Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 3, 2004
C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,

G.R. No. 161434

MARIA JEANETTE
JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634
March 3, 2004
ZOILO
ANTONIO
VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO
X.
FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving
of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition," 1 that
cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute
it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications
of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and
now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots
and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting
in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003
before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino

citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son
of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth
of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of
birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the
effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth
of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by
the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office
during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434,
entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme
Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due
course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact
(i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code "Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for
the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any
nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to,
and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to
our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vicepresidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as "not (being)
justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress,
on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of
the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly
affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed
revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election
contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would
support this premise "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.5 In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on
Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the
concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in
384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of
justice and in the holding of an office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the
constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would
be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. 7 The concept grew to include one
who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active
in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of
society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the
concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary
for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. 9 Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the
right to participate in the exercise of political power. 10 The 20th century saw the next stage of
the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the
modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of
Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a
low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to
the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in
Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to
be the subject of differing views among experts; 15 however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the
express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among
which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889,
which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. "(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline
as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in

sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no
effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by the Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on
the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although
they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under
American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of
1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was
taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01
July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was
given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States,

and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the
first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines
for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in
1912 "That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of
the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing
in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common
law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship "Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns "Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of
the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28 had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident
of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954.
The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes.
Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The
birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years
old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the
birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions
that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a naturalborn Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in
the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit
"21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his
Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e.,
the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and
the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that "Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x
xxx
xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could
be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin
of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred.31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the
age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was
born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from
1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou
was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the

contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of
a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of
all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the
child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child)
of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889
up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if
done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in
a record of birth, a will, or a public document. 32 Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that "In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not
be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The
failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is
whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry
record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No
such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as
required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or
either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in
any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True
enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document
was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least
shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, 35 this Court
defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one
of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be
demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation.
Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might
pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as
to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175
provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either
or both of the parties.
"x x x
xxx
x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the
voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article
278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal

affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil
status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to
the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family
and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which
determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of
a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."37
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards
although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature,
such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the
husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their
property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the
spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and
wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts
of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations.40 In adoption, for
instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded
the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude
may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and
successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code,
and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary
source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in
the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus
be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law
purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides "Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or
unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a
relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F.
Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley
and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.
"x x x
xxx
xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students
at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my
sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan
and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St.
(now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x
xxx
xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42 this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test

for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is
to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According
to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a
year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an
illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of
this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would
be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement
was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was
about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese
father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing
about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public
office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.
Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was
whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of
Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father,
Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that

there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his
son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court
said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino
because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x
xxx
xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs.
Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children
rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction.
Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a
public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive
the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate
child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and
must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor
Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis
of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother,
it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child
of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child,
not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the
petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in
the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material

representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No.
161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity
as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after,
not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed
by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners,
versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the
petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J., see
separate
opinion,
concurring.
Puno,
J., on
leave
but
was
allowed
to
vote;
see
separate
opinion.
Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on the matter.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should have been
remanded.

Ynares-Santiago,
J., concurs
and
also
with
J.
Punos
separate
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., concurs,
please
see
separate
Carpio,
J., see
dissenting
Austria-Martinez,
J., concurs,
please
see
separate
Corona,
J., joins
the
dissenting
opinion
of
Justice
Carpio-Morales,
J., see
dissenting
Callejo,
Sr.,
J., please
see
concurring
Azcuna,
J., concurs
in
a
separate
Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.

opinion.
opinion.
opinion.
opinion.
Morales.
opinion.
opinion.
opinion.

SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and
to deny due course to or cancel his certificate of candidacy for the position of President in the
forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidential elections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ
committed falsity in a material representation in his certificate of candidacy in declaring that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth and in fact he is not, since he is the
illegitimate son of Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, a Spanish national. The
case was docketed as COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 and assigned to the COMELECs First
Division.
At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier offered FPJs
record of birth to prove that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen, and Allan Poe, who was then married to Paulita Gomez. Upon the other hand, FPJ tried
to establish that his father was a Filipino citizen whose parents, although Spanish nationals,
were Filipino citizens. He adduced in evidence a copy of the marriage contract of Allan Poe and
Bessie Kelley, showing that they were married on 16 September 1940 in Manila.
In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed COMELEC
Case SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. It declared that COMELECs jurisdiction is limited to all
matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and
city officials, but not those of national officials like the President. It has, however, jurisdiction
to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code on petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground
that any material representation contained therein is false. It found that the evidence adduced
by petitioner Fornier is not substantial, and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material
representation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been denied,
petitioner Fornier filed a petition with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came to this Court
via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
161434, to challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the issue of the citizenship of FPJ.
They assert that only this Court has jurisdiction over the issue in light of the last paragraph of
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.

On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was docketed as G.R. No.
161634.
The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the oral argument,
are as follows:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates;
(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a) Tecson, et al., (b) Velez,
and (c) Fornier; and
(3) Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.
Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in
the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and raise the issue of the
ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said provision of the Constitution are postelection remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The petitioner should
have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such as those prescribed in Section 68
(Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69 (Nuisance candidates); and Section 78
(Petition to deny course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code, which are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. These pre-election remedies or actions do not, however, fall within the original
jurisdiction of this Court.
Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC has
the original jurisdiction to determine in an appropriate proceeding whether a candidate for an
elective office is eligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy or is
disqualified to be a candidate or to continue such candidacy because of any of the recognized
grounds for disqualification. Its jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 is, therefore,
beyond question.
Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Forniers petition (G.R. No. 161824)
under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged
resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
nay branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the following
facts have been established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either in the pleadings and
the documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the parties, through their counsels,
during the oral arguments:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not
shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage of his parents.
Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code then in force, he could either be (a) a natural child if both his
parents had no legal impediments to marry each other; or (b) an illegitimate child if, indeed,
Allan Poe was married to another woman who was still alive at the time FPJ was born.
Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case
around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue.
For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose
mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship
of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae. Since
paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC committed no
grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that the child
is acknowledged or recognized by the father.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The Antecedent Proceedings
Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") a "Petition for
Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." on
the ground that Fernando Poe, Jr. ("FPJ") is not a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec
First Division dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioner failed to present substantial
evidence that FPJ committed "any material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate
of Candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen." On motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En
Banc affirmed the ruling of the First Division. Petitioner Fornier now assails the Comelec En
Banc resolution under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Undisputed Facts
The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The first
document is the Birth Certificate of FPJ, showing he was born on 20 August 1939. The Birth
Certificate is an evidence of FPJ.[1] The second document is the Marriage Certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that their marriage took place on 16 September 1940. The
Marriage Certificate is also an evidence of FPJ.[2] Moreover, FPJ admits that his mother Bessie
Kelley was an American citizen.[3]

Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1) FPJ was born out
of wedlock and therefore illegitimate,[4] and (2) the mother of FPJ was an American citizen.
The Issues
The issues raised in Forniers petition are:
(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as a candidate for
President on the ground that FPJ is not a natural-born Philippine citizen;
(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisdiction
The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all candidates. Under
Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and function to
"[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The
initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with the Comelec
clearly falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct
of an election necessarily includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing
laws to run for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelecs certified list of candidates
will be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable.
For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of candidates for
president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec.[5]
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to "[D]ecide, except
those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x." The power to decide "all
questions affecting elections" necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate
possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad
constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any
situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is
obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President,
the Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate.
There is no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
Under Rule 25 on "Disqualification of Candidates" of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a voter
may question before the Comelec the qualifications of any candidate for public office. Thus,
Rule 25 provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. Any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file with the Law
Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional power to promulgate
its own rules of procedure[6] to expedite the disposition of cases or controversies falling within
its jurisdiction.
The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the Constitution provides
that some other body shall be the "sole judge" of the qualifications of the holders of the public
offices involved. The Court has upheld the jurisdiction of Comelec to issue such rulings,[7]
even when the issue is the citizenship of a candidate.[8] Thus, the Comelec has jurisdiction to
determine initially if FPJ meets the citizenship qualification to run for President.
However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual bases of its
ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue presented whether

FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc affirmed the First Division
ruling that "[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a
natural-born citizen." In short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run
in the coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine
citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 1,
Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the issue in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a candidate for
President only after the elections would lead to an absurd situation. The Court would have to
wait for an alien to be elected on election day before he could be disqualified to run for
President. If the case is not decided immediately after the election, an alien who wins the
election may even assume office as President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is
not what the Constitution says when it provides that "[N]o person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."[9] The clear and specific language of the
Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of
whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine citizen must be decided before
the election.
Governing Laws
Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth depends on the
Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth.[10] FPJs citizenship at the time of
his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939, determines whether he is a natural-born
Philippine citizen.
Natural-born Philippine citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[11] If a
person has to perform an act, such as proving in an administrative or judicial proceeding, that
an event subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such
person is not a natural born citizen.[12]
The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the governing
laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at the time of his
birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person
born in 1939 because such legislation would violate the constitutional definition of a naturalborn citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine
citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent legislation a natural-born citizen.
General Principles
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child born within
wedlock is presumed to be the son of the father[13] and thus carries the blood of the father.
Under the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as provided for in Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935
Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy, automatically follows the citizenship of
the Filipino father.
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to any father
unless the father acknowledges the child at birth.[14] The law has always required that "in all
cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved."[15] The only legally known
parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who
conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, unless the father acknowledges the
illegitimate child at birth, the illegitimate child can only acquire the citizenship of the only
legally known parent - the mother.
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood relation of
illegitimate child to the father) of the child to the Filipino father is established in accordance

