NERI VS.

SENATE COMMITTEE
March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the
case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of

the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary
in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First,
the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner
did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that,
he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators,
with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from
1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now
Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,
she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in
1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter

in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor
of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position,
filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district
for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of
origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained
a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile
of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.
Domino vs COMELEC
[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999]
Facts:
Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private

respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the petitioner is neither a resident nor a
registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
The COMELEC Second Division disqualified the petitioner as candidate and ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The votes cast for Domino were counted and
he got the highest number of votes. So, he filed a motion for reconsideration but denied
by the COMELEC en banc.

Issues:
1.

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of the petitioner.

2.

Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year

immediately preceding the May 1998 election

Ruling:
1.

Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the

Omnibus Election Code over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. It is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine whether false
representations as to the material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy
including the residence requirement.

2.

No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside
in a fixed place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired
his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by
leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The
lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it
does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his original
domicile.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the
Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in
the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of
Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo
before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also
affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the
ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of
the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For
purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can
have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has
met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for
granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he
migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that
country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile
for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate
of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts,
Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the
loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation
of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot
support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not
required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a
particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or
in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos
has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where
he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed
correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from
where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the
COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct
palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence
Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve
all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
Case Digest: Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which
found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and
affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly
proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner
submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May
18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18
, 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc
had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and

residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of
candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any
basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision,
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone
become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on
and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli
Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process
of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical
rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a
petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given
every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when
Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its
resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately,
she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be
given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require
a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely
by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable
than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard
on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the
Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her
status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner,
imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however,
petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Dimaporo v. Mitra
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative

District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990,
petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately
following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67,
Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to
respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his
seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative
under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the
present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of
the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said
members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the
local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that
under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of
a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT
SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM
THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING
HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND
DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but
primarily because under our Constitution, we have this chapter on accountability of
public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987)
on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers
must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed
to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this

statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for
another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should
they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is
consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with
utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their
constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily
cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective
upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and
act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does
not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress,
does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI
provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.
The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a
vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of
legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A
doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform
ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll
considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the
COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his
certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no
choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted
in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties
upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is
created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to
such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
NOTES:
- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The
term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not
change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman

may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in
an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
Farias vs Executive Secretary
FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office.
Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding
of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections
Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed
in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67
of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA
9006.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The
purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does
not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be
claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the
House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed
their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

G.R. No. 150605

December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities
as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of
Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was
pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of
the Comelec ex parte order, petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on
resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him.
Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution
was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondents proclamation as null
and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution
publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.
HELD:
1. The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had
not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the
disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and
for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could
not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorates choice.
2.
Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before
the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order
disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise
jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A
petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondents eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its
(Comelecs) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial.
Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of personal
judgment or opinion.

TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June
2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
(Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May
2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking of
the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts:
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the
Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with
the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due
to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13
candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term
of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They
contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it
failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in
their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it
failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under
the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions,
COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001
elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.
Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the
pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court
required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and
Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do
not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained
personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition
precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and
failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give
notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a
sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of

official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was
no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC
conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the
COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the
votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What
is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of
election, if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election
on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator
Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former
Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco,
the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the
senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at
least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the
House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should
the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating
in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district
representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party
list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first
party x additional seats for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Held:

Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving
of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to
have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system,
the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to,
in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents,
arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
1.
2.
3.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the
statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation,
in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble
purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents
in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary
which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and
the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be
remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.
BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the
COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty
bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in
these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on
22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in
the party-list elections?
Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as
the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the
two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we

cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation
of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are
two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,
19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections
as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major
political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in sociopolitical engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from
the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC
with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political
parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it
benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of
the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the
election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional
political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in
2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for.
The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional
Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution
of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it
to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of
votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties
(including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an
average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the
major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would
have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only
about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties

garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time
of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list
system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the
Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral
groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and
chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of
the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the
Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political
parties into the party-list system.
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)
However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2%
threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of
Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote
requirement fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI,
of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional
policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the
peoples broadest representation in Congress,the raison detre for the adoption of the
party-list system.
Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans Federation
Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives,
using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2%
threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50
seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed
100%.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold
vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in
careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in
Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is
needed -1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback
position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are
very low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats
within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those
who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor
under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list
seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the
foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer
viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and
it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law
from ever being fully operative.
It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling
for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941,
enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision,
contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally
impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront
to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative
measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions
remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular
legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
Case Digest: Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the
Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec,
in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled,
among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are
not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration
under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating
in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to
the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some
principles
established
in
the
two
aforestated
cases.
Political

