ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Montejo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

SECTION 1
[See Republic Act No. 6735]
System of Initiative and Referendum

Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran,

located in the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of
RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8
municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a
consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5
municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of
inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district
to the third district of Leyte.

SECTION 3
PIMENTEL JR. v. COMELEC
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with
certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence,
Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized
elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.
Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an
unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for
Senator?
Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office
whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government
undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI
of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5
qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
(5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify
these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another legislative district
Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally
regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major
power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section
2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its
power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also
give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular
province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and
inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue involves a
problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners remedy
lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives
Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of
the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district
to the third district of Leyte.

SECTION 5
TOBIAS v. ABALOS

AQUINO v. COMELEC

FACTS: The municipality of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only

one legislative district. R.A. 7675 aims to make Mandaluyong into a city. The
petitioner contends that the said law aims to increase the membership of
the House as the conversion of Mandaluyong into a city will result in the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

FACTS:
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of
the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment."

ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati into a city is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the creation of a new congressional
district for Mandaluyong was but a natural consequence of
Mandaluyongs conversion into a city. The Constitution provides that a
city should have a population of at least 250,000 and having met this
requirement Mandaluyong is qualified to be converted into a city and as
provided in the Constitution entitled to at least 1 representative.

Said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of

Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.

MARIANO JR. v. COMELEC

Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average

annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

FACTS: R.A. 7854, which aims to convert Makati into a city, is assailed as
being unconstitutional on the grounds that R.A. 7854 aims to increase
membership of the House which the Constitution fixes and that R.A. 7854
being a special law cannot change members of the Houses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati into a city is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that as was already decided by the
Supreme Court in Tobias vs. Abalos, the Constitution provides that the
compositions of the House should not be more than 250 members, UNLESS
otherwise provided by law. The natural result in the creation of a new
legislative from a special law whose purpose is to convert a municipality
into a city is sanctioned by the Constitution.

Art VI,Sec 5 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,

as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
ISSUES:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first
district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the
creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section
5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as
provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution

HELD:
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
The use of the word "or", which is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is
a VALID LAW.
Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which
obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional
party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the
House of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the
private respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step
is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received.
Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats.
The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be
referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since
the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the
first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS), RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
FACTS: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC
No. 07-041 (PL) before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC). Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed its
petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC]
have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is
duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
A Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters
as clearly stated in Veterans.
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

#district

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a

minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes

of party list system

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that
is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;

determination of total number of party-list representatives =

representatives/.80 x .20

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ #

votes of first party x additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number
of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the
proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation,
the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the
result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to
the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified

party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes."
Petitioner BANAT, in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following relief:
Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats
corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional
seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is,
in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group
in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after
deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats
under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
"ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION
2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining
how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System Act)
provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
This is where petitioners' and intervenors' problem with the formula in
Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total
number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

ISSUES:
1.
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling?
2.
Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3.
Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by
the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4.
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
RULING: We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment
of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. We cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from
being filled.
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for partylist representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.
Note: by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections

Issue:
1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
Ruling:
1st issue: YES. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance
with law."
The purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order
to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office."

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented.
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions
for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
The registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together
with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections.
Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or
accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of
several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
which:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan
and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization
to directly participate in this electoral window.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral
parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level,
keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations
and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on
the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions."
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec
a Petition praying that "the respondents be deleted from the 'Certified List
of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in
the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified
list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes
cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and
Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.

2nd issue: NO. marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive,

it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the
words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by
those in immediate association.

Paglaum vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent
In relation to Sec. 5(2) Article VI party-list system
FACTS: Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified
(either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system,
or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations) by the COMELEC in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections for
various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed
a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them. The Supreme Court resolved
to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,
20 November 2012, 27 November 2012, 4 December 2012, 11 December
2012, and 19 February 2013. Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was
tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case. Status quo ante orders
(SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to
the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or
only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the
COMELEC to include their names in the printing of official ballots.
Another argument of the petitioners was that whether the criteria for
participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: NO. In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court,
through Carpios ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and remanded
these petitions to the COMELEC. The party-list groups and organizations
covered by the 41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from
the high court still stand a chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as
the high court ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are
qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set forth in the
Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the
poll body merely for purposes of determining whether they may be granted
accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the
May 2013 elections.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters as
set forth in the Decision:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack welldefined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions
faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial
power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners,
but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
Additional info:
All the 54 petitions were granted.
The COMELEC held that Atong Paglaums nominees do not belong to the
sectors which the party represents, i.e., the urban poor, consumer, women
and youth. While these include the women and youth sectors, five of the
partys six nominees are all male, and all of its nominees are above 30 years

of age. Further, the COMELEC ruled that the personal circumstances of the
nominees belie the claim that they belong to the urban poor sector: (1) its
first nominee served as vice-president in a multinational corporation; (2) its
second nominee is the owner of a corporation engaged in the business of
pineapple contract growing with Del Monte Philippines; (3) its third nominee
is the owner and manager of two business establishments; and (4) its sixth
nominee is an electrical engineer and three-term member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Finally, the
COMELEC cited the partys failure to file its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures when it participated in the 2010 Elections, despite having
been ordered to do so during the summary evidentiary hearing.
In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always
been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since
theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2
states that while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected
to the House of Representatives.'
However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed
out that there was an inherent inconsistency in the Ang Bagong Bayani
guidelines since the requirement that the major political parties should
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors essentially
automatically disqualified these major parties from the party-list system.
As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that
the guidelines in this ruling merely formalized the prevailing practice when
it prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections even if through their allied sectoral organizations.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies. The common denominator
however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election
system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then
the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running
for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have welldefined political constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.

LADLAD VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partylist, herein petitioner is a national
organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to
public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the
said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In
fact, their acts which are contrary to public morals are even punishable
under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, petitioner filed this instant
Petition on Certiorari. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner
also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection
of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the
COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since
there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application of the petitioner as a partylist should
be granted
HELD: YES. The SC ruled that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside
from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that
Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any
of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally
vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation
is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which
we adhere.
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS:
In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the
sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of
Representatives in which Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the firstnominee
of the said party-list group. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina
Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr., ErlindaCadapan, Antonia Flores, and
Joselito Ustarez are members of the other party-list groups filed with the HRET
a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, Palaparan.
They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of
Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and under
represented sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels. Civilian
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.
Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that HRET had
no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was
elected to assume membership in the House ofRepresentatives.
Furthermore, he said that such question should be raised before the partylistgroup, not before the HRET.On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order
upholding its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparans
qualifications. Palparan filed a motion for reconsideration but the HRET
denied it by a resolution.

representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has

been proclaimed and the nominee has takenhis oath and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELEC

FACTS:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition
for review and a motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,2009 insofar as
it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These
resolutions delistedPGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List
System Act, COMELEC, upon verified complaint of any interested party,
may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, theregistration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to
participatein the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.For May
2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting
several party-listgroups or organizations from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2%
of thevotes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI
filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for
accreditation as a party-listorganization. One of the arguments cited is that
the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 MINERO(Philippine Mines
Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant
controversy.One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited
case is removed from PGBI's.
Additionally, therequirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the
Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 -BANAT(Barangay Association for
Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC. COMELEC
denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is
squarely in point, asMINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did
not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
ISSUE: Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting
PGBI.

HELD: YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of

the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be
elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. Thus, it is the partylist representatives who are elected into
office, not their parties or organizations. Although it is the party-list
organization that is voted forin the elections, it is not the organization that
sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives.

HELD: According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application

of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the
roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.First the law is clear in that the word "or"
is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independenceof one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which itordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain,
clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate
reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 andtherefore, simply cannot
stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of
a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list
organization that does not participate in an electionnecessarily gets, by
default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused
interpretationof the law, given the law's clear and categorical language
and the legislative intent to treat the two scenariosdifferently. A delisting
based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds
for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional
terms, it is an interpretation notwithin the contemplation of the framers of
the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.

As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET

shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of theHouse of Representatives. Since the
party-list representatives and districts representatives are treated in like
manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nomineehas taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of allcontests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House ofRepresentatives. Since
party- list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives
no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hearand pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs

COMELEC where the 2% party-listvote requirement provided in RA 7941 is
partly invalidated.The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b)of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematicallyimpossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available partylist
seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of theadditional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941
provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be
mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure
to garner 2% party-list votesin two preceding elections should now be

ISSUE: Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the
nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of
Congress.

understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure toqualify for a partylist seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. This ishow Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied under the authority of the Supreme Courtto state what the law is
and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established).The
most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling
case law is that it wasclearly an erroneous application of the law - an
application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone
cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the
law, the intent of the legislature and to the rule of law in general.Therefore,
the Supreme Court grants PGBIs petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC
Resolution No.8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is
concerned and the Resolution datedDecember 9, 2009 which denied
PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon asa
party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections.

