G.R. Nos.

160054-55

July 21, 2004

MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR,
INC., respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1) motion to quash the information; and (2)
motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order denying his motion to suspend the
arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also
questioned its August 5, 2003 Order2 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair competition under
Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No.
8293), similarly worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against
petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of
said informations read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at
Robinsons Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as
footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to
and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks,
symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the
buying public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and
owner of the following internationally: "CATERPILLAR", "CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN",
"CAT AND DESIGN", "WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN."
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in
view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446
for unfair competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors
resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated
August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for
reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the offense charged. He contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No.
8293, the penalty4 of imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the

offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A.
No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin motions.6 A motion
for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse
his discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the
pendency of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause
for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty
for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty
Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a
criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be
imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section
155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of
Origin and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under
Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with
appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall
be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The
Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V
Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and
False Description or Representation], hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No.
8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads
SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more
particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and

Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise,
it would not have used the phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith;" and it would
have simply stated "Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed." It would have removed all
doubts that said specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of the
phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith" only means that the repeal pertains only to
provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No.
8293.6 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of
R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual
property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under
Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general
law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional
Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.7
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws8 conferring jurisdiction over
violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail
over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.9 Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case
for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor
is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to
P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of
intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated
February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On
June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and
decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,10 invoked by petitioner finds no application in the
present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by
R.A. No. 8293. Neither did we make a categorical ruling therein that jurisdiction over cases for
violation of intellectual property rights is lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing
remark in Mirpuri on the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder to
the enactment of the present Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be construed as a
jurisdictional pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial
question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained
the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said
prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a
prejudicial question.

At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.11 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section
168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.12 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q00-41446, which as admitted13 by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall
be suspended in the following cases
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to
defer arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in
denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not
show the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.14 Moreover, the
Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition.
He thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his
arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who
alleges must prove his allegations.
In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not established that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his failure to attach documents
relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all
the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof
on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof,
such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122150

March 17, 2003

GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL
ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE
DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL
ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF
THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE
FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE
WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR
FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF
COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE
PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a
complaint for damages2 for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the
respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.3 In answer thereto, respondent
contended that the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,4 had
already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March
23, 1987, due to petitioners lack of interest;5 and that the dismissal was with respect to both
criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.6
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that
the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled
to damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay
plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical expenses and
P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages,
P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.7
On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,9 reversed and
set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioners complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the
dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages,
notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and
had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. 10
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave11 should be observed, i.e., a
civil action for damages may be filed and proceed independently of the criminal action even
without reservation to file the same has been made;12 and that the requirement of reservation,
as provided in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his
substantial right.13
The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,14 is the prevailing and governing law in
this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.
Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for
damages under the Civil Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise
it should be dismissed;16 and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or
defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly
procedure.17

In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio
Andaya that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo
Boado. The petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of the civil case for damages
filed against him in view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in
the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil action against the petitioner
or his driver. The criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to
prosecute its case. On appeal, the Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent can
file a civil action for damages despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of
the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation
requirement is substantive in character and beyond the rule-making power of the Court.18
The Court expounded:
1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for
the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the
criminal case. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery
of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal
action.
Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action
may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but
only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate
civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it
may be brought separately.19
While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the
rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.
Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can
be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the
criminal action.
Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the
words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":
to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear
congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with
the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.20
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil
action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for

damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED

t 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HERNANDO B. DELIZO, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 50995 granting the petition for certiorari of respondent Dr. Hernando B. Delizo and
nullifying the December 18, 1998 and February 1, 1999 Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 167-MD for estafa.
The Antecedents
Arsenio T. Ng filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondent with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, docketed as Inv. Slip No. 97-10288. After the requisite
preliminary investigation, First Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. signed an
Information dated October 10, 1997, charging the respondent withestafa. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1996, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President
and Chairman of Mediserv, Inc., by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent
representation, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, succeeded
in inducing herein complainant, Arsenio T. Ng to give the amount of P12 Million, to the accused
on his pretext that said amount will be converted by him into shares of stock (120,000 shares of
stocks) and in order to complement such false pretenses or fraudulent acts, he (respondent)
even showed a Board Resolution defining his authority to contract loan from the complainant
and the conversion of such loan into shares of stock, which, on the strength by said
manifestations and representations, the complainant gave said amount and duly received by the
accused, he knowing fully well that the same were false and fraudulent and were only made to
entice complainant into believing that he, indeed, is empowered and in a position to issue the
equivalent number of shares of stocks (120,000) in order to obtain, as in fact, he (accused)
obtained the total amount of P12 Million from the complainant and the accused, once in
possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to release the 120,000 shares
of stocks into complainants name, despite demands made on him and, with intent to defraud,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert said
amount, to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of Arsenio T. Ng, in
the aforementioned amount of P12 Million.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Before the Information was filed, the Ambulatory Health Care Institute, Inc. (AHCII), also known
as Clinica Manila (CM), and the Health Check, Inc. (HCI) filed a Complaint on October 22, 1997
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the respondent and a certain
"John Doe" for injunction and damages. The case was docketed as SEC Case No. 10-97-5794.
The petitioners therein alleged, inter alia, that a special meeting of the stockholders of CM was
held on October 9, 1997 after due notice to the respondent two weeks before the said date.

During the said meeting, the stockholders elected a new board of directors, replacing the
respondent as CM president. Thereafter, at 3:00 p.m. of October 13, 1997, the respondent and
an unidentified companion arrived at the CM office at SM Megamall, announced that he was still
the president, and rallied the officers and employees against the new board of directors. Despite
the security guards request for him to leave the premises, the respondent refused to do so. He,
thereafter, wrote the China Banking Corporation, the depository bank of CM, requesting it not to
honor any change in the authorized signatories for CM, and appended thereto a falsified
General Information Sheet (GIS) to show that he was still a member of the board of directors
and president of CM. It was prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission to adjudge that
respondent be ordered:
1. Not to do any act or deed that will disturb or interfere with the operations and business of the
petitioners, and not to cause any alarm, scandal, disturbance, intrigue, disloyalty, disorder, or
defiance on the part of any (sic) employees, officers, contractors, workers of CLINICA MANILA
and HEALTH CHECK, INC.;
2. Not to do any act that will interfere with or disturb the management and operation of the
funds, bank accounts, receivables, and all other property transactions of the petitioners, and to
stop representing themselves as having any kind of power and authority over any asset of the
two companies and their management;
3. Not to do any act or deed, directly or indirectly, that will dishonor the name and reputation of
the petitioners;
4. To pay actual damages of P1,000,000; moral damages of P2,000,000; and exemplary
damages ofP500,000; and to pay the costs of suit.4
On October 23, 1997, AHCII, Mediserv, Inc. (MI) and the respondent, filed a Complaint with the
SEC against Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya, Bartolome C. Felipe,
Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina. The complainants alleged, inter alia, that they had been
stockholders of AHCII since August 1995, and represented a majority of the outstanding capital
stock, owning 52.37% and 6.08%, respectively, as shown by the GIS dated October 15, 1997
filed with the SEC; the respondent was the incumbent chairman of the board of directors and
president of AHCII; and there was no quorum during the stockholders meeting of October 9,
1997; as such, the said meeting where a new set of board of directors and officers were, elected
was in violation of the by-laws of the complainant AHCII and, consequently, illegal. The
complainants prayed that the following reliefs be granted after due proceedings:
a) Declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued as permanent;
b) Adjudging the Special Stockholders Meeting purportedly held on October 9, 1997 as null and
void ab initio;
c) Adjudging any action, proceeding, resolution, and/or election made in the alleged
stockholders meeting purportedly held on October 9, 1997 as null and void ab initio;

d) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya,

Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina, jointly and severally, liable to pay to
complainant Delizo moral damages of not less than P1,000,000.00;
e) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya,
Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina, jointly and severally, liable to pay to
the complainants, as follows:
i. Exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00;
ii. Actual damages not less than P250,000.00;
iii. Attorneys fee of P200,000.00;
iv. Costs of litigation.
Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.5
The case was docketed as SEC Case No. 10-97-5796.
In the meantime, Mediserv, Inc., represented by its president, the respondent, and its treasurer,
Marissa D. Delizo, filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila, Branch 29, against the China
Banking Corporation, the Landheights (Iloilo) Development Corporation, Notary Public Romeo
A. Ignacio, Jr. and the Registrar of Deeds for the City of Manila. An amended complaint was
later filed, where it was alleged, inter alia, that MI received a loan from the bank in the amount
of P9,820,000, later increased to P11,200,000. To secure the payment of the said loan, MI
executed a real estate mortgage and amendment to real estate mortgage over its property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205824 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. MI
also executed a promissory note on October 5, 2000 in favor of the bank in the amount
of P11,200,000. The bank, thereafter, foreclosed the mortgage and sold the property at public
auction in favor of the bank for P15,649,023.29, through defendant Notary Public Romeo A.
Ignacio, Jr. It was prayed that, after due proceedings, it be granted the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:
1. Immediately upon filing of this Complaint, this Honorable Court issues a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, or at least a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining and restraining defendant
Register of Deeds from effecting/allowing the registration or annotation of the purported auction
sale of plaintiffs property covered by TCT No. 205824 of the Register of Deeds for the City of
Manila in favor of defendant Landheights, or any transaction, dealing or incident arising from the
purported auction sale allegedly conducted by defendant Ignacio until further orders from this
Honorable Court.
2. After hearing, to render Judgment, as follows:
a. Declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued as permanent;
b. Declaring the alleged public auction sale conducted by defendant Ignacio over the subject
plaintiffs property, as null and void;

c. Ordering and commanding Defendant China Bank to comply and to reduce into writing and/or
to document its agreement with plaintiff to consolidate the first P5 million loan of plaintiff with it
with the plaintiffs second loan of P1,800,000.00;
d. Adjudging defendants China Banking Corporation, Landheights (Iloilo) Development
Corporation and Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr., jointly and severally, liable to pay to plaintiff the
following:
1. Attorneys Fees in the amount of P200,000.00; and
2. Costs of suit.
Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.6
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-86152.
On December 3, 1997, the Information for estafa against the respondent was filed with the RTC
of Mandaluyong City and raffled to Branch 214. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
167-MD. The private prosecutor filed an ex parte motion for preliminary attachment, which was
opposed by the respondent. On December 18, 1998, the trial court issued an Order7 directing
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P8,000,000. The respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order with a prayer for the suspension of the proceedings on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question on December 23, 1998.
As early as January 13, 1998, the trial court in Branch 213 issued an Order denying the motion
to suspend proceedings on the ground that the private complainant, Arsenio T. Ng, was not a
stockholder of MI; hence, the pendency of the two (2) SEC cases was not a ground for the
suspension of the case. On February 1, 1999, the trial court issued the assailed Order denying
the motion for reconsideration.
On February 19, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50995, for the nullification of the Orders of the trial court,
contending as follows:
6.A.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT GROSSLY IGNORING THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT
APPLICATIONS FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT MUST BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE APPLICANT AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE PARTY
AGAINST WHOM IT IS DIRECTED.
6.B.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT
OF THE CRIMINAL CASE IS ALREADY COVERED BY CASES BEFORE THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA; HENCE,
THERE IS NO CIVIL ASPECT ATTACHED AND/OR DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH THE
CRIMINAL CASE.

6.C.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT ON A P12 MILLION CLAIM PER THE INFORMATION WITH
ONLY P8 MILLION BOND; HENCE, GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT, IMPROPER AND
UNREASONABLE.
6.D.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN MERELY RELYING ON THE ALLEGATIONS
OF THE EX PARTEMOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVIT/S AS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES.
6.E.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF PREJUDICIAL
QUESTIONS IN THE SEC CASES AND THE RTC CASE WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OF
THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT OF THE ACCUSED, THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
6.F.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR BEFORE THE SAID MOTION CAN BE HEARD; HENCE, A CLEAR
AND PALPABLE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
6.G.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT DISQUALIFYING THE PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE
SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE IS PRESENTLY LITIGATED AND/OR THE SUBJECT OF
SEPARATE ACTIONS BEFORE THE SEC AND THE RTC.8
On January 18, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition and nullifying the
assailed Orders of the trial court, as well as the writ of preliminary attachment it issued.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The assailed Orders of December 18, 1998 and
February 1, 1999, as well as the writ of attachment are hereby set aside. The respondent Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, is hereby directed to suspend
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 167-MD considering the existence of a prejudicial question in
SEC Cases Nos. 10-97-5794 and 10-97-5796 and Civil Case No. 97-86152.
SO ORDERED.9
The Present Petition
The People of the Philippines, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review on certiorari with
this Court, on the following grounds:
Public interest requires that all criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society (Gorospe vs. Pana Florida, 101 SCRA 445). Thus, the suspension of
criminal proceedings must be avoided unless the basis and grounds thereof are clear and
unmistakable.

The finding of the trial court that the criminal case, the civil case filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Manila and the cases filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
are based on the same transaction is grounded entirely on speculation. The complaints filed
with the RTC and SEC cases do not support such finding.
Moreover, in ruling that a prejudicial question exists, the court based its finding solely on its
conclusion that the criminal, civil and SEC cases arose out of the same transaction. This is
contrary to Sec. 5, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Supreme Court that for a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil
case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused (Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125).10
The petitioner, thus, raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND SEC CASES ARE BASED ON THE
SAME TRANSACTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES FILED WITH THE SEC AND THE CIVIL CASE FILED
WITH THE RTC RAISE PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE
THE SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION FOR ESTAFA.
Central to the issues in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court,11 which read:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution rests.12
The petitioner asserts that the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 167-MD for estafa are
entirely different from and unrelated to the issues in the SEC cases and in Civil Case No. 9786152 pending before the RTC of Manila. It asserts that, contrary to the rulings of the appellate
court, the said cases are based on facts and transactions different from those in the criminal
case. According to the petitioner, the resolution of the issues in the SEC and the civil cases are
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case; hence, the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case was barren of factual and legal bases.
On the other hand, the CA held that the P12,000,000 subject of the transaction in the criminal
case was the same amount involved in the SEC cases and the civil case. The CA then

