PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS

BAR OPS PILIPINAS

2016

POLITICAL
LAW
Prepared by: Dean Sedfrey Candelaria and
students of Ateneo de Manila University

FUNA v. VILLAR
[GR. No. 192791; April 24, 2012]

Facts:
On Feb. 15, 2001, PGMA appointed Carague as COA Chairman (7-year term). Caragues
term of office started on Feb. 2, 2001, to end on Feb. 2, 2008.
On Feb. 7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third member of COA (7-year term) starting
Feb. 2, 2004 until Feb. 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on Feb. 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar
as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from Feb. 4,
2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as COA
Chairman. Thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment.
He was to serve as COA Chairman until the expiration of the original term of his
office as COA Commissioner or on Feb. 2, 2011.
Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed
as COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up to
Feb. 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years. He argues that his term of office as such
COA Chairman, is up to Feb. 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from Feb. 2, 2008 when he
was appointed to that position.
Issues:
1) WON a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is
constitutionally permissible and does not constitute reappointment as barred by the Article
IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution.
2) WON the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman is valid.

Held:
1) YES. Section 1(2) of Art. IX(D) of the Constitution 1 does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the
full term of seven years. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission
membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the
term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years
so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a
1 Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution.
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2) NO. In light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villars appointment to a full term is not valid as
he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years under the constitutional ban. A shorter
term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment
would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years.
To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than
seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a
result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment
to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

HACIENDA LUISITA v. PARC

[GR. No. 171101; November 22, 2011]

Facts:
Pursuant to PD 27, tenant-farmers, depending on the size of the landholding worked
on, can either purchase the land they tilled or shift from share to fixed-rent leasehold
tenancy.
However, the scope of the PD covered only tenanted, privately-owned rice and corn
lands.
Proclamation No. 131, Series of 1987 was issued instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP) to cover all agricultural lands, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced.
EO 229 provided for the mechanisms for CARP implementation and created the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) as the highest policy-making body that
formulates all policies, rules, and regulations necessary for the implementation of CARP.
The Spanish owners of Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda Luisita and the sugar mill,
Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), within the estate.
Tarlac Devt Corp (Tadeco), owned by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group, was willing to buy.
Tadeco undertook to pay the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while that
for the controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars.
The PH Govt, thru the then Central Bank, assisted the buyer to obtain a dollar loan from a
US bank.
In 1957, GSIS also extended a P5.911M loan in favor of Tadeco upon the condition that
the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita shall be subdivided by Tadeco and sold at cost
to the tenants, should there be any, and other applicable conditions under the Land
Tenure Act.
In 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against Tadeco
et al, for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Argrarian Reform so
that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost.
Tadeco et al. alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants and that besides which
sugar lands, of which the hacienda consisted, are not covered by existing agrarian reform
legislations.
The Manila RTC ordered Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
Tadeco appealed to the CA.
The OSG moved to withdraw the govts case against Tadeco et al.

The CA dismissed the case the Marcos govt initially instituted and won against Tadeco et
al.

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o However, the dismissal action was made subject to the obtention by

Tadeco of the PARCs approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must
initially be implemented after such approval shall have been secured.
Section 10 of EO 229 allows corporate landowners, as an alternative to the actual land
transfer scheme of CARP, to give qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase shares of
stocks of the corporation under a stock ownership arrangement and/or land-to-share
ration.
RA 6657 also provides 2 alternative modalities: land or stock transfer, but subject to
conditions and timeline requirements.
o Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, corporate landowners may voluntarily transfer
ownership over their agricultural landholdings to the Republic of the
Philippines or to qualified beneficiaries.
Upon certification by the DAR, corporations owning agricultural lands may give their
qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the
corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears
in relation to the companys total assets.
Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition
by the farmworkers.
o Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion and other
farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of
stock.
Tadeco increased its capital stock from P1.5M to P400M with par value of P1/share.
150M shares were to be issued only to qualified and registered beneficiaries of the CARP
and the remaining 250M to any stockholder of the corporation.
93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita
signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock Distribution
Option Plan.
The Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA), styled as a MOA, was entered
into by Tadeco, HLI, and the qualified FWBs as attested to by then DAR Secretary
Philip Juico.
The ration of the land-to-shares of stock corresponds to 33.3% of the outstanding capital
stock of the HLI, equivalent to 118M shares of stock.
The SDP was approved in 1989.
In 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from
agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657.
o Sec. 65 of RA 6657: After the lapse of 5 years from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or
the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value of residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the
affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the
reclassification, or conversion of the land and its disposition.
The DAR approved the application subject to the payment of 3% of the gross selling
price to the FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance with its undertakings under the
SDP, among other conditions.
HLI ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to Centennary Holdings Inc. in
exchange for subscription of shares of stocks of the latter.
HLI transferred the remaining 200 hectares to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC).
Subsequently, Centennary sold the 300 hectares to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation
(LIPCO) for the purpose of developing an industrial complex.