Sec.7. the right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941 vs COMELEC

GR No. 177271
May 4, 2007

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the
right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment.
While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote,
in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases,
would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon
any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election

FACTS: There were two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus
to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. In the first
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BARA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) assail the various
COMELEC resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et
al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007
without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective
nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed
as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation
and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn COMELEC Resolution 07-0724
dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited
participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous
letter request While both petitions commonly seek to compel the
COMELEC to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be
declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that
the COMELEC be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from
participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the COMELEC to
the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that
these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent COMELEC, by refusing to reveal the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to
information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to
disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it
seeks to compel the COMELEC to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED.
Accordingly, the COMELEC is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced
in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual
determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way
of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the
undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does
not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (Note that
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of
an organization).
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941, which last sentence reads:
"[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified
list" is certainly not a justifying card for the COMELEC to deny the requested
disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than
the "Certified List" of the names.

3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of

the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right
to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the
public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees,
however, the right to information and its companion right of access to
official records are not absolute. The peoples right to know is limited to
"matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may
be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in
the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. Doubtless, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees
of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus,
therefore, lies.

SECTION 6
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs COMELEC
GR No. 119976
September 18, 1995
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school
in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University
also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in
San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate
for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought
to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that
she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to
be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.
The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioners claim of legal

residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own

declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In
the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile
of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos,
her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.

On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same
meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a
given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence
of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate
falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was
running in.

AQUINO v. COMELEC
Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
(remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village,
Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on
May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with
38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which,
on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission
on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2
orders.
Issues:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes
domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not
just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous
with domicile not only under the previous constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it

actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day
of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the
interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:

The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove
that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election
indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile
of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in
Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged
lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims
to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and
his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose
in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati
is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at
bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due
to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from
proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in
the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made
permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant
case after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in
another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded
to promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a
threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency
requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and
to applicable laws and jurisprudence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of
enforcing the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates
in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a
year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of
petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous
disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second
place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a
loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the
creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in
such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of
taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.

RULING: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid
repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections,
he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the
United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture
was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American
citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

SECTION 7
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to
support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a
candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a
domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

CO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

GR Nos. 92191-92
July 30, 1991
FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was
held. Among the candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent
Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district
of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent
Ong since Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and
questioned Ongs residence qualification since Ong does not own any
property in Samar.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the decision of HRET is appealable;
2. Whether or not respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3. Whether or not Ong is a resident of Samar.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the
sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no
improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
2. Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose Ong Chuan, respondents father, an
immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a
minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province
of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of
respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino
mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3. Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given
to the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as
domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of
respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.

Dimaporo vs Mitra
G.R. No. 96859
Oct 15, 1991
FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for
the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. Three years after, the petitioner filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (a different position from what he held at that time).
Upon being informed by the COMELEC about the petitioners CoC,
respondents Speaker Ramon Mitra and Secretary of the House of
Representatives Camilo Sabio excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) which reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner expressed his
intent to resume his duties and functions as a Member of the Congress. He,
however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman
because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the
present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable
to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner pointed out that the term of office of
members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which
the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in
the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section
7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be
shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of
Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground
that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States. Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to
protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under
the present Constitution.
2. Whether or not the act of filing a Certificate of Candidacy by the
petitioner for another office forfeits his seat in Congress.
RULING:
1. Yes. Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present
Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said

Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated

in Par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. Under the questioned
provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his
tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed
to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution
does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not
exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of
office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and
conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold
public office.
2. Yes. As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another
office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective
position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that
the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

and that if same were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be

subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the
Supreme Court. Osmea claimed that the resolution violates his
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman
Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to
discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. members of the legislature with parliamentary immunity which is
a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democracy are
covered by Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside the Congress. It does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly
or unbecoming as member of such. Osmeas petition is dismissed.

POBRE v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
SECTION 8
[See Republic Act No. 6645]

Facts: Sa kanyang privilege speech sa Senado, sinabi ni Senador Miriam

Defensor-Santiago ang:

SECTION 11
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives
and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958,
Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas,
was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners
allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool
to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging
that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the
case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house,
he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege
communication endowed to members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same
time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower
court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Osmea vs. Pendatun

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled
A Message to Garcia. In the said speech, he belittled President Garcias
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the
lower house to investigate the charges made by Osmea during his speech

I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am

suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.
Iniinvoke naman ng aking paboritong senador ang kanyang constitutional
rights bilang isang miyembro ng Kongreso (parliamentary immunity). May
mga nakatala (tulad ni Pobre) na ang pahayag na ito ng senadorang may
kaunting tililing ay bunga ng hindi pag-a-appoint sa kanya bilang Chief
Justice.
Issue: Kung si Miriam Baliw ba ay administratively liable dahil sa pahayag
niyang ito, at kung abuso ba ito ng kanyang mga karapatan bilang isang
senador.
Held: Baliw si Miriam at talagang baliw siya; bitter na bitter rin siya nang
hindi siya naging Chief Justice. Lol.
Eto seryoso na.
Isinaad ng Korte Suprema na ang Senadora ay indeed, may constitutional
rights na makikita sa Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof. Ika ng Korte Suprema, isa ang free
speech sa mga pundasyon ng demokrasya.
Ngunit kahit may parliamentary rights siya na naka-mandate sa
Konstitusyon, pinagalitan pa rin ng Korte Suprema ang senadora.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator
Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the
administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance.
Ayon na rin sa Korte Suprema, nasa Senado na ang opisyal na hatol kay
Miriam Baliw, dahil Rules of the House ang kanyang nilabag.
Huling hirit ng Korte Suprema: It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. i.e.,
#$%^&*&^%$#$%^&* dahil sa separation of powers, wala tayong magawa
noong ininsulto tayo ng luka-lokang iyon dahil hindi natin siya saklaw.
Nakanino ang huling halakhak?
"I lied." *hysterical laughter*

SECTION 13
ZANDUETA VS DELA COSTA
Facts: Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5th Branch of Courts of First
Instance of Manila. He received a new ad interim appointment issued
(Commonwealth Act No. 145) to discharge the Office of Judge in the Court
of First Instance of the 4th Judicial District with the authority to preside over
the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan
The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. The President of
the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa (respondent), judge of 4th
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of
Manila and Palawan. Dela Costas appointment was approved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No.
145 is unconstitutional
Issue: Whether or Not an Incompatible New office a public official
accepted in appointments would consider the same official to have
abandoned his Old appointment?
Held: Under his former appointment of June 2, 1936, the petitioner had
authority to preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan, while,
according to his new appointment of November 7, 1936, he had authority
to preside not only over said Fifth Branch of said Court of First Instance of
Manila but also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should be
noted that the territory over which the petitioner could exercise and did
exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that over
which he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the former.
Hence, there is incompatibility between the two appointments and,
consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred 1 by each of them,
resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter. In accepting this
appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the office
conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same,
disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner
abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise
of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official
voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or
reorganized by a law,which new office is incompatible with the one
formerly occupied by him, qualifies for the discharge of the functions
thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of
his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized
office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to
have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former
appointment and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by
virtue of which he was last appointed. He is excepted from said rule only
when his non acceptance of the new appointment may affect public
interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies.
SECTION 14
PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN
Facts:
In May 14, 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as
directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently
questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were
not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto case before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to
Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a
member of Aceros group and during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the
parties confer with each other, Fernandez entered his appearance as
counsel for Acero.
Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman
to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as
the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as
counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner
of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting
Fernandez leave to intervene.

Issue:
WON Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may
intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution
o
Meaning: whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, can appear
and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision
that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel, before an administrative
body
Ruling:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body
under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He
bought the a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out
of 262,843 outstanding shares before the litigation took place.
During the conference he presented himself as counsel for respondent but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so, under the constitution, he
instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a
workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get
himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not
likewise be done indirectly.
There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an
administrative body" and that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. Hence, Respondent Commissioner's Order is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The TRO heretofore issued is hereby made PERMANENT.

