3) RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

483 SCRA 649
February 28, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On April 19, 1998, at about 7:30 oclock in the morning, private
complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his
owner type jeep in front of his house at Lasip Grande, Dagupan
City when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Accused
Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the
complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber
pistol. The accused missed with his first shot but the second
one hit the complainant in the upper arm, causing him to
stumble on the ground. The complainant stood up and ran,
while the accused continued firing at him but missed.
Accused-petitioner Rodolfo C. Velasco was convicted of
Attempted Murder. According to the Information filed against
him, the complainant-accused Velasco, being then armed with
a gun, with treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon Frederick Maramba by shooting
him, hitting him on the left upper arm, the said accused having
thus commenced a felony directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which could have produced
the crime of murder, by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant Maramba.
Velasco alleged that he must not be convicted of attempted
murder but only attempted homicide as there was no treachery
since private complainant was still able to observe or focus his
eyes on him for a period of 10 seconds until he drew his .45
caliber pistol and fired at Maramba. After the first shot, the
victim was able to run away.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-accused Velasco is guilty of

attempted murder.
HELD: YES. Velasco is guilty of attempted murder.
In accordance with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
Velascos acts, having commenced the criminal act by overt
acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce
the felony by reason of some cause other than his own
spontaneous desistance, constitute an attempted felony.
Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent
to kill by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed
to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of
the latter. Private complainant sustained a wound on the left
arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is
that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to
cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the
accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would
have brought about death.
Though private complainant was looking at him, the former
was not forewarned by any outward sign that an attack was
forthcoming. It was only after the first shot that he felt his life
was in danger.
Petitioners asserted that he has no motive to harm, much less
kill the latter, he being a total strange. Motive is not an
element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved.
Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule
is that motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt
as to the identity of the culprit. Motive assumes significance
only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the
crime was. In the case at bar, since petitioner has been
positively identified as the assailant, the lack of motive is no
longer of consequence.
There is treachery when the following essential elements are
present: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of

attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift

and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It was clearly
established that private complainant, while washing his jeep,
was suddenly fired upon by petitioner for no reason at all. The
suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed
left private complainant with no option but to run for his life. It
is likewise apparent that petitioner consciously and deliberately
adopted his mode of attack making sure that private
complainant will have no chance to defend himself by reason of
the surprise attack.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower than two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed upon the principal in an attempted
felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpertua to death. The penalty
two degrees lower is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed
should be within the range of prision correccional, and the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the
range of prision mayor in its medium period.
4) NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
559 SCRA 461, 473
July 23, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three daughters,
Marianne, Mary Ann married with petitioner-accused Nover
Bryan Salvador and the victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to
the petitioner herein. They all live together at 550 Coloong
I, Valenzuela City. Their residence had three bedrooms one for
the Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene; and the
last for Mary Ann and the petitioner.

On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with

Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend the wake of Ernestos
mother; while Mary Ann with her new born child, and Arlene,
stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner Salvador, at that
time, asked permission to attend a birthday party. At
about 9:00 in the evening, Salvador, accompanied by Eduardo
Palomares, returned home to get some karaoke tapes to be
used at the birthday party. They thereafter went back to the
party and stayed there until 12 midnight before heading back
home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga spouses
and Marianne arrived home. Marianne proceeded to the room
which she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who
suffered stab wounds, already dead. After seeing Arlenes
body, the Zuiga spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann and
the petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlenes room,
petitioner stayed at the sala and cried. He was later seen
embracing Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent.
At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The
police found no forcible entry into the house; no valuables were
missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house except
Arlenes room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen
table, petitioners underwear (briefs), gray t-shirt and short
pants.[7] They further found hair strands on Arlenes bed. These
pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for
examination. It was found that Arlene suffered 21 stab wounds
produced by a pointed instrument, one side of which was sharp
like a balisong or a kitchen knife.
Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide on the basis of the
evidences: 1) the non-employment of force in entering the
scene of the crime; 2) no missing personal belongings; 3) the
absence of bloodstains in other parts of the house except
Arlenes room; 4) petitioners ownership of a balisong, the same
weapon used in stabbing the victim; 5) the presence of type O
human blood on petitioners T-shirt and briefs; 6) the positive
result of the DNA analysis using the bloodstains found in
petitioners shirt and briefs; and 7) petitioners unusual behavior
after the discovery of the victims lifeless body. [21]