concluded that the issues raised or involved in such cases were determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal case, warranting the suspension of the latter case.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
In case the civil action is instituted ahead of the criminal action, under Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits upon the commencement of the criminal action. Such criminal action
has precedence over the civil action to enforce the civil liability of the accused arising from
the delict. An exception is where the prejudicial question exists, under Sections 5 and 6, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
If the issues raised in a civil action are so similar or intimately related to those in the criminal
case such that the resolution of the said issues in the civil case are determinative of the juris et
de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case, the proceedings in the latter
case shall be suspended and the civil action shall proceed until judgment on its merits.13 A
prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime because if both
actions arose from the same fact or transaction, the civil case does not constitute a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal action.14 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal actions can, according to the law and rules, proceed independently of each
other.15 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.16
In this case, the transaction subject of the criminal case for estafa against the respondent is
the receipt of the amount of P12,000,000 from the private complainant, Ng, which was intended
for the purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks of MI. According to the Information in Criminal
Case No. 167-MD, the respondent used the money for his personal benefit instead of
purchasing the said shares in behalf of Ng. The event or occurrence subject of SEC Case No.
97-5794 filed by the AHCII and the HCI against the respondent was the latters refusal to vacate
the office of the president, and his insistence on performing and exercising the duties and
powers of the said office, as well as the chairmanship of the board of directors of the said
corporation despite his alleged ouster from the said positions. The plaintiff corporations sought a
writ of injunction and relief for damages against the respondent. Neither Ng nor the MI were
parties in the said case. On the other hand, SEC Case No. 97-5796 was filed by the respondent
and several others, for and in representation of the AHCII and the MI, as the plaintiffs, to nullify
the October 9, 1997 stockholders meeting and the election of the board of directors and officers
held thereon, anchored on their claim that they owned majority of the outstanding capital of the
AHCII, and that the said meeting and election subsequently held were null and void. As in SEC
Case No. 97-5794, Ngs projected investment of P12,000,000 in the MI which, as alleged in the
Information, the respondent had misused for his personal benefit, was not the subject of SEC
Case No. 97-5796. There is even no showing in the SEC cases that Ng claimed to be a
stockholder of the MI on account of the respondents receipt of the P12,000,000 for the intended
purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks therein.
These issues are not, in any way, determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in
the criminal case forestafa. Whether the said meeting and elections will be declared null and
void by the SEC will not result in the conviction or acquittal of the respondent for estafa, for
swindling Ng of P12,000,000. Furthermore, the SEC cases involve intra-corporate disputes

between the respondent, on the one hand, and Ng and the other stockholders of the AHCII, on
the other, for the control of the said corporations management. It must be stressed that the
petitions before the SEC are bare of allegations relating to the alleged P12,000,000 received by
the respondent from Ng, and intended for the latters purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks in
the MI.
In his petition with the CA, the respondent alleged that in the SEC cases, the MI insisted that
the P12,000,000 received by him was a mere loan; that he would not be liable of estafa if he
could prove the same.17 According to the respondent, Ng alleged in the said SEC cases that he
and the members of his group became the major and controlling stockholders in AHCII because
of the infusion of P12,000,000 by Ng. On the other hand, the respondent averred in his
comment on the instant petition that the P12,000,000 he received from Ng referred to AHCII
shares of stocks owned by MI.18 A cursory reading of the Information will show that
the P12,000,000 was intended for the purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks of the MI, and not
of the AHCII. Even the CA in its decision declared that the P12,000,000 was intended for Ngs
purchase of shares of stocks in the MI:
As regard the motion to suspend the proceedings in [the] questioned criminal case in view of the
presence of a prejudicial question in the SEC cases, petitioner insists in that the "nature of the
subject transaction involving the alleged P12 million of Mr. Cusencio (sic) T. Ng which is the
subject of the case at bar, is, likewise, the subject of the consolidated SEC cases." A perusal of
the complaints (p. 79, Rollo) filed with the SEC (SEC Cases Nos. 10-97-5794 and 10-97-5796)
and the Regional Trial Court of Manila shows that there really exists a prejudicial question. It
appears, as claimed by private respondent, that the amount of P12 million subject of the instant
Criminal Case for Estafa was given to petitioner to be diverted into shares of stocks from
Mediserv, Inc., while the petitioner averred that the amount was given as a loan. Thus, it is clear
that the nature of the transaction involving the P12 million of private respondent in the criminal
case is the same as the cases before the SEC and the Civil Case Q-97-88152 (sic) in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.19
Moreover, the respondent failed to submit to the CA the answer and other pleadings filed by Ng
as well as the pleadings of the stockholders of the AHCII in the SEC cases, containing
allegations that they became the majority and controlling stockholders of the AHCII because of
the infusion of P12,000,000. Such pleadings would have bolstered the respondents stance in
this case, and debilitated that of the petitioner herein.
We agree with the petitioners contention that the issue of whether or not the P12,000,000 was
merely a loan by Ng in favor of the MI is a matter of defense by the respondent in the criminal
case.
The transaction subject of the civil case is the loan procured by the MI in the amount
of P9,820,000, later increased to P11,200,000, from the China Banking Corporation, the
payment of which was secured by a real estate mortgage and amended real estate mortgage
over its property in Sampaloc, Manila. The MI sought to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the said mortgage and the sale of its property at public auction, on its allegation that it did not
breach its contract with the bank. The respondents agreement with Ng for the purchase of
120,000 shares of stocks in the MI, as well as the alleged misappropriation of the amount
of P12,000,000 by the respondent, is not the subject matter of the civil case. Ng is not even a
party thereto; neither was he privy to the said transaction between the respondent and the MI,
and the China Banking Corporation involving the said loan.

In sum, the outcome of the civil case is not, in any way, determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the respondent in the criminal case. The CA thus erred in granting the petition of the
respondent and nullifying the assailed orders of the trial court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City
dated December 18, 1998 and February 1, 1999 are REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148595

July 12, 2004

SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG, petitioners,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56,
Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN
BANK and TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang,
for the nullification of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59157.
The Antecedents
On January 5, 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term
loan of one million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by
Non-Negotiable Promissory Note No. 1906013 and was, likewise, secured by a real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29607.4 As the
petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon, the respondent
foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property
was sold at public auction on January 8, 1998 to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was executed by Pasnonito D. Antiporda as Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the
respondent on January 14, 1998 and was registered with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City on January 27, 1998.
On December 29, 1998, the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption
period of the property would expire on January 27, 1999.5 Instead of redeeming the property,
the petitioners filed, on January 19, 1999, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale against
the respondent bank and the Sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Mandaue City), Branch
56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-3454.6 Therein, the petitioners alleged that the respondent
bloated their obligation of P1,500,000.00 to P2,403,770.73 by including excessive past due
interest, penalty charges, attorneys fees and sheriffs expense. They claimed that such
exorbitant charges were made to frustrate their chance to pay the loan, and to ensure that the
respondent bank would be the highest bidder during the auction sale. They also asserted that
the respondent failed to remit to the Sheriff the purchase price of the property and was, likewise,
guilty of fraud, collusion, breach of trust or misconduct in the conduct of the auction sale of their
property. Besides praying for injunctive relief, the petitioners prayed for the following alternative
reliefs:
3. After trial on the merits, and after determination of plaintiffs true obligation with defendant
bank, to declare the foreclosure on the subject property as null and void, and to allow the
plaintiffs to pay the same; as alternative prayer, to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the subject real
property based on the amount determined and established as true and exact obligation of
plaintiffs to defendant bank.7