Law-

Party-list

system

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed
that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the
party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the partylist
system
prescribed
in
the
Constitution.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral
partyor a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party.
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions
for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each
other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party
and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941
that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless
of
their
economic
status
as
citizens.
Political

Law-

parameters

in

qualifying

party-

lists

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups
or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political
or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have
been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or
more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified
nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent partylist elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party,
and
is
linked
to
a
political
party
through
a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women,
and
the
youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who
remains
qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and
desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what
the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not
because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners,
but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
Petitions Granted.

Case Digest: COCOFED v. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is an
organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector,
particularly the coconut farmers and producers.On May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested
with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013
and submitted the names of only two nominees Atty. Emerito S. Calderon (first nominee)
and
Atty.
Domingo
P.
Espina.
On August 23, 2012, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, to determine whether COCOFED, among several
party-list groups that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the May 13, 2013
party-list elections, had continuously complied with the legal requirements.
In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFEDs registration
and accreditation as a party-list organization on several grounds.Notably, the Concurring
Opinion of Commissioner Christian Lim cited, as additional ground, that since
COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941that requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list of not
less
than
five
nominees.
On December 4, 2012, COCOFED submitted the names of Charles R. Avila, in
substitution of Atty. Espina, as its second nominee and Efren V. Villaser as its third
nominee.
COCOFED, among several others, questioned the COMELECs cancellation of its
registration and accreditation before this Court, with a prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. By reason of the status quo
ante order issued by the Court, COCOFEDs name was included in the printing of the
official
ballots
for
the
May
13,
2013
elections.

On April 2, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Atong Paglaum, Inc., etc., et al. v.
Commission on Elections. The Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to
determine their compliance with the new parameters and guidelines set by the Court in
that
case
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier
ruling cancelling COCOFEDs registration and accreditation for its failure to comply with
the requirement of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, i.e., to submit a list of not less than five
nominees.
The COMELEC noted that all existing party-list groups or organizations were on notice
as early as February 8, 2012 (when Resolution No. 9359 was promulgated) that upon
submission of their respective manifestations of intent to participate, they also needed to
submit a list of five nominees.During the hearing on August 23, 2012, the COMELEC
pointed
out
to
COCOFED
that
it
had
only
two
nominees.
COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later. Instead, on May
20, 2013, COCOFED filed a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional
Nominees with the COMELEC, namely : (i) Felino M. Gutierrez and (ii) Rodolfo T. de
Asis.
On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation of
COCOFEDs
accreditation
final
and
executory.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

COCOFEDS

HELD:
REMEDIAL

registration

can

be

Petition
LAW

moot

cancelled?
dismissed.

and

academic

petition

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy because
of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
In the present case, while the COMELEC counted and tallied the votes in favor of
COCOFED showing that it failed to obtain the required number of votes, participation in
the 2013 elections was merely one of the reliefs COCOFED prayed for. The validity of
the COMELECs resolution, canceling COCOFEDs registration, remains a very live issue
that
is
not
dependent
on
the
outcome
of
the
elections.
Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already registered "need not register
anew" for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to file a manifestation of
intent to participate with the COMELEC. These two acts are different from each other.
Under Section 5 of RA No. 7941, an applicant for registration has to file with the
COMELEC, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a verified petition stating
its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization
or
a
coalition
of
such
parties
or
organizations.
The applicant is required to submit its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require. Aside from these, the law requires the publication of the
applicants petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The
COMELEC then resolves the petition, determining whether the applicant has complied
with
all
the
necessary
requirements.
Under this legal reality, the fact that COCOFED did not obtain sufficient number of votes
in the elections does not affect the issue of the validity of the COMELECs registration. A
finding that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling COCOFEDs
registration would entitle it, if it is so minded, to participate in subsequent elections
without
need
of
undergoing
registration
proceedings
anew.

