TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Protection scheme maloperations due

to AC on the substation DC supply
by Stuart van Zyl, Eskom
This paper describes two incidents in which spurious alternating current (AC) signals superimposed on a substations main direct current (DC)
supply caused protection schemes to maloperate, tripping circuit-breakers. Two type testing standards, a regional standard from the United
Kingdom and IEC 60255-22-7, are described which may be used to verify the immunity of protection components and schemes to power
frequency AC interference on DC inputs.

E s ko m D i s t r i b u t i o n h a s e x p e r i e n c e d
substation shut-downs caused by
spurious AC signals superimposed on the
substation's main DC supply. In one case,
commissioning staff mistakenly connected
a 230 V AC mains supply to the positive leg
of the DC supply. In another, an AC signal
was coupled to the DC circuitry during
earth fault conditions on the HV network as
a result of irregularities with the substation
earthing. Both cases led to the complete
shutdown of the MV (secondar y-side)
busbars at the affected substations, with
all HV/MV transformer MV circuit-breakers
tripping spuriously. Both incidents were
subsequently found to have been caused
by the same circuit of the specific type of
transformer protection scheme used.
The two incidents of maltripping due to
AC coupling onto DC circuits were found
to involve the same circuit in the same
type of transformer protection scheme
(see Fig. 1).
The circuit in Fig. 1 operates as follows:

I n t h e e v e n t o f a w i n d i n g o v e rtemperature condition on the power

t r a n s f o r m e r, c o n t a c t A i n t h e
transformer inter face box closes,
energizing the coil of the alarm
annunciator (for purposes of local
and remote indication) and the coil
of the winding temperature trip relay.
Not shown in Fig. 1, the pick-up of the
tripping relay causes the transformer's
MV (secondary side) circuit-breaker to
be tripped.
The winding temperature trip is
physically Anded with the closed

status of the MV circuit breaker and the

combined signal is wired to a binary
input (BI1) of the numerical transformer
IED. Not shown in Fig. 1, BI1 starts a
sustained fault timer which if not deenergised within 500 ms causes the
HV circuit-breaker to be tripped via the
master relay. The timer thus causes the
HV circuit-breaker to trip should the MV
circuit-breaker fail to trip.

The scheme makes provision to accept

a potential-free tripping contact from
an MV busbar protection scheme,
also operating BI1. BI1 is thus set to
immediately issue a trip command
to the transformer's MV circuit breaker
upon pick-up in addition to the time
delayed function indicated above.

Fig. 2: Transformer IED waveform

recording showing transient pick-up of
BI1 in the presence of AC on the DC supply.

The transformer IED in Fig. 1 is typical of

early numerical IEDs , featuring binar y
inputs with no intentional pick-up delay
(often termed debounce time) or power
frequency AC filtering. The circuitry to BI1
features three wires into the substation yard:
K135 between the relay panel (RP) in the
control room and the transformer interface
box, and K137 and K157 between the
relay panel and the MV circuit-breaker.
Each of these cabled wires is seldom less
than 30 m long. In some large distribution
substations each wire may exceed
200 m in length.

connection of a 230 V AC mains supply

to the positive leg (+55 V DC) of the
substation DC supply via undetected
terminal block bridges in the tap change
drive of a new transformer. The MV circuitbreakers of the three existing transformers,
protected by the scheme indicated in
Fig. 1, tripped immediately upon closure of
the AC supply miniature circuit-breaker. The
only flagging on the protection schemes
was a TRIP LED on the transformer IEDs.
A waveform recording from one of the
transformer IEDs is included as Fig. 2. Note
in particular the performance of binary
input BI1. The transformer's HV current (in
secondary Amps) are included in Fig. 2
to view the pickup of BI1 in relation to the
power system frequency. The pick-up of
BI1 is not directly related to the transformer
currents, however.

Case 1: Direct coupling of AC mains

supply

Case 2: Capacitively coupled AC signal

during network fault conditions

A multiple circuit-breaker trip incident

occurred due to the inadvertent

A second incident occurred at a large

distribution substation that was equipped
with three 132/33 kV 40 MVA transformers.
The neutral points of the star-connected
132 kV windings were solidly earthed and
each contributed up to 1500 A of zero
sequence current to earth faults on the
HV supply network. The substation is of
a terraced design with the HV busbar,
transformers and MV busbar all on different
terraces. A similar incident to that in case 1
occurred upon the incidence of a nearby
earth fault on one of the 132 kV lines
feeding the substation. The transformer
IED exhibited transient pick-up of BI1 as
in Fig. 2, cycles 10 14, for the duration
of the HV line fault. It was subsequently
established that the earth mats of each of
the substation terraces were not bonded
to one another and that the armouring

Fig. 1: DC circuit susceptible to operating due to AC supply coupling.