with law, the child follows the citizenship of the Filipino father. This gives effect, without
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children, to the provision of the 1935
Constitution that "[T]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines"[16] are Philippine
citizens.
Nature of Citizenship
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a natural-born
Philippine citizen because no other act after his birth is required to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship. The child possesses all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at
birth.
If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as of
the time of the acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not possess all the qualifications
to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act - the acknowledgement of the Filipino father is required for the child to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on
retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be given effect because they would be contrary to the
constitutional definition of natural- born citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child has the blood
of any man who is supposed to be the father. There is only a conclusive presumption that the
child has the blood of the mother. If an illegitimate child claims to have the blood of a man who
is supposed to be the childs father, such blood relation must be established in accordance with
proof of filiation as required by law.
Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of the putative
father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood relation to the putative
Filipino father since there is no presumption that an illegitimate child has the blood of the
putative father. Even if the putative father admits paternity after the birth of the illegitimate
child, there must be an administrative or judicial approval that such blood relation exists upon
proof of paternity as required by law.
Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate
child of an alien mother on the mere say so of the putative Filipino father. The State has a right
to examine the veracity of the claim of paternity. Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship
to an illegitimate child of an alien mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino
father. For example, a Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has
several illegitimate children in China. The State cannot be required to grant Philippine
passports to these supposed illegitimate children born in China of Chinese mothers just
because the putative Filipino father acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There
must be either an administrative or judicial determination that the claim of the putative
Filipino father is true.
The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of Vietnamese mothers and
allegedly of Filipino fathers, is illustrative. These children grew up in Vietnam, many of them
studying there until high school. These children grew up knowing they were Vietnamese
citizens. In 1975, a Philippine Navy vessel brought them, together with their Vietnamese
mothers, to the Philippines as Saigon fell to the communists. The mothers of these children
became stateless when the Republic of (South) Vietnam ceased to exist in 1975. The
Department of Justice rendered Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995 that being children of
Filipino fathers, these Vietnamese children, even if illegitimate, are Philippine citizens under
Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973
Constitution. This Opinion is cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a natural-born
Philippine citizen.[17] However, this Opinion categorically stated that before the illegitimate

Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens "it is necessary in every case referred
to that such paternity be established by sufficient and convincing documentary evidence."[18]
In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial authority the
paternity of the alleged Filipino father by "sufficient and convincing documentary evidence."
Clearly, an administrative or judicial act is necessary to confer on the illegitimate Vietnamese
children Philippine citizenship. The mere claim of the illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino
father, or the mere acknowledgment of the alleged Filipino father, does not automatically confer
Philippine citizenship on the child. The State must be convinced of the veracity of such claim
and approve the same. Since the illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform an act to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They
become Philippine citizens only from the moment the proper administrative or judicial
authority approve and recognize their filiation to their alleged Filipino fathers.
The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high public
offices[19] is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up knowing they were
at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative years they knew they owed from birth
their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other country claims their allegiance, they
would be faithful and loyal to the Philippines of which they were citizens from birth. This is
particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[20] The
President of the Philippines must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have
grown up knowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition
of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth
recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later[21] a natural-born Philippine
citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity.
Proof of Filiation
Article 131[22] of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized only the following
as proof of filiation of a natural child:
a. acknowledgment in a record of birth;
b. acknowledgment in a will;
c. acknowledgment in some other public document.
To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an acknowledgement in
a record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of
his birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a
citizen from the time of such acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after
birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.
After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent legislation
liberalizing proof of filiation cannot apply to such person to make him a natural-born citizen. A
natural-born Philippine citizen is expressly defined in the Constitution as one who is a citizen
at birth. If a person is not a citizen at birth, no subsequent legislation can retroactively declare
him a citizen at birth since it would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born
citizen.
Burden of Proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his
Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for President because he is,
among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving he is a natural-born
citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born citizen is resolved against him. The
constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election
as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled
in Paa v. Chan: [23]

It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of
the Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant
of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
State.
Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been born out of
wedlock, the burden is on FPJ to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino father. An
illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of blood relation to any father. Such blood relationship
must be established in the appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person because
citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State interest. Even if
petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the son of Allan F. Poe, such
admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the status of a naturalborn Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a
person as a natural-born Philippine citizen just because the private party litigants have
admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor General, as
representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a natural-born
Philippine citizen.
Legitimation
Under Article 123[24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the date of
marriage. There was no retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the rights of the
legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights of a legitimate child only as of
the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married on 16
September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one year earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming
that Allan F. Poe was FPJs natural father, the effects of legitimation did not retroact to the
birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939.
Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child. As the Court
held in Ching Leng:[25]
The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein political
questions. Hence, apart from reproducing the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship, the
Code contains no precept thereon except that which refers all matters of "naturalization", as
well as those related to the "loss and reacquisition of citizenship" to "special laws." Consistently
with this policy, our Civil Code does not include therein any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28
of the Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship. (Underscoring in the original)
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley legitimated FPJ,
such legitimation did not vest retroactively any civil or political rights to FPJ.
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902
FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came to the
Philippines from Spain.[26] To benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of
1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and
resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is established that Lorenzo Pou was an
inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he is presumed to have
acquired Philippine citizenship under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of
1902.[27] Being an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899 is the
determinative fact to fall under the coverage of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine
Bill of 1902.[28]
There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine inhabitant and
resident on 11 April 1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines is not known. If
he arrived in the Philippines after 11 April 1899, then he could not benefit from the mass

naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. There is also
no evidence that Lorenzo Pou was naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11 April 1899. Thus,
there can be no presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine citizen.
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou and the alleged
father of FPJ, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the evidence adduced
there is no legal basis for claiming that Allan F. Poe is a Philippine citizen. Nevertheless, there
is no need to delve further into this issue since the Court can decide this case without
determining the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe. Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and
Allan F. Poe were Philippine citizens is not material in resolving whether FPJ is a natural-born
Philippine citizen.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and
ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean "every human
being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is
attained earlier." Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention since he is not a child as defined
in the Convention, and he was born half a century before the Convention came into existence.
FPJs citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be affected by the Convention which
entered into force only on 2 September 1990.
The Convention has the status of a municipal law[29] and its ratification by the Philippines
could not have amended the express requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born
citizens of Philippines are qualified to be President. While the Constitution apparently favors
natural-born citizens over those who are not, that is the explicit requirement of the
Constitution which neither the Executive Department nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty,
could amend. In short, the Convention cannot amend the definition in the Constitution that
natural-born citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
In any event, the Convention guarantees a child "the right to acquire a nationality,"[30] and
requires States Parties to "ensure the implementation" of this right, "in particular where the
child would otherwise be stateless."[31] Thus, as far as nationality or citizenship is concerned,
the Convention guarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be
stateless. The Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely "the
right to acquire a nationality" in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939,
he was apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth.[32] After his birth FPJ
also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino
father in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being
stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine
citizen.
The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien
mother follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known parent. The
illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the Filipino father, cannot
acquire the citizenship of the father. The Court made this definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching
Leng v. Galang,[33] which involved the illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of
Chinese descent with a Chinese woman, Sy An. The illegitimate children were later on jointly
adopted by the naturalized Filipino and his legal wife, So Buan Ty.
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial courts decision are as follows:
After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court dated May
2, 1950 granting his petition for naturalization, he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed

another petition also in this Court in Special Proc. No. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong
Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam, Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An, all
minors and admittedly the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An, a
Chinese citizen. Finding the petition for adoption proper, this Court granted the same in a
decision dated September 12, 1950, declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and
purposes the children of the adopter Ching Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all
the legal rights and obligations provided by law.
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a full
pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate children became Filipino
citizens by virtue of his naturalization, petitioner Ching Leng addressed a communication to
the respondent Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of registration
of the said minors be cancelled. (Bold underscoring supplied)
In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor child or children"
in Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,[34] as well as the meaning of children "whose parents
are citizens of the Philippines" under the Constitution. The Court categorically ruled that these
children refer to legitimate children only, and not to illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child", used in these provisions,
include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is,
for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word "children" or "child" is used
in statutes, it is generally understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the
context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the
Constitution provides that "those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines, "and "those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines," who shall elect Philippine citizenship "upon
reaching the age of majority", are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions
3 and 4), our fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46
Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful wedlock, when
the adopter, at least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children are under the parental authority
of the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse,
29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Govt of the Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v.
Republic, supra; Gallofin v. Ordoez, 70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953). Although, adoption gives "to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were
a legitimate child of the adopter", pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code, we have
already seen that the rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264, and
do not include the acquisition of the nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term "children" could not
possibly refer to those whose relation to the naturalized person is one created by legal fiction,
as, for instance, by adoption, for, otherwise, the place and time of birth of the child would be
immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at bar are illegitimate
children of appellant Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation before us, for,
by legal fiction, they are now being sought to be given the status of legitimate children of said
appellant, despite the circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their
legitimation. (Bold underscoring supplied)
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a unanimous
decision of the Court En Banc. Subsequent Court decisions, including Paa v. Chan[35] and
Morano et al. v. Vivo,[36] have cited the doctrine laid down in Ching Leng that the provision in
the 1935 Constitution stating "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" refers only to

legitimate children. When the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted, the framers did not
attempt to change the intent of this provision, even as they were presumably aware of the
Ching Leng doctrine.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The inexorable
direction of the law, both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all
forms of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children. Where the Constitution
does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children, we should not also
distinguish, especially when private rights are not involved as in questions of citizenship.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine upholds the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the
Covenant on the Rights of Children mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of
discrimination based on the status of children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in
the Constitution itself like the reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born
citizens.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father and an alien mother automatically becomes a Philippine citizen at birth. We
have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate child does not enjoy any presumption of blood
relation to the alleged father until filiation or blood relation is proved as provided by law.[37]
Article 887 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their
filiation must be duly proved." The illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the
time he establishes his blood relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is established
after the birth of the illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen
since an act is required after birth to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born Philippine citizen
since there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at
birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a Philippine citizen "from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect" his Philippine citizenship. Private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does not meet this citizenship qualification.
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to dismiss the
petitions of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo Antonio Velez on the
ground that their direct petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 4,
paragraph 7, Article VII of the Constitution are premature, there being no election contest in
this case.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has
reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present
case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St.
Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed
to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the
Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election
Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing
that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching
was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar
examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof
of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on
the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution
was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is
a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a)
the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines;
and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG

then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not
made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule
on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath
as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of
Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July
1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school
records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino
citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a
notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to ( sic) the
Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question
raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In
the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the
bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution.
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens
of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried

over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person
was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under
the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter
only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to
the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining
the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean
that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3)
year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of
age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirtyfive (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15
June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"

Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and
a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching
erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in
the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was
about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference
for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining
therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its
applicability. First, EstebanMallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling
in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not
necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already
a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court
stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos
Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs.
Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous
belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is
rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive
act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have

elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification,
voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or
his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in
this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we
consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching
the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect
Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case,
Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992
RAMON L. LABO, Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105384 July 3, 1992
ROBERTO C. ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAMON L. LABO, Jr., respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is the second time 1 that this Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship of Ramon
Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing his certificate of candidacy on March
23, 1992.
Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on other hand, also filed his certificate of candidacy
for the same office on March 25, 1992.
Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner Ortega filed on March
26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the
ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec on March 27, 1992 to
petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring him to file his Answer
within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed to respond.
On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his Answer.
On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio
City to personally deliver the summons. On May 4, 1992, the disqualification case was set for
reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo
v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.
Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was
only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to
grant the petition; respondent's (Labo's) certificate of candidacy is hereby DENIED due course
and ordered CANCELLED; the City Election Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to delete

the name of the respondent (Labo) from the list of candidates for City Mayor of Baguio City.
(Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No. 105111)
On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he
shall have raised the matter before this Court.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads:
Acting on the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification", filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9,
1992,the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying
respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from
promulgationpursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of
Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is
elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. (Rollo, p. 53; GR No. 105111;
emphasis supplied)
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of
Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. (Rollo, pp. 64-65; GR
No. 105111)
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review docketed as G.R. No.
105111 with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set
aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as
a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the
event he wins in the contested elections.
On the same date, or on May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the Comelec an urgent
motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of
candidacy.
After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec, in its resolution dated May 26, 1992,
denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (G.R. No. 105111) earlier filed by Labo of
the same nature before this Court.
On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. 105384 praying
for the implementation of the Comelec's May 9, 1992 resolution.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution
disqualifying Ramon Labo has already become final and executory.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the Court, on June 16, 1992,
Resolved to consider the case submitted for decision.
I. GR No. 105111
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen. Alleging lack of
trial on the merits as well as the lack of opportunity to be heard in Labo v. Commission on
Elections (supra), it is the submission of petitioner that he can prove his Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein it was held that in
proving expatriation, an expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the Commission on Immigration or the
Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in SPA No. 92-029
which denied him adequate opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of his case. Thus:
a) only one (1) day was set for hearing of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6,
1992 the hearing was set; c) instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned
resolution on May 9, 1992.

If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that of his counsel, records disclose
that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992 followed by a
telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992,
petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo)
the benefit of due process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this
time directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the summons.
The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner Labo
and no one else. Thus, the respondent Comelec in its resolution dated May 9, 1992 stated:
On May 4, 1992, the Acting Regional Election Registrar called this case for reception of
evidence. Surprisingly, while as of that date respondent had not yet filed his Answer, a lawyer
appeared for him.
The petitioner (Ortega) presented the certificate of candidacy of respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr.,
which contained in item 9 thereof the verified statement that respondent is a "natural-born"
Filipino citizen. To prove that respondent is not a Filipino citizen, petitioner submitted the
decision of the Supreme Court in "Ramon L. Labo, Jr., petitioner, v. Comelec, et al.," GR No.
86564, August 1, 1989, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. (sic) Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He
is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once
this decision becomes final and executory.
No evidence was adduced for the respondent as in fact he had no Answer as of the hearing.
On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting that he is a Filipino
citizen and continue to maintain and preserve his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an
Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that
"existing facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of Philippine citizenship" and
"supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling in the Labo v. Comelec case and
the respondent (Labo) now hold and enjoys Philippine citizenship.
No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing facts and supervening
events are to preclude the application of the Labo decision. (emphasis supplied)
The Commission is bound by the final declaration that respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Consequently, respondent's verified statement in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
"natural-born" Filipino citizen is a false material representation." (Rollo, pp. 45-48; GR No.
105111)
Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to shore his claim
before this Court that he has indeed reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
Instead, petitioner relies in the US case of Vance v. Terrazas (supra). Suffice it to state that
petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for reconsideration in Labo v.
Comelec (supra; Rollo, p. 375). Having been previously passed upon, the Court sees no pressing
need to re-examine the same and make a lengthy dissertation thereon.
At any rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if
there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or the
Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a
Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec (supra).
Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a
legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as
the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the
election was held.

The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable. In the first place,
Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to
wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend
the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes
notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any evidence before
the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated in Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,:
Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record,
nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. . . .
Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was
disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding
public office (Sec. 39, Local Government Code).
Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated before the respondent
Comelec. Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his
application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the Solicitor
General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270 3(Rollo, pp. 116-119; G.R. No.
105111).
To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the Special
Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for repatriation. Indeed, such
fact is even admitted petitioner. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper
authorities, a mere application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic
reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
II. GR No. 105384
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as
regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's certificate of
candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the
view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
We agree with Ortega's first proposition.
At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy had
already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having
been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in
the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.
Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy

xxx xxx xxx
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
(emphasis supplied)
A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of procedure, to wit:
Sec.
3.
Decisions
final
after
five
days.
Decisions
in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to
declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his proclamation
as Mayor of Baguio City.
To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the
Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect. (emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification
for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines."
The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage the very essence which strikes at the
very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested office, he being an alien and
not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no
moment. As we have held in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):
. . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega, i.e., whether the disqualification
of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to
be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the
Mayor of Baguio City.
We make mention of petitioner Ortega because in his petition, he alleges that:
. . . the May 11, 1992 elections were held with both herein petitioner (Roberto Ortega) and
respondent LABO having been voted for the position of Mayor and unofficial results indicate
that if the name of respondent LABO were deleted from the list of candidates, herein petitioner

(Ortega) will be entitled to be proclaimed as Mayor-elect of Baguio City. (Rollo, p. 7, GR No.

105384; emphasis supplied)
and further prays this Court "to proclaim as the Mayor-elect of Baguio City the candidate who
may have garnered the most number of votes after the exclusion of the name of respondent
candidate LABO." (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.) Implicit, therefore, is petitioner Ortega's desire to be
proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio City.
As discussed hereunder, however, the Court finds Ortega's prayer devoid of merit.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor,
the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then
qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v.
Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate
of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains
that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief
that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes was counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He
was repudiated by the electorate. . . . What matters is that in the event a candidate for an
elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for
not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position cannot assume
the vacated position. (emphasis supplied)
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason to
depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's)
candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo,
who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as
he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA
740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected
after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a noncandidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of the Court then (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino JJ., concurring)
with three dissenting (Teehankee, actingC.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another
two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio

vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court (Gutierrez, Jr.,
J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring), without any dissent, . . . . There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they did not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless.
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles,
52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At the risk of
being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to
be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government.
Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no
circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the
12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for
petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No.
105111).
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none
was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less
the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed
by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office

of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.
As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. Ortega failed to
satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the election either by a majority or mere plurality of
votes sufficient to elevate him in public office as mayor of Baguio City. Having lost in the
election for mayor, petitioner Ortega was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code, to wit:
Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and ViceMayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vicegovernor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners both being
ineligible for the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the vacancy created in
said office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 elections is hereby declared
Mayor of Baguio City after proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting
There is no need for me to discuss Mayor Ramon L. Labo, Jr.'s reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In the first case brought to us, Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989], I
dissented from the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship, he never lost
his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to Australia was null and void because he was
not qualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clear from the certification of Australia's
Embassy officials. To me, a null and void act cannot have the positive and serious effect of
stripping a Filipino of his natural-born citizenship.
Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of
that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was bigamous and void because his
Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied the knot with him. Not being
married to her, Labo could not become an Australian. Not being qualified to become an
Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act. It should not
deprive him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe that Mayor Labo gave up his
citizenship in order to acquire a stateless status.
I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of the rule that it is the
vice-mayor elect who succeeds the disqualified mayor-elect and not the losing candidate for
mayor.
I have to be consistent with my ponencia in Geronima v. Santos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985].
The Geronimo ruling is even more applicable to this case because on May 11, 1992, the day of

the elections, Labo was not yet disqualified. He was allowed to vote and to be voted for. The
COMELEC decision disqualifying him became final and executory only on May 14, 1992. In the
meantime, the citizens of Baguio had already stated who was their choice for Mayor. He had
already been elected.
I would like to repeat some observations made in my dissent in the first Labo case:
xxx xxx xxx
I agree with the Court that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such
and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has
seen fit to grant it to him. We love the Philippines; it is the land of our birth; it is the home of
our people. The emotions kindled by love of country cannot be described.
But precisely because of the inestimable value of Philippine citizenship, we should never
declare a Filipino as having lost his citizenship except upon the most compelling consideration.
Let us be realistic. There must be over two million Filipinos who are scattered all over the world
desperately trying to earn a living. They endure loneliness and separation from loved ones, bear
with racial discrimination, suffer rape and other forms of abuse, brave the perils of foreign
cultures, and put up with the failings of their own Government in looking after their welfare.
Being in foreign countries, most of them yearn for their homeland and realize what they have
lost. Only now do they appreciate what they used to take for granted.
If some of them may have been forced by circumstances to seemingly renounce their
citizenship, let us not summarily condemn them.
xxx xxx xxx
Citizenship is a political and civil right no less important than freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and other basic guarantees of the Bill
of Rights.
In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believe that the presumptions should be in favor of its
retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases involving civil liberties. We
should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip
a person of his natural born status but should accord to him every possible interpretation
consistent with the exercise of a right that was vested in him from birth.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the proclamation and
assumption of office of Baguio Mayor Ramon Labo, Jr.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting
There is no need for me to discuss Mayor Ramon L. Labo, Jr.'s reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In the first case brought to us, Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989], I
dissented from the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship, he never lost
his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to Australia was null and void because he was
not qualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clear from the certification of Australia's
Embassy officials. To me, a null and void act cannot have the positive and serious effect of
stripping a Filipino of his natural-born citizenship.
Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of
that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was bigamous and void because his
Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied the knot with him. Not being
married to her, Labo could not become an Australian. Not being qualified to become an
Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act. It should not

