LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS v. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.

,
Digested by: KR Gutierrez
Facts:
1. The question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether or not Article 103 of
the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the
lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the
court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as
an ancillary remedy to such a suit.
2. Respondent Cipriano Vamenta, Jr., of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental ordered the suspension, upon the plea of the other respondent the
husband Clemente G. Ramos, of the hearing on a motion for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction filed by petitioner at the same time the suit for legal
separation was instituted.
3. Petitioner, Lucy Somosa-Ramos, the wife who brought the action for legal
separation disputed such a ruling
4. The pleadings show that on June 18, 1971, petitioner filed a case in the sala of
respondent Judge against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation; on
concubinage on the respondent's part; and an attempt by him against her life
being alleged.
5. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive
property, then under the administration and management of respondent
Clemente Ramos.
6. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971,
based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a
pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory
injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would
become even more dim.
7. Respondent Judge ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda on
the matter.
8. Judge granted motion of respondent to suspend the hearing of the petition for a
writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is the order complained of in this
petition for certiorari.
9. Respondents were required to answer according to our resolution of October 5,
1971. The answer was filed December 2 of that year. Then on January 12, 1972
came a manifestation from parties in the case submitting the matter without
further arguments.
Issue: Whether Article 103 of the NCC an absolute bar to the hearing of the motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period?
Ruling: NO. It is understandable why there should be a [cooling-off] period during which
the court is precluded from acting. Ordinarily of course, no such delay is permissible.
Justice to parties would not thereby be served. The sooner the dispute is resolved, the
better for all concerned. A suit for legal separation, however, is something else again. It
involves a relationship on which the law for the best reasons would attach the quality of
permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be
is not of course to be denied. One or both of the spouses, whether fancied or real, may
entertain grievances. There may be constant bickering. The loss affection on the part of
one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less

the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. The
healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend
his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence,
the interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation is to
be tried.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It
must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There
is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as
one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there
would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law,
however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself
is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing
of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from
each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage
the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another
to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and
duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital
except in accordance with the orders of the court." There would appear to be then
recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left
unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed
for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation
from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties
may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence
that the lower court should not ignore her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction.
There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that
the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in
the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this
Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the
period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a
cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of
their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions
against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity
for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out
legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the
courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." At any rate, from
the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six
months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower
court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Separate Opinions
Reyes, J.B.L.,. J., concurring:
Concurs, specially in view of the ruling in De la Via vs. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13, 24.