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TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Fig. 3: Set-up for the differential

mode AC immunity test.
Standard

VTest
Vrms

C1
nF

C2
nF

R1

R2

IEC 6025522-7

150

100

100

100

100

ESKASAAO4

250

100

N/A

N/A

N/A

Table 1: AC immunity test parameters.

of control cables between the relay

house (on the transformer terrace) and
the HV and MV equipment formed the
only connections between the different
electrodes. Potential differences occurred
between the three sections of earth mat
during earth fault conditions on the HV
network (with significant fault current
contribution from the transformer terrace).
This potential difference was capacitively
coupled to the substation DC supply via
the extensive network of control cables
from the relay house.
Investigation into the above incidents
found that the circuit ( Fig 1) presents the
following mechanism for spurious operation
in the presence of AC signals on the DC
supply: an AC source coupled to either
the positive or negative legs of the DC
system anywhere in the substation creates
a capacitive leakage current through
BI1; discharging via the capacitance-toearth of the control cables K135, K137
and K157. In these cases, the capacitive
current was sufficient to cause transient
pick-up of BI1 and gave rise to the tripping
of the transformer's MV circuit-breakers.
Each core of typical 4-, 12- and 19core control cables with 0,5 mm 2 wire,
have capacitances to earth of between
375 nF and 440 nF per kilometre [3,4].
For the transformers in case 1 and 2, wire
K135 from the transformer interface box
to the relay panel was approximately
100 m long, whilst K137 and K157 from
the MV circuit-breaker mechanism box
to the relay panel were 125 m long. Wire
K135 thus presented an approximate
capacitance to earth of 40 nF, whilst
K137 and K157 together presented a
capacitance of approximately 100 nF.
Laboratory tests were undertaken on the
circuit in Fig. 1 with the three cabled wires
represented by non-polarised capacitors.
The transformer IED's Contact BI1 was
seen to exhibit the behaviour shown
in Fig. 2, cycles 10 to 14, with a 59 V
AC voltage source applied between
K102 and the capacitor earth. The coiloperated winding temperature trip relay
and alarm annunciator did not operate
in this condition, or when up to 350 V AC
was applied. The winding temperature
trip relay remained stable for an applied
voltage of 250 V AC with K135 modelled

as a 70 nF capacitor (approx 185 m of

wire) and K137/K157 a 130 nF capacitor
(350 m of wire), but operated intermittently
with K135 and K137/K157 modelled as 100
nF and 200 nF capacitors respectively.
The transformer IED's BI1 could be made
immune to transient operation for AC
signals (tested up to 350 V AC, 200 nF
capacitance) by applying a 10 ms delay
on pick-up via programmable logic. This
would not have been sufficient for the
case presented in Fig. 2, however, as
the transformer IED experienced a 15 ms
pick-up of BI1 between cycles 9 and 10.
A technical instruction was subsequently
issued to the Eskom business to apply a
20 ms delay on pick-up on BI1 of all such
schemes/IEDs in service.
AC immunity testing standards
The investigation into the above incidents
found there to be at least two type testing
standards for the verification of power
frequency AC immunity of protective relay
DC inputs:
A CEGB standard from England and
Wales, later incorporated in National
Grid Company Technical Specification
NGTS 3.24.15 Issue 1 (2000) [4]. A
similar standard was adopted in
Eskom standards NWS 1819 (1989)
andm ESKASAAO4 Rev 1 (1995) Section
5.6.5.2 [1, pp.58]; and

IEC 60255-22-7 published in 2003 [2].

The above standards test the immunity of

DC inputs to power frequency voltages
coupled via capacitors both in common
mode (between one terminal of the
equipment and earth) and in differential
mode (directly across the input under
test). The incidents described in this paper
relate to interference in the differential
mode, and the common mode tests are
thus not discussed further. The differential
mode test set-up is indicated in Fig. 3. Test
parameters for the differential mode test
of IEC 60255-22-7 Class A, the highest test
specification as applicable to substations
with high fault levels (as opposed to the
low fault levels of Petersen Coil earthed
or isolated systems), and ESKASAAO4 are
indicated in Table 1.
Both testing standards require the AC
voltage to be applied and removed at a