SECTION 16
Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad vs. Teofisto T. Guingona,
Rr. and Marcelo B. Fernan G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of
20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that
he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,
stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By
virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona
as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a
petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator
Tatad.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution
Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of
whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over
the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.
However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from
practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by
a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner
of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such

other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will
be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

April 18, 2001 G.R. No. 128055
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:

JOSE AVELINO vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO

G.R. No. L-2821
March 4 1949
FACTS: In the session of the Senate in February 18 1949, disorderly conduct
broke out in the Senate gallery, wherein the petitioner Jose Avelino banged
the gavel and abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked out of the
session followed by other senators, including the Assistant Secretary. As not
to paralyze the functions of the Senate, the other members moved to
declare repsondent Mariano J. Cuenco and Gregorio Abad as the acting
Senate President and Secretary respectively. The next day, the President
recognized the appointment of the respondent. This is a petition made to
declare Avelino as the rightful Senate President and oust Cuenco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction in the internal matters of
the Senate.
RULING: No. The Court refused to take cognizance of this matter in the light
of the principle of separation of powers. The political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not interfered with, nor taken over,
by the Judiciary.

ARROYO vs. DE VENECIA

August 14, 1997 G.R. No. 127255
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives (HoR)
assailing the validity of RA 8240 amending certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing sin taxes on the manufacture and
sale of beer and cigarettes. Respondent is Speaker Jose De Venecia.
Petitioners allege that the Rules of the House were violated when the bill
was enacted into law. Hence, the constitution was violated as these rules
are constitutionally mandated.
The law originated in the HoR as House Bill (HB) No. 7198. This bill was
approved on the third reading and transmitted to the senate which
approved it with certain amendments. A Bicameral Conference
Committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill.
Petitioners claim that the Rules of the House were violated because the
Chair (of the Bicameral Conference Committee) in submitting the
Conference Committee Report to the House, did not call for the voting of
yeas or nays but simply asked for its approval by motion to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum.
ISSUE:
1.
W/N RA 8240 is unconstitutional.
2.
W/N Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting RA No. 8240.
HELD:
1.
NO. Only internal rules of procedure of the House were violated
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of the law as
established in Section 26-27 of Article VI. The Constitution requires that
yeas and nays of the members should be taken upon:
a.
Last and third readings of the bill
b.
At the request of one-fift of the members present
c.
In repassing a bill over the veto of the President
2.
No. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of HB 7198 by
the Speaker of the House and Senate President and the certification by
secretaries of both Houses that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. Hence, Congress did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
enacting RA 8240. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court
will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both houses that a
bill has been duly passed. To set aside a legislative action as void by the
Court on the basis of the House disregarding its own rules of procedure is
an encroachment by the Judiciary on the legislative departments
prerogative.
Notes:
1.

Motion for Reconsideration is DISMISSED.

A group of Commission of Immigration and Deportation employees (CID)

filed complaints against petitioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in her
capacity as CID Commissioner for alleged violation of RA 3019 or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. This was due to petitioner, as CID
Commissioner, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approving the application
for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens in violation of EO 324.
Respondent Sandiganbayan, in response, suspended petitioner from her
position as Senator and from any government position she may hold
thereafter. Her suspension was good for ninety days and took effect
immediately upon notice.
Petitioner invoked Section 16, par. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution which grants
each House of Congress to punish its members for disorderly behavior, and
suspend or expel a member by a vote of two-thirds of all its members
subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days.
ISSUE:
1.
W/N Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a preventive
suspension against petitioner who is a Senator.
HELD:
1.
Yes. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself does not
exclude members of Congress from RA 3019 or its sanctions. The doctrine
simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent branches
of the government, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. RA 3019 does
not exclude from its coverage the members of the Congress. Therefore the
Sandiganbayan did not err in decreeing the assailed suspension order.
Notes:
1.

Petition is DISMISSED

Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

GR 118354 August 8 1995
FACTS: In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, then vice mayor of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the
governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of
Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly
conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment
notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against
him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling
the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the
arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet
on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but
he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only
changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged
with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was
eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be
suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on
the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress.
The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by
a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of
in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan

GR 130240 February 5, 2002
FACTS:
On 12 March 1993, an information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of
Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the
prosecution filed a Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite. In its
Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and
ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not
comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the
Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the
rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be
dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted
on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court
and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.
Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General
of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House
of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is
a penalty or a precautionary measure; and
(2)Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.
HELD: As ruled in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan , the suspension
provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature
and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine
of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from
the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic
Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, upon an erring member.
Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his
prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary
evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the
other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is
a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for
disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings,
or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor
from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three coequal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives
and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents
one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.

U.S. vs. Pons

G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916
FACTS: Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914,
the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25
barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso
subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the
customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record
were not delivered to any listed merchant. And so the customs officers
conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine
actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing
opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally
and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to
the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was
approved while the Philippine Commission was not in session. He said that
his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March
1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN
on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to
determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: No, the SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of
adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative
Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into
the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as
the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due
weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the
legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight
on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Casco vs Gimenez
GR No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a
claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. is engaged in the production of
synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main
components of the said glue are "urea and formaldehyde" which are both
being imported abroad. Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin
Fee Law, the Central Bank issued Circulars fixing a uniform margin fee of
25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued memorandum
establishing the procedure for the applications for exemption from the
payment of said fee as provided by R.A. 2609. Petitioners paid the required
margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of their transactions
through R.A. 2609 they wanted to avail the exemption from the payment
of said fee as provided by RA. 2609. Petitioners filed a refund request to the
Central Bank and the Central Bank issued the vouchers but was not
accepted by the Auditor of the Bank. The refusal was also affirmed by the
Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact that the separate
importation of "urea and formaldehyde" is not in accord with the provisions
of R.A. 2609, because section 2 of R.A. 2609 clearly provides Urea
formaldehyde and not urea and formaldehyde. Petitioner maintains
that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "urea and formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and"
between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners contentions that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde"
RULING:
No, because what is allowed in RA. 2809 is urea formaldehyde, not "urea
and formaldehyde", both are different from each other. The National
Institute of Science and Technology defines urea formaldehyde is the
synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions
of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low
cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde
is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea and formaldehyde.
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is
well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed and approved by
Congress. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it
was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Chief
Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones
of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO

G.R. No. 105371
November 11, 1993
Case Digest
In relation to ARTICLE VI (Legislative Department)
FACTS:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It
is asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired
by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The main target of
this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The
petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them
insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration
cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to
intervene.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads
as follows:

In the Courts view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking
privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation,
which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in
the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between
the government and the people. Assuming that basis, the Court cannot
understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question
that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege,
it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out.
Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely
of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving. In lumping the Judiciary with the other
offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35
has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong.
If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members
of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not
recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the
administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can
only further deepen this serious problem. The Court is unable to agree with
the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise
of discretion by the Legislature under the police power.

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts,

decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.

NOTE:
Franking Privilege - The privilege of sending certain matter through the
public mails without payment of postage. In pursuance of a personal or
official privilege. (Black's Law Dictionary)

All franking privileges authorized by

law are hereby repealed, except
those
provided
for
under
Commonwealth
Act
No.
265,
Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180,
1414,
2087
and
5059.
The
Corporation may continue the
franking privilege under Circular No.
35 dated October 24, 1977 and that
of the Vice President, under such
arrangements and conditions as
may obviate abuse or unauthorized
use thereof.

SECTION 17

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that:
(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
HELD:
YES. It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while
withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for
the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on
Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against
public offices and officers. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in
a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a
more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.
The Court does not believe that the basis of the classification was mere
courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments would have
intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and
equal departments the government. The same observations are made if
the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the
extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census
and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts
of justice.

ROBLES v. HRET
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
assailing the resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET): 1) dated September 19, 1988 granting herein private respondents
Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated
January 26, 1989, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were
candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan
City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was
proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET.
He alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan
City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of
electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections,
during the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election
returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all
the 320 contested precincts (pp. 16-20, Rollo).
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the
protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence
of protestant and the late filing of his protest.
On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the
commencement of the revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988
and directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total contested
precincts which he desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18
of the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (pp. 76-77,
Rollo).
On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts,
representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was terminated.
On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision
and on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on
the unrevised precincts (pp. 78-80, Rollo).
No action on Robles motion to suspend revision and Santos motion to
withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet taken by respondent
HRET when on September 14, 1988, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall
and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest (pp. 81-85, Rollo). On September 19,
1988, Robles opposed Santos Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal
of Protest in an Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with
Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo). On the same
day, respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others, granted
Santos Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. The
said resolution states:

