THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 190984, August 19, 2015

ACOMARIT ACOMARIT LIMITED, PHILS., AND/OR HONGKONG, Petitioners, v. GOMER L.
DOTIMAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a petition for review on certiorari, dated March 8, 2010, of petitioners Acomarit Phils.
and/or Acomarit Hong Kong Limited, assailing the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated December 12, 2008 and January
20, 2010, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the Resolutions3 dated September 30, 2003 and
February 23, 2004 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and ruling that respondent Gomer L. Dotimas
suffered from permanent total disability thus entitling him to US$ 60, 000.00.
The antecedents follow:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Under a Contract of Employment dated October 27, 1999, respondent Gomer L. Dotimas was employed by
ACOMARIT Phils. for its principal and ACOMARIT Hongkong, Limited as Able Seaman on board the vessel "M/V
SAUDI RIYADH" for 10 months.4 His Employment Contract5 stated the following terms and
conditions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Duration of Contract
Position
Basic Monthly Salary
Hours of work
Overtime

:
:
:
:
:

Vacation leave with pay

Point of hire

:
:

10 months
Able Seaman
US$ 410.00/mo.
44 hours/week
US$ 228.00/mo. Fixed overtime
2.68/hour after 90 hours
6 days/mo.
Manila, Philippines

Respondent was issued a clean bill of health prior to being deployed after he underwent a medical examination
required by the POEA and existing laws.6redarclaw
On April 26, 2000, while on board and discharging his duties, respondent met an accident which injured his left leg.
He was brought to the Rashid Hospital in Dubai where he was given first aid treatment.7 Sometime in May 2000,
respondent was repatriated for medical reasons.8redarclaw
Petitioners referred respondent to its designated physician who recommended that his knee should be operated
on.9 Respondent underwent surgery known as Open Reduction and Fixation with Intramedullary Nails.10 After a series
of evaluations, on September 21, 2000, Dr. Elenita Torres Supan, the attending physician, issued a final evaluation
certificate wherein she categorically cleared respondent from his injury and allowed him to resume his work even with
implants, which can be removed after a year and a half.11redarclaw
On May 2, 2001, respondent, through counsel, wrote petitioners, claiming for full disability benefits amounting to
US$60,000.00. He claimed that the injury suffered while working for petitioners "will not permit him to work again" as
a Seaman which rendered him totally and permanently disabled.12redarclaw
After his demand went unheeded, respondent filed on July 6, 2001 a Complaint for Disability Benefits and for Moral
and Exemplary Damages plus attorney's fees alleging that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1.

he continues to suffer from the injury which caused his repatriation;

2.

an independent physician had suggested a disability grade of 13 for his injury;

3.

he is suffering from permanent medical unfitness which entitles him to at least US$3,360 up to a
maximum of US$60,000; [and]

4.

private respondents failed and unjustifiably refused to pay his disability benefits.13

Having failed to reach amicable settlement during the mandatory conference, the parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers.
Respondent averred that under the provision of the Labor Code and Supreme Court doctrines, he is entitled to full
disability benefits because his injury occurred during his 10-month contract and he is no longer fit for sea services as
certified by an independent doctor, and has, as a result lost his earning capacity. He argued that the POEA Contract
does not exclude or prohibit an independent physician from giving a disability grading and that the Labor Code
concept of disability (loss or diminution of earning power) is not excluded in the interpretation of the provisions of the
POEA Contract.14redarclaw
Furthermore, respondent alleged that although he was pronounced fit to work, he can never be considered fit for
employment if he still has implants on his leg since he can no longer carry heavy objects while on board a vessel. He
claimed that the declaration of fit to work by the company designated physician was made out of bias.15redarclaw
On the other hand, petitioners averred: that respondent is not entitled to any disability benefit as he was declared fit
to work by the company designated physician; that his fit to work declaration negates his claims for disability benefits;
that under the provisions of POEA Standard Employment Contract, respondent's disability can only be assessed by
the companydesignated physician and such declaration binds the complainant; and, that the company-designated
physician is the most qualified to determine the precise condition of respondent's health for having monitored and
treated the complainant.16redarclaw
In a Decision17 dated January 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion
of which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the instant complaint be, as it is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.18
In ruling that respondent is not entitled to disability benefits, the LA cited the case of German Marine Agencies, Inc.
vs. NLRC19 where the Court held that it is the company-designated physician who must proclaim that the seaman
suffered a permanent disability whether total or partial due to either injury or illness during the term of the latter's
employment, thus, the complainant's claim for permanent partial or permanent total disability must necessary
fail.20 The declaration of fitness issued by the physicians who attended to and periodically evaluated the respondent's
condition soon after his repatriation from the vessel may not be outweighed by the certification of purported disability
issued 10 months after the complainant was certified fit to resume employment.21redarclaw
Respondent appealed before the NLRC, which affirmed the ruling of the LA and rendered its decision in favor of the
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision is hereby ordered AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.22
In its decision, the NLRC noted that all the evaluation certificates issued by the company-designated physicians were
all in order and not biased as to favor petitioners in their findings. The medical evaluation was periodically made and
consistent with the diagnosis made on the complainant as with continuous improvement on his operated
leg.23redarclaw
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 31, 2003. However, the NLRC dismissed the motion for
not finding any compelling reason to disturb the findings and conclusion thereon.24redarclaw