After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was issued by the
Register of Deeds in its name. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of
Possession before the RTC of Mandaue City (Branch 56), docketed as LRC Case No. 3.8
The petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate
Court,9 opposed the petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case
No. MAN-3454 constituted a prejudicial question, which warranted a suspension of the
proceedings before the court. The petitioners averred that the filing of their complaint within the
period to redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent to an offer to redeem the same, and
had the effect of preserving such right. They also asserted that the respondent acted in bad faith
in procuring the title over the property despite the pendency of their complaint in Civil Case No.
MAN-3454.
On March 28, 2000, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, rendered a decision in LRC Case No.
3 granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
respondent.10
Citing the case of Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,11 and Gawaran v. Court of Appeals,12 the RTC
ruled that since the petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the
foreclosure, the respondent was entitled to a writ of possession as a necessary consequence of
the readjudication of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the original certificate.13 The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the court issued an order
denying the motion, stating that it was merely its ministerial function to issue a writ of
possession.14
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 59157 for the nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision and the May 19, 2000 Order
of the RTC. Thepetitioners alleged that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent bank for a
writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 instead of suspending the proceedings therein based on
the ruling of this Court in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the
writ of possession, the CA rendered a decision on March 2, 2001, dismissing the
petition.16 Citing the rulings of this Court in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals17 and Navarra v.
Court of Appeals,18 the CA explained that the pendency of a separate proceeding questioning
the validity of the mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof cannot bar the issuance of
a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser at public auction. The appellate court ruled that
after a title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee, the issuance of a writ of
possession becomes a ministerial act of the trial court. Furthermore, the right of the respondent
bank to possess the property was based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the
properties in the foreclosure sale. The CA explained that the ruling in the Belisario case was
inapplicable because it involved a complaint to enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed
property within the period of redemption, whereas, the complaint filed by the petitioners in Civil
Case No. MAN-3454 was for the annulment of the mortgage or extrajudicial sale which was not
equivalent to an offer to redeem the property.19 The Present Petition

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the decision, having been denied by the
appellate court, the petitioners filed this instant petition, assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONERS RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OVER THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY AS HAVING EXPIRED ON
JANUARY 26, 1999, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR PENDING COMPLAINT TO ANNUL THE
FORECLOSURE FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE ONE-YEAR REDEMPTION
PERIOD, ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD, AND CONSIDERING FURTHER THEIR SPECIFIC
PRAYER THEREOF FOR DETERMINATION OF THEIR TRUE OBLIGATION WITH PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, AND TO ALLOW THEM TO PAY THE SAME AND/OR TO REDEEM THEIR
FORECLOSED PROPERTY.20
2. PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE OF THEIR
PROPERTY WITH A PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION
TO STOP THE ISSUANCE OF A DEFINITE DEED OF SALE AND CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE
OF THEIR PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHILE GIVING
PREFERENCE AND ACTING WITH DISPATCH ON PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PETITION
FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION ON THE SAME PROPERTY, BY GRANTING
THE WRIT OF POSSESSION THEREON THEREBY RENDERING MOOT AND ACADEMIC
PETITIONERS PRAYERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE.21
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF BELISARIO VS. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L-73503, WHEREBY "THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT TO
ENFORCE REPURCHASE WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION IS EQUIVALENT TO
AN OFFER TO REDEEM AND HAS THE EFFECT OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION" INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF PETITIONERS.22
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT
THAT THE ISSUE OR ISSUES JOINED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT BEFORE
RESPONDENT JUDGE DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4353 (sic) IS A PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION TO THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION IN LRC
CASE NO. 3.23
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
VALID CAUSES OF ACTION OF PETITIONERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT IN
CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4354 (sic).24
The threshold issues are as follows: (a) whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil
Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of
the respondent bank for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3; and, (b)
whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent in LRC Case No. 3 and in issuing the writ
of possession in its favor.
The issues being interrelated, the Court shall resolve the same simultaneously.
The petitioners contend that their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 and the respondents
petition for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 were raffled to Branch 56 of the RTC.
Although their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the nullification of the extrajudicial

sale at public auction on the ground of fraud, they also prayed, as an alternative remedy, that
they be allowed to redeem the property based on the amount to be determined by the court
after trial. Hence, they assert, the filing of their complaint before the expiry of the redemption
period to enforce their right of redemption was equivalent to a formal offer to redeem the
property and had the effect of preserving their right of redemption. They argue that the RTC
should have suspended the proceedings in LRC Case No. 3 pending the final resolution of Civil
Case No. MAN-3454 so as not to render moot and academic the latter case, conformably with
the ruling of the Court in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court,25 after all, the two cases
were pending before the same court. The petitioners, thus, aver that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of
the respondent bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3. They, likewise, aver that the
Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial court and declared, thus:
Further, as to the applicability of the case of Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No.
L-73503, Aug. 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 101, 108), suffice it to say, that the cause of action therein
was to enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed property within the period of redemption, which
the Supreme Court held that it has the effect of preserving the right of redemption. Whereas,
Civil Case No. MAN-3454 filed by the petitioners is for the annulment of mortgage or
extrajudicial sale, which is not in effect an offer to redeem. Verily, the pendency of said civil case
does not preserve the right of redemption of the petitioners after the period of redemption.26
The Courts Ruling
The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.27
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil
action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A,
Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and,
therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions.28 A similar
issue was raised in Manalo vs. Court of Appeals,29 where we held that:
At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must be
considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the
respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to
have the property repurchased or resold to a mortgagors successor-in-interest (petitioner);
while that in the latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory period for
redemption has expired. The two cases, assuming both are pending, can proceed separately
and take their own direction independent of each other.30

The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of
their property at public auction forP2,403,770.73 are null and void, whereas, the issue in LRC
Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank was entitled to the possession of the property
after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and title was issued .
Our ruling in Belisario has no application in this case because in the said case, no prejudicial
question was involved. We merely held therein that the filing of an action to enforce redemption
within the period of redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, and should the Court
allow the redemption, the redemptioner should then pay the amount already determined. In fine,
the filing of an action by the redemptioner to enforce his right to redeem does not suspend the
running of the statutory period to redeem the property, nor bar the purchaser at public auction
from procuring a writ of possession after the statutory period of redemption had lapsed, without
prejudice to the final outcome of such complaint to enforce the right of redemption.31
The remedy of the petitioners from the assailed decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 3 was to
appeal by writ of error to the Court of Appeals.32 However, instead of appealing by writ of error,
the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari. Certiorari is not proper where the aggrieved party
has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Moreover, the error of the trial court in
granting the respondent bank a writ of possession, if at all, was an error of judgment correctible
only by an ordinary appeal.
It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature.33 The
trial court is mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory
period for redemption without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It cannot be
validly argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merely complied with its
ministerial duty to issue the said writ of possession.34
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157 is AFFIRMED.
Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar
Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the
merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of
plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special
division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through
her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of
her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in
October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to
the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the
defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of
the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of
P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not

endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la
categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho"
(Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having
rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that
recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F.
Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the
editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation
of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not
expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of
the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded
rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical
profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases
he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which
not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio
Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 182836

October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSCSUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision1dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of
respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on
the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental
Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel CorporationSolidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with
pay to any employee in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse,
children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of
death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the
employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with
proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus
died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement
and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA.
Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting
the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region
(NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the
parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to
Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section
4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or
must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by
the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation
(MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental
Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar
provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer
Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the
delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugans child was only 24
weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 3738 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who
signed the CBA with their respective employees unions were the same as the representatives
of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for
the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there
are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as
legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on
Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could
die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was
dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not
be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead
could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire
the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since
neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions
thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have
unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom
would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits
bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister
companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither
could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to
the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death
benefits.

Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of
employees "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided
under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable
elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employees
"dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.18
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically,
his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the
labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married,
making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein
petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the
amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death
benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employees
dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded
from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a
legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental
Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified

by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be
determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the
conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos
Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is
used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the
purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to
serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of
a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such
event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be
covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected
employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as
condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steels] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less
than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave
and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latters immediate family,
extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality
upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for
statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan
S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of
the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child,

brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee.
The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are:
(1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of
the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of
the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed
clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of
the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union
sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the
negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of
the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity
and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the
unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were
passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the
latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by
death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn
from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn

already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or
sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even
an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance.
Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependentmay be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have
been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the
unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove
the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was
not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived
during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling
him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of
his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under
the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to
give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered

the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from
the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the
CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. InMarcopper Mining v. National
Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that
"when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the
same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the
interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons.
What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution,
to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we
categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice,
the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the
law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social
justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao,
which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the
amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan
de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20,
Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners
in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ,
SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan
de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS,
NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS
SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN,respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to
enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55,
RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and
implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September
1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October
1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the
application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September
1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her
desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At

the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and
living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus,
but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who
had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the
subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained
a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at
the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a
registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his
residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of
her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court.
Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court,
directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its
autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss
the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under
sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding
for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted
leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28
September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents
(Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was
wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the
Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the
legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed.
The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the
respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes
in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a
duly authorized government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17
November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second
amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to
be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the
custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court, considering the

circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to
the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in
the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that
under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The
authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of
this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings
in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a
decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired
jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the
petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first
dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to
Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the
decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original
petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained
of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead
person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained
the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and
sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the
petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all
other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful
custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give
support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving
spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who
was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were
pure questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140);
hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion
for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied
in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to
sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas,
which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further
pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover
custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are
full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which
states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it,
shall be made in the following order:(
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is
an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition;
but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a
specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether
Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the
petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the
court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ

should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make
a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas
corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise
of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or
detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was
virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the
minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and
morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said
respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law
repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the
technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving
the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award
temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and
hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the
records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings,amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to
avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be
liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of
action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or
the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to
amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became
moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue
of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term
spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such
qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters
contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man
and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions
but not in the Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present
in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed
by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a
legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI
of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of
Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted
however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not commonlaw spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is
said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament
or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to
the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact,
he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and
sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon
the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of
burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15499

February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance of Manila dismissing the action for legal
redemption filed by plaintiff-appellant.
It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located
at Sta. Cruz, Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of
the following co-owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E.
Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was
instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the
aforementioned property. And although his last will and testament, wherein he bequeathed his
estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M.
Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate, the estate
proceedings are still pending up to the present on account of the claims of creditors which
exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial
administrator.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners
of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy
& Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution by her
attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect that formal notices of the
sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly registered and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789 was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in
the name of the vendee and the other-co-owners.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the
Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it
of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the
latter to Mrs. Butte c/o her counsel Delgado, Flores & Macapagal, Escolta, Manila, and having
received the same on December 10, 1958, said law office delivered them to plaintiff-appellant's
son, Mr. Miguel Papa, who in turn personally handed the letters to his mother, Mrs. Butte, on
December 11 and 12, 1958. Aside from this letter of defendant-appellant, the vendor, thru her
attorney-in-fact Mrs. Chambers, wrote said bank on December 11, 1958 confirming vendee's
letter regarding the sale of her 1/6 share in the Sta. Cruz property for the sum of P500,000.00.
Said letter was received by the bank on December 15, 1958 and having endorsed it to Mrs.
Butte's counsel, the latter received the same on December 16, 1958. Appellant received the
letter on December 19, 1958.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a
Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons,
Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender
having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the
corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of
the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly
excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply thereto,
trial was held, after which the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959, dismissing plaintiff's
complaint on the grounds that she has no right to redeem the property and that, if ever she had
any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal redemptions provided
by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of defendant for damages was likewise dismissed for not
being sufficiently established. Both parties appealed directly to this Court.
Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed in this appeal are: (1) whether or not
plaintiff-appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie
Garnier Vda. de Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final
distribution of her share in the testate proceedings; and (2) whether or not she exercised the
right of legal redemption within the period prescribed by law.
The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all
the other-co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may
be. The deed of sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)
That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is clear.
As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in
the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the Santa Cruz
property, from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the
rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of

his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive the
decedent.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. (657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees
from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil
Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as
of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment(Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donationinter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly,
the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the
death of the testator (Art. 935),and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to
the legatee (Art. 948).
As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired
his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of his death, and from that
instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the original surviving coowners of their decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is necessarily a coowner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner, became
entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another coowner (Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy
& Sons, Inc. This right of redemption vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's
share which the law nowhere takes into account.
The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial administrator of the estate of
Jose V. Ramirez while under the Rules of Court the administrator has the right to the possession
of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the
decedent's debts and the expenses of administration (sec. 3, Rule 85), and the administrator
may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
deceased (sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights of possession and administration do not include the
right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to Uy & Company by Mrs. Garnier Ramirez.
The reason is obvious: this right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to
Uy & Sons, Inc. was perfected, eight (8) years after the death of Jose V. Ramirez, and formed
no part of his estate. The redemption right vested in the heirs originally, in their individual
capacity, they did not derivatively acquire it from their decedent, for when Jose V. Ramirez died,
none of the other co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property had as yet sold his undivided share to a
stranger. Hence, there was nothing to redeem and no right of redemption; and if the late
Ramirez had no such right at his death, he could not transmit it to his own heirs. Much less
could Ramirez acquire such right of redemption eight years after his death, when the sale to Uy

& Sons, Inc. was made; because death extinguishes civil personality, and, therefore, all further
juridical capacity to acquire or transmit rights and obligations of any kind (Civil Code of the Phil.,
Art. 42).
It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs. Butte in the estate of Jose V. Ramirez has not
been specifically determined as yet, that it is still contingent; and that the liquidation of estate of
Jose V. Ramirez may require the alienation of the decedent's undivided portion in the Sta. Cruz
property, in which event Mrs. Butte would have no interest in said undivided portion. Even if it
were true, the fact would remain that so long as that undivided share remains in the estate, the
heirs of Jose V. Ramirez own it, as the deceased did own it before his demise, so that his heirs
are now as much co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V. Ramirez was himself a coowner thereof during his lifetime. As co-owners of the property, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez, or
any one of them, became personally vested with right of legal redemption as soon as Mrs.
Garnier sold her own pro-indiviso interest to Uy & Sons. Even if subsequently, the undivided
share of Ramirez (and of his heirs) should eventually be sold to satisfy the creditors of the
estate, it would not destroy their ownership of it before the sale, but would only convey or
transfer it as in turn sold (of it actually is sold) to pay his creditors. Hence, the right of any of the
Ramirez heirs to redeem the Garnier share will not be retroactively affected. All that the law
requires is that the legal redemptioner should be a co-owner at the time the undivided share of
another co-owner is sold to a stranger. Whether or not the redemptioner will continue being a
co-owner after exercising the legal redemptioner is irrelevant for the purposes of law.
Nor it can be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his heirs
would stand in law as never having acquired that share. This would only be true if the
inheritance is repudiated or the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the heirship is
undisputed, the purchaser of hereditary property is not deemed to have acquired the title directly
from the deceased Ramirez, because a dead man can not convey title, nor from the
administrator who owns no part of the estate; the purchaser can only derive his title from the
Ramirez heirs, represented by the administrator, as their trustee or legal representative.
The right of appellant Angela M. Butte to make the redemption being established, the next point
of inquiry is whether she had made or tendered the redemption price within the 30 days from
notices as prescribed by law. This period, be it noted, is peremptory, because the policy of the
law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period. In
considering whether or not the offer to redeem was timely, we think that the notice given by the
vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly
prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted from notice in writing
by the vendor. Under the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was immaterial who gave the
notice; so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger, the
redemption period began to run. It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that method must be deemed
exclusive (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne vs. State, 12 S.W. [2d] 528). As ruled in Wampler vs.
Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affd. in 75 Law Ed. [U.S.] 275) Why these provisions were inserted