Petitioner questions the sufficiency of each and every

circumstance enumerated above and denied such accusations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner-accused Salvador is guilty of
homicide.
HELD:
YES. Salvador is guilty of homicide.
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The
rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial
evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts
from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is
imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many
cases, result in setting felonies free and deny proper protection
to the community.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites are complied with:

Ill motive was shown by petitioners previous act of

peeping through the bathroom and Arlenes room on two
occasions while she was taking a bath and while she was inside
the room with Marianne.
More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by
the witnesses when they testified relative to the peeping
incident. Although there was no evidence or allegation of
sexual advances, such incident manifested petitioners evil
motive. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of
mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts
or statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it
or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred. Motive and intent may be considered one and the
same, in some instances, as in the present case.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the indeterminate penalty, absent any modifying
circumstances, Petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

(1) There is more than one circumstance;

(2) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(3)
The
combination
of
all
the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
All the circumstances must be consistent with one
another that the accused is guilty. Thus, conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Thus, in the present case, all circumstantial evidences were
proved against the accused and such can conclude the guilt of
the accused Salvador.

7) EDUARDO L. BAXINELA, vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
485 SCRA 331
March 24, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
On the late night of October 18, 1996, petitioner-accused SPO2
Eduardo Baxinela was in Superstar Disco Pub was already
drinking with INSP. Regimen and SPO4 Legarda. After
witnessing an altercation between SGT Ruperto Lajo and
another customer, on Lajos way out, Baxinela decided to
confront him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held
the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on

to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other and accosted
Lajo why he had in his possession a firearm Lajo respond "I am a
MIG, Pare". Then, when Lajo was about to get his wallet on his
back pocket for his ID, SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela anticipated that
the victim was drawing his firearm on his waist prompting said
policeman to shoot the victim. Baxinela then got a gun from Lajos
waist and handed it over to Regimen. Afterwards Baxinela held both of
Lajos arms, who was still standing, and pushed him against the wall
and repeated his question. Lajo answered "Why did you shoot me? I am
also a military." At this point Lajo got out his wallet and gave it to
Baxinela. Baxinela opened the wallet and looked at an ID. Afterwards
Baxinela and Regimen just left and did nothing to aid Lajo. Lajo was
pronounced dead due to cardiopulmonary arrest and severe
bleeding caused by the gunshot wound.

lawful performance of official duty under Article 11, paragraphs

1 and 5, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code.

On defense, Baxinela alleged that he, together with Regimen,

proceeded to the Superstar Disco Pub in response to the
information given by Romy Manuba that there was an armed
drunken man creating trouble inside the pub. He introduced himself
as a policeman and asked the man why he had a gun with him. The
man did not respond and, instead, suddenly drew out his gun. Baxinela
then drew his sidearm and was able to fire first, hitting the man on his
upper left arm, critically wounding him. When the man fell down,
Baxinela took his gun and wallet and handed them over to Regimen.
Regimen then stated that he enlisted the services of the pubs security
guard to bring the wounded man to the hospital. Thereafter, Baxinela
and Regimen went to the Kalibo Police Station to report the
incident and turned over the wallet. Next, they proceeded to
Camp Pastor Martelino and also reported the incident to Col.
Bianson.

The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of selfdefense. It is a condition sine qua non, without which there can
be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. 23 On this
requisite alone, Baxinelas defense fails. Unlawful aggression
contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the
life and limb of a person or an imminent danger thereof, and
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The attack
must be real, or at least imminent. Mere belief by a person of
an impending attack would not be sufficient. As the evidence
shows, there was no imminent threat that necessitated
shooting Lajo at that moment. Just before Baxinela shot Lajo,
the former was safely behind the victim and holding his arm. It
was Lajo who was at a disadvantage. In fact, it was Baxinela
who was the aggressor when he grabbed Lajos shoulder and
started questioning him. And when Lajo was shot, it appears
that he was just turning around to face Baxinela and, quite
possibly, reaching for his wallet. None of these acts could
conceivably be deemed as unlawful aggression on the part of
Lajo.