Aggrieved, the respondent elevated the matters.to the CA via petition for certiorari. The CA reversed and set aside
the twin Resolutions of the NLRC. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed twin Resolutions, dated September 30,
2003 and dated February 23, 2004, of the Public Respondent National Labor Relations Commission, in OFW (M) 01071332-00, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Private Respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay Petitioner permanent total disability
benefits of [US$ 60,000.00] at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment and attorney's fees of ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.25
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a Resolution dated January 20, 2010.
Hence, the petitioners filed before this Court the present petition raising the following issues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred in failing to abide by the express mandate of the governing POEA
Contract and jurisprudence which provides that disability benefits are only given to seafarers who suffer disabilities. In
this case, respondent was already declared "FIT TO WORK" by the company-designated physician;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious, reversible error of law in failing to consider that the findings of
the company-designated physician are conclusive in accordance with the ruling of this Honorable Court in several
cases; [and]
3. Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious, reversible error of law in not giving petitioners the opportunity to
file any comment to respondent's Petition for Certiorari.26
This Court finds the present petition partly meritorious.
A cursory reading of the applicable contractual provisions and a judicious evaluation of the supporting evidence on
records, lends strong credence to the contentions and arguments presented by petitioners.
Petitioners argued that the decision of the CA awarding disability benefits to respondent constitutes grave error and
grave abuse of discretion for reason that respondent was already declared "FIT TO WORK" by the companydesignated physician. Petitioners alleged that the declaration of fitness by the company-designated physician bars
respondent's claim for disability benefits from prospering.27redarclaw
Petitioners disagreed with the CA's ruling that respondent is suffering from total and permanent disability as he was
purportedly unable to work for more than 120 days.28 The CA concluded that as a result of his illness, respondent was
clearly shown to be actually unfit to go back to his work as Able Seaman for at least five (5) months or for more than
120 days.29redarclaw
The CA held that respondent's inability to resume work for more than 120 days, by itself, already constituted
permanent total disability. However, we have settled that a seafarer's inability to resume his work after the lapse of
more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a magic wand that automatically warrants
the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor.30redarclaw
While it may appear that under the POEA-SEC31 and Labor Code32 the 120-day period is non-extendible and the
lapse thereof without the employer making any declaration would be enough to consider the employee permanently
disabled, interpreting them in harmony with the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC)33 indicates
otherwise. That if the employer's failure to make a declaration on the fitness or disability of the seafarer is because of
the latter's need for further medical attention, the period of temporary and total disability may be extended to a
maximum of 240 days.34redarclaw
We held in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.35 that a temporary total disability becomes permanent when
so declared by the company-designated physician within the period allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240day medical treatment period in case of absence of a declaration of fitness or permanent disability.36redarclaw

In the Vergara case, this Court discussed the significance of the 120- day period as one when the seafarer is
considered to be totally yet temporarily disabled, thus, entitling him to sickness wages. This is also the period given to
the employer to determine whether the seafarer is fit for sea duty or permanently disabled and the degree of such
disability.
Based on this Court's pronouncements, it is easily discernible that the 120-day or 240-day periods, and the
obligations the law imposed on the employer are determinative of when a seafarer's cause. of action for total and
permanent disability may be considered to have arisen. Thus, a seafarer may pursue an action for total and
permanent disability benefits if:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or
disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment
would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician;
the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as
the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC
are of a contrary opinion;
the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors
who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but
total as well;
the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute
on the disability grading;
the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related
under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20- B(3) of the
POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
the company designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to
pay him the corresponding benefits; and
the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods.37

It is undisputed that after respondent's repatriation sometime in May 2000, he was referred to the companydesignated physician who, upon evaluation, recommended that he underwent a surgery. After a series of evaluations,
Dr. Torres-Supan, the attending physician, issued a final evaluation certificate on September 21, 2000 wherein she
categorically cleared respondent from his injury and declared him fit to resume his work even with implants.
This Court has observed that the records are devoid of facts about the intervening period from the time that the
respondent was declared fit to work and the time he claimed permanent disability benefits. It was never alleged
whether respondent attempted to resume his work with the petitioners or applied for work to another company.
From May 2000 to September 21, 2001, 144 days had lapsed before respondent was declared fit to work.
Concededly, said periods have already exceeded the 120-day period under Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC and
Article 192 of the Labor Code. However, records show that respondent underwent a series of evaluations which
implied requirement of further medical treatment, thus, justifying the extension of the 120-day period. The companydesignated doctor had a period of 240 days within which to make a finding on his fitness for further sea duties or
degree of disability.
When respondent was declared fit to work 144 days from the date of his medical repatriation, he cannot be
considered under the state of permanent total disability. Hence, he cannot be said to have acquired a cause of action
for total and permanent disability benefits. To stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the
lapse of the same, he fails to make such declaration. In this case, he was declared fit to work 144 days from the date
of his medical repatriation or before the lapse of 240 days.
Petitioners reiterated that the findings and/or assessments of the company-designated physician are final and form
the basis on whether or not respondent can claim for disability benefits as per provisions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract. As the company-designated physician declared him fit, then he should not be awarded
disability benefits.38redarclaw
The claim for sickness and permanent disability benefits arose from the stipulations in the standard format contract of
employment pursuant to a circular of the POEA. Such circular was intended for all parties involved in the employment
of Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel. The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is
the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them. Thus, the parties are both bound by the

