Kidde plc
Thomas C. Hillman
Kidde Aerospace & Defense; USA
Steven W. Hill
Kidde Aerospace; USA
Martin J. Sturla
Kidde Aerospace; USA
ABSTRACT
A review of past and state-of-the-art
aircraft
fire/explosion
detection
and
extinguishing components is presented. The
lessons learned from previously fielded
systems are discussed so that they can be
applied to the modern protection systems as
they are implemented.
Discussions of various types of fire detection
systems, fire extinguishing systems, integrated
total protection systems, and other fire
protection and prevention are discussed. A
brief overview of some of the operational
features and characteristics of these protection
components and systems are presented so that
trade studies and comparisons can be
conducted. By understanding the technological
feature sets and the differences between the
various approaches, an optimized protection
approach can be defined for any given aircraft
platform.
INTRODUCTION
Active
protection
systems
and
components have always been the last resort
for dealing with anomalous faults and other
hazards which may lead to fires and explosions
onboard
aircraft.
Historically,
these
components, which are made up of detection
sensors and frequently fire extinguishing
vessels, have been employed only after design
measures could not adequately assure the
elimination of a potentially catastrophic fire
incident.
RESISTANCE-OHMS
6 IN
HEATED
Wires
1 FT
HEATED
10 FT
HEATED
Thermistor
Sheath
TEMPERATURE-DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
10 FT HEATED
RESISTANCE-OHMS
EUTECTIC SALT
ALARM PRESSURE
TEMPERATURE-DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
H
NG
TH
LE
LE
HO
W
PRESSURE
EA
TE
HELIUM GAS
SHEATH
HYDRIDE CORE
(HYDROGEN)
N
LE
H
GT
T
OR D
SH ATE
HE
TEMPERATURE
No
to threshold drift. This, in turn, has made solidstate-smoke detectors less prone to false
alarming in that their sensitivity setting remains
within calibration threshold alarm limits for a
longer period of time, and these threshold limits
should have been specifically catered to the
individual cargo bay environment. Another
advantage of solid state smoke detectors is the
use of longer life components. A good example
of this is the light source used in photoelectric
smoke detectors. Early models used a low
voltage light bulb that had an extremely short
life.
The solid state photoelectric smoke
detectors use a long-life light emitting diode
(LED) as its source of light.
jkljlkj
10
11
makes
thermal
based
systems
alone
impractical, also.
While other combustion
gases, such as CO or CO2, could be monitored,
these gases can be introduced from sources
other than fires (exhalation from live animals,
plants, etc.). Plus, most commercially-available
detectors for monitoring these gases are easily
contaminated and have short lives.
The
presence of smoke seems to be the most
consistent parameter associated with a cargo
bay fire. However, combinations of these other
technologies, in conjunction with smoke
detection, will be included in the nextgeneration of cargo bay detection system
13
SENSOR
UV
IR based
(Single Band, 2 band IR,
UV/IR, etc.)
RELATIVE RESPONSIVITY to
FIRE HAZARD
VERY HIGH
HIGH
LOW
LOW
APPROXIMATE FIELD OF
VIEW
RELATIVE FALSE ALARM
OPERATING TEMPERATURE
SENSOR WEIGHT (NOM)
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
260 F W/ TRANSIENTS UP
o
TO 300 F or HIGHER
0.3 0.5 LBS
THERMAL CONTINUOUS
ELEMENT
SMOKE
RELIES ON CONVECTIVE
HEAT TRANSFER
EXCELLENT, IF UNDAMAGED
RELIES ON CONVECTIVE
MASS TRANSFER
SUSCEPTIBLE TO DUST
& HUMIDITY
1200 F DEPENDING ON
DESIGN
0.01 LBS. / FT. + 0.25 lbs. FOR
END CONNECTORS
160 F
0.75-1.25 LBS.
NON-SMART SENSOR*
HIGH MTBF
AVG. MTBF
HIGHEST MTBF
AVG. MTBF
REMOTE MOUNTING
REMOTE MOUNTING
LOCALIZED ROUTING
FREMOTE MOUTING
FIELDED CONCEPT
FIELDED CONCEPT
FIELDED CONCEPT
FIELDED CONCEPT
*CONTROL ELECTRONICS / CIRCUIT CARD INTERFACE REQUIRED TO PROCESS DATA COLLECTED BY SENSOR (Not Applicable to pneumatic based
thermal detection sensors)
14
AND
SUPPRESSION
15
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16
17
Passenger Compartment
With regard to the extinguishing
protection, hand held Halon 1211 and/or water
extinguishers have been the approved
approach
for
accessible
fire
fighting
applications for over 50 years.
