness was only P2
Million.
4. The spouses Beluso, however, failed to make any payment of the foregoing amounts.
5. On 2 September 1998, UCPB demanded that the spouses Beluso pay their total obligation
of P 2,932,543.00 plus 25% attorneys fees, but the spouses Beluso failed to comply therewith. On 28
December 1998, UCPB foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the spouses Beluso to secure their
credit line, which, by that time, already ballooned to P3,784,603.00.
6.On 9 February 1999, the spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages
against UCPB with the RTC of Makati City.

7. Trial court declared in its judgment that:

a. the interest rate used by [UCPB] void
b. the foreclosure and Sheriffs Certificate of Sale void
c. UCPB is ordered to return to [the spouses Beluso] the properties subject of the foreclosure
d.UCPB to pay [the spouses Beluso] the amount of P 50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees
e.UCPB to pay the costs of suit.
f. Spouses Beluso] are hereby ordered to pay [UCPB] the sum of P1,560,308.00.
8. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial court's decision subject to the modification that defendantappellant UCPB is not liable for attorneys fees or the costs of suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not interest rate stipulated was void
Yes, stipulated interest rate is void because it contravenes on the principle of mutuality of contracts
and it violates the Truth in lending Act. The provision stating that the interest shall be at the rate
indicative of DBD retail rate or as determined by the Branch Head is indeed dependent solely on the
will of petitioner UCPB.
Under such provision, petitioner UCPB has two choices on what the interest rate shall be: (1) a rate
indicative of the DBD retail rate; or (2) a rate as determined by the Branch Head. As UCPB is given
this choice, the rate should be categorically determinable in both choices. If either of these two choices
presents an opportunity for UCPB to fix the rate at will, the bank can easily choose such an option,
thus making the entire interest rate provision violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.
In addition, the promissory notes, the copies of which were presented to the spouses Beluso after
execution, are not sufficient notification from UCPB. As earlier discussed, the interest rate provision
therein does not sufficiently indicate with particularity the interest rate to be applied to the loan covered
by said promissory notes which is required in TRuth in Lending Act
2. Whether or not Spouses Beluso are subject to 12% interest and compounding interest stipulations
even if declared amount by UCPB was excessive.
Yes. Default commences upon judicial or extrajudicial demand. The excess amount in such a demand
does not nullify the demand itself, which is valid with respect to the proper amount. There being a valid
demand on the part of UCPB, albeit excessive, the spouses Beluso are considered in default with
respect to the proper amount and, therefore, the interests and the penalties began to run at that point.
As regards the award of 12% legal interest in favor of petitioner, the RTC actually recognized that said
legal interest should be imposed, thus: There being no valid stipulation as to interest, the legal rate of
interest shall be charged. It seems that the RTC inadvertently overlooked its non-inclusion in its
computation. It must likewise uphold the contract stipulation providing the compounding of interest.
The provisions in the Credit Agreement and in the promissory notes providing for the compounding of
interest were neither nullified by the RTC or the Court of Appeals, nor assailed by the spouses Beluso
in their petition with the RTC. The compounding of interests has furthermore been declared by this
Court to be legal.
3. Whether or not foreclosure was void
No. The foreclosure proceedings are valid since there was a valid demand made by UCPB upon the
spouses Beluso. Despite being excessive, the spouses Beluso are considered in default with respect
to the proper amount of their obligation to UCPB and, thus, the property they mortgaged to secure

such amounts may be foreclosed. Consequently, proceeds of the foreclosure sale should be applied to
the extent of the amounts to which UCPB is rightfully entitled.