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Case No. 43 (Romeo L. Santos

vs. Virgilio P. Robles). Three pleadings are submitted for consideration by the
Tribunal: (a) Protestees Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision, dated
September 8, 1988; (b) Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing, dated September
12, 1988; and (c) Protestants Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard
Withdrawal of Protest, dated September 14, 1988.
Upon the filing of Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest, the revision of
ballots was stopped and such revision remains suspended until now. In view
of such suspension, there is no need to act on Protestees Motion.
The Motion to Withdraw Protest, has been withdrawn by Protestants later
motion, and therefore need not be acted upon.
WHEREFORE, Protestees Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and
Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest are NOTED. The Urgent Motion to
Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest is GRANTED.
The Secretary of the Tribunal is directed to schedule the resumption of the
revision on September 26, 1988 and to send out the necessary notices for
this purpose. (p. 84, Rollo)
On September 20, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation
praying that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Revision with Opposition to Motion
to Recall dated September 19, 1988 be treated as a Motion for
Reconsideration of the HRET resolution of September 19, 1988 (pp. 92-94,
Rollo).
On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to comment on
Robles Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition
to Motion to Recall Withdrawal and ordered the suspension of the
resumption of revision scheduled for September 26, 1988.
On January 26, 1989, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal denied
Robles Motion for Reconsideration (pp. 109-111, Rollo). Hence, the instant
petition was filed on February 1, 1989 (pp. 1-14, Rollo).
On February 2, 1989, We required the respondents to comment within ten
(10) days from notice of the petition (p. 118, Rollo). On February 9, 1989,
petitioner Robles filed an Urgent Motion Reiterating Prayer for Injunction or
Restraining Order (pp. 119-120, Rollo) which We Noted on February 16, 1989.
Petitioners Motion for Leave to File Reply to Comment was granted in the
same resolution of February 16, 1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner filed
a Supplemental Petition (p. 129, Rollo), this time questioning respondent
HRETs February 16, 1989 resolution denying petitioners motion to defer or
reset revision until this Court has finally disposed of the instant petition and
declaring that a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Rules was had with private respondent
Santos making a recovery of 267 votes (see Annex C of Supplemental
Petition, p. 138, Rollo).
It is petitioners main contention in this petition that when private
respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised
Precincts and Motion to Set Case for hearing dated September 12, 1988,
respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent
HRET subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots,
notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
We do not agree with petitioner.
It is noted that upon Santos filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action thereon was taken
by respondent HRET. Contrary to petitionerss claim that the motion to
withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records show that it was only on
September 19, 1988 when respondent HRET resolved said motion together
with two other motions. The questioned resolution of September 19, 1988
resolved three (3) motions, namely: a) Protestees Urgent Motion to Suspend
Revision dated September 8, 1988; b) Protestants Motion to Withdraw
Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated
September 12, 1988; and c) Protestants Urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, dated September 14, 1988. The resolution
resolved the three (3) motions as follows:
x x x
WHEREFORE, Protestees Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and
Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest are NOTED. The Urgent Motion to
Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest is GRANTED.
x x x.

The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining

uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent
tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1).
We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
when it held:
We cannot agree with Protestees contention that Protestants Motion to
Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts effectively withdrew the precincts
referred to therein from the protest even before the Tribunal has acted
thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the
Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is
granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of
jurisdiction already acquired.
We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to
grant or deny Protestants Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the
Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the electorate
is ascertained.
Since Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised Precincts
had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled by the
Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the precincts covered
thereby from the protest. If these precincts were not withdrawn from the
protest, then the granting of Protestants Urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest did not amount to allowing the refiling of
protest beyond the reglementary period.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all
questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and
however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari
(Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378;
Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987, 148
SCRA 564). This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose
independence as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld
by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8,
1988, thus:
The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162.] The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as intended to be complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature [Id. at 175.]
Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as full, clear and complete [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919).] Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and
it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379,
September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140.] The same may be said with regard to
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral
Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Courts so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, x x x upon a determination that the tribunals
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated ERROR manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, a writ of
certiorari will not issue.
Further, petitioners objections to the resolutions issued by respondent
tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to
withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral
protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks
the essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective
office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the
office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order
that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved
vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal
be allowed to perform its function as a constitutional body, unhampered
by technicalities or procedural play of words.

The case of Dimaporo v. Estipona (G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA
282) relied upon by petitioner does not help to bolster his case because the
facts attendant therein are different from the case at bar. In the said case,
the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before the resolution
thereon was questioned.
As regards petitioners Supplemental Petition questioning respondent
tribunals resolution denying his motion to defer or reset revision of the
remaining seventy-five (75) per cent of the contested precincts, the same
has become academic in view of the fact that the revision was resumed
on February 20, 1989 and was terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private
Respondents Memorandum, p. 208, Rollo). This fact was not rebutted by
petitioner.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when
respondent tribunal rendered a partial determination pursuant to Section
18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes
after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts
has likewise, no basis. The partial determination was arrived at only by a
simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of
which both parties were properly represented.
It would not be amiss to state at this point that an election protest is
impressed with public interest in the sense that the public is interested in
knowing what happened in the elections (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.),
for this reason, private interests must yield to what is for the common good.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the
assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (G.R. NO. L-45081. JULY 15, 1936)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas in the
September 17, 1935 elections. Petitioner was proclaimed winner.
The National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 which effectively confirmed
the election of petitioner to the said body. Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of petitioner.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1935, the National Assembly, in a resolution,
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by them.
Angara then filed a petition praying for the dismissal of Ynsuas protest. He
alleged that Resolution no. 8 was passed by the National Assembly in the
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be presented. But
said Motion to Dismiss was denied by the Electoral Commission. Hence the
present petition filed by petitioner seeking to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the protest made
by Ynsua against the election of said petitioner.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy.
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly.
HELD:
(1) YES. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere.
In the case at bar, here then is presented an actual controversy involving
as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. The
Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ created for a specific
purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach
of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not

subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a

separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting
claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Upon principle, reason and
authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
(2) NO. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes,
and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman.
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and
history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly
appreciate its full meaning, import and significance. The Electoral
Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary
authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific
function assigned to it by the Constitution. The grant of power to the
Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1935, cannot be construed as a limitation upon
the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been
good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of
members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of
the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of
all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its
members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner
to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of
the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he
can discharge his duties as such member.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The
petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby
denied.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner vs.

THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents
FACTS:
The petitioner and the private respondent were among the candidates for
Representative of the first district of Pampanga during elections of May 11,
1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to
the inclusion of certain election returns. He brought his case to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of
the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May
26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proceed with canvassing of votes and proclaim the winner. The petitioner
was proclaimed the Congressman-elect on May 27, 1987. Private
respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners

proclamation void ab initio and prohibit the petitioner from assuming the
office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was
able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC resolution declared the petitioners proclamation void ab initio,
which the petitioner later challenged. The Court set aside the COMELECs
revocation of petitioners proclamation on January 25, 1988. On February
8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
Petitioner moved to dismiss the private respondents protest on the ground
that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 2501 of the Omnibus Election Code.
However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in
accordance with Sec. 92 of the HRET rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents protest had been seasonable
filed.
HELD: YES. The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time,
hence, HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. Petitioners reliance on Sec. 250 of
the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 applies only to petitions
filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial, or city official.
Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same
code which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members
of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials,"
reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution.
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding
the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang
Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987
Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already
been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral
Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral
Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC
is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election
regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those
involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
1Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial
and city offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member
of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall
be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within
ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
2Sec. 9. Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall
be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post
office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal,
together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each
protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on
November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the
effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen
(15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising from
the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of
Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of the Tribunal
shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these
Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof.

ABBAS v. SET
Facts: On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent
Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections.
The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of
the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice
Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales,
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator
Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been
designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter
having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's
representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion
for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the
hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them
are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that,
Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had

filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the

same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground.
Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same contest,
thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the
motion for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were
also filed and oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with
the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and
the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they
perceive to be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does
not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally
unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's
Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three
Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the
concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of
whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by
majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation
created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that
situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who
would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
Issue: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of
which are sitting in the tribunal?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The Constitution provides no scheme or mode
for settling such unusual situations of for the substitution of senators
designated to the Tribunal. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes
for the vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Tribunal. We do
not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit

BONDOC V PINEDA
FACTS: Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a
Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member
of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a
member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election.
However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was
subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr.
who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDPs
leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of
the NP. He confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly
won the election. This resulted to Camasuras expulsion from the LDP.
Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They
further prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP
representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be
voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was
then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally,
Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court because Camasuras removal is an official act of Congress
and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not
interfere.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of
the said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of
powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without
encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof,
HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been
made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral
contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP
cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has
already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the
issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing
their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura
should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid
cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership
in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5
coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17.
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Francisco I. Chavez v Commission on Elections

Facts: This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying,
among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th
highest senatorial candidate. On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution
in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution was received by
respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed
an urgent motion to disseminate through the fastest available means and
order said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor Chavez as printed
in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count all
votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed that COMELEC
failed to perform its mandatory function thus the name of Melchor Chavez
remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be
rendered requiring the COMELEC to reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348
precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for
Chavez votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said
scanned Chavez votes in favor of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant
petition.
Ruling: It is quite obvious that petitioners prayer does not call for the
correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election
returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed,
petitioner has not even pointed to any manifest error in the certificates of
canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none,
petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under
the constitution and the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members (Emphasis supplied). The word
sole underscores the exclusivity of the tribunals jurisdiction over election
contest relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that
this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate
Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
petitioner relating to the election of a member of the Senate.
As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not
questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid for purposes of
canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for
lack of merit.