LIPCO transferred several parcels of land to RCBC by way of dacion en pago in

payment of LIPCOs loan obligations.

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 Petitioners sought to revoke the SDOA, alleging that HLI failed to give them their dividends
and the 1% share in gross sales, and the 33% share in the proceeds of the sale of the converted
500 hectares of land.
o They prayed for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation.
The DAR constituted a Special Task Force to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI, who
found that HLI had not complied with its obligations under R A6657 despite the implementation
of the SDP.
PARC adopted the recommendation of DAR to recall/revoke the approval of HLIs SDP and the
acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through the compulsory acquisition scheme.
HLI sought reconsideration.
Notwithstanding the MR, HLI filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 assailing and seeking to set aside the PARC Resolutions.
RCBC and LIPCO moved to intervene, claiming that the revocation of the SDP cannot legally
affect their rights as innocent purchasers for value.
Issue/s:
1) WON PARC and DAR have jurisdiction, power and/or authority to nullify, recall,
revoke or rescind the SDOA
2) WON the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case

Held:
1) YES.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, the authority to approve the plan for stock
distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC.
However, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved.
Such power or authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of
necessary implication.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from it terms.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of
express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of
corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the
plan.
A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations between or
among parties is deemed read into the contract and its implementation cannot
successfully be resisted by force of the non-impairment guarantee.
The non-impairment protection is applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing intention of the parties.
Necessarily, the constitutional proscription would not apply to laws already in effect at
the time of contract execution.
The prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts is aligned with the
general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot
affect acts or contracts already perfected.
However, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and
deemed a part thereof.
2) YES.
The non-impairment clause under Sec. 10, Art. II is limited in application to laws about
to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
The operative fact doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null and
void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided.
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Rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly
incurred in the meantime.
The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
Prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative to executive act must have
been in force and had to be complied with.
This is so until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects.
Prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.
That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive actsin this case, the
approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distributionis well-settled in our
jurisprudence.
Considering that more than two decades had passed since the PARCs approval of the
HLIs SDP, in conjunction with numerous activities performed in good faith by HLI, and
the reliance by the FWBs on the legality and validity of the PARC-approved SDP,
perforce, certain rights of the parties, more particularly the FWBs, have to be respected
pursuant to the application in a general way of the operative fact doctrine.

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN,

and Rep. LIZA MAZA v. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs
G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011
Facts:
1. On May 9, 2003, Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note Np. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral
agreement between the USA and the RP.
2. The Agreement provides that the current or former Government officials, employees, or
military personnel or nationals of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent
the express consent of that Party, be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international
tribunal, or to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of
surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal unless such tribunal has been established by
the UN Security Council.
3. Via Exchange of Notes dated May 13, 2003, the RP, represented by DFA Secretary Ople,
agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government.
4. Bayan Muna imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as constitutional, or at least declared as without force
and effect.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the RP-US Non-Surrender was contracted validly
2. Whether the Agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least
two-thirds of all the members of the Senate
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Held:
1. Yes. According to the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes
falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted
form of international agreement. The notes exchanged, be it viewed as the Non-Surrender
Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance or as consent to be bound is a
recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.
2. Yes. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a
treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The Executive
exercises the right to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. An act of the executive branch with a
foreign government must be afforded great respect. The authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. This is in consonance with the inviolable
doctrine of separation of powers. Absent any clear contravention of the law, courts should
exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid.

ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ,

and CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU;
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) V. RICARDO
L. INOCIAN, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES,
EMILIA E. BACALLA, RESTITUTA E. MONTANA, and RAUL L. INOCIAN; and
ALETHA SUICO MAGAT, in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of PHILIP
M. SUICO, DORIS S. DELA CRUZ, JAMES M. SUICO, EDWARD M. SUICO,
ROSELYN SUICO-LAWSIN, REX M. SUICO, KHARLA SUICO-GUTIERREZ,
ALBERT CHIONGBIAN, and JOHNNY CHAN
G.R. No. 168770 and G.R. No. 168812; February 9, 2011
Facts:
1. The case is a consolidation of two petitions with the issue of the right of the former owners of
lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or secure
reconveyance of their respective properties. The repurchase was based on the assurance of the
government negotiating team that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug
Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.
2. In 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to
accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. This prompted the former lot owners
to demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to
repurchase. However, their demands were not granted.

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Issue:
Whether or not the abandonment of the public use for which the subject properties were
expropriated entitles the Ouanos and Inoncian to reacquire them

Held:
Yes. If the genuine public necessity, the very reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first
instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent
point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The government cannot keep the
property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of
expropriation.
Equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the
Ouanos and Inocians. Justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to
MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective
properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the
time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. They must likewise pay MCIAA the
necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the monetary
value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private owners,
were benefited thereby.

Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board

[G.R. No. 166910 October 19, 2010)

Facts:
In 1977, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1112, authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on
public improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need
to tap into the resources of the private sector to implement the program. The TRB was
given the power to enter into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation
of tollways, grant authority to operate a toll facility, and issue the necessary Toll
Operation Certificate (TOC). PD 1112 also allowed the collection of toll fees for the
use of certain public improvements, allowing a reasonable rate of ROI.
P.D.1113 was also issued, granting the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) a franchise to construct toll facilities with a right to collect fees as the TRB
may fix. TRB and PNCC signed an agreement for the operation of the North Luzon and
South Luzon expressway.
PD 1894 was then issued further granting the PNCC a franchise over the Metro
Manila Expressway (MMEX) and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX. As stated
in the previous P.D.s, PNCC may sell its franchise upon the Presidents approval.
Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1994, the DPWH
together with other private entities executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private
capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into financial
and technical JVAs through Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) with
private entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sections 3 (a) and (d) of P.D. 1112 in relation to
Section 8 (b) of P.D. 1894 insofar as they vested the TRB, on one hand, toll operation
awarding power while, on the other hand, granting it also the power to issue, modify and
promulgate toll rate charges. Petitioners allege that the TRB, cannot be an awarding
party of a TOA and, at the same time, be the regulator of the toll way industry and and
ajudicator of rate exactions disputes.
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Issue: WoN the TRB has the power to grant public utility franchise (Toll Operation
Agreements).
Held:
YES, the TRB may issue toll operation agreements.
A franchise is basically a legislative grant of a special privilege to a person, which
includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but
also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has
been delegated by Congress.
There is nothing in the Constitution indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise
before each and every public utility may operate. That the Constitution provides that the
issuance of a franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does not
necessarily imply that only Congress has the power to grant such authorization.
Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility
franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the
power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to
some administrative agencies. By explicit provisions of the subject PDs, the TRB was
given power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects.
The only limitations provided for by Article 12, Section 11 of the Constitution are as
follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or
corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and
(c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years.

RUBRICO v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
[GR. No. 183871; February 18, 2010]

Facts:
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D.
Rubrico (Lourdes) and detained her at the air base without charges.
Following a week of relentless interrogationconducted alternately by hooded
individualsand what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes was
released but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset.
After she was released, the harassment still continued. Her daughters were also
constrained to leave their house because of the presence of men watching them.
Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse
of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben
Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters
301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes.
o But nothing has happened and the threats and harassment incidents have been
reported to the police but nothing eventful resulted from their investigations.
Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate
that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of
Loudes.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to
desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended
party.
The respondents, President GMA, the AFP and PNP officers denied the allegations.
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Issue/s:
WON the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition and dropping President
Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent?

Held: NO. The president is immune from suit and may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of
the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to
make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and
harassment that followed.

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