in the statute we are not informed, but we may assume until the contrary is shown, that a state
of facts in respect thereto existed, which warranted the legislature in so legislating.
The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer, are
easily divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his coowners that under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller removes all
doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation
thereof, so that the party need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation.
This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer.
The notice which became operative is that given by Mrs. Chambers, in her capacity as attorneyin-fact of the vendor Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Under date of December 11, 1958, she
wrote the Administrator Bank of the Philippine Islands that her principal's one-sixth (1/6) share in
the Sta. Cruz property had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for P500,000.00. The Bank
received this notice on December 15, 1958, and on the same day endorsed it to Mrs. Butte,
care of Delgado, Flores and Macapagal (her attorneys), who received the same on December
16, 1958. Mrs. Butte tendered redemption and upon the vendee's refusal, judicially consigned
the price of P500,000.00 on January 15, 1959. The latter date was the last one of the thirty days
allowed by the Code for the redemption, counted by excluding December 16, 1958 and
including January 15, 1959, pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the redemption
was made in due time.
The date of receipt of the vendor's notice by the Administrator Bank (December 15) can not be
counted as determining the start of thirty days; for the Administrator of the estate was not a
proper redemptioner, since, as previously shown, the right to redeem the share of Marie Garnier
did not form part of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez.
We find no jurisdiction for appellant's claim that the P500,000,00. paid by Uy & Sons, Inc. for the
Garnier share is grossly excessive. Gross excess cannot be predicated on mere individual
estimates of market price by a single realtor.
The redemption and consignation having been properly made, the Uy counterclaim for damages
and attorney's fees predicated on the assumption that plaintiff's action was clearly unfounded,
becomes untenable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and
another one entered:
(a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 made by appellant Angela M. Butte duly and
properly made;
(b) Declaring that said appellant properly exercised in due time the legal redemption of the onesixth (1/6) undivided portion of the land covered by Certificate of Title No. 59363 of the Office of
the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, sold on December 9, 1958 by Marie Garnier Vda. de
Ramirez to appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

(c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept the consigned price and to convey to
Angela M. Butte the undivided portion above referred to, within 30 days from the time our
decision becomes final, and subsequently to account for the rentals and fruits of the redeemed
share from and after January 15, 1958, until its conveyance; and.
(d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable
to this opinion. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-52179

April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, IAUREANO BANIA, JR.,
SOR MARIETA BANIA, MONTANO BANIA, ORJA BANIA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIA, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by
the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of
First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case
No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Bania, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated
November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26,
1979; September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated
October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo
Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting
of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit and dismissing
the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge
Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While private respondents Juana RimandoBania, Laureano Bania, Jr., Sor Marietta Bania, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia R.
Bania are heirs of the deceased Laureano Bania Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg
before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a
passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a
dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to
the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of
the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the
Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the
passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party
Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent
judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order
dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and
its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner

filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of
the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following questioned orders,
to wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with
respect to the supposed lack of jurisdiction;
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the grounds for the Motion to
Dismiss until the trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of July
13, 1976 filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of July 13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for decision it appearing
that parties have not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite the court's direction;
and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or
order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is hereunder
quoted as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and
defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly
and severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Bania, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Bania Jr.,
Sor Marietta Bania, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia B. Bania the
sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the
late Laureano Bania Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees.
Costs against said defendants.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to another
motion which was then pending. However, respondent judge issued another order dated
November 7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of September 7, 1979 for
having been filed out of time.

Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing that if
defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of
July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision.
Furthermore, petitioner asserts that while appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is
not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that
the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the good faith which is indispensable in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress that
petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent
power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of
the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability
of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to
resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its
judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of
the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision
dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its
regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it
gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of
the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in
Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an
alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see
United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to
the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening
itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when
they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity

from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions
because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand,
it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
(United States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its
employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in
the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the
distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court
of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one
they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the
duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and
agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in
behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state
or sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under
the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way
to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty
is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We
rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that
the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger
tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's dereliction in failing
to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby
modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159567

July 31, 2007

CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALANMILAN, ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and
GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO CATALAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA and
ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES CATALAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and
damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military
service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was
unfit to render military service due to his "schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which
incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries,
withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech."1
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.2
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute Deed of Donation,"3 wherein
Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real
property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by
heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan;
and on the West by Roman Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square
meters, more or less.
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 180804 to
Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property
remained in Felicianos name under Tax Declaration No. 18081.5
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings No.
45636 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. On

December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for
Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance7 of Feliciano. The following day, the
trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company as Felicianos guardian.8 Peoples Bank
and Trust Company has been subsequently renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property,
registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.9
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus
Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on
February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents.11
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property
registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida
Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu215956) of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.12
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,13 as well as damages against the herein
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as
Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano
had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of
sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the
Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia
and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the
property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its
registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought
remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute
his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants
was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the
time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared,
the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of
due execution of the donation in question must be upheld.14 It rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of the land in
question which is now declared in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);

3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorneys fees of P10,000.00, and to pay the
Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via a Notice of
Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.16 The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing that plaintiffappellants failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the
precise moment when the property in dispute was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation coupled
with compliance with certain solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real
property under Article 749, which provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of her
ownership, the property is completely subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by law of
the concurrence with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees Folder of
Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia
Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident
much less apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the
RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of
Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document,
the deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document
with respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein,
jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.17
Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV
NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT "THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY
OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE WAS DONATED";
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE
(EXHIBIT "S") AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS "S-1" AND "S-2") ARE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CAG.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES
CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.18
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to donate property to Mercedes
had been rebutted because they presented more than the requisite preponderance of evidence.
First, they presented the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on
October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs.
Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these
two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental
condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until his
death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Felicianos marriage to Corazon Cerezo on
September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the time he made the questioned
donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano executed in favor of his successors
(Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these donations
were approved and confirmed in the guardianship proceedings.19 In addition, petitioners claim
that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her
children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact
that the document was registered only on February 20, 1992, more that 10 years after
Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that Feliciano
was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of the
property in question.20 Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not barred by prescription or
laches under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1,
1997, even before the four year period after Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.21
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court.