The Court now proceeds to determine if, following the

prosecutions version of what happened, Baxinela can claim
the justifying circumstances of self-defense and fulfillment of a
duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner-accused Baxinela can claim the
justifying circumstances of self defense or in the alternative the

HELD:
No. Baxinela cannot claim the justifying circumstances of selfdefense or the lawful performance of official duty under the
Revised Penal Code, Article 11.
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means
to prevent and repel and aggression.22 By invoking selfdefense, Baxinela, in effect, admits killing Lajo, thus shifting
upon him the burden of the evidence on these elements.

Next, we consider the alternative defense of fulfillment of a

duty. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be
shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence

of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right

or office.25 While the first condition is present, the second is
clearly lacking. Baxinelas duty was to investigate the reason
why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place.
This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at
the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the
desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing
upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo
cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time
Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the
civilians in the pub.
In the present case, the Court finds that there was negligence
on the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was shot, was simply
turning around to see who was accosting him. Moreover, he
identified himself saying "I am MIG." These circumstances
alone would not lead a reasonable and prudent person to
believe that Baxinelas life was in peril. Thus, his act of
shooting Lajo, to the mind of this Court, constitutes clear
negligence. But even if the Court assumes that Lajos actions
were aggressive enough to appear that he was going for his
gun, there were a number of procedures that could have been
followed in order to avoid a confrontation and take control of
the situation. The events inside the disco pub that
unnecessarily cost the life of Lajo did not have to happen had
Baxinela not been negligent in performing his duty as a police
officer.
The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete
defense of fulfillment of a duty as a privileged mitigating
circumstance. Accordingly, the Court grants in favor of Baxinela
a privileged mitigating circumstance and lower his penalty by
one degree in accordance with the decision in Lacanilao v.
Court of Appeals. His entitlement to the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender is also recognized, thereby
further reducing his penalty to its minimum. The conviction of
appellant Eduardo Baxinela for the crime of homicide
is AFFIRMED and his sentence is reduced to an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum, as maximum.

The use of unnecessary force or wanton violence is not justified

when the fulfillment of duty of policemen as law enforcers can
be effected otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" attitude can
never be countenanced in a civilized society.
8) ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, vs
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
482 SCRA 44
February 9, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim
Philip Cantre and witness Saano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in
Crossing Capsay,Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. On their way home,
they crossed paths with petitioner-accused Rollie
Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was
harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as
the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantres house
on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao,
victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran
away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of
victim Cantre and witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then
picked up a stone, as big as a mans fist, which he threw at
victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When hit
by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his
back. Witness Saano put himself between the
victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to
pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put
down another stone he was already holding. He also urged
victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutanto just go
home. Witness Saano accompanied victim Cantre to the latters
house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in
the left side of his back hit by the stone.They arrived at
the Cantres house at around 12:00 noon, and
witness Saano left victim Cantre to the care of the latters
mother, Belen.
Calimutan opposed to such testimony alleging that
Cantre refused to calm down at that time and pulled out from
his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was

looking for trouble, either to kill or be killed. At that point,

petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the
victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for
fear that the enraged man would turn on him. When he saw
that the victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao,
petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the
victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right
buttock.
A day after, Victim Cantre died. According to his
exhumation and autopsy report conducted by Dr. Ronaldo
Mendez, it was due to internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to
his lacerated spleen which can be caused by any blunt
instrument, such as a stone. Before such autopsy,
victim Cantre was also examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday,
the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate and the PostMortem Examination Report stated that the cause of death of
victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected
food poisoning which cannot be given much weight because
there was no showing that further laboratory tests were indeed
conducted to confirm such suspicion.
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had
happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning incident and
knew that Cantre died the following the day because of food
poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no
personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the
stoning incident.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner-accused Calimutan can be held
criminally liable.
2. Whether or not Calimutan is guilty of an intentional crime of
Homicide.
HELD:
1. YES. Calimutan can be held criminally liable.