deprive him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe that Mayor Labo gave up his
citizenship in order to acquire a stateless status.
I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of the rule that it is the
vice-mayor elect who succeeds the disqualified mayor-elect and not the losing candidate for
mayor.
I have to be consistent with my ponencia in Geronima v. Santos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985].
The Geronimo ruling is even more applicable to this case because on May 11, 1992, the day of
the elections, Labo was not yet disqualified. He was allowed to vote and to be voted for. The
COMELEC decision disqualifying him became final and executory only on May 14, 1992. In the
meantime, the citizens of Baguio had already stated who was their choice for Mayor. He had
already been elected.
I would like to repeat some observations made in my dissent in the first Labo case:
xxx xxx xxx
I agree with the Court that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such
and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has
seen fit to grant it to him. We love the Philippines; it is the land of our birth; it is the home of
our people. The emotions kindled by love of country cannot be described.
But precisely because of the inestimable value of Philippine citizenship, we should never
declare a Filipino as having lost his citizenship except upon the most compelling consideration.
Let us be realistic. There must be over two million Filipinos who are scattered all over the world
desperately trying to earn a living. They endure loneliness and separation from loved ones, bear
with racial discrimination, suffer rape and other forms of abuse, brave the perils of foreign
cultures, and put up with the failings of their own Government in looking after their welfare.
Being in foreign countries, most of them yearn for their homeland and realize what they have
lost. Only now do they appreciate what they used to take for granted.
If some of them may have been forced by circumstances to seemingly renounce their
citizenship, let us not summarily condemn them.
xxx xxx xxx
Citizenship is a political and civil right no less important than freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and other basic guarantees of the Bill
of Rights.
In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believe that the presumptions should be in favor of its
retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases involving civil liberties. We
should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip
a person of his natural born status but should accord to him every possible interpretation
consistent with the exercise of a right that was vested in him from birth.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the proclamation and
assumption of office of Baguio Mayor Ramon Labo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-20089

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate
planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete
public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this
note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment
was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings
and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on
August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955
"to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable
settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's
residence on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted
from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956
calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant
has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant
alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was
stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being
negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid

defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his
petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause
of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event
and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10,
1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a
mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having
been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs.
Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating
the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33)
of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have
to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs.
Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept.
30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed
out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions
that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel
for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and
the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable
in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant

contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the
New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the
above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless
[and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and
Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO
PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO,
LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION
PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO,
MARGARITA
PERIDO,
ROLANDO
SALDE
and
EDUARDO
SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA

PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO,

TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No.
37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil
Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife
was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After
Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio,
Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in
1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her
deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino,
Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is
also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but
survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio
and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido,
Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only
child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio
Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts
about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the
children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein
among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by
the defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises
and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five
children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no
successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the
foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration
of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots
involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio
Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No.
458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:t.hqw

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring the
following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio
Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased;
great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson:
George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the
following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia
Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased;
grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all
lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of
Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to
Felix Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided
and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age,
married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64
to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to
Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia
Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same should
be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo
Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five
children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age,
widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but
he is already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to
Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to
Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven children, the same should be
divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz;
1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of
age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married
to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one
child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria
Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes
to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares
in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which
should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8)
equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or
11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by the children of each child now
deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his
heirs to be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the
plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with
respect to the counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, for equity
and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in
declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido,
were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in
declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part,
807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that

said lots were the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed
it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted
he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments
in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first
three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last
two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the
first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by
petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on
the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony
of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show
that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding
conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had
no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him
in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show
that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and
insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are
married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as
in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the
illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee 1 this Court explained the rationale
behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of
marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the
appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora
Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that
Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it
because "during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from
(their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the
ceremony.

In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471,
506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In
disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership
of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:t.hqw
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by
the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there
is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n.,
p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido
which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be
divided accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots
were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to
establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The
question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of
Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining
the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:t.hqw
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769
issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be
disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the
registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the
law presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal
(Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60
Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse in
whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It
appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership
had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the
same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that
6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife,
Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the
proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first
marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation
of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding
on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence
introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the
circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the
whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish
the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the
other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established. 2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.1wph1.t

Muoz Palma, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner's appeal from an
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to
petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and
petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the
time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights
between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on
private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him;
that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a
one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer,
and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of
whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner
gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children
compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends;
that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal
partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large obligations with banks,
credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private respondent's consent;

that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for
powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. 1
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed
that he and private respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years of their
marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they
began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity
due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the "extreme
animosities " between them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in
1984; that it is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious
affair with another man; that petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television
station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in media and the
entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business
and was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in
exclusive golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the
conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage
counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the
spouses, and Atty. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondent's counsel. Private respondent likewise
submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husband's
relationship with other women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of
drugs; and copies of a prior a church annulment decree. 2 The parties' marriage was clerically
annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986. 3
During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his
Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner's
evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to
return on the first week of June. 4 The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June
8, 1990. 5
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court
declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent.
The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and
Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let
herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where
the marriage was contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is
annulled.

The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby
awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment
as provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines. 6
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken
from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties." 7 Petitioner
opposed the motion on October 17, 1990. 8
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial
court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991. 9
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition
for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the order of the trial court.10
Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the
circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof.
When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a
Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set
aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or
cause of action. 11 If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. 12
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had
already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary
period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for
violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing
to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to
present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent.
Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for
medical and/or rehabilitation reason." 13 In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he
attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug
Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for
treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. 14 The
records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of
this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the
country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken
therefrom. 15

The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him
to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is
binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face. 16
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of
petitioner's confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the
scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally
or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the
case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial
court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his
right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the record show, petitioner,
through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the
petition, cross-examined private respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to
private respondent's motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. 17
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may
be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or appeal from
an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of
this petition. 18 Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost
thru inexcusable negligence. 19
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code
which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting
officer should intervene for the state because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard
declaration of annulment of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to appear
at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance. 20
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. 21

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. 22 Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties.23 The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. 24 Our Constitution is
committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 25 Our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid
and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged
by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several
pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that
every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by
collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of
the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to
the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses, particularly Dr.
Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if
he were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he was not psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten
years, he and private respondent lived together with their children as one normal and happy
family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that
his work as owner and operator of a radio and television corporation places him in the public
eye and makes him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These
facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of
petitioner's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on
us. 26 Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation
of the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly
and manifestly erroneous. 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1wphi1.nt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the
Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost
25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could
solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the

marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with
the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was
because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by
her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application
for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage
license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May
2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no
record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia
to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1wphi1.nt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite

laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced
the status of married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. InPeople vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1wphi1.nt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does
not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be
bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this
Court as a disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in
the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities
of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person.
The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his
wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife
have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be
solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and
that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent
judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the
latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding
ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by

Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before
him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly
married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and
that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof
of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . .
marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court,
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of
the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article
3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them
to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a sixmonth suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a

bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent
judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect
in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 99-1211
January 28, 2000
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,
vs.
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and
Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso
charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and
of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of
the Local Registrar alleging
a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence of J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; . . .
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal
sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any
reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City
Civil Registrar to inquire my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my
marriage was not registered; . . .
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the
Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as:
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office of the
Local Civil Registrar.
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized
by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta.
Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing circumstances:
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his
station in Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment, complainant
Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants
said she must leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as
scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be
expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair
of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang
Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to
get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and
their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the
parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would
complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of
marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage,
which respondent found all in order.
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized,
deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that
by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too
expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate
and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the
following circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent left the
three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies
were held, intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth
(sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating to the
said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files, all the
three last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena . . . .
Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put
the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was
too late to contract complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's claim.
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the country, a
reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this dispute.
If we believe the claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr.
Yman, abandoned her without any reason . . . but that said husband admitted "he had another
girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" . . . it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage
contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the public
interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing documents in some
amicable way during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of
Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for
possible registration of reconstituted copies of said documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998
found that respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he
be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or
future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out that:
As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to
solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,
Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code,
wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other
than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed to register
the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting
parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate
and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
civil register of the place where the marriage was solemnized. . . . (emphasis ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed nonfeasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic
social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law.
Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a
holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious in handling official
documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by
Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being
devoid of proof.
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report
of the OCA well-taken.
Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus:
"[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence.
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty
of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about a condition that
would shake its foundation and untimely lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among
others, that
Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or viceconsul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the

point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (Emphasis ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote
places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fianc Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers
or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was
prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official
attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in
solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was
leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated
for citizens to get married."
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide
by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. 2 A judge
is not only bound by oath to apply the law; 3 he must also be conscientious and thorough in
doing so.4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more
circumspect in the performance of their duties.5
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier proclivity
on its significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of
engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve
so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial
doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made
him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as a
solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
authority or jurisdiction of his court.6 Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized
to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate court
justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.7
Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. MargaritaTarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the City of Calbayog.8
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its
solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the

event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in
no uncertain terms that
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the
contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those
mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was
less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra
care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact.
There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. 9 However, the records show
that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court reiterates
that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to
bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to
devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one
directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.11
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
October 2, 2001
GARCIA,
a.k.a.
GRACE
J.