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it.22 Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous.23 The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like
any contract, renders the donation voidable.24
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given.25 However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon
the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.26
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence
presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado
of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia
by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the
allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable
of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the public
when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, combined "hebrephrenia" and
"catatonia" with certain paranoid states and called the condition "dementia praecox." Eugene
Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins conception in the early 1900s to include
cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition "schizophrenia." According to
medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with
symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses.1avvphi1 The condition
improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers
may appear relatively normal, while other patients in remission may appear strange because
they speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and
are prone to have "ideas of reference." The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors
are directed against the sufferers.27 It has been proven that the administration of the correct
medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer
to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent
thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of relapse.28Schizophrenia can result in a dementing
illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax and wane
over many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect.29
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does
not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the
existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus,
the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this

condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.30 Sufficient proof of his
infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.31
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time he
donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered
into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his
other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute
contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency
and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts
executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.32
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to
whomever she chose.33 Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that
Mercedes sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little
bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material
is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its
execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the first time
on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present appeal
had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it
remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years. 34
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-11872

December 1, 1917

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendantappellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of
September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land,
and to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter,
the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his
administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and
their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of
Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897,
leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of
Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the
amended complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their
sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the
year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in
getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their
mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their
sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its
assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in question belonged to Margarita
Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the
other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to
the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was
equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until
the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor
by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis
Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of
the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita
Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit,
P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying
each and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land,
the subject-matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May
25, 1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due
authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the

sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen
cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the
plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto
de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an
area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his
(Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from
said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May
17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria
del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph
of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had
belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor
of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu,
in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which
they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-complaint
the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and
that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate
of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs
to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate
estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth,
and in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in
the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the
four years fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore
asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the
case and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the
proper bill of exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the
clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17,
1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to
the decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then
minors and therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument
Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor
and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and
within legal period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some
defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300),
so that he may obtain the restitution of the land sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by
composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of

Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25

ares, and 59 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death,
his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and
Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the
complaint as containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis
and Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno
Cruz, had by this husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and
Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by
operation of law, one-half of the land described in the complaint.
The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of twofourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the
complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this
claim the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as
is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother
conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a
portion of the land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes
of seed; and that, on account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the
possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the
protocols or registers of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao
Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the
instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May
20, 1901, in his own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz,
Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion
of land had been made by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower
Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the
same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the
land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now
forms a part of the land in question a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in
order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the
plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado,
together with their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in
possession of the required legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land,
effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and
authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an
increase" of the previous purchase price, the land described in said instrument and situated in
Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes
of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on

the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu,
and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground
that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the
further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in
obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were
born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891,
were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book
Exhibit A, which she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father
Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo
Mercado was born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this
witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration
certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in
1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was 22
years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and
sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of
age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and
sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his
uncle Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his
predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other
cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then
already 23 years of age; that she did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother
and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado,
prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu
who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her
sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some
time, she did not know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to
his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land
allotted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law
Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of
inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914,
when the said two sisters' share was 764 cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the
defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that

said document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been
read to them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not
understand Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of
age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young
maiden, although she had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took
place about the year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,]
34 years of age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the
latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death,
was under witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products
yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed,
had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and
that, after Margarita Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of
another portion of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left
by this deceased, and that he held same until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis
Espiritu. lawphi1.net
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the
plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the
year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his
other relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to
the Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he
mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita
Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not
acquainted with its contents. This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction
had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which
the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a
witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did
not do so, for no instrument whatever was presented to him for identification. The transaction
mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in
1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on
May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document
Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary
Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that
she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the
day she signed it, on which occasion and while said document was being signed said notary
was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose names appear therein; and that she
went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters,
sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of her
brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the
execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis
Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in
the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother
and the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu,
attested the certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in
behalf of said purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao
Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo
of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid
them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare
having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth
any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of the
property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the
parcel or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors'
mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of
the contract of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made
with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate
sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors'
father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed
to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs'
widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to
her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument
Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts,
and the totality of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold
absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no
conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the
employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the
vendors who executed it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous
dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting
parties, and also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the
vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in
the amount loaned, without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view
of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need
to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the
capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and
likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6
cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.

So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate
estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21
cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15
cavanes, and, in consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of
P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area containing 6
cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its
ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale;
and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17,
1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao
Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but,
after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the
ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this
latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the
nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of
the date of the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are
the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife
Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of
about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by
her on May 25,1894 an instrument that disappeared or was burned and likewise
recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were
destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he
had no objection to give the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth
regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the
exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale, he
himself being the husband who authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony
affected his children's interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that might be
produced by said real property.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of
the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this
document is false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed
by the plaintiffs' father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be
rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set
forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the
date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they
had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in

the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified
copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any
supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of
age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook,
Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute
sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it
cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the
time they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed
Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6
cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received
by him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15
cavanes had been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will
not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and
the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint
filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the
juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of
April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis
Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910,
causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial
instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to
be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out
on February 14, 1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years
of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the
statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that,
on the date when they executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation
contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be
concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial
instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and
interests as a result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the
plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes
of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father
stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining
portion of the land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which
was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to

meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made
by their father himself, they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of
seed, which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must
have accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution
of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the
sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the
P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes
all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land
containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was not impugned, and,
consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of
said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have
been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of
record, we should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

G.R. No. 173822

October 13, 2010

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners
of murder.1 On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the awarded damages.2
The petitioners contest the CAs affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition for
review on certiorari.
We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because the
RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the commission of the crime.
We order his immediate release from prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby
modified. Also, we add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to
accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the
petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the following information,
to wit:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Boga, Municipality of Castilla,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without
any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot
one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7, 1994,4 the
trial ensued.

The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major
Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona
(Herminia).
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her commonlaw husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8
pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay;
that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the
sala of Desders house, she heard "thundering steps" as if people were running and then two
successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona;
that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, thats enough!; that while
aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking
sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously
adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she
rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting;
and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.5
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994,6 based on
the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in
Castilla, Sorsogon.
Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated
his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.7
Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses
of Llona.8
Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were
Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and
Lagonsing.
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his
family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the
house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the
petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of
Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated only because of their being employed by
their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador
Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court

hereby sentences each of the accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency,
in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to
reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the
cost.
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he
being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered,
unless he is charged of other lawful cause or causes.
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the
service of their sentence.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court referred the petitioners direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.10
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado
and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.11
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,12 the petitioners now appeal.
Issue
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a
credible witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandillas testimony unreliable, namely:
(a) she had failed to identify them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not actually
witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the
assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the
autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to
Mirandillas claim; (d) Mirandillas testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e)
Mirandillas account was inconsistent with that of Jesalvas.
Ruling
The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed on
Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.

I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect
The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas positive identification of the
petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of them made during
her court testimony on March 6, 1995,13 viz:
q Who were you saying we sat together?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.
q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the sala and the
house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting arrangement of
yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of me,
I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona
q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in otherwords,
the door was at his back.
q Was the door open?
a Yes, sir.
q Was the door immediately found Rather was this the main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
a Yes, sir.
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished assisting the
persons in Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were you doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.
q How about Kgd. Jesalva?

a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.

q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was any incident
that happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were successive
shots.
q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or who was
responsible for the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.
q Who is this Salvador Atizado?
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.
q Can you be able to identify him?
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered Salvador Atizado.)
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward.
q Then after that what happened?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible stop thats enough, and I gave
assistance to Kgd. Llona.
q Then after that what happened?
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the gun.
q Then what did you do when you heard that?
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at that time I do
not know his name.
q Then what did you see of him?
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the cylinder of the gun.
q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun
was pointed at?

a It was pointed towards me.

q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.
q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this man?
a Yes, sir.
q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?
a Yes, sir.
q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?
a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of the person, the
person tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)
q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his revolver and he
was moving backward, did you see other persons as his companion, if any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already on the process
of leaving the place.
q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
a Danilo Atizado
q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandillas positive
identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the
petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt
whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery.
It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judges evaluation of the
credibility of a witness and of the witness testimony is accorded the highest respect because
the trial judges unique opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him
to determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not.14 Such evaluation, when affirmed by
the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the disposition of
the case.15 We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners have not called attention to

and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the

application of the rule is that Mirandillas positive declarations on the identities of the assailants
prevailed over the petitioners denials and alibi.16
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.17 Yet, the State did not have to
prove the petitioners previous agreement to commit the murder,18 because their conspiracy was
deduced from the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act.19 They had
acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of
purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable as
co-principals.20 Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in
murder.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment
or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might
make.21 For treachery to be attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders.22 Moreover, treachery must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.23