POLITICAL LAW : Grave abuse of discretion; requirements to be validly registered as

party
list
This brings us to the issue of whether the COMELEC indeed gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed resolution. We hold that it did not.
Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of
its
registration
The law expressly requires the submission of a list containing at least five qualified
nominees.
Section
8
of
RA
No.
7941
reads.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization
or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall
be
chosen
in
case
it
obtains
the
required
number
of
votes.
As early as February 8, 2012, the COMELEC had informed, through Resolution No.
9359,all registered parties who wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections
that they "shall file with the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to participate in the
part-list election together with its list of at least five (5) nominees, no later than May 31,
2012."
Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However,
not every kind of violation automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list groups
registration. Since a reading of the entire Section 6 shows that all the grounds for
cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules and regulations
violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily
imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member
or
its
nominee.
COCOFEDs failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so
before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA No.
7941.
First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in
connection with the requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory
term in conjunction with the number of names to be submitted that is couched negatively,
i.e., "not less than five." The use of these terms together is a plain indication of
legislative intent to make the statutory requirement mandatory for the party to
undertake.With the date and manner of submissionof the list having been determined by
law a condition precedent for the registration of new party-list groups or for participation
in the party-list elections in case of previously registered party-list groups,and was in fact
reiterated by the COMELEC through its resolutions COCOFED cannot now claim good
faith,
much
less
dictate
its
own
terms
of
compliance.
Pursuant to the terms of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, the Court cannot leave to the party
the discretion to determine the number of nominees it would submit. A contrary view
overlooks the fact that the requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is
primarily a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the
submission of this list is part of a registered partys continuing compliance with the law to
maintain its registration. A party-list groups previous registration with the COMELEC
confers no vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In order to maintain a party
in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued possession
of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the basic
requirements
of
the
law.
Second, while COCOFEDs failure to submit a complete list of nominees may not have
been among the grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier canceling its registration, this
is not sufficient to support a finding of grave abuse of discretion. Apart from the clear
letter of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 and the COMELEC resolutions issued more or less a

year before the 2013 elections, COCOFEDs belated submission of a Manifestation with
Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees several days after the elections betrays
the
emptiness
of
COCOFEDs
formalistic
plea
for
prior
notice.
Section 6 of RA No. 7941 requires the COMELEC to afford "due notice and hearing"
before refusing or cancelling the registration of a partylist group as a matter of
procedural due process. The Court would have demanded an exacting compliance with
this requirement if the registration or continuing compliance proceeding were strictly in
the nature of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.In several cases, however, the Court
had already ruled that the registration of party-list groups involves the exercise of the
COMELECs administrative power, particularly its power to enforce and administer all
laws
related
to
elections.
While COCOFED could have complied after the elections (as it in fact did), it should
have, at the very least, submitted an explanation justifying its inability to comply prior to
the elections. However, COCOFED simply chose to ignore the law; this, to us, is a plain
disregard of the administrative requirement warranting the cancellation of its registration.
Third, the fact that a party-list group is entitled to no more than three seats in Congress,
regardless of the number of votes it may garner,does not render Section 8 of RA No.
7941
permissive
in
nature.
On February 21, 2012, the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 9366,again apprised
registered party-list groups that its Manifestation of Intent to Participate shall be
accompanied by a list of at least five (5) nominees. Under Section 9, Rule 5 of this
resolution, the Education and Information Department of the COMELEC shall cause the
immediate publication of this list in two national newspapers of general circulation.
The publication of the list of nominees does not only serve as the reckoning period of
certain remedies and procedures under the resolution. Most importantly, the required
publication satisfies the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. The need for submission of the complete list required by law becomes all the
more important in a party-list election to apprise the electorate of the individuals behind
the party they are voting for. If only to give meaning to the right of the people to elect
their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment, then the party-list group must
submit a complete list of five nominees because the identity of these five nominees
carries critical bearing on the electorates choice.A post-election completion of the list of
nominees
defeats
this
constitutional
purpose.
Even if a party-list group can only have a maximum of three seats, the requirement of
additional two nominees actually addresses the contingencies that may happen during the
term of these party-list representatives. Section 16 of RA No. 7941 reads.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list
representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from
the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party,
organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted,
the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
While the law allows the submission of additional nominees once the list is exhausted,
the exhaustion of the list presupposes prior compliance with the requirement of Section 8
of RA No. 7941. Since the exhaustion of the list is an event that can rarely happen under
this interpretation, then the law effectively upholds the peoples right to make informed
electoral judgments. Again, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that the provisions
of the law must not be read in isolation but as a whole, as the law must not be read in
truncated parts; its provisions in relation to the whole law and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole.
Moreover, after the submission of a list of nominees to the COMELEC, the party itself
has no discretion to change the names or to alter the order of nomination in the list it
submitted.While there are instances when a change of name or alteration of the order is