G.R. No. 138322

GRACE
J.
GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law on evidence.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner a Filipina and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage andits subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The
court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted
their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not
on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged
lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial
union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53
of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the
marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party

pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx
xxx
xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the

protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may
be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national

law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that
the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity
of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry
on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A"
Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (FilipinoAustralian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha
D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of
the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended
Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick
A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso
facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one
in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show

respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143286
April 14, 2004
PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision dated
31 January 2000 as well as its Resolution dated 25 April 2000 in CA-G.R. No. CV-46716. The
assailed Decision dismissed petitioners appeal of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 55, Mandaue City ("trial court").
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Napisa Retuya ("Eusebia") filed a complaint before the trial court
against her husband Nicolas Retuya ("Nicolas"), Pacita Villanueva ("Pacita"), and Nicolas son
with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva ("Procopio"). Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas
and Pacita of several properties listed in paragraph 2 of the complaint ("subject properties"),
claiming the subject properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Eusebia also prayed
for accounting, damages and the delivery of rent and other income from the subject properties.
Antecedent Facts
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been
married to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children,
namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo,
Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu, more particularly described as follows:
1. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24951;
2. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24952;
3. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24953;
4. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24954;
5. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24956;
6. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24957;

7. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24958;
8. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01042;
9. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01043;
10. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01046;
11. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01041;
12. A parcel of land located at Nawanao-Subangdaku, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No.
01488;
13. A parcel of land located at Baklid, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 00492;
14. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01044;
15. A residential house located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01050;
16. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01048;
17. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01051;
18. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01047;
19. A parcel of land located at Banilad, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 02381;
20. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01049;
21. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01045;
22. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01450 (in the name
of Pacita Villanueva).
Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which
he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of
hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income from coconuts and the other
lands/houses are leased to the following:
a) Mandaue Food Products Company for Lot 121-F, Lot 121-G and Lot 121-H under TCT No.
11300 at an annual rental of P10,800.00;
b) Barben Wood Industries, Inc. for Lot 148 covered by TCT No. l731 for an annual rental
ofP21,600.00;
c) Metaphil, Inc. parcel of land consisting of 2,790.51 sq. meters at the rate of P2,700.00
annually for the first five (5) years, and P3,240.00 for the second years;
d) Benedicto Development Corp. for a portion of Lot 148 covered by TCT No. 1731 for a period
of 20 years at an annual rate of P3,500.00 renewable for another 20 years after April 1, 1995 at
an annual rate of P4,000.00;
e) Benedicto Development Corporation for a portion of Lot No. 148 covered by Certificate of
Title No. 1731 over an area of 6,000 sq. meters for an annual rental of P9,500.00 for a period of
2 years from June 1, 1982;
f) Visayan Timber and Machinery Corp. over a parcel of land at Nawanaw, Mandaue City, for a
period of 2 years from June 1, 1987 and renewable for another 12 years at an annual income
ofP4,000.00;
g) House lessees listed in Exhibit "13" with total monthly rentals of P1,975.00 a month for the
24 lessees or P24,700.00 annually. (Exhs. "7" to "13")
In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.
Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties.
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has
no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they
have to raise him up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her
father because they visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya

suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is defendant Procopio
Villanueva, one of Nicolas illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these
properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their
father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that
their father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied
that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no
settlement was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written
demands were made by plaintiff, through her counsel, to the defendants, including the
illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached by the parties.
Further, plaintiffs witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of land covered by tax
declaration marked Exhibit "T" was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol
for at the time of purchase of the property, defendant Pacita Villanueva had no means of
livelihood (TSN, p. 6).
The trial court rendered its Decision on 16 February 1994 in favor of Eusebia. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya and against defendants Procopio Villanueva, Nicolas Retuya
and Pacita Villanueva:
1. Declaring the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the amended complaint as conjugal
properties of the spouses plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and the defendant Nicolas Retuya;
2. Ordering the transfer of the sole administration of conjugal properties of the spouses
Eusebia Retuya and Nicolas Retuya in accordance with Art. 124 of the Family Code to the
plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya;
3. Ordering defendant Procopio Villanueva to account and turnover all proceeds or rentals or
income of the conjugal properties from January 27, 1985 when he took over as administrator
thereof and until he shall have ceased administering the same in accordance with the
judgment of this Court;
4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to reconvey the parcel of land situated at Tipolo,
Mandaue City now in the name of defendant Pacita Villanueva under tax dec. No. 01450 and
transfer the same into the names of the conjugal partners Eusebia N. Retuya and Nicolas
Retuya;
5. Ordering the City Assessors Office of Mandaue City to cancel tax declaration No. 01450 in
the name of Pacita Villanueva and direct the issuance of a new title and tax declaration in the
names of Eusebia Napisa Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
6. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to reconvey that certain building of strong
materials located at Tipolo, Mandaue City under tax dec. No. 01450 into the names of Eusebia
Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
7. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the sum of P5,000.00 plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Thereafter, Eusebias heirs substituted her pursuant to the resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 7 April 1997. The Court of Appeals eventually upheld the Decision of
the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees, ruling in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 16, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the modification that
the award of attorneys fees of P50,000.00 is deleted.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 23 February 2000 which the Court of Appeals
denied in a Resolution dated 11 May 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court applied Article 116 of the Family Code, which reads:
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal
unless the contrary is proved.
The trial court ruled that the documents and other evidence Eusebia presented constitute
"solid evidence" which proved that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage
with Nicolas. This made the presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject properties.
Thus, the trial court ruled that Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are conjugal in
nature. On the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to meet the standard of
proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal properties of
Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita presented no "factual solidity" to support her claim
that she bought Lot No. 1522 exclusively with her own money.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the trial court. The appellate court found
that Pacita failed to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that the
subject properties are conjugal. The appellate court dismissed Pacitas defense of prescription
and laches since she failed to have the issue included in the pre-trial order after raising it in
her answer with her co-petitioners.
The Issues
Petitioners Nicolas, Pacita and Procopio contend that both the trial and appellate courts erred
in ruling in favor of Eusebia. They seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DECLARATION OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROPERTIES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE COMPLAINT ARE
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF NICOLAS RETUYA AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ALTHOUGH THIS
WAS NOT ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION IN EUSEBIAS COMPLAINT.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION THAT
PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE OF NICOLAS
RETUYA AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ARE CONJUGAL.
3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING INSTEAD THE
PRESUMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE IN FAVOR OF CO-OWNERSHIP
BETWEEN NICOLAS RETUYA AND PACITA VILLANUEVA.
4. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE OVER LOT NO. 152 IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.3
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
First Issue: On the Alleged Failure
To Claim that the Properties are Conjugal
Petitioners contention that Eusebias complaint failed to state that the subject properties are
conjugal is absolutely without basis. A cursory reading of the complaint readily shows that the
complaint maintains that the subject properties are conjugal.4 The first sentence of the second
paragraph of the complaint states:

2. The plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and defendant Nicolas Retuya are husband and wife
and conjugal owners of real properties and all improvements thereon situated in Mandaue
City and Consolacion, Cebu more particularly described as follows: (Emphasis added)
The same claim is restated and repleaded throughout the complaint. Petitioners should know
better than to clutter their appeal with useless arguments such as this.
The other issues petitioners raise contest in essence the finding that the subject properties are
conjugal in nature. Apart from this, the only other issue raised is whether prescription or
laches bars Eusebias complaint. We shall resolve first the issue of prescription and laches.
Second Issue: Prescription and Laches
We agree with the Court of Appeals observation that while petitioners did raise the issue of
prescription and laches in their Answer,5 they failed to have the same included in the pre-trial
order for consideration during the trial. Now, petitioners wish to raise the issue on appeal by
relying on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
Petitioners are mistaken.
The determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other
questions, whether during trial or on appeal.6 Section 1 of Rule 9 covers situations where a
defense or objection is not raised in a motion to dismiss or an answer. What we have before us
is the exact opposite. Here, petitioners in fact raised in their answer the defense of prescription
and laches. However, despite raising the defense of prescription and laches in their answer,
petitioners failed to include this defense among the issues for consideration during the trial.
The non-inclusion of this defense in the pre-trial order barred its consideration during the
trial. Clearly, Section 1 of Rule 9 does not apply to the present case.
Pre-trial is primarily intended to insure that the parties properly raise all issues necessary to
dispose of a case.7The parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend to raise
during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. 8 Although a pre-trial
order is not meant to catalogue each issue that the parties may take up during the trial, issues
not included in the pre-trial order may be considered only if they are impliedly included in the
issues raised or inferable from the issues raised by necessary implication. 9 The basis of the
rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial
because they themselves agreed to the same.10
Petitioners argue that in past instances we have reviewed matters raised for the first time
during appeal. True, but we have done so only by way of exception involving clearly meritorious
situations.11 This case does not fall under any of those exceptions. The fact that the case
proceeded to trial, with the petitioners actively participating without raising the necessary
objection, all the more requires that they be bound by the stipulations they made at the pretrial.12 Petitioners were well aware that they raised the defense of prescription and laches since
they included it in their answer. However, for reasons of their own, they did not include this
defense in the pre-trial.
Able counsels represented both parties. We see no claim that either counsel erred or was
negligent. This could only mean that petitioners counsel chose to waive, or did not consider
important, the defense of prescription and laches. Petitioners are bound by their counsels
choice. Other than arguing that it is allowable to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, we

have no explanation from petitioners why they suddenly decided to change their mind. Parties
are not allowed to flip-flop. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate
parties who choose to go to trial haphazardly. Moreover, it would be grossly unfair to allow
petitioners the luxury of changing their mind to the detriment of private respondents at this
late stage. To put it simply, since petitioners did not raise the defense of prescription and laches
during the trial, they cannot now raise this defense for the first time on appeal.13
Third Issue: Whether the Subject Properties Are Conjugal
We proceed to the crux of this petition.
We reiterate the basic rule that a petition for review should only cover questions of
law.14 Questions of fact are not reviewable. The exceptions apply only in the presence of
extremely meritorious circumstances.15 None exists in this case. We note with disfavor that
most of the issues raised in this petition are factual. We caution the petitioners that this
practice of deluging the Court with factual issues in defiance of well-settled rule, in the hope of
having them reviewed, is unacceptable.
The only issue proper for resolution is the question of whether the subject properties are
conjugal. Petitioners claim that the subject properties16 are exclusive properties of Nicolas
except for Lot No. 152, which they claim is Pacitas exclusive property. This issue is easily
resolved. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family
Code.17 Article 10518 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. 19 The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.20This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
marriage before they are presumed conjugal. 21 Petitioners argue that Eusebia failed to prove
this pre-requisite. We disagree.
The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject
properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. 22 The tax
declarations23 covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias
witnesses, establish this fact. We give due deference to factual findings of trial
courts,24 especially when affirmed by the appellate court. A reversal of this finding can only
occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. Petitioners in the
present case have not.
Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer came from petitioners
themselves. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957.25 The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these
are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the
subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists "unless the
contrary is proved," stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of
proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the
evidence required must be clear and convincing.26 Petitioners failed to meet this standard.

Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer certificate of title and the tax
declaration of Lot No. 152 are all in the name of Pacita. Petitioners maintain that this can only
mean that Pacita is the real owner of Lot No. 152. We disagree. The totality of the evidence
reveals that this was merely just one of the several schemes Nicolas employed to deprive
Eusebia of their conjugal property. Ironically, petitioners themselves submitted in evidence a
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, in Civil Case No. R960227 involving the acquisition of Lot No. 152.
The decision in Civil Case No. R-9602 stated that Tranquiliana Marababol Remulta testified
that the one who offered to buy the lot from her was none other than Nicolas
Retuya.28 Tranquiliana narrated that at first she refused to sign the deed of sale because the
buyer placed in the deed was Pacita and not Nicolas, her understanding being that the buyer
was Nicolas. We find that the trial court in the present case correctly took into consideration
the decision in Civil Case No. R-9602.29 Considering that the decision in Civil Case No. R-9602
has become final and executory, its findings of fact involving the sale of Lot No. 152 to Nicolas
and Pacita are conclusive and binding on petitioners who introduced in evidence the decision.
Petitioners also point out that all the other tax declarations presented before the trial court are
in the name of Nicolas alone. Petitioners argue that this serves as proof of Nicolas exclusive
ownership of these properties. Petitioners are mistaken. The tax declarations are not sufficient
proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All property acquired
by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the property is registered, is
presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.30 The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact
that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only.31 Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the presumption remains
even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."
In some of the documents that petitioners presented, Nicolas misrepresented his civil status by
claiming that he was single. Petitioners point to this as proof of Nicolas desire to exclude
Eusebia from the properties covered by the documents. 32 Petitioners further claim that this
supports their stand that the subject properties are not conjugal. This argument is baseless.
Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one of the
spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of conjugal
property. The clear intent of Nicolas in placing his status as single is to exclude Eusebia from
her lawful share in the conjugal property. The law does not allow this.
Petitioners point out that Pacita had the means to buy Lot No. 152. Even if Pacita had the
financial capacity, this does not prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money. To
rebut the presumption that Lot No. 152 is conjugal, petitioners must prove that Pacita used her
own money to pay for Lot No. 152. Petitioners failed to prove this.
Petitioners further argue that since Nicolas and Pacita were already cohabiting when Lot No.
152 was acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal property of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Petitioners keep belaboring this point in their petition and memorandum.
Petitioners argument is flawed.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage.33 Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to
an act that is both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and
Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage
of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living
with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and
Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed

conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject properties was
acquired outside or beyond this period.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code 34 is misplaced. A reading of
Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the
live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their
contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of
their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is
proven first. Simply put, proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise
there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed to show proof
of actual contribution by Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed to
prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that she actually contributed her
own money to acquire it.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January
2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 46716 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
LEONCIA
BALOGBOG
and
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
BALOGBOG, respondents.

GAUDIOSO
RAMONITO

BALOGBOG, petitioners,

BALOGBOG

and

GENEROSO

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the
deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio
Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an
older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the
estate of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother
Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias,
Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by
their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality
of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband
and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he
knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as
"balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of
Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and
Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private respondents, who
testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him,
the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu
and that he knew this because he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to
accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the
poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his
residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners'
claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.)
Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also
made the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testified that after the
wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but
it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot
three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the
age of six. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common
law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.
Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P)
that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina,
another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the
birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been
lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there
was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost
or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified 5 that Gavino died
single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate
children and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. She
obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that
office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared
by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6
Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a
certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally
married. He added, however, that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the
war, although he did not know the names of the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated
that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case
filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private
respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the

finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of
the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court
erred in not giving weight to the certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the
Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was
their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the
parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome
the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9 Hence, this petition.
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at
the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under
the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the
Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are
questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous
possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the
registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did
not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after
the
extension
of
that
code
to
this
country. 10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in
the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with
the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they
related to vested rights, 11 and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married. 12 This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 13 In
this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect
that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the
production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias.
Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage
of private respondents' parents.
This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, 14 the defendants, who questioned the
marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no
record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses
was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered
primary evidence of marriage, 15 the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place.
Other
evidence
may
be
presented
to
prove
marriage. 16 Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and
Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that
their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private

respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate
children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed
because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence
of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. 17 An
exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without
an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of
the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated
in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: 18
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28)Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
(U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs.
Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to
support their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the
status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such
status shall be proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or
by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated
in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession
of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession
by private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for
the years 1928-1929 is available.
What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private
respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in
the preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of
that municipality for the year 1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or
destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot
three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private
respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private
respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the
police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:
Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in
favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of
Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of inquiring into a
complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso
testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his nephew. Excerpts from the
transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4")
read:
Atty. Kiamco May it please this investigative body.
Q. Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?
A. Yes I know.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. I know because he is my nephew.
Q. Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you mean to say that you are close to him?
A. Yes. We are close.
Q. Why do you say you are close?
A. We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also leaving (sic) in
the same house in Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of
P300.00, when I return to Balamban, Cebu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?
A. Because he is the son of my elder brother.
This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case.
It is considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly,
Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not
even testify during the trial. Such silence can only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew
of Gaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:+.wph!1
Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court, Fourteenth Judicial District,
Cebu-Bohol (now Regional Trial Court), finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Susana Taborada-Borromeo, in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana
Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting
frantically for help because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told the
child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango plantation.
Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to
Susana's hut. The windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through
the bamboo slats at the wall where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead
beside her one-month old child who was crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still
holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officer Fernando C.
Abella and three policemen arrived. The peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the
door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open the door. When he
did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her
abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side.
When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble incoherent words.
Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted his necropsy report (Exhibits "A" & "B")
which states that the cause of death was "stab wounds, multiple chest, abdomen, left
supraclavicular region and left shoulder." There were five (5) incised wounds and six (6) stab
wounds on the deceased.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in holding as it did that
appellant and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married in a church
wedding ceremony, when the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage
contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, the accused could only be liable for
homicide; (2) in failing to appreciate in favor of appellant the mitigating circumstances of
provocation or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to
offset the same; and, (3) in convicting appellant of the crime of parricide and in imposing upon
him the penultimate penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial court's finding to the effect that he killed
Susana Taborada (the deceased) without legal justification" The main issue raised by him is
that he and Susana were not legally married and therefore the crime committed is not
parricide, but homicide.
Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of marriage in order to lessen
or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted
that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife. Hereunder is his testimony on this point:
Q Please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married, farmer, resident of Putingbato, Babag Cebu City.
The COURT:
Q You say you are married, who is your wife?
A Susana Taborada.
Q When did you get married with Susana Taborada?
A I forgot.
Q Where did you get married?
A Near the RCPI station in Babag.
Q There is a church there?
A There is a chapel.
Q Were you married by a priest or a minister?
A By a priest.
Q Who is this priest?
A Father Binghay of Guadalupe.
Q Do you have any children with Susana Taborada?
A We have one.
Q How old is the child?
A I already forgot, I have been here for quite a long time already. (pp. 4-5, tsn., December 12,
1981 hearing)
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such
marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA 525).
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco,
22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The
law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not
bastardy. There is the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are
married to each other. The reason for this presumption of marriage is well stated in Perido vs.
Perido, 63 SCRA 97, thus: t.hqw
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legal
matrimony. ...
And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not
invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are
present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said
requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).
Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that the penalty for parricide is
reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246, Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, provides that where the law prescribed a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstances, with no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus,
assuming the presence of the mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty is
still reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to P30,000.00. With costs.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent,
a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into
question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in
the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse

should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a

divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID
NIAL,
ARCHIE
NIAL
&
PEPITO
NIAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient"
to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and
void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as

husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a
legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil
Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with

each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment
of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence
of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights

upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40
of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of
a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a
prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent
Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void
and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to
marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a
fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered
in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court
to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by
a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo
Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special
application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez
is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient"
to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and
void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a
legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same

footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil
Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment

of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence
of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40
of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of
a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge,
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary
issue in this petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who
opposes respondent Isabel's petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's
estate by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage,
three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo
all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case 1 against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In
retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) 2 a complaint for
legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the
custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. 3 The suit was docketed as
civil case number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel CojuangcoSuntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties .
It being admitted by the parties and shown by the record that the question of the case and
custody of the three children have been the subject of another case between the same parties
in another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in
this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third party
defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept
the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded said sum of
P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P5.000.00.
SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis supplied).
As basis thereof, the CFI said:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial
Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was
already out of the hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified
as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist
(sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958,
years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic) existing at
the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason.
The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist
handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication
of schizophernia (sic). 5 (Emphasis supplied).
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died
on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will. 6
Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 7 a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
which case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged
among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that
she be appointed as administratrix of the estate. 8
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse
of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent
has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner,
that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for

more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to
him. 9
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to
dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be
appointed as administratrix of the decedent's estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that
under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of
representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
respondent Isabel's father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and
thus, opened succession by representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the
declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null
and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her
paternal grandmother the decedent. 10 On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the
assailed order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 11 When his motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998, 12 petitioner, as mentioned
above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to
dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is
appropriate in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the
motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents "null and void" must be upheld; and (d) said decision
had long become final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioner's motion to dismiss was alte
having been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer
in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically
deny respondent Isabel's allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
the decedent's son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of
the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict
between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment
of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of the marriage or nullifies it. It does not,
after hearing declare a marriage "voidable" otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly,
that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is
"voidable."
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding. 13 There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to
prosper. 14
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted
thereunder, to wit:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent laws
applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering
the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At
the outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called

upon to assert a cause of action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a
vital interest in the maintenance of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but
also because if no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
xxx xxx xxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file and
maintain this special proceedings, that in the case bench, the body of the decision determines
the nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of nullity.
The oppositor's contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex "A" Motion)
prevails over the body thereof is not without any qualification. It holds true only when the
dispositive portion of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given
effect without need of interpretation or construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be referred to
for purposes of construing the judgment (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and
Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive portion must find support
from the decision'sratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex "A" of
oppositor's motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was
annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are
considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the
decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.). 15
The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate." The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal
and special proceedings. 16 The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof.
Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed "within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint." Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing
of petitioner's opposition 17 which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after
respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence
and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only
improper but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence
on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal
precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the
dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the
CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel's
parents is clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to
the enactment of the Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has
categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and
that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the
children born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained.
Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 18 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while
Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. 19