Aquilino Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal

GR 141489 29 November 2002
Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May
1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were
held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of
party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo
Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M.
Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka,
Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and
Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE).
Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to
the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each.
Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political
parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission on Appointments (CA)
contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional
bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political
parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA.
From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present
petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed
solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA,
and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired),
as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000,
the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives.
On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement
of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary
General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with
this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary
Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its
Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.
They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have at least 1 seat in the HRET, and also in
thethe CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. I
n its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et
al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then
Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court
granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator
Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect,
defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and
as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from
APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue: 1. W/N the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal
violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation
because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET
2. W/N the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to
include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
1. NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to
choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the
12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each
chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally
defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats

of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional

provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose
its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However,
under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere
with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty,
absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of
separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone
to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate on what
action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated
for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any
allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House
from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA.
Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House
barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET
or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list
groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the
election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their
nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable
result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for
election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list
representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot
resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
2. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and
the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and
18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and
the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMELEC

October 22, 2013 G.R. No. 207264
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: During the 2013 elections, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes was
proclaimed the winner and took her oath of office for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives (HoR) for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque. However, prior to her proclamation, the COMELEC
en banc, acting on a petition to cancel Reyes Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC), ruled that petitioner does not possess Filipino citizenship and
residency. Petitioner Reyes claims that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has exclusive jurisdiction over her
qualifications as a member of the HoR and COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of the cancellation case against her.
ISSUE: W/N HRET has jurisdiction over her case.
HELD: NO. The HRET has no jurisdiction over her case as COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the petitioners CoC, its due course or its cancellation,
which determines who can be legally proclaimed. After a COMELEC en
banc decision, no certificate cancellation can go to the HRET. The HRETs
constitutional authority is over the HoR Members. Petitioner is not a Member
of the HoR as her proclamation has no effect due to the prior cancellation
of her CoC by the COMELEC en banc.
Notes: Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

SECTION 18
DAZA v. SINGSON
FACTS: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of
the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was
listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member
from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his
seat by the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition
of the Commission on Appointments
HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation
in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood
that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties
or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political
party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member
of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in
that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

Coseteng vs Mitra
Facts: Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives
from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the
only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized
as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of
Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,
including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments,
had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker
Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed
as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral
Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House
majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with
the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep.
Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as
the 12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null
and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and
Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them
from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from
recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the
theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
1. W/N the question raised is political.
2. W/N the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner
of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in
nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution,
which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments

consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve

Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except
in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to
it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987
Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission
on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to
80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten
(10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to
the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of
the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on
the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.
There is no merit in the petitioners contention that the House members in
the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and
elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that
they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They
were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission
on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from
the minority-is unassailable.

GUINGONA v. GONZALES
FACTS: This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Taada from sitting and assuming the
position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to prohibit
Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman, of said Commission from
recognizing and allowing the respondent senators to sit as members
thereof.
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN
senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members
for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5
member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Based on the mathematical computation of
proportional representation of the various political parties with elected
senators in the senators in the Senate, each of these political parties is
entitled to a fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments.
Each political party has a claim to an extra half seat, and the election of
respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Taada to the Commission on
Appointments by the LDP majority is precisely questioned by the petitioners
because, according to them, it unduly increased the membership of LDP
and LP-PDP-LABAN in the commission and reduced the membership of the
LAKAS-NUCD and NPC correspondingly. In view of the conflicting claims of
each of the political parties/coalition duly represented in the Senate to a
fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments, the election of
respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Taada has become
controversial and its validity questionable. On the claim of Senator Taada
that under the ruling in the case of Senator Lorenzo Taada, and the cases
of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a member of
the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE: Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E.
Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance
with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the respondents' claim to
membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section
18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same
because it is not in compliance with the requirements that twelve senators
shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties represented therein. To disturb
the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a
whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will
give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a
representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in

character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the
Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation;
otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the
House of Representatives can by sheer force of number impose its will on
the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the
majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow
it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon
such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on
Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by
the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the
Commission.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and
jurisprudence on the matter before this Court, the Supreme Court declare
the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Taada as
members of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being in
violation of the rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

SECTION 21
Bengzon v Senate Blue Committee
.
FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint
with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege,
among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy
Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former
President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in
schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
the Filipino people
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the
Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on
the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila
Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon
"the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case,
particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act."
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry
was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan,
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted
it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment
on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has authority to conduct inquiry.
RULING: No.The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or
in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a
purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation
is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa
had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature; therefore it is violative of the separation of powers
between the Senate or Congress and that of Judiciary.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and
that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights
must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to
be compelled to testify against one's self.

Standard Chartered Bank vs Senate Committee on Banks

Facts: On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of
respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of Wealth
before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing
SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the
Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution
No. 166, to wit: DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK
SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS
OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator
Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to
investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and
resolution filed by Senator Enrile.
Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing,
requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through
counsel, submitted to respondent a letter, dated February 24, 2005
presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases
pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the
legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent to continue with the inquiry.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the
end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening
Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper
authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their
accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in
Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending
court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines
of unregistered foreign securities.
Issue: Whether or not respondent committee acted without jurisdiction
and/or acted with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, purportedly in aid of legislation
Ruling:
NO. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional
mooring to conduct the legislative investigation -- was the Courts
determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The
Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, merely called upon the
Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019.
Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to comply with a
fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said
resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as
initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply
to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling
unregistered foreign securities x x x. This fallacy is made more glaring when
we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile
urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before
a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
of legislative investigation.
In Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had
to others who possess it.
In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aid of
collection is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate
Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the
contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.

The power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the

attendance of witnesses. In the case at bench, considering that most of
the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily
evade the compulsive character of respondents summons by leaving the
country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from
evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose.

JEAN ARNAULT v. LEON NAZARENO

G.R. No. L-3820
July 18, 1950
Case Digest
In relation to ARTICLE VI (Legislative Department)
FACTS:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of
land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. In the latter part of
October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong
for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum,
P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his
attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented
by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista
Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt
through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc.,
also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt
in the Tambobong Estate.An intriguing question that the Senate sought to
resolve was the apparent irregularity of the governments payment to one
Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5
million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The
Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited
from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its
hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly
refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount
of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed
to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he
answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus
directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for
a term beyond its period of legislative session?
HELD:
1.
Yes. The Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave
the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
The Court finds that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter
under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution
No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the
Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is
obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the
P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in
fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the
question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation

or materiality to any proposed legislation. The Court already indicated that

it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced
by the committee by imprisonment.
2. Yes. The Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt
for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
The Court finds no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to
punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the
last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of selfpreservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to
the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

SENATE v. ERMITA
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail
Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to
conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak
before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to
pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered
by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief
of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police
(PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of
the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing
in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the
Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO
464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21
from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and

effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to

be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had
to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question
Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance
of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that
matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt
of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information
that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress
to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere
fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power
of impeachment.
It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
The
requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as
it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads
are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance
as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

FRANCISCO V. GUDANI and ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN, petitioners vs.

GENEROSO S. SENGA, et al., respondents
FACTS: The petitioners in this case are high-ranking officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Petitioners Gen. Francisco Gudani and
Lieutenant Col. Alexander Balutan belonged to the Philippine Marines. At
the time of subject incidents, both were assigned to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, Gen. Gudani as PMA Assistant
Superintendent, and Col. Balutan as the Asst. Commandant of Cadets.
Sen. Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a
public hearing before the Senate Committee scheduled on September 28,
2005. The said hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct
of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of
massive cheating and the surfacing copies of an audio excerpt of a phone
conversation between Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of elections, Gen. Gudani had
been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan, as member of Joint

Task Force Ranao, was tasked with maintenance of peace and order
during elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant Gen.
Generoso Senga were among the several AFP officers who received a
letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the September 28, 2005 hearing.
On 23 September 2005, Gen. Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon
that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to a previous
commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless directed other officers from the
AFP who were invited to attend the hearing. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the
PMA Superintendent.
On the evening of September 27, 2005, a message was transmitted to Gen.
Senga, that as per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, no AFP personnel shall appear
before any congressional or senate hearing without her approval. The
following day, Gen. Senga informed Sen. Biazon about the instruction.
Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the
hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004
elections.
Few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had their testimony, the
office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had
appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a
guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought
prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with the
time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were relieved from their assignments and will be subjected to
General Court of Martial proceedings in violation of Articles of War 65
(Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer).
On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG
notes that the E.O. "enjoined officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval".
ISSUE: Whether or not the President, as commander-in-chief, may prevent
a member of the AFP from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
HELD:
YES. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance
of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the
land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of

CAMILO L. SABIO v. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
[Congress Power of Inquiry]
FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested
PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.