allowed, these circumstances focus on the nominee himself, whether voluntary (the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination) or involuntary (the nominee dies or
becomes incapacitated). To allow COCOFED to complete the list of its nominees beyond
the deadline set by the law would allow the party itself to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly.
Fourth, we cannot discern any valid reason why a party-list group cannot comply with
the statutory requirement.The party-list system is a constitutional innovation that would
expand opportunities for electoral participation to those who cannot hope to win in the
legislative district elections, but who may generate votes nationwide equivalent to what a
winner in the legislative district election would garner.In short, the party-list system
operates on the theoretical assumption that a party-list group has national constituency
whose interests, concerns, or ideologies call for representation in the House of
Representatives. We quote with approval the COMELECs observation.
If the party cannot even come up with a complete list of five names out of a purported
more than one million members, then it is highly doubtful that COCOFED will meet this
expectation to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that is beneficial
for the nation as a whole; and if it cannot even name at least three more people who
belongs to, or with sufficient advocacy for, the sector sought to be represented then as a
sectoral party or organization, it has already forsaken what it seeks to represent.
Given this driving idea, a party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing
"not less than five nominees" and consider the deficiency as a waiver on its part. Aside
from colliding with the plain text of the law, this interpretation is not in harmony with the
statutory policy of enhancing the party-list-groups chances to compete for and win seats
in the legislature, and therefore does not serve as incentive to Filipino citizens belonging
to these groups to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation.
Fifth, while under the 6th parameter in Atong Paglaum, the Court said that the
disqualification of some of the nominees shall not result in the disqualification of the
party-list group "provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified,"
the
Court
largely
considered
that
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or
more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
In fact, almost all of the petitioners in A tong Paglaum were disqualified on the ground
that the nominees failed to "qualify," as this word was interpreted by the COMELEC.In
other words, the Court in no way authorized a party-list group's inexcusable failure, if
not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the submission of at
least
five
nominees.
In sum, all these reasons negate a finding that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling COCOFED's registration.
Case
REYES,

Digest:

Abang-Lingkod

v.

COMELEC
J.:

FACTS:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant
farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22,
2009. It failed to obtain the number of votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat
in
the
House
of
Representatives.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC August 9,
2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing
compliance
with
the
requirements
under
R.A.
No.
7941.
In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it
conducted
after
the
May
2010
elections.
ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said
petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by 51 other party-list groups
whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list
system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain
status
quo
ante
orders
from
the
court.
The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list
groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified
under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in
the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter
alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list
system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary
evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13, 2013 elections as the reason
therefor.
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC's
Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD
withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead,
instituted the instant petition with this Court, alleging that there may not be enough time
for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its motion for reconsideration considering
that the election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by the
COMELEC.
ISSUE:

Whether

HELD:

BANG

POLITICAL

or

not

ABANG

LINGKOD
LAW:

was

LINGKOD
not

was

denied

administrative

denied
of
due

due
due

process?
process.
process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to

administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court
finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to
present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified
through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC.
That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent
documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No.
7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its
claim
that
it
was
denied
due
process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary
hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum.

ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to

establish its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the
COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose
of determining ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant
to
Atong
Paglaumwould
just
be
a
superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not
categorically require the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the
purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new
parameters
for
screening
party-list
groups.
POLITICAL

LAW:

cancellation

of

party-list

registration

Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system. The COMELEC affirmed
the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared
untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013
elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of
activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the
ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the
marginalized
and
underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to
submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only
imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove
through their, inter alia, track record that they truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines
on who may register under the party-list system and the representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list
system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized
and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors
stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized
and
underrepresented.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG
LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals
represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which
they
represent.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or organizations
intending to register under the party-list system are still required to present a track record
notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that
would have to be presented would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization.
He opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and
underrepresented while national or regional parties or organizations must show that they
have been existing as a bona fide organization.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who
is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first

instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for
his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as
member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite
of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery
of the purposes of the correction system.

Jimenez

vs

Cabangbang

Digest

Facts:
Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused
its publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly
operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up
of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a
candidate for President in 1961.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
Held:
The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the
purview of the phrase speech or debate in Congress as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now
Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance
of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open
letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing
the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a

member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said

communication is not absolutely privileged.

ANTONINO V VALENCIA
MAY 27, 1974
FACTS:
Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party
in the election for governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the
support given by Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP
candidate Maglana which caused a division in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various
newspapers that had Valencia not Sabotaged and double-crossed them, the LP would
have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and
equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue
Ribbon Committee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published
in newspapers
Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in
favor of Antonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator
Antonino (Wife)
ISSUES:
1.W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia
2.W/N the Press Release is libelous
Held/Ruling:
YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is
seen in the following facts:
1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino.
2.On the press release there was marked For release under the date.
3.It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of
Antonino in the same numerical order.
4.The press release indicated that it came from Valencia
5.The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in
the presence of the press
6.The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and
reports and information he received about Antonino
7.The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the
time constraint
8.Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.
YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed
upon him certain corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately
or officially, malice is presumed and such presumption was not overcome as
Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good

intentions and with a justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right
of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have
filedcharges against Antonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate
forelection and that his term as senator was no yet to expire.
Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in
making libelous statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the
Blue Ribbon.
Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossingcannot be considered libelous
ascontemporary politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who
changes political parties.
Eugenio Puyat vs Sixto De Guzman, Jr.
113 SCRA 31 Political Law The Legislative Department Appearance in Court
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International
Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats
rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a quo
warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979.
Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros
group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from
May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez
entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any
administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself
from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI
shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and
intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an
assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the
litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because
it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented
himself as a party of interest which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after
the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be
done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
Case

Digest:

Liban

v.

Gordon

(2011)

LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
J.:
FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court
decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is
unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by
the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself
with the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the second part of
the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a
private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched
upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched
upon
if
it
is
not
the
lis
mota
of
the
case.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality
of
the
PNRC
statute.
HELD:

Petition

has

merit.

Political Law: It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should
exercise judicial restraint when it comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not the
lis mota of the case.
In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of
standing. As such, the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as
unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the
private corporations that the Constitution wants to prevent Congress from creating. First,
the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of
war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among
others. It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since
the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor personal
gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the mitigation of the
effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC is
compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a National Society,
an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities and GOCC.
The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local
law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to
have declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the
stand of Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the Government to create a National
Society to this effect. He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a
private corporation organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the
PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power of Congress to
create.
Avelino vs. Cuenco
FACTS: Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges
against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof.
Before Senator Taada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the
incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the
Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued
meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President.
Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the
latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum
the
majority
required
of
the
24-member
Senate.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and

67

validly

approved?

HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a
political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere
nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority
of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing
a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different
had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia
that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum
required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly
because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were
at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in
view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a

majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the
members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it
injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the
office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that
majority.
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than

Senate President and House Speaker

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of

legislature

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject
to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were
both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with
the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen.
Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the minority. However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCDUMDP Party number 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the
minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the

selection of respondent as Senate minority leader

Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative

procedure

RULING:
The
The

petition
meaning

of

majority

fails.
vis-a-vis

minority

The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half
or more than half of any total. The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of
more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who
comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is no

showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings
of
these
terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,
not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast,
minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than
the majority. Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the
greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority.
But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is
the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government
with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by
the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In
the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different
political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe
which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the
right
to
select
the
minority
leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President
and
House
Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose
such other officers as it may deem necessary. To our mind, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed
by
the
Senate
itself,
not
by
this
Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine
the
rules
of
its
proceedings.
xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts
may
intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation,
modification
and
waiver
by
the
body
adopting
them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Being

merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of
a
majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for
such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion
to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running
afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty
that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather,
it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for
this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel
V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House
Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted
invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in
the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The
Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would
itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a
case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new
law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements
for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the
rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may
be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform
to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has
a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. .
. . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established
rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does
not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody
objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and
third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power
as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House
and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies
good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check
an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal
principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll
may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if
we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
J. Bengzon
Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen
in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No.
59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President
with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio
Osmea, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to
have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling free things at
premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity
of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without
basis in truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential
office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of
the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmea, Jr. It was
authorized to summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it,
and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its
findings before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmea alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable
speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules
of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman
Osmea a chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and
acting on such report, the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175,
declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen
months.

The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session,
the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." The provision has always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII,
sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken
in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been
censured, committed to prison, and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This
was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine
Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action
against him, because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer
that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary
practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however,
affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts
are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action taken by a deliberative body when the required number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it
is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules
of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty
action. (Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured
by the House, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the
objectionable remarks.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be disciplined, the court believed that the

House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not
be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct
constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene
in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the
power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of
California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement,
alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides
falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, due to the Constitution.
Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has
the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that
it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to
the safety of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body
must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its
exercise. Given the exercise of the power committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of
the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly
forbidden to do.
The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it
is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of
Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from
office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of that Body. The Senator
challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the
separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it
nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because
suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no
power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law
specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member. The Jones Law
empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that
vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive
senator who was then the affected party.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation,
except as restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the
conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercisedthe
power of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is
necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation
can not be weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to
commit one of their members to jail.

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent
the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because
no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to
the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session,
and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should
be dismissed for having become moot or academic.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most
probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction.

Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

252 SCRA 641 Political Law The Legislative Department Suspension of a Member
of Congress RA 3019
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur
filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same
province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk
of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and
of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment
notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio
was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the
criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution
was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of
Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only
changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the
Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public
Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order
of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman
Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the
court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which
deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
United States vs Juan Pons
34 Phil. 729 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez
y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said
barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons
house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as
wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so
the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of
wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is
against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the
sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission
(Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was

passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null
and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine
if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals
which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill in this particular case.
Case Digest: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez and Mathay
FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange margin Fee
Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% foreign
exchange transactions. Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., a manufacturer
of resin glues, had bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde raw materials for the said glues and were thus paying for the margin
fees required.
Relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring that
the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the
petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees that had been paid. This was denied by
the Auditor of the said Bank stating that the claim was not in accord with the provisions
of section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. 2609.
ISSUE: Whether urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee
HELD/RULING:
Urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from law.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision
of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and

hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
(Emphasis provided.)
Urea formaldehyde is different from urea and formaldehyde, the former being a finished
product. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. The
courts cannot speculate that there had been an error in the printing of the bill as this shall
violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there have been any error in the
printing, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Title:
Facts:

ASTORGA

vs

VILLEGAS

In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065.
He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city
police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority
of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a
petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel Villegas
et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and
Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose
Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law
was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd
reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator
Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the
Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant
amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent
back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the
President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the
copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the
President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no
amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly
approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the
Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the
attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly
enacted.
Decision:
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject
to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case.
This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced
on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate
such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate
and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also
declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of
members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect
of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed
the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected
Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last
day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative,
RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate
cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the

constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to
an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as
an express prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot
be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing
of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied,
with cost against the petitioner.
Abbas vs Senate Electoral Tribunal - A case digest
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Facts:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying,
respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion
for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves
in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore
leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming
from the judiciary.
Issue:
WON the SET can function without the Senator members.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the
decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself,
rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective
and impartial judgment.
Case

Digest:

Vinzons-Chato

vs.