There are no unique aviation
standards that portable fire extinguishers must
meet, in that the FAA (nor any other
airworthiness authority) does not specifically
approve hand-held fire extinguishers. The FAA
accepts hand-held fire extinguishers in
accordance with guidance stated in Advisory
Circular (AC) 20-42C, Hand Fire Extinguishers
for use in Aircraft. This AC states that handheld portable extinguishers must be approved
by Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL). In
addition to the ULs approval, the FAA accepts
Factory Mutual Research Corp. and US Coast
Guards hand held fire extinguishers under 46
CFR for use in aircraft.
Generally the kinds of fires that are likely to
occur in an aircraft are Class A, B and C since
the material used in the aircraft interior
construction and articles carried in the aircraft
passenger compartment usually fall into these
categories. These classifications for fires, as
defined by the National Fire Protection
Association, are defined as follows:
Class
A:
Fires
involving
ordinary
combustible solid materials, such as wood,
paper, rubber and many plastics
Class B: Fire involving flammable liquids,
oils, greases, paints, lacquers and
flammable gases
Class C:
Fires involving energized
electrical equipment
The
number
of
hand-held
fire
extinguishers to be carried in an aircraft is
generally determined by the number of seats
and the FAA, JAA, etc. stipulate the location
and the fact that at least two of the
extinguishers should contain Halon 1211.
Typically, the extinguishers contain 2.5 to 3.3
lbs (1.1 to 1.5 kg) of halon and have a 5-B:C
rating. In order to meet the requirement for
fighting a Class A fire, a water extinguisher or
18
19
20
Name
Chemical Formula
Halon No.
Refrigerant No.
ODP (CFC11 = 1)
100 Year GWP (CO2 = 1)
Atmospheric Lifetime (years)
Molecular Weight
Boiling Point (C)
Freezing Point (C)
Vapor Pressure (bar(a) at 25C)
-3
Liquid Density (g.cm at 25C)
Critical Temperature (C)
Critical Pressure (bar(a))
-3
Critical Density (g.cm )
-1
Heat of Vaporization (J.g @ Boil pt)
-1
-1
-1
-1
CF3H
13
23
0
11,700
264
70.01
-82.0
-155
45.2
0.67
25.9
48.4
0.53
240
1.377 @40C
0.888 @40C
>65
FE-25
(HFC-125)
FM-200
(HFC227ea)
FE-36
(HFC236fa)
CF3CF2H
25
125
0
2,800
32.6
120.02
-48.3
-103
13.1
1.190
66.3
35.9
0.571
164.4
CF3CFHCF3
37
227ea
0
2,900
36.5
170.03
-16.36
-131
4.5
1.43
101.7
28.7
0.621
132.6
CF3CH2CF3
36
236fa
0
6,300
209
152.04
-1.4
-103
2.724
1.360
124.9
32
0.5553
160.0
1.26
1.102
1.1085
0.800
0.777
0.8444
0.361
>79
>18.9
>70
ITM
BTM
BCF
CF3I
(13001)
13I1
0.0001
<1
<0.005
195.91
-22.5
-78
5.4
2.096
100
4.04
CF3Br
1301
13B1
12-13
5,400
65
148.90
-57.8
-168.0
16.0
1.54
67
39.6
0.745
121
CF2ClBr
1211
12B1
5.1
0.883
0.783
0.473
0.460
27.4
80
13
7.5
1.0
112.3
20
165.36
-4
-160.5
2.8
1.8
153.8
41.0
0.713
137
>50
10.0
10.5
15
0.4
30
7.5
9.0
10
0.2
5.0
0.5
2.0
Yes
12.4
16.3
19.8
1.8
4.1
DuPont
0.69
Yes
9.0
12.4
15.7
2.2
2.7
DuPont
1.2
Yes
6.4
10.0
11.5
2.2
2.4
Great Lakes
1.6
Yes
6.3
7.4
0.06
Yes
3.0
3.8
6.5
1.2
0.9
AJAY
1.3
N/A
3.3
5.9
7.7
1.0
1.0
-
0.12
N/A
3.6
8.2
5.9
1.2
1.0
-
1.8
2.0
DuPont
21
vv
22
area.
Many military aircraft users started using
nn
23
24
mmm
25
appropriate).
This approach offers much
flexibility, in that the number of suppressors can
be increased without having to increase the
number of sensors (to access their suppressor
drivers). The parts count is minimized in that
the processing electronics and suppressor
driver circuitry can be shared. This increases
the MTBF. Also, since the unit price of a
sensor goes down the simpler its design and its
MTBF goes up, the sensor can many times be
classified as a non-repairable item, thus
reducing maintenance costs. Lastly, since the
decision on whether there is a fire or explosion
event can now be made based on the output of
multiple sensors, the confidence of the
protection system operating as designed is
greater. Some signal conditioning/processing
electronics may still be necessary in the
detection sensor, especially in case of the IR
based sensors, but the price of these types of
sensor will be lower than a smart sensor with
suppression drivers.