provisions of the POEA contract which declares that the degree of disability or fitness to work of a seafarer should be
assessed by the company-designated physician.39redarclaw
The relevant provision of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
xxxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work related injury or illness during the term of his contract
are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the companydesignated physician hut in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a companydesignated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do
so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the
seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the
above benefits.40
It was held that a claimant, in submitting himself to examination by the company-designated physician, does not
automatically bind himself to the medical report issued by the company-designated physician; neither are the labor
tribunals and the courts bound by said medical report. Its inherent merit will be weighed and duly considered. The
claimant may dispute the medical report issued by the company-designated physician by seasonably consulting
another physician. The medical report issued by said physician will also be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the
court based on its inherent merits.41 In this case, respondent failed to dispute the declaration of fit to work by the
company-designated physician by not timely consulting another physician.
Both the LA and the NLRC denied respondent's claim on the ground that he failed to controvert the certification
issued by Dr. Torres-Supan that he is fit to work. Respondent took roughly eight months or until May 2, 2001, before
disputing the finding of Dr. Torres-Supan by writing the petitioners, through his counsel, for claim for disability
benefits. Then, after his demand went unheeded, he challenged the doctor's competency and the correctness of her
'findings when he filed the complaint against the petitioners before the LA on July 6, 2001.42 It is likewise noted from
records that his basis of disability was an evaluation made 10 months after he was certified fit to work by the
company-designated physician. He presented the certification of Dr. Jocelyn Myra R. Caja on July 20, 2001
suggesting disability grade 13.43redarclaw
As this Court has settled, it makes no sense to compare the certification of a company-designated physician with that
of an employee appointed physician if the former is dated seven to eight months earlier than the latter- there would
be no basis for comparison at all.44 In this case, the certification of the company-designated physician was ten
months earlier than that of the appointed physician of the respondent. Thus, there would be no basis for comparison.
Nevertheless, this Court finds that respondent is entitled to temporary total disability benefit. Both the companydesignated physician and respondent's own physician concluded that his left tibia was fractured and that it was
healed after the surgery.45 Under the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or
Illness Contracted in Section 30 of 1996 POEA SEC, the "slight atrophy of calf of leg muscles without apparent
shortening or joint lesion or disturbance of weight-bearing line" suffered by respondent has a corresponding
Impediment Grade of 13. The Schedule of Disability Allowances in Section 30-A of POEA-SEC provides
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Impediment Grade
13

Impediment
(maximum rate)
US$ 50,000.00

6.72%

Thus, respondent Dotimas is entitled to US$3,360.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the exchange rate

prevailing during the time of payment.

Lastly, the petitioners argued that the CA committed serious, reversible error of law in not giving them the opportunity
to file any comment to respondent's Petition for Certiorari.
If the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process, the court shall
issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within 10 days from receipt. In
petitions before this Court and the CA, the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a
motion to dismiss, the petition before giving due course thereto. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply
and such other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper.46redarclaw
It is also provided in the Internal Rules of the CA that in petitions for certiorari, the court may dismiss the petition
outright or require the private respondents to file a comment, not a motion to dismiss.47redarclaw
Contrary to petitioners' claim, records show that the CA issued a Resolution on August 3, 2004, ordering them to file
their Comment within 10 days from notice. As per tracer reply of Postmaster Makati City, petitioners received the
Resolution on August 9, 2004. On November 18, 2004, it was noted on the records that no comment was
filed.48 Thus, the CA ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda within 15 days from notice on
November 23, 2004.49redarclaw
Lastly, in conformity with current policy and pursuant to the case of Nacar v. Gallery Frames,50 we impose on "the
monetary award for temporary total disability benefit an interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment until full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari, dated March 8, 2010, of petitioners Acomarit Phils. and/or
Acomarit Hongkong Limited is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution, dated
December 12, 2008 and January 20, 2010, respectively, of the Court of Appeals reversing the Resolutions dated
September 30, 2003 and February 23, 2004 of the National Labor Relations Commission and ruling that respondent
Gomer L. Dotimas suffered from permanent total disability, thus, entitling him to US$60,000.00, are
hereby MODIFIED to the effect that petitioners Acomarit Phils. and/or Acomarit Hongkong Limited are ORDERED to
pay, jointly and severally, respondent Gomer L. Dotimas the amount of US$3,360.00, or its Peso equivalent at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment as disability benefits plus the interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 170706, August 26, 2015

PRUDENCIO CARANTO, Petitioner, v. BERGESEN D.Y. PHILS. AND/OR BERGESEN D.Y. A.S.A.,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 9, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals issued inCA- G.R. SP No. 87979 which reversed the Resolution2 dated August 31, 2004 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 00-09-1459-00. Also assailed is theCA
Resolution3 dated December 9, 2005 denying reconsideration thereof.
On October 21, 1999, petitioner was hired by respondent Bergesen D. Y. Phils., Inc., the local manning agent of
respondent Bergesen D. Y. ASA, as Chief Steward/Cook aboard its vessel "M/V Berge Hus", for a period of 9 months
with a salary of US$877.00 per month.4 Petitioner had previouslyentered into 3 separate contracts of employment
with respondents. Petitiorter is a member of the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union pCthe Philippines
(AMOSUP) which has a Collective Bargaining (CBA) with respondent foreign principal, represented by respondent
local manning agent.5 Petitioner underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) before he was deployed
for overseas employment. His PEME indicated that he was fit for sea service but with a notation "Class B diabetes
mellitus controlled with medications".6 Petitioner embarked on respondents' vessel and left the Philippines on
December 11, 1999.