It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power
is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled
that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is
a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is coextensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly
repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG
members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the
legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that
infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution
because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress
power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art.
XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of
access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11
hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe
him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the
senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered
by executive privilege?

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative
inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

HELD:

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power
of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also
to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism
which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative
functions are also available to the committees.

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to

follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited
to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the

subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution
to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that
an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy
decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners
claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might
have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them
at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that,
he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be
stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of
the House proceedings.
Ranada and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275),retired justices of the CA, filed a
Petition for prohibition to bar the Senate from conductingits scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued inthe main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article IIIof the Constitution
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338
and 179275. It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello
Garci" recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and
stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second,
G.R. No. 179275.
Issues:
1) W/N the petitioners have legal standing
2) W/N there is an actual case of controversy
Ruling:
1) Yes. In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate
the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci"
tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees
actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing
to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by
alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the
IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci"
tapes will further divide the country. Given that petitioners Ranada and
Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor
Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens
of the Republic.
2) A. No. versus house of representatives GR No. 170338, The Court,
however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise
by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution
of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing
conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to
hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot question
in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.
B. Yes. versus Senate G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

SECTION 22
GARCILLANO v. HOR

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

Facts: More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into
a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on
the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The
tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained
the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Garcillano filed a petition for prohibition to restrain the HOR committees
from using the tape recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped
conversations in the committee reports and for any other purpose. He

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of
the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for
Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for
being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through
its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).

exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or

concur with amendments."

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the

Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud
in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the socalled Gloriagate Scandal.

The intention of the Constitution, is that the "initiative" must begin in the
House of Representatives, also "originate exclusively" does not connote that
certain amendments cannot be made since this will deprive the Senate the
power of legislation, which would be violative of the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress. hence the amendments
were in pursuant of the law.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

SECTION 24
TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 115525

October 30, 1995

FACTS: The case at bar is a petition seeking reconsideration of the decision

dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law. Before the enactment, the RA No. 7716 was first in
the House of Representatives, several bills were endorse in the subject of
expanding the tax base of VAT however, only House Bill No. 11197 was
considered and approved on the third reading by the House of
Representatives, upon submission to the Senate it was sent to the
Committee on Means and Ways, Senate Committee then submitted report
recommending the approval of Senate bill No. 1630. The said Senate bill
was then read and had its 2nd and 3rd readings (on the same day) before
being affirmed by 13 votes of its members with one abstention. This was then
refereed to the Conference Committee together with H. No 11197, which
was then consolidated, approved in accordance with the attached copy
of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. The Conference
Committee then endorse bill entitled "An Act Restructuring the Value
Added Tax (VAT) System, Widening its Tax Base and Enhancing its
Administration and for these purposes Amending and Repealing the
Relevant Provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code as Amended
and for other purposes" which was then approved respectively by House of
Rep and Senate on April 24, 1994 and May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was
then presented to the President and was signed. Then, RA No. 7716 was
then published, however its implementation was suspended and should
have been enforced on July 1, however was stopped by SC. The petitioner
questions the constitutionality of the act on the ground that it did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives because it was only
a consolidation of two separate bills by the HoR and Senate as laid down
by Sec 24 of Art. VI of the Constitution, that it also had not been passed on
three separate readings in pursuant of Sec 28 of Art.VI of the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 7716 violated Sections 24 and 28 of Article VI
of the Constitution.
RULING: No. Section 24 of Art VI of the Constitution provides that :
"SECTION 24.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate

While Paragraph 2 of Section 26 of Art VI of the Constitution provides that

"(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal."
While it is true that the readings were on done on the same day, this was in
pursuant of the certification of the President that Senate Bill 1630 is "urgent".
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three
readings on separate days and printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. The certification of
the bill was anchored by the "growing budget deficit."
Additional Notes:
The petitioners also contested that there had been additional provisions
included that are within the the enrolled bill of both houses but was
supplemented by the Conference committee.
Conference Committee
According to Agpalo the rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives provide for a conference committee. To which he defined
it as a "mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
the House in the passage of a bill into law. There is nothing in the Rules which
limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions.
It is within its power to include in its report an entirely new provision that is
not found either in the House Bill or in the Senate Bill."
Rules of Senate
Rule XII
26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution differences
shall be settled by a conference committee of both houses which shall
meet within ten days after their composition. . . .
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV
85. Conference Committee Reports. In the event that the House does not
agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the
differences may be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.
....
ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago
into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago)
was passed in the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of
HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994,
the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the
Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for
approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB
8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the
said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from
the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the
income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the
computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA
was included which should not be.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.

then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs

which may be funded by PDAF, and the list of the same will be sent back
to the Executive branch for their discretion of spending of the budget.

2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an

LGUs income.
Garcia vs Mata
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record
shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB
while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only
conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was
transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average
annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government
can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis,
too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a
technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local
Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds
or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-orcontrolled corporations.

Facts: On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for

"Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compel
the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to
pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his
reversion to inactive status.
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960,
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332.
June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner
had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active
commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner
had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months
and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant
to the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for
cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings;

SECTION 25
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY and POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 165987
April 24 2012

From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive

status and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the
Government in any capacity;
As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the
necessary petition.

FACTS: This is a petition for cetriorari assailing the constitutionality of the

Priority Development Assistance Fund as provided in R.A. 9206 or the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) for 2004. Petitioners Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making and
thereafter releasing budgetary allocations to the individual members of
Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF. LAMP insists on the absence of
an expressed provision and the flaws in (1) the implementation of the DBM
illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in
favor of the members of the Congress and that (2) the latter do not possess
the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually
funded by PDAF. They further contend that the same act runs afoul against
the principle of separation of powers because the Congress is granted with
an executive function, and cannot directly spend funds appropriated by
them. The respondents then argued that the petition cannot stand on
inconclusive media reports, and argued that the Congress authority to
propose and identify priority projects are merely recommendatory in
nature.

Issue: W/N claims of the petitioner for his reinstatement to active duty and
payment of all emoluments and allowances violates any constitutional
appropriation provision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review
are met in the case at bar;
2. Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the members of the
Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

DEMETRIA v. ALBA

RULING:
1.
Yes. The petitioners are standing as citizens and taxpayers, in
which they have proved that they are adversely affected in appropriation
proceedings and expenditure of public funds. This affords ripeness, definite
and substantial controversy before the Court.
2.
No. The Court believes that these allegations lack substantation.
Newspapers and electronic reports cannot be appreciated. No convincing
proof was presented showing that there were direct releases of funds to the
Members of the Congress, an actually spent them to their sole discretion,
and not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in
favor of the former to be able to convince the court on their claims. It is also
convinced that the law is outwardly legal and capable for lawful
enforcement. Further, there is no infringment of the principle of separation
of powers, considering that the budget execution and allocation of funds
come from the Executive Branch, and the crafting of an appropriation act
is on the authority of the Legislative department. DBM lays down the
guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are

Held: Yes. Non-appropriation items inserted in an appropriation measure

shall be unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative; therefore, it confers no
right and affords no protection.
Paragraph 11 of Republic Act 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the
budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein. Par. 11
refers to government policy on calling to active duty and reversion to
inactive status. It violated Art. VI, Sec. 19, Par. 2 of 1935 Constitution:
embracing provisions or enactments relating specifically to appropriation.
It also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, Par.1 which provides for bills not embracing
more than one subject expressed in the title. It is meant to preclude the
insertion of riders in legislation; Riders are provisions not germane to the
subject matter of the bill.

FACTS: Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform
Decree of 1977." Paragraph 1, Section 44 provides that: The President shall
have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Petitioners,
who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as
members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their
millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the
people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be
affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for listed the grounds relied
upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
MONEYS.