In accordance with Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code stating

Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended, thus, the accused is criminally liable for all the direct
and natural consequences of the unlawful act even if the
ultimate result had not been intended.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was

able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the
victim Cantre was
the
stone
thrown
at
him
by
petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no
other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by
another blunt instrument which could have caused the
laceration of his spleen.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the
victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous one and
the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the
victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of the
impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen
causing the death of the victim.
One is not relieved from criminal liability for
the natural consequences of ones illegal acts
merely because one does not intend to produce
such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
Calimutan cannot contend that the
throwing of the stone by the accused was in
defense of his companion, because after the
boxing Michael was able to run and thus, the
aggression already ceased and there was no more
need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the
stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can
be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be

held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4

of the Revised Penal Code.
2. NO. Calimutan is not guilty of intentional crime of
homicide but is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according
to the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1)
intentional felonies which was done with deliberate intent to
cause injury, and (2) culpable felonies which is unintentional, it
being
simply
the
incident
of
another
act
performed without malice or as stated in Art. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
In the case at present, petitioner Calimutan cannot be
attributed to any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill,
the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court
cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the
intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period
of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two
years and one day of prision correccional.
(Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for
the definition of reckless imprudence
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily,
but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.)

While the evidence on record suggests that a running

grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did
not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity
between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.
The
prosecution
did
not
establish
that
petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with
the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the
victim Cantre. It was as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a
swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and
unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. What is
obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans intention to
drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the
victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as
earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the
victim Cantre.
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a
lawful objective when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre,
his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He
failed to consider that a stone the size of a mans fist could
inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his
own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely
disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to
seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy
distance of ten meters.

11) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.

FERNANDO ILIGAN, et al. (EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN
MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.)

191 SCRA 648

November 26, 1990
FERNAN, J.:

FACTS:
On or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, 2:00 oclock in the
morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. and his

companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home

from barangay Sto. Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after
attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his
nephew, Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis
pushed ("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to
box him. Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused
that they had no desire to fight. Fernando Iligan, upon seeing
his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy
Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three
accused. They ran for about half an hour, passing by the house
of Quiones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that
they were no longer being chased. After resting for a short
while, Quiones, Jr. invited the two to accompany him to his
house so that he could change to his working clothes and
report for work as a bus conductor.
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiones, Jr.,
the three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside and
without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiones, Jr. with his
bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down.
Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200
meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of
people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May
nadalena."
On the spot where Quiones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and
Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his head busted. On
the post mortem examination report by municipal health
officer, Dr.Marcelito E. Abas, Quiones, Jr.,died of "shock and
massive cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident." It
was also seen in evidence that there are contusions and
abrasions on body of the victim while on the right forehead
there is another wound caused by a sharp instrument.
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They
alleged that they were in their respective houses at the time
the crime was committed and presented their alibis and
assailed the victims death to a vehicular accident.
First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident has not been

fully established. Second, EsmeraldoQuiones, Sr., (the) father

of the victim, testified that Dr.Abas told him that if his son was
hacked by a bolo on the face and then run over the entire head
by a vehicles tire, then that hacking on the face could not be
visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981)
Third, Exhibit 2 (the photograph of the victim taken
immediately after his body had been brought home) is a hard
evidence. It will attestly (sic) show that the entire head was
not crushed by any vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only
half of the face and head, was damaged with the wound
starting on a sharp edge horizontally. There are contusions and
abrasions on the upper left shoulder and on the neck while the
body downwards has none of it, while on the right forehead
there is another wound caused by a sharp instrument.
Therefore, it is simple, that if the victim was run over by a
vehicle, the other half portion of his head and downward part
of his body must have been likewise seriously damaged, which
there are none."
ISSUE:Whether or not the accused Iligan, et al. are criminally
liable for the death of Quiones, Jr.
HELD:
Yes. The accused were liable for the death of Quiones, Jr.
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el queescausa de la
causaescausa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential
requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed by the offender.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head
of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial
by the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point.
What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking
Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was

meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with

him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body:
the head.
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30
where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such
vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and ZaldyAsis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of
around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented
highway, was run over by a vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking
of Quiones, Jr.s head might not have been the direct cause, it
was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal
cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom." In other words, the
sequence of events from Iligans assault on him to the time
Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very
short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of
events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
liability.
Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of
the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiones, Jr.
Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show
treachery. There must be evidence that the mode of attack was
consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or
hard for the person attacked to defend himself. In this case,
the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing

of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the

deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the
appellants. The group of Quiones, Jr. was therefore placed on
guard for any subsequent attacks against them.
The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation
have likewise not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution
failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to
commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 36
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable
only for homicide. There being no mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium
(Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within
the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the
award of P256,960 for the victims unrealized income and
therefore, the same is disallowed.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby
convicted of the crime of homicide for which he is imposed the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of
EsmeraldoQuiones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000). Appellant EdmundoAsis is hereby acquitted of the
crime charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.