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property
relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of
such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights
and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 20irrespective of whether or
not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from
being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the
second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations
as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal
fiction. 21 (Emphasis supplied).
Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of
the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences
which the marital union produced during its continuance." 22
Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and
implications, Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with 23whereas null and void is something that does not
exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later
ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a
marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already exists from the very
beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that it is the dispositive portion of the
decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents
was void or voidable. Such argument springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the
decision and its dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as
to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement
in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing, 24 the same is not
without a qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final
decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need
of interpretation or construction-which usually is "the case where the order or decision in
question is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts
and the law on which the judgment is based." 25
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of
the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give
effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. de los Angeles 26 the
Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to

prevail." This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to
its judgments.
. . .The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to bring
all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation
and so as to give effect to every word and part if possible, and to effectuate the intention and
purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863864) [Emphasis supplied].
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier
shows that the marriage is voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified
as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict
(sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958,
years after plaintiff's mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason.
The charges in this very handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in
reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). 27
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent
Isabel's parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal
consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the
second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just
above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting
aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking
appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including respondent
Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation the estate of their grandmother
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their
grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether
the Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the
successional rights of the personalities involved over the decedent's estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to "all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy
that extreme degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of
a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The
adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as
the directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body
of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely
no room for dispute, debate or interpretation. 28

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISIMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127263
April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44144, which affirmedthe decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
denying the petition3 for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy
and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November
15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on
July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware
business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son
Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988,
and from then on, lived with his father.7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No.
7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds
that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for
more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and
approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina
testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring
him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and
continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her
son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son,
and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband
started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was

dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a
result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a
certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of
property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to
the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological
incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the
following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing
to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act
only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her
husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9,
1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not
constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision 17 of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of
evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of
law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their
marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems
surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage.
And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with
law and the evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated November 21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED
THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON
NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO
MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT
THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO
WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS
APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not
ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that
certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason
for their existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires,
exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to
cavil. 25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the
marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent
conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and
what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was
attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date of
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15,
1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of
petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and

private respondent's answer admitting it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as
Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In
addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner
did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between
the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil
Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among
those enumerated in Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80
of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the
birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that
these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents
are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer
detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21,
1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No.
44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever
issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage
was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states
that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she
was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only
for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave
birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig,
Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were
allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage
license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in
order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her
signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that
the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It
declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled
that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in
their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the
respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void,
respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the
subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage voidab initio. 5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to
find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties
is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an
official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182
to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is,
in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate
her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered
that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally nonexistent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held
against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings
and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to
answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence
on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between
the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact
that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig,
may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject
of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased

and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated
March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose
it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of
the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void
ab initio. 14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that
such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common
by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone
as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his
legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:

... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio
as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in
the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why
in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their
existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code,
clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously
married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree
declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage
is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or
invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case
for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or
her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the
rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial
v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107,
and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.
Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in
Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in
fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselitas psychological
incapacity.
The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family
Code. 1 Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for annulment of
marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition.
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7
January 1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same
became manifest only thereafter." 2 Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita
moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of
Particulars, Edwin specified that
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor
of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack
of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the "assertion (in
the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not
an averment of ultimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion
may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the
trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive
pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we referred her
petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition thus
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salitas alleged psychological
incapacity in his bill of particulars . . .
In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules requirement that a
complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiffs cause of action. To require
more details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salitas particular conduct or behavior with

the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person indicating her alleged
psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. To obtain
evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself of the different modes of discovery provided by the
Rules of Court
(Rules 24 to 28).
Whether Espinosas averments in his bill of particulars constitute psychological incapacity in
the contemplation of the Family Code is a question that may be resolved in a motion to dismiss
or after trial on the merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. And certainly, that
matter cannot be resolved in the present petition. 5
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita questioning the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying due course to her petition.
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not
an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly
was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to
her husbands cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her
particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person
does not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot
adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars
constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He
defines ultimate facts as
. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right
and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The
term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate facts upon the
existence of which the entire cause of action rests. 6
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of
mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary
fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible
facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial
will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts . . . 7
Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and evidentiary matters need not
be stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only
to such operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief
against the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of evidence, statements of
law, inferences and arguments need not be stated." 8
In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein
respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to
properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes
of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will
support." 10 As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of
particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already
states a sufficient cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters

which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be
obtained by other means. 12
We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by private
respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private
respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has
already been adequately apprised of private respondents cause of action against her thus
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts
so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose
intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner)
was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his time
and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed
be asking for information on evidentiary facts facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate
facts. 13 For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a
motion for bill of particulars. 14
We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic 15 where we said
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations,
dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts
as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in
nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and
definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of
the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling involves
alleged "misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nations wealth, extortion,
blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power." The respondents therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant
case, on the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not
unfeeling, to document each and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the
complaining spouse will have to prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.
Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the
annulment proceeding which have already been delayed for more than two years now, even
before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should
be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the
petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still
have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.
A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to define or limit the scope of
the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so, the actual
controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this
juncture would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that petitioner
in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it

to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family code, explains
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 17
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the
questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the
Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On
20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did
not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start

a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989,
Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried
to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint
and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully,
by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91,
which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however,
provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one
is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that

lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that
lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would
make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's
marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity,
why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the
reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon
Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground
for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there
are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said
that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are
lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not
know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might
not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for
voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the
consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added
that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in
the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it
is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals

and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and
that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it
should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the
defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has
been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action
for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have
been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that
he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign
that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there
are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not
apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for
void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge
Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
"psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after
the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage,
one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand,
Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser
in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9,
1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is
why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express
it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of
the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into
the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it
is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law,
are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically
annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at
least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psychosexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .
(cf.SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of
the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt,
Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly,
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to
be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family

Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility
of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded
that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in
Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia.
But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into
holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and

cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that
petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision
in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize
the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by
couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did
and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her
whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted
efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating
her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the
former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground
rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an
incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on
insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and
wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual
love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have
regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no
intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact,
her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and
neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these
indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is
it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife,

the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce
but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential
marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage
declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in
behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee
were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation,
legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years
of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name.
Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they
agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute
divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to
whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not
pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an
action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action

for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees
now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity
as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In
fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void
on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear
grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses
to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the
inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity.
Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing
at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is
open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in
interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals

which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our
society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken
as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality
that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of
this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union
through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment
as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the
wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have
implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct
from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia.
But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into
holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that
petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision
in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize
the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by
couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did
and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her
whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted
efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating
her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the
former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground
rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an
incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on
insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and
wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual
love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have
regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no
intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact,
her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and
neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these
indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is
it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife,
the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce
but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential
marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage
declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in
behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee
were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation,
legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for

dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years
of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name.
Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they
agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute
divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to
whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not
pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an
action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action
for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees
now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity
as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In
fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void
on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear

grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses
to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the
inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity.
Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing
at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is
open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in
interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our
society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken
as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality
that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of
this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union
through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment
as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the
wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have
implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct
from the other.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975
February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CAG.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in
Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20
years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978;
and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982. 3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20,
1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of
the house of their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then
disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees
with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda
was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her
children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, 6 and that he
escaped from jail on October 22, 1985. 7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was
issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by
publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and
17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter,
on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only
witness.

Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in
Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never
stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now,
and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating
prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would
be deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and
found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the
case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated
December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision 12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and
Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the
marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7
September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of
Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the
ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991
to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on
the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring
Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated
August 21, 1991 as follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated
December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect
that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is
abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits,
stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children
since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown.
He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the
failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and
enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are
uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became
manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of
marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family
members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General,
these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the
sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New
Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.

WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error
that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG
NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER,
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 15 affirming the decision of the trial
court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the
duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the
right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic)
destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is
not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her
Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by
preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the
marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband
suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a
habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each
case must be judged, not on the basis ofa priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the

decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code20as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code21 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The SolicitorGeneral shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the
above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which
requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified
and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a

fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested
was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and
Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence
presented. We further explained therein that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions

to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many
judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the
present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court
in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially,
the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's
best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding
that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our
civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright

"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of

"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain,
that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife
in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual
millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute
so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due
to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice
of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
excludemental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations
attendant
to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity

becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for
nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former
being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity
into the Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab
initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to
law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant'
of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)

required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This
line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did
not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach
to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself
had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological
problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give
valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . .
is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual
acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one

spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other
spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has
a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping
with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference
and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to
declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and

protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a

spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia,
and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the
Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand

in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to
be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility
of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of
psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its
overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put
it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987
Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that

constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a

different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm
than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency
or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain,
that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife
in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual
millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute
so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due
to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice
of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
excludemental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for
nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former
being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity
into the Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab
initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to
law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant'
of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This
line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did
not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach
to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself
had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological
problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give
valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the

ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . .
is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual
acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other
spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has
a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping
with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference
and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to
declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia,
and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the
Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to
be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility
of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of
psychological
4
incapacity.