On December 18, 1999, while on board the vessel, petitioner felt a severe headache accompanied by fever and
dizziness. Despite the medication given him by the Chief Mate, his condition did not improve. He was examined by a
medical doctor from Jivan Deep Hospital and Polyclinic in Jamnagar, India, who diagnosed him to be suffering; from
diabetes mellitus and hypertension.7 He was then signed off from the vessel and repatriated to the Philippines on
December 25, 1999 for further medical treatment.
On January 3, 2000, petitioner was referred to Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), the company-designated physician,
from Medical Center Manila. Dr. Cruz had seen petitioner seven times8 wherein he instructed the latter to undergo
laboratory examinations. He had issued reports9 on different dates indicating the laboratory results and the prescribed
medications as well as petitioner's physical condition. During petitioner's visit on April 7, 2000, Dr. Cruz found that
petitioner was not suffering from body weakness, the repeat FBS was normal and his blood pressure was 130/70
which was normal Petitioner was then diagnosed with controlled hypertension and diabetus mellitus, and was
declared fit to work on April 7, 2000.10redarclaw
While Dr. Cruz declared petitioner fit to work on April 7, 2000, respondents still granted the request of petitioner's
counsel for another medical opinion. Thus, in a fax transmission11 dated June 22, 2000 sent to petitioner's counsel,
respondents required petitioner to see Dr. Natalia G. Alegre (Dr. Alegre) of St. Luke's Hospital for a second medical
opinion. Petitioner went to see Dr. Alegre only on August 31, 2000 wherein he was directed to undergo laboratory
examinations. On September 7, 2000, Dr. Alegre issued a Medical Report12 as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The chest x-ray of Mr. Prudencio Caranto showed the heart not enlarged. The FBS was elevated at 236 mg/dl
(normal Value: 70-110). The creatinine (kidney function test) was normal but the urinalysis showed +2 glucose. The
Glycohemoglobin test (HbAIC) was normal. The 2D Echo revealed concentric left ventricular hypertrophy with
adequate wall motion and contractility but with diastolic dyskinesia.
Patient then has complications involving the heart and the eyes (Gr. I-II hypertensive retinopathy). He belongs to
medium to high risk category group that in 20-30% in 10 years will develop severe complications (heart attack, heart
failure). These target organ damage, eyes and heart, were brought about by non-compliance in the intake of
medications (financial reasons?). Proper control could not be attained because of the above reason. Our Cardiologist
feels that the hypertension and diabetes could be brought under control with diet, exercise and medications given an
approximate time.
Diagnosis: Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Poorly Controlled Non-Insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus, Poorly
Controlled.
Mr. Caranto at this time is not fit for work as opined by our Cardiologist based on the above diagnoses and may be
given a disability of Gr. 12 (slight residuals of disorder of the intra-thoracic organ [heart] and intra abdominal organ
[pancreas-diabetes]) under the heading Abdomen #5.13
Respondents offered petitioner the amount of US$5,225.00 as disability compensation in accordance with his
disability grading but petitioner rejected the offer.
It appears that on May 18, 2000, petitioner had consulted a private physician, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), who
diagnosed him to have Essential Hypertension, Diabetes Mellitus, non-insulin dependent and found his condition to
be a partial permanent disability with an impediment Grade V (58.96%). His justification for Impediment Grade V were
as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
-Patient has both hypertension (uncontrolled) and diabetes mellitus
-His being male and age 51 put him at risk for complications of both elevated BP and blood sugar (diabetes)
-These complications commonly involve the heart, the brain and the kidneys, although at present he does not have
obvious clinical manifestations of such, in the very near future any of these target organs may fail.
-His HPN and DM necessitates lifetime maintenance medicines.
Gainful employment is hard to get when one is diabetic and hypertensive.14
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint against respondents seeking disability benefits, sickness
allowance or reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner filed a Motion15 praying for the issuance of an order to submit himself to the Employees Compensation
Commission for medical re evaluation, as the parties' respective physicians had different assessments. Respondents
filed their Opposition thereto. In an Order16 dated May 25, 2001, the LA denied the motion and directed the parties to
file their position papers with supporting evidence.

On January 30, 2003, the LA rendered a decision,17 the dispositive portion of which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby entered ordering herein respondents Bergensen D.Y.
Philippines, Inc. and Bergensen D.Y. ASA jointly and severally to pay complainant Prudencio
Caranto:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. To pay the sum of US$60,000.00 as permanent medical unfitness benefits under the pertinent provisions of the
CBA (TCCC) of herein parties; and
2. To pay further the sum often percent (10%) of the total award due to the complainant as attorney's fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.18
The LA found that petitioner had already been compensated of his sickness allowance in the total amount of
US$3,299.57. He, however, found that from the time petitioner had been signed off from the vessel on December 25,
1999 for medical treatment up to April 7, 2000, when Dr. Cruz declared the latter fit to work, more than 120 days had
elapsed which entitled petitioner to either a permanent partial or total disability compensation, pursuant to Section
20B (5) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Contract (POEA) contract. The LA upheld the medical assessment
made by Dr. Vicaldo over that of Dr. Alegre's saying that the latter's certification was self-serving being a companydesignated physician whose opinion was biased in favor of the company, hence, petitioner is entitled to a permanent
partial disability benefits equivalent to Grade V (58.96%), or the amount of $29,480.00. However, under the parties'
CBA, petitioner is entitled to a permanent medical unfitness of US$60,000.00.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC. Petitioner filed his Comment thereto.
On August 31, 2004, the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the LA.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was dismissed for Jack of merit in a Reso1ution19 dated November 22,
2004.
Dissatisfied, respondents filed a petition with the CA. After the parties' filing of their respective pleadings, the case
was submitted for decision.
On September 9, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for
accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated August 31, 2004 and November 22, 2004 of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 035491-03 (NLRC NCR Case No. [M] 00-09-1459-00) are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered ORDERING the petitioners Bergesen D.Y. Phils. Inc.
and/or Bergesen D.Y. ASA to pay private respondent Prudencio Caranto permanent disability benefits in accordance
with the Schedule of Compensation under Section 30 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract on the basis of
disability assessment Grade 12 (slight residual of the intra-thoracic organ and intra abdominal organ) of the companydesignated physician Dr. Natalia G. Alegre in the amount of US$5,225.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency. In
addition, private respondent is entitled to attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award.20
In so ruling, the CA found, among others, that there was no substantial evidence to support the NLRC's finding that
Dr. Vicaldo's medical finding and disability assessment were reliable and satisfactory compared to that of Dr. Alegre's.
It also ruled that the NLRC erred in finding that petitioner is entitled to a higher disability compensation benefit
granted under the parties' CBA provision on medical unfitness on the basis of Dr. Vicaldo's disability grade of 58.96%.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied m a Resolution dated December 9, 2005.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
errors:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF BOTH THE

LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC FINDING PETITIONER TO BE ENTITLED, AMONG OTHERS, TO
DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE AMOUNT OF US$60,000.00 UNDER THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CBA.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE PETITIONER'S INDEPENDENT
PHYSICIAN AND IN UPHOLDING INSTEAD THE OPINION OF THE RESPONDENTS' "OTHER COMPANYDESIGNATED PHYSICIAN."
III
IN ANY EVENT AND EVEN IF THE OPINION OF THE COMPANY DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN WAS CORRECTLY
UPHELD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, STILL, PETITIONER'S DISABILITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS
TOTAL AND PERMANENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT
CASE OF CRYSTAL SHIPPING INC., A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN VS. DEO P. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. 154798,
OCTOBER 20, 2005.21
Petitioner assails the CA's finding which gave credence to the disability grading on petitioner's sickness accorded by
Dr. Alegre, the company-designated physician, over that of Dr. Vicaldo's, petitioner's private physician, which involves
a factual inquiry. Elementary is the principle that we are not a trier of facts; only errors of law are generally reviewed
in petitions for review on certioraricriticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals.22 Questions of fact are not
entertained.23 And in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.24 Factual questions are for labor tribunals to
resolve.25 However, since the findings of the LA and the NLRC, on one hand, and the Court of Appeals, on the other,
are conflicting, we have to resolve the factual issues in this case together with the legal Issues.
When the parties entered into a contract of overseas employment on October 21, 1999, the provisions of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Authority Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On-Board the Ocean-Going Vessels is deemed written in his contract of employment. And these provisions
are those prescribed in POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 and DOLE Department Order No. 33, series of
1996.
Section 20-B of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness. - The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel.
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the
full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the
seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical
attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is
declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the companydesignated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a companydesignated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so,
in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above
benefits.
4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of
repatriation in the event that the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable
to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest
efforts.
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by i either
injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section

30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and
the rules of compensation application at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company designated physician who is entrusted with the
task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the
latter's employment.26 It is his findings and evaluations which should form the basis of the seafarer's disability claim.27
His assessment, however, is not automatically final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the
courts,28 as its inherent merits would still have to be weighed and duly considered. The seafarer may dispute such
assessment by seasonably exercising his prerogative to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his
choice.29redarclaw
In this case, petitioner was repatriated on December 25, 1999 and was seen and examined by Dr. Cruz, the
company-designated physician, seven times and each time was prescribed corresponding medications. Dr. Cruz
made a diagnosis30 of controlled hypertension and diabetes mellitus and declared him fit to work on April 7, 2000. As
petitioner was not satisfied with the assessment made by Dr. Cruz, he, through counsel, requested respondents for
another medical assessment to which respondents acceded by directing petitioner to go to Dr. Alegre at St Luke's
Hospital for a second medical opinion. Petitioner went to Dr. Alegre's clinic for consultation only on August 31, 2000.
After petitioner was subjected to laboratory examinations, Dr. Alegre issued a medical report declaring the former not
fit to work and gave him a disability of Grade 12 (slight residuals of disorder of intra-thoracic organ [heart] and intraabdominal organ [pancreas-diabetes]) under the heading abdomen #5.
However, petitioner sought the opinion of a private physician, Dr. Vicaldo, who declared him unfit to board ship and
work as seaman and found his condition to be a partial permanent disability with an impediment Grade V (58.96%).
The LA and the NLRC gave credence to Dr. Vialdo's disability grading but the CA reversed and accepted that of Dr.
Alegre's. We find no error committed by the CA in giving more weight to Dr. Alegre's finding than that of Dr. Vicaldo's.
Dr. Alegre's finding was based on the results of the laboratory examinations conducted on petitioner. On the other
hand, Dr. Vicaldo examined petitioner only once, and his justification for the latter's disability grading was not
supported by any diagnostic or medical procedure but merely based on general impressions. We adopt the CA's
ratiocination in giving more evidentiary weight to Dr. Alegre's assessment, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x Clearly, the determination of whose medical findings, including disability assessment, should be given more
weight would depend on the length of time the patient was under treatment and supervision, results of laboratory
procedures used as basis for diagnosis and recommendation, and detailed knowledge of the patient's case reflected
in the medical certificate itself. A comparison of the medical certificates issued by Dr. Alegre and Dr. Vicaldo reveals
that the former's findings were based on results of certain laboratory procedures such as urinalysis and chest x-ray,
while that of the latter merely stated the usual expected long term complications associated with diabetes mellitus.
The present target organ in private respondent's case was determined by Dr. Alegre to be the heart and eyes
(hypertensive retinopathy), while Dr. Vicaldo plainly indicated the lifelong medications are necessitated by his "HPN
and DM" and that long term complications involve the heart, brain and 'kidneys. Further, while Dr. Vicaldo's diagnosis
of uncontrolled diabetes mellitus and essential hypertension was based only on the patient's age belonging to high
risk group, Dr. Alegre attributed the patient's poorly-controlled diabetus mellitus and essential hypertension to "noncompliance with the intake of medicines" considering his earlier medication and treatment under Dr. Cruz from the
time he was repatriated to the Philippines in a three (3)-month period, at the end of which term he was declared "fit to
work."
Indeed, diabetus mellitus is a chronic disease with no cure but it can almost always be managed effectively
Management of the disease may include lifestyle modifications such as losing weight, diet and exercise to long term
use of oral hypoglycemics or insulin therapy. Adequate control of diabetes leads to a lower risk of the complications of
uncontrolled diabetes which include kidney failure (requiring dialysis or transplant), blindness, heart disease and limb
amputation. Thus, patient education and compliance with treatment is very important in managing the disease;
improper use of medications and insulins can be very dangerous causing hypo- or hyper glycemic episodes. Among
the major risk of the disorder are chronic problems affecting multiple organ systems which will eventually arise in
patients with poor glycemic control. Considering the subjective factor involved in the assessment of risks for longterm complications of the disease, an accurate appraisal of the disability of private respondent must be based not
only on laboratory procedures conducted at the time of examination but also his medical history, i.e., medications and
progress in his condition. We find the generalized statements of Dr. Vicaldo not sufficient compared to a more
detailed medical assessment of Dr. Alegre based on actual laboratory results and recent medical history of private
respondent. Private respondent assailed the finding of Dr. Alegre that his poorly-controlled diabetes mellitus and
essential hypertension were brought about by his non-compliance with the intake of medicines. Private respondent
produced some prescriptions by different doctors, but his appointed doctor, Dr. Vicaldo, neither presented any clinical