HRET

FACTS:
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010 elections as
representative of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte, composed of the
seven (7) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente, and
San Lorenzo, with a total of 205 clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes
(Panotes) who was proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having garnered a total of
51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes.
Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) assailing the results in four (4) municipalities, namely: Daet, Vinzons, Basud
and Mercedes. Panotes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and prayed that a
preliminary hearing be set in order to determine the integrity of the ballots and the ballot
boxes used in the elections. In its resolution, the HRET directed the copying of the
picture image files of ballots relative to the protest. Chato then filed an Urgent Motion to
Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images reiterating the
lack of legal basis for the decryption and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no
preliminary hearing had been conducted showing that the integrity of the ballots and
ballot boxes was not preserved. The HRET denied Chatos motion. HRET declared that,
although the actual ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections are the best evidence of
the will of the voters, the picture images of the ballots are regarded as the equivalent of
the original ballots. Chato filed a motion for reconsideration but the HRET denied the
same.
Chato then moved for the revision of the ballots in all of the protested clustered precincts
arguing that the results of the revision of twenty-five percent (25%) of the precincts

indicate a reasonable recovery of votes in her favor. She filed a second motion reiterating
her prayer for the continuance of the revision. The HRET denied the motion.
However, on March 22, 2012, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution No. 12-079
directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining seventy-five percent
(75%) protested clustered precincts, or a total of 120 precincts. Panotes moved for
reconsideration
but
the
HRET
denied
the
same.
Hence, Panotes filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of
jurisdiction
in
issuing
Resolution
No.
12-079?
HELD:
The HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 12-079.
POLITICAL LAW: HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns
and
qualifications
of
its
members
It is hornbook principle that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review decisions
and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the
electoral tribunals exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has
been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or the exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion
of
positive
duty.
To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an
intrusion into its domain and a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its
evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented before it.
In the main, Panotes ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET in
ordering the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% of the protested
clustered
precincts.
The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. By employing the word
sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication
of election contests involving its members is intended to be its own full, complete and
unimpaired.
There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any clear showing,
as in this case, of arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power that
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to
be
a
remedy
therefor.
DISMISSED.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA
166 SCRA 533 (1988)

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power

EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation

Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan.
The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the
POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death
benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping
Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA
assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of nondelegation of powers

HELD:
SC

held

that

there

was

valid

delegation

of

powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines

contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under
the
principle,
is
not
subject
to
delegation.
GENERAL

RULE:

Non-delegation

of

powers;

exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature
to
the
delegate.
Two

Tests

of

Valid

Delegation

of

Legislative

Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation
from
running
riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially
legislative.
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
Rationale

for

Delegation

of

Legislative

Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular
fields.
Power

of

Subordinate

Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more
and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to
carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate
legislation.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in
statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
Feliciano, J.

Facts:

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the
school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of
Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private
respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners
sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and
(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985,
dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance
of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted
and administered as previously scheduled.

Issue:

whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend
against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative
power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
Board of Medical Education

Held:

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are
necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standard may be either expressed or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety.

In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical
Act: the standardization and regulation of medical education and in Section 5 (a) and 7
of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy [Nov. 5,1997]
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation
process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full
deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are
considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the
depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in
Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA
No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997
regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of
the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to time it as
far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform, decline as
meaning to take a downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given
weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department
failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the
extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to
alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no
powers to make laws.
Case No. 11. People v Dacuycuy
People vs Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval,

and Cirilio M. Zanoria
Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and
Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal
Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and
prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch
VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the
correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670)
prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment
is unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent
Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases
for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration
on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative
department of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes
punishable by fine of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of
municipal courts.
Decision:
The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents
herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte
for trial on the merits.
Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC
Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district
of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on
October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution
No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act
201.