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its
overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put
it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987
Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm
than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency
or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498
May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent
Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan
and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his
given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to
effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996.
In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed
to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a
motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial
court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the
trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. QuinteroHamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the
trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as
husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the
Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents
mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28,
1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the
celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and
take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any
support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited
the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all
efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer
in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping
them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were
Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to
comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them
did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General,

along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The SolicitorGeneral shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological
incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his
family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him
several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to
see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to
some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not
physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person
from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here
because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated
on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that
the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her
marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997
of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner's appeal from an
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to
petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and
petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the
time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights
between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on
private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him;
that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a
one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer,
and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of
whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner
gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children
compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends;
that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal
partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large obligations with banks,
credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private respondent's consent;
that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for
powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. 1
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed
that he and private respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years of their
marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they

began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity
due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the "extreme
animosities " between them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in
1984; that it is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious
affair with another man; that petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television
station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in media and the
entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business
and was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in
exclusive golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the
conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage
counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the
spouses, and Atty. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondent's counsel. Private respondent likewise
submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husband's
relationship with other women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of
drugs; and copies of a prior a church annulment decree. 2 The parties' marriage was clerically
annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986. 3
During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his
Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner's
evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to
return on the first week of June. 4 The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June
8, 1990. 5
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court
declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent.
The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and
Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let
herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where
the marriage was contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is
annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby
awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment
as provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines. 6
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken
from the decision.

On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties." 7 Petitioner
opposed the motion on October 17, 1990. 8
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial
court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991. 9
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition
for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the order of the trial court.10
Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the
circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof.
When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a
Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set
aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or
cause of action. 11 If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. 12
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had
already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary
period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for
violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing
to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to
present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent.
Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for
medical and/or rehabilitation reason." 13 In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he
attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug
Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for
treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. 14 The
records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of
this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the
country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken
therefrom. 15
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him
to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is
binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face. 16

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of
petitioner's confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the
scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally
or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the
case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial
court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his
right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the record show, petitioner,
through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the
petition, cross-examined private respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to
private respondent's motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. 17
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may
be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or appeal from
an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of
this petition. 18 Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost
thru inexcusable negligence. 19
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code
which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting
officer should intervene for the state because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard
declaration of annulment of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to appear
at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance. 20
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. 21
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. 22 Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to

determine if collusion exists between the parties.23 The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. 24 Our Constitution is
committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 25 Our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid
and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged
by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several
pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that
every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by
collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of
the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to
the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses, particularly Dr.
Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if
he were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he was not psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten
years, he and private respondent lived together with their children as one normal and happy
family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that
his work as owner and operator of a radio and television corporation places him in the public
eye and makes him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These
facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of
petitioner's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on
us. 26 Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation
of the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly
and manifestly erroneous. 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137590
March 26, 2001
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of
the family.1 It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of
morality and provides the very bedrock on which our society finds stability. 2 Marriage is
immutable and when both spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes
irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab
initio, the "permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it
so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification. 3 Where it applies and is duly proven, a
judicial declaration can free the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences
stemming from their marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application
of procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly
devolves upon petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure.
Should there be non-compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand
the case to the lower court for proper trial.
The Case
What is before the Court4 is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals 5 which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City 6 dismissing petitioner Florence
Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter "Florence") petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent
Philipp T. Sin (hereafter "Philipp"), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish
in San Miguel, Manila.7
On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a
complaint for "declaration of nullity of marriage" against Philipp.8 Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's petition.9
On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.10
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant."11
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.12
On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal.14

The Court's Ruling

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson 15 filed with the trial court a manifestation
dated November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion between the parties, 16 he did not
actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case,
nothing more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage
the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
"ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall orderthe prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed (italics ours).
"In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment."
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be
prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation
of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. This is made clear by the following
pronouncement:
"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, 17 briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095
(italics ours)."18
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case
not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the
"manifestation" filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any
pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,19 while we upheld the validity of the
marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as "prematurely
rendered" since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the
participation of the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the
province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum
For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows
(omitting guideline [8] in the enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage
as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both

the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
"(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified,
b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically (sic) ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
"(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
"(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts."
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY,
Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora,
are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia
B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same
court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5,
1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing
fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A
Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred
to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation
report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive
Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a
cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative
matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient
of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.:
Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C,
D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,

respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who
prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of
the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that
he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she
discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was
Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these
with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in
preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file
copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she
had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage
licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and
Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage
license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the
couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the
latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of
which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the
administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not
signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay
and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him
since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of
Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate,
he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized
and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in
the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null
and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6)
documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred
thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00
therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated
by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant
Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made
therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization
fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is
likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for

whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those
payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered
by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as
part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme
Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent
theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant
Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should
not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are
solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents
notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk
of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for
notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by
complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court.
Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the
monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge
forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell
Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court
on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed
because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an airconditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac
and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent
judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the
Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of
court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he
had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning
unit
was
bought
from
his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as
item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman
Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond;
that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made
to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the
money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money
was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court,
then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding
receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman
desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the
bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing
to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his
house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former
escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived
pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention
prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived
because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at
large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and
that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount
to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because
respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the
Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same
in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that
after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00
was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona
prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together
with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are
favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and
evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity
reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and
supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the
material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon
is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya
and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the
number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts,
Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano
and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said
marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the
Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article
23 of the Family Code.

The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon
without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge
Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with
them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband
and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because
the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign
the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the
marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This
happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he
consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told
that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and
the place of the parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20)
kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign
the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local
Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show
that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the
testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and
whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K3-c,
K-4,
K-4-a,
K-4-b,
K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a
simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the
explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to
be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he
did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming
of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya
and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their
marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that
he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so
a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that
they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12;
Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he
and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already
before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less

than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to
believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage
as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve)
executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage
license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again
Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by
Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is
that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code
as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that
the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage
and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the
second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time
he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already
signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require
the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a
marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was
solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37
and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs.
H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by
blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23
of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage
contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed
joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1).
Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not
solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination,
however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just
told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to
just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already
prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage
contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent
Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was
also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly
because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage
contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already solemnized
(TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage
contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon.
This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias
and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage
contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their
marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William
Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did
not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already
required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage
contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what
happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to
save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4)
times
everyday
(TSN,
p.
12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and
declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts
(Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and
procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized
their
marriage
(TSN,
p.
53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing
three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July,
1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only
seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September,
1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has
presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These
persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage
contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of
having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he
solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of
cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual
number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees,
have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for
July and September, 1992 are concerned.

The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both
signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by
Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial
register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q
to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July,
1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by
official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing
that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases
with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based on how many
notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or
recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the
correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of
Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the
monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close
supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions
(The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174
SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report
of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly
report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents
and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties
she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial
register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 1123-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to
Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report
based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the report
is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts,
notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only
because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all
court records including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks
of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of
all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also
shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received
for those documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence
adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she did
not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary
receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge
Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred

thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5)
documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that
there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as
appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that
what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to
the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court
the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy
herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid
later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that
she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to
lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the
contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not
know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial
fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the
minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992
shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the
functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial
fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n
July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo
to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any
memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings
and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs.
4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain
Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she
assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not
deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own
cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was
deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,
after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book,
however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on
March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to
8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash
bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it
because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any
authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3)
months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy
received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones

in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an
annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the
Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her
that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later
when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used
to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she
received. She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to
place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93).
Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme
Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started
issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy
gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of
Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid
partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court
in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box
when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00)
Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as
proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22).
The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time
when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991
until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this
case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between
the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to
suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject (them) to
suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs.
Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed
an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the
P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as
she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent
Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his
house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this
fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence
adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled
People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe
were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur

(Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he
escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David
Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented
records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused escaped while in the
custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving
said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991
and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to
this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused"
(Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service
of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested
(Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047
referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should
have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was
supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of
Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he
heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should
ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been
required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that
Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when
he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving
this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which
gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the
complainants could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed
by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying
filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent
Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4,
1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it
paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The
complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks
(from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on
loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural
Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4,
1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing
fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the
bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all
Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really
exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of
threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them

dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992.
Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently
show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly
that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been
shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly
for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said
two (2) months were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS
with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of
the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the
irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of
the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of
closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions,
particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16).
His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court
already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check
and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false
statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court
of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the
monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the
number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received
for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those
marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for
unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for
receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it
with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five
months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and
redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for
which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not
depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for
requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992
for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but
turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully

recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from
the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue
official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court
deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of
Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A
circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the
municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper
receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks
of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that
"all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited
immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits
shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court
and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma
Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it
was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City,
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982
and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and
fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds
constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious
misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate
dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all
else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness
and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies,
without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they
being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of
justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in
the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of

respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance
with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent
judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization
of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's
concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and
his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail,
approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever
issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage
was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states
that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she
was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only
for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave
birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig,
Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were
allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage
license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in
order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her
signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that
the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It
declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled
that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in

their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the
respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void,
respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the
subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage voidab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to
find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties
is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an
official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182
to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is,
in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate
her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered
that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally nonexistent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the

knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held
against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings
and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to
answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence
on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between
the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact
that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig,
may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's
complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25,
1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. 1 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second

marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy
case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused.4 It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal
action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. 5 Consequently, the defense must involve an
issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. 6 Its two essential
elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged
in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on
the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the
accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 8Whether or not the first
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be
remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two
of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had
it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the
marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held inLandicho v.
Relova:10
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the

first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from
the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their
marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a
prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be
that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was
celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." 12 [] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge
for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the
intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code
requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v.
Relova,14 he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. 15 This ruling applies here by
analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked
as an excuse.16The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not
been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act
penalized by the Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain
that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it
by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he
can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the
criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage
was contracted rests upon the defense, 18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of
the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the
civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal
action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover,
when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage
ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he
thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial
question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been
discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into
the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will

also be void.19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage
is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner.20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is
ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.