The down side of a control unit based
protection system is that all the components
(sensors, suppressors, and the controller) are
interfaced via electrical cables. These cables
could be susceptible to damage from a ballistic
impact.
Thus,
an
integrated
detection/suppression unit (where the sensor is
physically and funcitionally mated to the
suppressor) is a more survivable design
approach than a segregated system that
interfaces the protection components though
the use of electrical cables.
DRY BAY SUPPRESSION- Suppressor
designs, similar to those used for active fuel
tank protection systems, were used in early dry
bay proof-of-concept designs.
However,
because dry bays were typically cluttered, low
vapor pressure agents did not distribute well
around this clutter. Therefore, to achieve the
rapid agent-out times necessary to suppress an
explosive event and to ensure that after the
agent is out of the suppressor, it dispersed
quickly, even in a cluttered compartment, high
vapor pressure extinguishing agents were
required. As a result, pressurized vessels,
more similar to those used in the engine and
cargo compartment as opposed to the fuel tank
suppressors, are employed.
High vapor pressure, Halon 1301, has
been the preferred agent for dry bay
suppressors.
However, FE-25TM is being
introduced as an non-ozone depleting
alternative to halon, and many military aircraft
26
27
SENSOR
UV
IR
5 mSEC
1-3 mSEC
HIGH
MEDIUM
FIELD OF VIEW
BETTER
OPERATING TEMPERATURE
0.25-0.4 LBS
0.3-0.5 LBS
SMART SENSOR
REMOTE MOUNTING
REMOTE MOUNTING
SENSOR WEIGHT
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
29
CONCLUSION
The aircraft type, the type of protection
required, the area of the aircraft which requires
protection, and the level of protection one can
afford (with regard to cost, weight,
supportability requirements, etc.) are all factors
which affect the definition of the optimal
protection systems or component.
The
characteristics of various aircraft environments
and of various protection system components
were briefly discussed so that these factors
could be considered during future design
studies.
Concepts and technologies from the
past were discussed at some length. The
purpose of this to establish the fact that many
of the existing and new protection concepts
performance can be maximized if some lessons
learned from the past are applied.
30
REFERENCES
1. Delaney, Charles, Fire Detection System
Performance in USAF Aircraft, AFAPL-TR72-49,
Air
Force
Aero
Propulsion
Laboratory, Wright Patterson AFB, OH,
August 1972.
2. Springer, R., Sheath, P., Robinson, S., and
Smith, P., Advanced Ultra-Violet (UV)
Aircraft Fire Detection System, Volumes I,
II, and III, AFWAL-TR-82-2062, Aero
Propulsion Laboratory, Wright Patterson
AFB, OH, August 1982.
3. Hill, Richard, The Feasibility of Burner-Can
Burn-Through Thermal Detection Prior to
Engine Case Rupture, Report No. FAARD-72-134,
Federal
Aviation
Administration, National Aviation Facilities
Experimental Center, Atlantic City, NJ,
January, 1973.
4. Schumacker, Richard, Jet Engine BurnThrough Investigation, Volume I: Sonic
Analysis, Report No. FAA-RD-72-149, I,
Federal Aviation Administration, National
Aviation Facilities Experimental Center,
Atlantic City, NJ, March, 1973.
5. Hill, Richard, Ultraviolet and Near-Infrared
Spectral Analysis of a Burner-Can BurnThrough Flame, Report No. FAA-RD-73154, Federal Aviation Administration,
National Aviation Facilities Experimental
Center, Atlantic City, NJ, November 1973.
6. Hill, Richard, The Influence of EngineDucted By-Pass Air on a Burner-Can BurnThrough Flame, Report No. FAA-RD-73155, Federal Aviation Administration,
National Aviation Facilities Experimental
Center, Atlantic City, NJ, November 1973.
7. Hill, Richard, The Feasibility of Detecting a
Burner-Can Burn-Through by Means of CO,
CO2, Pressure, and Air Temperature Levels
in a Jet Engine Nacelle, Report No. FAARD-74-18, Federal Aviation Administration,
National Aviation Facilities Experimental
Center, Atlantic City, NJ, March, 1974.
8. Hill, Richard, Jet Engine Burn-Through
Flame characteristics, Report No. FAA-RD74-19, Federal Aviation Administration,
National Aviation Facilities Experimental
Center, Atlantic City, NJ, July, 1974
9. Private
correspondence
with
KiddeGraviner, Ltd., Poyle Road, Colnbrook,
Slough, Berkshire, UK, June, 1989.
10. Private
correspondence
with
KiddeGraviner, Ltd., Poyle Road, Colnbrook,