Plant Description

IEC

zero crossing, in order to avoid unwanted

transients at turn on and turn off [2, pp.15].
The IEC test further requires that where the
DC input under test has a settable time
delay, the test shall be undertaken with the
delay set to its minimum value. If the test
is failed, then the delay is increased until
the test is passed. The final setting must be
recorded in the test report.
The equipment under test passes the
power frequency AC immunity test if
no maloperation occurs during the test
duration: 10 s for IEC, 2 s for ESKASAAO4. To
date, few IEDs or coil-operated relays have
been declared compliant to IEC 6025522-7 by their suppliers. Note from Table 1
that the AC immunity test of ESKASAAO4
ver y closely mimics the AC/DC supply
mixing scenario encountered in Case 1.
The 100 nF coupling capacitor represents
approximately 250 m of cabled wire being
coupled to the DC input. The origin of
the IEC testing parameters: voltage and
coupling impedances, is not clear from
the testing standard.
Relay compliance to AC immunity tests
A number of numerical IEDs and coiloperated tripping and control relays
were tested for power frequency AC
immunity as per Fig. 3 and Table 1.
The results are presented in Table 2.
Numerical IEDs were tested with the
settable debounce time and/or AC filters
in different states, indicated in brackets
after the Plant Description. The wattage of
the operating coil is indicated in the case
of coil operated relays. The fifth column in
Table 2 describes the maximum coupling
capacitance at which the equipment
passes the ESKASAAO4 test: 250 V AC test
voltage. Column 6 indicates the cabled
wire lengths corresponding to these
capacitances (assuming approximately
400 nF/km of wire). Numerical IED 1 in
Table 2 was the transformer IED in the two
case studies presented above. Relay 4
was the winding temperature trip relay.
It is to be noted how, with no input delay
(debounce time), the numerical IED is
highly susceptible to maloperation due
to capacitively coupled AC signals. Relays
3 and 4 were subject to noisy contact
bounce during both AC immunity tests,
causing the entire relay to vibrate. The

ESK

Max C @
250V AC

Cable
length

1a

Numerical IED (0 ms)

Fail

Fail

5 nF

12 m

1b

Numerical IED (10 ms)

Pass

Pass

300 nF

800 m

2a

Numerical IED (Filter off)

Pass

Pass

150 nF

400 m

2b

Numerical IED (Filter on)

Pass

Pass

>800 nF

>2100 m

10-pin auxiliary relay (1,2 W coil)

Fail

Fail 15 nF

40 m

Self-reset tripping relay (3,2 W coil)

Fail

Pass 110 nF

270 m

Self-reset tripping relay (25 W coil)

Pass

Pass 570 nF

1500 m

Latching relay (6 W coil)

Pass

Pass

230 nF

600 m

Latching relay (12 W coil)

Pass

Pass

360 nF

900 m

Table 2: Results of AC immunity tests on a sample of protective relays.

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TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Conclusion

Table 3: Effect of circuit components on AC immunity of DC inputs.

results from Table 2, suggest that the IEC

and ESK tests for power frequency AC
immunity are functionally very similar. This
is supported by theoretical calculations
which indicate that for a DC input/coil
impedance of 20 k (typical of numerical
IED binary inputs), the test currents from
the above tests are similar in magnitude;
similarly the test voltages. With a 4 k
impedance (typical of a coil operated
relay), the test currents and voltages across
the input are some 20% higher in the IEC
test than with ESK. This explains why Relay
4 in Table 2 passed the ESK test, but failed
the IEC test. Relay 4 was seen to fail the ESK
test when the coupling capacitance was
increased from 100 nF to 110 nF.
It must be noted that although the
numerical IED in 1b passed both AC
immunity tests, it would have maloperated
in the practical case presented in Fig. 2.
This is due to the switching transient that
occurred in practice, but which is expressly
excluded from the testing standards (via
the requirement for switch on/off at zero
crossings). The AC immunity tests are thus
unable to guarantee relay stability in the
transient period immediately following AC
and DC supply mixing. Columns 5 and 6
in Table 2 indicate the maximum amount
of cabled wire that can be connected to
each DC input such that the input remains
immune to direct coupling of symmetrical
250 V AC onto the DC supply. The relays in
the test sample, all except relays 1 and 3,
can be connected to significant lengths of
wire cabling without fear of maloperation
due to stray power frequency voltages on
the DC supply. It must be noted, however,
that even this level of immunity may not
be sufficient in all applications. A high
impedance bus zone protection scheme
using zone selection via isolator auxiliary
contacts is one example where a large
number of relatively long cables may be
coupled to one or a limited number of
tripping relays. Relay 6 which has been
used in such applications for Eskom, may
not have sufficient AC immunity despite
passing both the IEC and ESK tests.