B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE

CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR
WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT
TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress have the legal standing to question the
validity of acts of the Executive.
HELD: The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal standing
to question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their
person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case,
the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be
questioned by members of Congress. In the absence of a claim that the
contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly
intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal
standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of
Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: NO. While Sec 16 (5) of the Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President,
the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the
privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void. But it should be noted, transfers of
savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may
be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no
transfer from one department to another here.
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105, August 19 1994, 235 SCRA 506
FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of
1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to
realign their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, making it as
Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense
category claiming that it violates Section 25, Article 7 of the Constitution.
Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
Petition prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void
the provision under Article 16 of the Countrywide Development Fund and
the veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of
1994.
There were 16 members of the Senate who sought for the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary of Department of Budget and Management and the
National Treasurer and questions the constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 as well as the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
debt services.
Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners
contest the constitutionality of (1) the veto on four special provisions added
to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations
for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and National Highway Authority

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa

Facts:
History of Congressional Pork Barrel

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English

origin, refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.

The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of

Act 3044, otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this
provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an
item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee
elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives

of the people, also became involved in project identification.

The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when

martial law was declared.

It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General

Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for Local Development
Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works
project or hard projects but also covered soft projects such as those
which would fall under education, health and livelihood.

After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of

democracy, the pork barrel was revived through the Mindanao
Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.

In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide

Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was meant to cover small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects.

CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released

directly to implementing agencies subject to the submission of the required
list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any
kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and bridges to
soft projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.

In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of
funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first time when
the Vice-President was given an allocation.

The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except

that the Department of Budget and Management was required to submit
reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of

congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF. Examples of the CIs include
the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations,
and the Public Works Fund, among others.

The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon
prior consultation with the representative of the legislative district
concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how, where and
when these appropriations were to be spent.

In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by
three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para
sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation
with members of Congress for the release of funds.

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)

appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with the
representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed
realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services
and other personnel benefits.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which

is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.

It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal

participation of non-governmental organizations in the implementation of
PDAF projects was introduced.


The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to
specific amounts for individual legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express

statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as

implementing agencies.
Legislators were also allowed identify
programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds
and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as
the case may be.
Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund (PSF).

The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under

Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 910 issued by President
Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.

The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistleblowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using
dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives,
the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the
several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended
for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be
issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lumpsum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the
Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate
the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.
Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to
the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar
as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1.
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congressrole must be confined to mere oversight
that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring
of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions
of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated
to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional.
2.
Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to
the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law.
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was
declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE
AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE
PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY,
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

SYJUCO v. ABAD
G.R. No. 209135
July 1, 2014
Case Digest
In relation to ARTICLE VI (Legislative Department)
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow
moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive
and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. Meanwhile, in September
2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in
favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary
Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed
upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does
not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some nonExecutive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain
Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates
the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law
(Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that

they have not acted in good faith.

SECTION 26
PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ 15 SCRA 489, 1965
FACTS: The Supreme Court was called upon in to decide the grave and
fundamental problem of the constitutionality of RA 3836 insofar as the
same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
leave to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both
houses (of Congress). The constitutionality of the law is assailed on the
ground that the provision for the retirement of the members and certain
officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of the
Constitution.

HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated
by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are nonexistent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared
by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from
a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects
of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy.
It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP
effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is

ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional provision that every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
HELD: YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA 186, as amended by RA Nos. 660
and 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who
have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This
provision is related and germane to the subject of CA 186. On the other
hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members of Congress
and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the GSIS. To
provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials would relate to
subject matter, not germane to CA 186.

TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram
operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the
amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed
video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual
tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank
video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall
collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as
the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram
containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality
where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax
shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation
thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and
theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in
theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous
drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other
taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million
annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per
annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these
earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected
the viability of the movie industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police
power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to
answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of
the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights,
and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in
pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.
While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund
movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film
piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about
by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually
untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees
are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs
Tan v Del Rosario
Facts:
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the
NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates
the following provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rulemaking authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships.
Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is
deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme
for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually
reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The SelfEmployed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as
amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due
process
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a
clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise
of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be
treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate
classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve
the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well
to all those belonging to the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to
increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in
the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large,
the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court does not
view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in
promulgating the RR

No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the
amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant
variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their
respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general
professional partnership.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Ermita

GR No 168056
FACTS: R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely,
House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Before R.A. No. 9337
took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections
4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a
10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale
of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions
contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January
1, 2006. Petitioners claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted
to the President by the Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of
the no-amendment rule upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI,
Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 is unconstitutional on the grounds that
it violates Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Constitution
RULING: NO. Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral
conference committee is allowed to add or delete provisions in the House
bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is not a
circumvention of the no amendment rule. Article VI, Section 26 (2) must be
construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house
of Congress, not to the conference committee report. The Court reiterates
here that the no-amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be
followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of
said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for
its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way
as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on
it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of
Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or
introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution
cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral
Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is
prohibited.
Note: RA 9337 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
House Bill No. 3555 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005 and
was certified by the President for immediate enactment. On January 27,
2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third
reading. House Bill No. 3705 was approved on February 2, 2005. The
President also certified it as urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of
Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading on February
28, 2005. Meanwhile, Senate Bill No. 1950 was approved on March 7, 2005,
in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into
consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705. The President certified the bill
on March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate on second and third
reading on April 13, 2005.
On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the
House of Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing
provisions of the proposed bills.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, after having
met and discussed in full free and conference, recommended the
approval of its report, which the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the
House of Representatives agreeing thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.
On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate
version was transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on
May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337

SECTION 27
Gonzales vs Macaraig
GR No. 87636

never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power
to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
the repeal of existing laws.

FACTS: On December 16, 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186
(General Appropriations Bill of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or
decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by
the president. The same was signed by the President bill law (RA 6688) but
vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general provision. Senate passed
Res. No. 381 to contest the constitutionality of the veto of the president of
SEC 55. The said section was vetoed as it will allegedly disallow the President
and heads of several departments to augment any item in the GAB thereby
violating CONSTITUTION ART VI SEC 25 (5). A supplemental petition with
same issues but included Sec 16 of House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA
6831) was also filed. SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and
the reason for veto remains the same with the additional legal basis of
violation of PD 1177 Sec 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670 that authorizes
the President and the heads of departments to use saving to augment any
item of appropriations in the exececutive branch of government.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the
power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and
to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same
item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This
cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or
not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at
all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the
pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations
to the other departments of the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989
and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is unconstitutional.

Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan vs. Hon. Beinvenido Tan

as Commisioner of Internal Revenue
GR L-81311

RULING: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. The petitioners contend that the

Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s
and does not cover provision/s; therefore, in the case at bar, the veto
exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power of the president because
Sec 55 and Sec 16 are provisions. However, the court held that
inappropriate provisions can be treated as items and therefore can be
vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must
be struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits
the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR
5.) Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on
the part of the legislative as the subject matter of the provisions should be
dealt with in separate and complete legislation. If the legislature believes
that the exercise of veto is invalid, congress should resort to their
constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)
Veto upheld, petition dismissed.

BENGZON v. DRILON
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No.
1797) that were repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired
judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress
felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits
among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed
the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out
that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD
was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of
Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court
then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for
pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the
following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund
Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in
different brances of the government; among such obligations is the
allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for
the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained
that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed
H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices
to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The
President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the
General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued
pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was

SECTION 28

Facts: EO 273 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended
the Revenue Code, adopting the value-added tax (VAT) effective 1
January 1988. Four petitions assailed the validity of the VAT Law from being
beyond the President to enact; for being oppressive, discriminatory,
regressive, and violative of the due process and equal protection clauses,
among others, of the Constitution. The Integrated Customs Brokers
Association particularly contend that it unduly discriminate against customs
brokers (Section 103[r]) as the amended provision of the Tax Code provides
that service performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except
custom brokers) subject to occupational tax under the Local Tax Code,
and professional services performed by registered general professional
partnerships are exempt from VAT.
Issues:
Whether or not EO 273 is unconstitutional on the Ground that the President
had no authority to issue EO 273 on 25 July 1987 and whether she
committed grave abuse of discretion. (Most Important)
Whether or not EO 273 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is
discriminative among custom brokers. (For Additional Info.)
Whether or not EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive.
(For Additional Info)
Held:
1.
No. It should be recalled that under Proclamation No. 3, which
decreed a Provisional Constitution, sole legislative authority was vested
upon the President. Art. II, sec. 1 of the Provisional Constitution states: Until
a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative powers. On 15 October
1986, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 adopted a new Constitution
for the Republic of the Philippines which was ratified in a plebiscite
conducted on 2 February 1987. Article XVIII, sec. 6 of said Constitution,
hereafter referred to as the 1987 Constitution, provides: Sec. 6. The
incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the
first Congress is convened.
It should be noted that, under both the Provisional and the 1987
Constitutions, the President is vested with legislative powers until a
legislature under a new Constitution is convened. The first Congress,
created and elected under the 1987 Constitution, was convened on 27 July
1987. Hence, the enactment of EO 273 on 25 July 1987, two (2) days before
Congress convened on 27 July 1987, was within the President's
constitutional power and authority to legislate.
2.
No. The phrase except custom brokers is not meant to
discriminate against custom brokers but to avert a potential conflict
between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. The
distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are
subject to occupation tax under the Local Tax Code is based upon material
differences, in that the activities of customs brokers partake more of a
business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the
percentage tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to its amendment
by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the
VAT. If the Association did not protest the classification of customs brokers
then, there is no reason why it should protest now.
3.
No. The petitioners" assertions in this regard are not supported by
fact and circumstances to warrant their conclusions. They have failed to
adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory or unjust.
Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay
and have evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and