explanation to controvert Dr. Alegre's evaluation. At any rate, we find no substantial evidence to support the NLRC's
finding that Dr. Vicaldo's medical finding and disability assessment as reliable and satisfactory compared to that of Dr.
Alegre, the company-designated physician. Hence, Dr Alegre's disability rating of Gr. 12 (pancreas-abdomen) under
the Schedule of Compensation should be the basis of computation of disability benefit to which private respondent is
entitled.31
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to US$60,000.00 disability benefit as provided in their CBA, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
20.1.4 Compensation for disability
xxxx
20.1.5 Permanent Medical Unfitness - A seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the POEA
Employment Contract shall, for the purpose of this paragraph as regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service
in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$80,000.00 for officers and US$60,000.00 for ratings.
Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the Contract but certified as permanently unfit
for further sea service in any capacity by the company doctor, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation.32
Such provision finds no application in petitioner's case. Dr. Alegre, the company-designated physician, gave petitioner
a disability grade of 12 only, which is less than 50%, but he did not make a certification that petitioner was
permanently unfit for further sea service. In fact, Dr. Alegre's medical report stated that petitioner's illness could be
brought under control with proper diet, exercise and medications given an approximate time.
Petitioner contends that the two company-designated physicians vary in their assessment of his medical condition,
hence, he cannot be faulted for not relying on any of their findings but relied instead on Dr. Vicaldo's disability rating.
We are not persuaded.
After petitioner' repatriation on December 25, 1999, he was seen by Dr. Cruz seven times and was prescribed
corresponding medications. He was declared fit to work on April 7, 2000 after his hypertension and diabetes mellitus
were diagnosed to be controlled. However, when petitioner went to consult with Dr. Alegre on August 31, 2000, he
was found not fit to work at that time because of his poorly-controlled diabetes mellitus and hypertension and gave
him a disability rating of grade 12. The drastic change in petitioner's health condition, as indicated in Dr. Alegre's
Report, was brought about by the non-compliance in the intake of medications. The interval of almost four months
from April 7, 2000 and without the intake of proper medications explain the difference in the assessment of the two
company designated doctors.
Petitioner alleges that as he was unable to work for more than 120 days as a result of his illness, his condition
constitutes permanent total disability relying on the case of Crystal Shipping Inc. v. Natividad.33redarclaw
The factual circumstances of the Crystal Shipping case is different. There, the seafarer was diagnosed with cancer
and was assessed by the company-designated physician as suffering from Grade 9 disability, while his private doctor
issued a Grade 1 disability. It was found that the seafarer was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22,
1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment, which showed that his disability was
permanent. In this case, petitioner was repatriated on December 25, 1999 and had been declared fit to work on April
7, 2000, which was within the. 120-day period treatment or the temporary total disability period from the date of the
seafarer's sign-off.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 9, 2005 and
the Resolution dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals issued in CA-GR. SP No. 87979 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