In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007,
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato
City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato
City prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the
canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to
Sec. 5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an
LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to
create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is
constitutional, provided the criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement
in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an
Act of Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1
representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to
at least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power
only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the
Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to
reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
Congress exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a
law enacted by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is
traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and is thus
vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in
its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national
law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by
Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional
Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office
because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers
of regional assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in
Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion
legislative districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact
laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
DAZA vs. SINGSON
FACTS:
1

After the May 1987 Congressional Elections, the House of Representatives

proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments
(COA) among the several political parties represented in the chamber, as pursuant
to Article 6, Section 18 of the Constitution. Herein Petitioner Daza was among
those chosen and listed as representative of the Liberal Party (LP).

However, on 16 September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)

reorganized which resulted to political realignment in the House; 24 members of
LP resigned and joined LDP, thereby swelling the formers number from 159 to
17.

Due to such, the House revised its representatives in the COA by withdrawing the
seat of Petitioner and giving it to the newly LDP, respondent Singson.

Hence, petitioner filed a complaint in the Supreme Court on the ground of his
removal from the COA. Consequently, the Court issued a TRO to prevent both
petitioner and respondent from serving in the COA.

Petitioner contends that he cannot be removed because his appointment is

permanent, citing a ruling in Cunanan v. Tan, and asserting that the rerganization
of LDP is not based on permanent political realignment since LDP is not a duly
registered pol. party.

On the other hand, respondent avers that the question raised by petitioner is
political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Moreover, he invokes
that nowhere in the Constitution requires that a political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the COA.

ISSUE: WON petitioners removal from the COA by the HRep is legal?
RULING:
1

First, on the jurisdictional issue, the Court held that the contention of respondent
is not correct; the Court has jurisdiction over the matter since what is involved is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of the chamber in removing the ptitioner
from the COA.

Second, on the issue of removal, the Court ruled that petitioners contention that
the LDPs reoirganization is invalid since it is not yet registere. However, on 23
November 1989, the COMELEC en banc already affirmed the registration of the
LDP.

On the contention that LDP has not yet passed the test of stability is ikewise
untenable. The Court stated that if such theory be followed, petitioners party
(LP) will also fall under such category and will not be entitled representation in
the COA since the Liberal Party was just reorganized before for Pres. Roxas be
able to run.

Further, the Court stressed that LDP had already been existing for more than a
year and having 157 members in the House and 6 in the Senate is enough for it to
be considered an eligible pol. party and if petitioners contention be pursued, the
members of LDP will be denied of representation in the COA.

COSETENG V MITRA
13 Mar
G.R. No. 86649 | July 12, 1990 | J.Grio-Aquino
Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives
under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the
Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal a request backed by nine
congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12
congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member,
representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also

organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA

due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson
(LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary
Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the
Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members
null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats
and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she
is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the
Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question,
hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the proportional
representation clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the
Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political
question but because revision in House representation in CA was based on proportional
representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the
House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10
seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties.
KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices.
Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than
1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats
in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong.
Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have been
nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their
floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the
Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the
other government branches.
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
I.

THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to
resolve was the apparent irregularity of the governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a
non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest
in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was

one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to
whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5
million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody
of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning
the validity of his detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that
it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by
the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the
parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that
the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it
has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that
it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a
witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that
it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that
subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt

to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence
of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to
enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by
duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or
conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which
that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of selfpreservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3.

NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal
instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of
that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable
rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the
Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate
him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole
case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the
facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer
to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend
to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection
of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time
liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved
from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but
rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee En Banc
Posted by kaye lee on 5:46 PM
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 [Section 21, Article 6: Aids in Legislation: On
Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in
devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff
and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the
alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of
SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by
Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in
the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
[SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they know regarding the
sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to

testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly
prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC
continued its investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief,
claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the
defendants of the civil case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to
inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. The Court has provided that the allocation of
constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to
delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid
of legislation.
2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in
Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such
inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection
with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate
alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really
"in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege
speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the
PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected
with the government but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or
prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only
requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying
at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my
mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating
question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse
to take the witness stand completely.
Sabio vs Gordon
Posted by kaye lee on 9:17 PM
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L.
SABIO v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
[Congress Power of Inquiry]
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same
time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall
be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only
to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the
committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is
co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry,
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power
to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art.
VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full

disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec.
7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.