argumentative implication. As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the
requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. A tax is considered uniform when it
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject
may be found." The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all
goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the
constant rate of 0% or 10%. The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is
imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in business
with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200, 000.00. Small corner
sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application.
Conclusion:
In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and
continued application of the VAT are prejudicial to the general welfare or
the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek recourse and
relief from the political branches of the government. The Court, following
the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the President as to the wisdom, justice and advisability
of the adoption of the VAT. The Court can only look into and determine
whether or not EO 273 was enacted and made effective as law, in the
manner required by, and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure
that it was not issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and, in this regard, the Court finds no reason to
impede its application or continued implementation.

manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.If real property is

used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the
exempted purposes but is subject to taxation
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its
real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of
patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying
or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals
for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased
to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business name
Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Indeed, the petitioners evidence
shows that it collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for
1992 from the said lessees.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities
as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not
exempt from such taxes.On the other hand, the portions of the land
occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients,
whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after
due hearing, the precise portions of the land and the area thereof which
are leased to private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due
thereon as provided for by law.

LUNG CENTER V QUEZON CITY

[G.R. No. 144104. June 29, 2004]
FACTS: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity
established by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of the land
on which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected.
A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private
parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional
practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. Also, a big portion on
the right side of the hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a
private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and hospital
building for real property taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines filed a
claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution
amounting to 4.5M pesos with a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds
exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital
operation is to serve charity patients.
The claim for exemption was denied, prompting a petition for the reversal
of the resolution of the City Assessor with the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City, which denied the same. On appeal, the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local boards
decision, finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable
institution and that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively
used for charitable purposes.
Hence, the present petition for review with averments that the Lung Center
of the Philippines is a charitable institution under Section 28(3), Article VI of
the Constitution, notwithstanding that it accepts paying patients and rents
out portions of the hospital building to private individuals and enterprises.
ISSUE: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable institution within the
context of the Constitution, and therefore, exempt from real property tax?
HELD: The Lung Center of the Philippines is indeed a charitable institution. To
determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the
elements which should be considered include the statute creating the
enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods
of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, that character
of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries and the use
and occupation of the properties.
However, under the Constitution, in order to be entitled to exemption from
real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that:
(1) it is a charitable institution and
(2) its real properties are ACTUALLY,DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for
charitable purposes.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for
charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of
the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is
organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.
Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others;
debarred from participation or enjoyment; and exclusively is defined, in a

Province of Abra vs Hernando

FACTS: The Roman Catholic of Bangued filed a petition for declaratory relief
for tax exemption in the Court of First Instance in Abra which was
immediately granted by the respondent judge denying the motion to
dismiss filed by the petitioner and without allowing the petitioner to file an
Answer and without hearing. A petition for certiorari and mandamus was
filed on the ground that the respondent judge disregard the basic laws of
procedure resulting to denial of due process on part of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due process
RULING: Article 28(2), Chapter VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
charitable institutions, churches, and parsonagesactually, directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes are
exempt from taxation. However, it is necessary that proof must be
established for the exemption to be granted. In the case at bar, the
respondent judge immediately approved the petition merely on the
declaration of the respondent that the parcels of land are actually,
directly and exclusively by the church. The petitioner was deprived of due
process when the court failed to accord hearing to petitioner and
immediately deciding the case in favor of the private respondent.
Therefore, the court remanded the case to trial court to hear the
petitioners merit on the case.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINO 162 SCRA 106, 1988

FACTS: Petitioner filed suit to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure"
and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building for non-payment of real estate
taxes and penalties. Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and
building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof,
determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article
VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college
lot and building, which are contrary Private respondents counter that the
college lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and
sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (I) for the educational purposes
of the r college; (2) permanent residence of the President and Director
thereof, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for
commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is
being used and rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern
Marketing Corporation
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building is question are used exclusively
for educational purposes thereby exempting petitioner from property taxes.
HELD: NO. The lot and building are not used exclusively for educational
purposes. It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more
liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for
educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph
3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been
made that exemptions extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.

Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while
the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at the bar for
residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification
under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main
or primary purpose - educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination
be considered incidental to the purpose of education. Under the 1935
Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the
school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not
because the, second floor of the same is being used by the Director and
his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being
used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for
purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be
returned to the school involved.
SECTION 29
PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage
or benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the
promotion of a particular enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for
declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which
apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and
improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads,
however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the
petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private
respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder
roads do not connect any government property or any important premises
to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public
purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted
from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the
donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its
owner to the government.

Petitioners argue that the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of
the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority
to education. They also aver that the said automatic appropriations under
the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio
when he was ousted in February, 1986. Also, it should have become
inoperative after adoption of 1987 Constitution and that said decrees are
inconsistent with:
o
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, whereby bills have to be
approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to
authorize said automatic appropriation and
o
Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation; otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the
debt service.
Issue:
1.
WON the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget is unconstitutional.
2.
WON the Presidential decrees became inoperative when Pres.
Marcos was ousted and/or the PDs are inconsistent with constitution.
3.
WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to the
President.

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE

Ruling:
1. NO. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority
to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy
is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and
so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional
2. NO. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked." This transitory provision of
the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the
social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be
recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are
inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or
revoked.
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees are
inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution is
untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that
existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees
appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go
through the legislative. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions
of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation
measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers
thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more
direct or express manner. Repeal or amendment by implication is frowned
upon.

Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under RA 6831: The General Appropriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

3. NO. Unlike the Constitution of Nebraska, our Constitution does not require
a definite, certain, exact or "specific appropriation made by law." Section
29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of these words and simply
states that No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by:

o
PD No. 81: Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered 4860, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177:
Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society, and
o
PD No.1967:
An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating
Funds For The Purpose.

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any

particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law,
such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations)
as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by
the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general
as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special
provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate
public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees.
An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and

ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose"

for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to
appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the
essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of
the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited
by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from
the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although
each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.

The petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81,
Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. They also seek to restrain the
disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said
decrees.

certainly appears from the language employed, whether in the past or in

the present.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81,
Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or
appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by
Congress.

the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did
not comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it
did not state the date when the petitioners received notice of the ERB
decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when
petitioners supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.
On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that our resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the
Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular.

Petition is DISMISSED.

SENATOR JOHN OSMEA vs. OSCAR ORBOS in his capacity as Executive

Secretary
220 SCRA 703
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993
" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must
be a standard which implies that the legislature determines matter of
principle and lays down fundamental policy."
FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1of
PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts
on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil
companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that
the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid
delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that
since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power
of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is
limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus
appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on
the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended,
partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred
to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special
treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and
while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the
fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA.
The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund."
With regard to the alleged undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring
the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum
products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be
exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956
expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the
resources of the Fund.

SECTION 30
Diaz v. CA
G.R. No. L-109698 December 5, 1
Bellossillo, J.
Facts: On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC)
filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval
of the sound value appraisal of its property in service.
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC
as of 12 March 1990 at One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven
Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after
deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00)
worth of property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its
operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case
for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed
the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review with

In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issue: whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution
Held: Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice
and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this provision never became
effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the
Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB,
remains.
ARTICLE 32
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 125416)
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic
Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared
national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative
productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner
commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of
the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the
American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its
absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang
Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow
Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by
promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC
of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the
metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former
naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and
2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing
for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a
national law.
Issue:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum
proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof
the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law."
Ruling:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote
below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is
not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum";
the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the
documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used
in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably
an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and
laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative
assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people
to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part
of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of
elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the
content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still
in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved
law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest
and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has
become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture
or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review
Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse
of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the
proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that
matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec
simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848.
Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch,
instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and
acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.