A.C. No. 7314

August 25, 2015

MARY ANN T. FLORES, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
In a Resolution 1 dated 21 March 2014 in Administrative Case No. 7314, Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio LL.
Mayor, Jr., the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation 2 of the Investigating Commissioner 3 finding respondent guilty of violation of his sworn
duty not to delay any man's cause for money or malice and disbarring him from the practice of law.
FACTS
This administrative case stemmed from the Complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) by Jose Roberto Flores (Flores), the husband of herein complainant, against JMJB International
Services, Inc. The case, docketed as NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, was raffled to respondent, who is a Labor
Arbiter.4 In a Decision 5 dated 23 July 2001, respondent dismissed the case on a finding that Flores had voluntarily
resigned from employment.6
Flores elevated the case to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The case was
then brought to the Court of Appeals (CA).7 The CA, in its Decision 8 dated 21 October 2002, ruled that the appeal to
the NLRC had been timely filed.9 The appellate court set aside the NLRC Resolution for being null and void and
granted monetary awards to Flores. 10 On 19 February 2003, the CA Decision became final and executory. 11 On 24
July 2003, Flores filed before respondent a Motion for Execution of the CA Decision.12 On 15 November 2003,
complainant claimed that the counsel of her husband received from the CA a Notice of Transmittal of Records of
Case dated 19 August 2003 addressed to the Clerk of Court of the NLRC. As respondent was not acting on the
Motion for Execution, the counsel of Flores filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation on 20 September 2004 praying
that the motion be resolved with dispatch. Upon inquiry with respondent's labor arbitration associate, the counsel
learned that the records of the case were still being requested from the Records Section of the NLRC. 13 Apparently,
as shown in the Certification 14 dated 13 October 2004 issued by a Records Officer of the NLRC, the case records
had been sent for archiving sometime in 2003 and were difficult to retrieve.
On 16 November 2005, respondent finally issued a Writ of Execution against JMJB International Services, Inc. By
that time, the corporation had not yet been dissolved, but had already amended its name to F .0. Maidin International
Services, Inc. 15 This amendment prompted the counsel of Flores to file a Motion to Amend Writ of Execution.
Respondent, however, refused to act on the motion, reasoning that F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc. was not a
party to the case.16 Accordingly, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent, citing that the latter's
act of archiving the records of the labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards.17 In a Resolution 18 dated 11 April
2007, this Court referred the administrative case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBPs Investigating Commissioner, in a Report and Recommendation 19 dated 21 July 2008, found respondent
guilty and recommended his disbarment. The gist of the report reads: 20
We find as unacceptable the respondents gross delay in performing what is supposedly a purely ministerial act on
his part, his unexplained and unsanctioned resort to "archiving" which led to the disappearance of the case records,
and his gross ignorance of the law in refusing to issue a writ of execution against what the SEC has essentially
certified to be a company hiding under a new name. We believe that the respondent's actions were not a product of
ignorance, indolence, or negligence, but rather, were clearly borne out of a willful, deliberate, and wholly malicious
intent to misuse his position by favoring one of the parties in NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, thus causing no small
degree of serious injury to the complainant therein and to the integrity of the legal process as a whole.
In a Resolution 21 dated 14 August 2008, the IBP Board adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation with
modification, lowering the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for three years.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 22 but it was denied in the IBP Board Resolution 23 dated 21 March
2014. The Board affirmed its previous Resolution with modification, reverting the penalty to disbarment. 24
Neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or petition for review thereafter. 25

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of the Lawyer are Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
other ethical standards.
DISCUSSION
We adopt the IBP Board Resolution.
There is a clear neglect of duty and ignorance of the law on the part of respondent on account of his failure to
immediately act on the Motion for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of Execution despite having
been informed of the amendment of the name - but not the dissolution - of the corporation against which the writ was
issued.
The justification offered by respondent to explain his delay in acting on the motion cannot be countenanced, as it was
through his fault that the records of the case were lost. That he archived the case records at the NLRC Records
Section, not on the basis of official or sanctioned guidelines but only because it was the common practice in his
office, reflects his lack of due diligence and care in the custody of official documents.
While delay in the processing of documents normally occurs, it was inexcusable and out of the ordinary for
respondent to allow a period of more than two years to lapse before acting on the motion. This omission amounts to
gross misconduct as the unnecessary delay has caused prejudice to complainant. As defined, gross misconduct is
any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of
justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. 26
Respondent also erroneously interprets jurisprudence when he insists that the writ could not have been issued
against F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc., because it was not a party to the case. His argument contravenes the
pronouncement of the Court in Republic Planters Bank v. Court of Appeals, 27 in which it said that "a change in the
corporate name does not make a new corporation, and whether effected by special act or under general law, has no
effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities."
As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer 28 who must at all times be accountable to the people, whom he must
serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. 29 The unjustified delay in his actions and his failure to
act according to law constituted a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but also to the public in
general.
Further, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to delay no man for money or malice, 30 and abandoned his
professional responsibility to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. 31
Without a doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalties, including suspension and disbarment. 32 these penalties are imposed with great caution,
because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond
repair. 33Disbarment, in particular, may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. 34
The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a
repeat offender.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting, 35 the respondent lawyer was disbarred after the Court found out that he had notarized a
forged deed of quitclaim. The penalty of disbarment was imposed after considering that he was previously suspended
from the practice of law for six months on the ground that he had purchased his client's property while it was still the
subject of a pending certiorari proceeding 36
In Flores v. Chua, 37 the respondent lawyer was disbarred after he was found guilty of notarizing a forged deed of
sale. The penalty of disbarment was imposed because in a previous administrative case, respondent was found guilty
of violating Rule 1.01 [16] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He was also sternly warned that a repetition of a
similar act or violation in the future would be dealt with more severely. 38

Herein respondent was already suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months in another case,
Lahm Ill v. Mayor, Jr., 39 in which he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. For that offense, he was warned that the commission of the same or a
similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. In light of respondent's previous
suspension from the practice of law in an earlier administrative case as above-mentioned, the recommendation of the
IBP Board to disbar respondent is only proper.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR. guilty of grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of respondent; all the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206612, August 17, 2015

