Echegaray v Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96 1.19.

99
02/14/20111 Comment
"On finality of decision"
F: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC issu
ed a temporary restraining order for the execution until it ensures that there w
ill no longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA 8177.
Such action by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgm
ent on the case.
I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.
R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rende
red upon it. What it cannot do is modify or amend the final decision. The court
held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend the
decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdicti
on to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the purpose of
enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is
rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may trans
pire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.
People vs. Mariano
G.R. No. L-40527, 71 SCRA 600, June 30, 1976
FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan beca
use of misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and
electric cables being the person in authority to receive the same in behalf of m
ayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent Mariano then moved to quash the inform
ation for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the items were the
same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military commission for Malvers
ation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found guilty, hence, the co
urt a quo has no jurisdiction.
The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.
RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction In all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than
two hundred pesos Section 44, paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of 1948.
The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arre
sto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, o
r imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4
) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprison
ment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent,
Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction
over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversa
tion charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and mal
versation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us t
he accused in one is different from the accused in the other.
Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular
offense and impose the punishment for it.
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
FACTS:

Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner ra
ised in his affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an
administrative case is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the s
ame parties and involving the same piece of land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Responden
t over the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitio
ner argue that the administrative case was determinative of private respondents
right toe eject petitioner from the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicia
l question which bars a judicial action until after its termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioner s aff
irmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private R
espondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI pra
ying that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be dismi
ssed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclus
ively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment c
ase to be one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack of
merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES INVOLVING THE
LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHI
CH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT CASE.
DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL COURT O
F MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case th
e resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4
SCRA 510 (1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial
Question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal acti
ons are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely
related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before th
e criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in
a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latt
er pending final determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Ru
le 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal action
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may p
roceed.
However because of intimate correlation of the two proceedings and the possibili
ty of the Land Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which will terminate
or suspend Private Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner, the SC gave the lower
court and advise. This advise became the which became the basis for deciding th
e case.

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial c
ourt to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after
a determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwiths
tanding the possibility of petitioner s right of possession being upheld in the pe
nding administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the
court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a shee
r exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discreti
on, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyan
ce to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where th
e parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every cour
t to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and ef
fort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the
second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the f
irst action are settled the second action should be stayed. (at page 622)
While the rule is properly applicable for instances involving two [2] court acti
ons, the existence in the instant case of the same consideration of identity of
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and t
he parties as well as the need to resolve the parties right of possession before
the ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule s analogous app
lication to the case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogo
us situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then CFI of Misamis Orient
al ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public docu
ment against several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane
until the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forg
ed document shall have been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its o
wn action on administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court
against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in Abeyance, thus:
As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago C
atane, etc, et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu
CFI, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has final
ly been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such decision. (
SC minute resolution April 27, 1962 in Adm Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran
vs. Santiago Catane, etc. et. al)
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial q
uestion to an administrative case. We see no reason why the reverse may bot be s
o considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.
The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.
Finally, events occurring during the pendency of the petition attest to the wisd
om of the conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel f
or petitioner, it was stated that he intervenor Land Authority which later becam
e the Department of Agrarian REform had promulgated a decision in the administra
tive case affirming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell issued in favor of the
private respondent. Wit this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment c
ase to proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.