The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that treachery
attended the attack o[n] the victim" because Atizados shooting the victim at the latters back
had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals
conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed
with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreals handgun did not fire.24
We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their deadly
assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an
altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim
provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be swift and
unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend himself.25 Such manner
constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured their unhampered
execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetuato death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly
imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article
63 (2) of the RPC.26 But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his
being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate
Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth
certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was
committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that
he was 17 years of age.27 Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he
was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994.28 Thirdly, Villafes affidavit dated
June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.29 Fourthly, as
RTCs minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,30 Monreal was 22 years old when he
testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,31 which meant that he was not over 18 years
of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager
and young looking at the time of the incident.32
The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the
norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,33 viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption
of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is
proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the
childs birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of
these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies

of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same
court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main
case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,34 when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the
RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of
imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum
period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his
proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18,
1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreals detention should be credited in
the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,35 the revision of
the penalty now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic
Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and
services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and reintegration, geared towards their development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict
serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act
and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of
Llona.1avvp++il Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of the crime
stands,36 despite the reduction of Monreals penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages
in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA granted only P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the
amounts for death indemnity and moral damages should each be raised to P75,000.00 to
accord with prevailing case law;37and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the
attendance of treachery should be further awarded,38 to accord with the pronouncement in
People v. Catubig,39 to wit:
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the
social order and other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one
day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release
Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being
held for other lawful causes; and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L.
Llona P75,000.00 as death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau of

Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days
from service.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166470

August 7, 2009

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-1 and NATIVIDAD CRUZHERNANDEZ,Petitioners,

vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169217
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA C.
HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,2 Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses
Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to
complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal
uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children,
petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. HernandezVilla Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable
real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years
old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu
stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her
estate.3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix
continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993,
petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners
undertook various "projects" involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased
one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision.4 In 1995,
Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property5 was under litigation.

Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney6 (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma.
Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her halfsister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400.7 Thereafter,
Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to
Oxford Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at
her disposal.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita
San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided
to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and
was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She
later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without
running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the
garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical
examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from
which she was suffering several complications.8
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from
petitioners.9However, the demand was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship10 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband
were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal
partnership.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had
been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and
maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage.
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of
executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope
of their respective authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such
matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among
those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family. However, because the "sale"
between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already

barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they
claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences
with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents,
stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the
San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they
lived a "luxurious" lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother
and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the
alarming state of her health.11 Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and
suffering from its complications,12 she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular
disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in
view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would
not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,13 the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical
and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and
property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian
over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient
to secure LulusP50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.14 The motion, however,
was denied.15
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court
of Appeals (CA).16 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of
the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.17 It held that respondent presented sufficient
evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed
assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her
estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that,
since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal
guardian.1avvphi1 Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to
appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.
Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.18
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was
provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was
abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police
Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.

The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in
Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio
subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad
because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.19
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus20 in the CA alleging that
petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez,
Rizal.
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal
guardian, was entitled to her custody. 21
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution
dated July 12, 2005.22 Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.
The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who requires
the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property.
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians23 regarding her mental state
were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore
failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been
presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason,
Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family
Code,24 legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support
each other fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo. She
disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and
convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive
behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and
imaginary pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna."25 The November 21, 2005 medical
report26 stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant
improvements in her behavior.
We find the petition to be without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on
the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.27 Lulu's attending
physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe
her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage
below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.28 The
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental

sanity will suffice.30 Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally
when she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments
and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would
require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves
questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take
cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this
case.32 We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.1avvph!1
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the
propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.33 We therefore affirm her
appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of
Lulu, and manage her estate as well.34
Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the
issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the
rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.35 Respondent, as the judicial
guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her
obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.36
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate
and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for
themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for
any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs
estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
Treble costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176947

February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting
(Tambunting) of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc dismissed
Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18 August 2006. The present petition seeks to
reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of
the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordoras motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that
Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B
[Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows,
particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.3 (Boldface and
capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting

claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon
departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu,
Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re:
CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state,
among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9- residence requirement which
he lost when [he was] naturalized as an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic]
Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the
above basic requirements under No. 12 that he is indeed eligible for the office to which
he seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established
by his own statementsbefore the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x x.4 (Emphases in the
original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino
mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after
Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an
American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took
an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225),
or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has
imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in
Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines
was shown by his service as councilor of Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambuntings
certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his
naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is
not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint against
Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordoras
reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an
American passport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his
accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion which
concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out
that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively
renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004
and ran for public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same
arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the
COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable
cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambuntings failure to
meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare
Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute
Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an
Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Bancs ruling that there is no
sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for
trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable

cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of

documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the
complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one
hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of Section
74, among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambuntings Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process
involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting
acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented
contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly,
Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before
the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.7

Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled
that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local
position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
xxx
[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was
not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of

different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child
of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any
person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but
his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that
such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of
his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation
disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or
the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can renounce.
There are such countries in the world.1avvphi1
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be
an election for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election.
Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question.
So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of
Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that
he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v.
Manzano,9 Valles v. COMELEC,10 and AASJS v. Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve
similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed
dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the
United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and
a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by
effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individuals active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No.
9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his
Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The
act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years
after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per
se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized
citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the
Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal
and COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve

natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter
ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino,
did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of
Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is
not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the
twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there
permanently,16 and is not dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully
made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently
proved his innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which
he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by
law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections En Bancdated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to
the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution
seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House
of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record
94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued
declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing
the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March
20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before
the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise
filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the
word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking
her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed
her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along
with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and
clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote
of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification
in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing
with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy
after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with
the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that
what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In
an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven

months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the
District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides,
the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she
was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to
be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore,
is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the
case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and
orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only
as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent
indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition).
Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro
Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on
March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded
to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted
by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has
not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTCTacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991,
the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila
and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate
of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile.
She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a
resident ofManila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case
of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile
by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention
to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in
Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative
of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return
to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
"since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of
Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers
only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the
First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that
she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it,
no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC

reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held
May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May
14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes
compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of
the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues
may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under
Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in
the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent
to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons,
he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu
vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place
of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled
is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this
Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile
or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that
is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision
in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence
in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence
in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a

candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run
in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was
a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source
of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the
first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District
of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she
lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter.
Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in

San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of
the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is
where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives
with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and
without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in
the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or
business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or
business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one
and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification
in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in

election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to
Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting wellpublicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the
ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties
to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of
the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could

not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there
again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms
imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while
in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as

they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia.
Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion
cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home
or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place
to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is
Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of
the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife
should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to
conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision

must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one
another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has
been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence
is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence
or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under
the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting
to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs.Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of
those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England,
formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice
was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and
in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the

English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England,
could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes
Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who
had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby,
36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of
the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order
of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in
the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she
had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property;
and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed
by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place
of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places
of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos
had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home
in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her
"homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified
as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our
discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be
highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of
her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to
this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec.
17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have

clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities,
this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was
held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time
of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident
of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to
be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction
over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and
spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat
the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are

hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
SO ORDERED.