Influence of circuit design on ac immunity

of relays
The relays from Table 2 were used in an
investigation on the effect of common
control circuit design practices on the AC
immunity of relays: installation of a diode
in series with the input or a shunt positive
temperature co-efficient (PTC) resistor
(or thermistor) across the input. Refer to
Table 3.
The dramatic effect of the shunt PTC on
the power frequency AC immunity of
binary inputs and coiloperated relays was
unexpected given that the component was
added to satisfy a different test requirement.
This was found to be due to the PTC having
a relatively low resistance at ambient
temperature (usually between 300 and
700 ) and that the coupling capacitor
thus represents the dominant impedance
in the test circuit, limiting the AC current to
the milli-Amp range. The PTC can sustain this
test current for long periods without heating
up towards its cut-off threshold where
it effectively becomes open circuited.
The binary input or operating coil that is
shunted by the PTC has an impedance
in the k or tens of k range, and most
of the AC test current is shunted by the
PTC. The manufacturer of relays 4, 6 and
7 in Table 2 has released a range of coiloperated tripping- and latching relays
featuring PTCs across their operating coils.
The documentation suggests that the PTCs
were added to provide for immunity to
capacitive discharge current. In practice,
the PTCs also provide the relays with a
significantly increased level of immunity to
capacitively coupled AC signals. Results
indicated in Table 2 are quoted for models
of relays without PTCs installed.The tests in
Table 3 suggest that series diodes tend
to increase the level of AC immunity of a
specific relay, but may not be sufficient
to prevent nuisance operations. Where
used, the circuit design must be such as
to provide a discharge path for the cable
capacitance so as not to leave this in
a charged state, potentially causing an
electric shock to maintenance staff.
energize - March 2012 - Page 35

It is strongly recommended that design

engineers specify- and test their protection
schemes to one of the available AC
immunity standards. For complex circuits
involving interfaces to a number of cabled
wires (e.g. Fig. 1 or bus zone tripping
circuits), each wire may be represented
by an equivalent capacitance-toearth rather than the fixed values of the
testing standards. Notwithstanding this
previous recommendation, the existing
test standards do not provide a firm
guarantee of immunity to all AC signals
that may occur on DC systems, especially
in the case of direct AC/DC mixing. This is
because the test methods expressly seek to
avoid supply transients on the application
of the AC test signal, while transients may
occur in practical applications. To this
end, commissioning and maintenance
p e r s o n n e l m u s t t a ke t h e n e c e s s a r y
precautions to avoid the occurrence of
inadvertent coupling of mains AC and
substation DC supplies. Protection scheme
DC circuits can achieve a higher level
of immunity to AC signals by limiting the
number and length of cabled wiring that is
interfaced with a single input or operating
coil. Physical logic combinations achieved
by wiring distant contacts in series or
parallel (e.g. the winding temperature trip
And MV circuit-breaker closed logic of
Fig. 1) are better achieved by supplying
each contact into a separate binary input
and logically combining them within the
IED. The application of shunt PTCs across
IED inputs and relay operating coils,
typically to provide for immunity against
capacitor discharge, tends to provide a
high level of immunity to maloperation due
to capacitively coupled AC signals. Some
manufacturers of coil-operated relays
offer transient performance variants with
shunt PTCs factory-fitted internally to the
relays, and type tested as a single unit.
Such variants should be used in tripping
applications in preference to their more
AC-susceptible predecessors.
Acknowledgement
This paper was presented at the
Southern African Power System Protection
Conference, Johannesburg November
2010, and is reprinted with permission
References
[1] Eskom standard, ESKASAAO4 Rev.1 (1995):
Standard for electronic protection and fault
monitoring equipment for power systems.
[2] IEC 60255-22-7 (2003), Electrical relays Part
22- 7: Electrical disturbance tests for measuring
relays and protection equipment Power
frequency immunity tests.
[3] LV control cable information downloaded from
www.aberdare.co.za/ and www.africancables.
com/.
[4] AREVA Analysis of Power Systems Protection
Course Notes: Volume 5 Section 11 Type Testing
of Protective Equipment. 7 Mar 18 Apr 2005,
Stafford, UK.

Contact Stuart van Zyl, Eskom,

Tel 012 421-4713,
stuart.vzyl@eskom.co.za