TOYOTA ALABANG, INC., Petitioner, v. EDWIN GAMES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
Remaining at bench is the Motion for Reconsideration1 of petitioner Toyota Alabang, Inc. We had unanimously
denied2 its Petition for Review on Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Injunctive Relief,3which sought the nullity of the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and Resolution.4 The CA affirmed the Resolutions5 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dismissing petitioner's appeal for non-perfection and for lack of merit. In effect, the NLRC
sustained the ruling6 of the labor arbiter (LA) finding that petitioner had illegally dismissed respondent Edwin Games
(Games).
In gist, the antecedent facts are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Games, who worked as a foreman for petitioner, allegedly stole its vehicle lubricants. Subsequently, it charged him
with qualified theft before the trial court. Two years thereafter, or on 24 August 2007, Games filed a Complainant for
illegal dismissal, nonpayment of benefits, and damages against petitioner. The latter, through counsel, failed to file its
Position Paper on the date set on 15 November 2007.
Several resettings of the hearings ensued. During the 21 December 2007 hearing, petitioner manifested that it had
failed to file its Position Paper because its handling lawyer was no longer connected with the company. Then, in the
hearing of 11 January 2008, petitioner failed to appear and even reneged on submitting its pleading. Accordingly, on
25 January 2008, the case was declared submitted for decision.
On 5 February 2008, the LA ruled against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay Games P535,553.07 for his
separation pay, back wages, service incentive leave pay and attorney's fees resulting from his illegal dismissal.
Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the LA's ruling became final and executory.
The LA issued a Writ of Execution, which petitioner sought to quash. It prayed that the proceedings be reopened,
explaining that it had failed to present evidence because of its counsel's negligence in filing the appropriate
pleadings. The LA denied the claims of petitioner. Aggrieved, the latter appealed before the NLRC.
The appeal of petitioner was denied due course because it had failed to show proof of its security deposit for the
appeal bond under Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure. According to the NLRC, the bonding
company's mere declaration in the Certification of Security Deposit that the bond was fully secured7 was not

tantamount to a faithful compliance with the rule, because there must first be an accompanying assignment of the
employer's bank deposit.
On the merits, the NLRC dismissed the case on the basis of the rule that no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution of a final judgment.8 For the NLRC, petitioner's failure to appeal the LA Decision already made the ruling
final and executory.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, but the action was dismissed. Firstly, the CA ruled
that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the appeal, given that petitioner had failed to comply
faithfully with the bond requirement. Secondly, it echoed the ruling of the NLRC that a final judgment is no longer
appealable. Thirdly, the CA found that petitioner's own negligence had caused it to lose its right to appeal.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Injunctive Relief before this Court.
It disputed the finding that it did not show proof of its security deposit for the appeal bond. It also insisted that its
counsel's gross negligence justified the reopening of the proceedings below.
By way of a minute Resolution, this Court denied the petition considering that the allegations, issues and arguments
raised by petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA had committed any reversible error in the challenged
decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Court'sdiscretionary appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the instant
Motion for Reconsideration.
The determinative issues in this case remain the same. This Court is tasked to review, on reconsideration, whether or
not the CA committed a reversible error in refusing to reopen the proceedings below.
RULING OF THE COURT
To recall, the LA's decision finding that petitioner illegally dismissed respondent was already final and executory
because of petitioner's failure to file a timely appeal. Therefore, the labor dispute between the parties should have
been considered a closed case by then, and no longer subject to appeal. At that point, Games should have already
reaped the benefits of a favorable judgment. Still, petitioner sought the reopening of the case, which the tribunals a
quo denied.
This Court maintains that the CA correctly refused to reopen the proceedings below. The reopening of a case is an
extraordinary remedy,9 which, if abused, can make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long
become final and executory. Hence, there must be good cause on the movant's part before it can be granted.
In this case, petitioner itself was negligent in advancing its case. As found by the appellate court, petitioner was
present during the mandatory conference hearing in which the latter was informed by the LA of the need to file a
Position Paper on 15 November 2007. However, petitioner not only reneged on the submission of its Position Paper,
but even failed to move for the filing of the pleading at any point before the LA resolved the case on 5 February 2008.
Moreover, petitioner had failed to exhibit diligence when it did not attend the hearing on 11 January 2008, or any of
the proceedings thereafter, despite its manifestation that it no longer had any legal representative. Given the
instances of negligence by petitioner itself, the Court finds that the CA justly refused to reopen the case in the
former's favor. Definitely, petitioner cannot now be allowed to claim denial of due process when it was petitioner who
was less than vigilant of its rights.10redarclaw
At this stage of appellate review, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin dissents and votes to remand the case to the LA for the
reception of petitioner's evidence. He posits three reasons as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First, he states that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in requiring petitioner to post an appeal bond, because
this requirement does not cover an appeal from a decision of the LA denying a motion to quash a writ of execution.
Second, he writes that in any event, the NLRC erred in requiring petitioner to accompany the appeal bond with proof
of a security deposit or collateral securing the bond. He bases this point on the fact that the bonding company has
already issued a Certificate of Security Deposit declaring that the appeal bond was fully secured by a security deposit
equivalent to the judgment award.
Third, he advances the opinion that there may be merit in the Rule 45 petition filed by petitioner. He cites that it had a
just cause to dismiss respondent after he had allegedly stolen its vehicle lubricants.
Before discussing these points, it is apropos to elucidate that this Court must be faithful to the framework of resolving

labor cases on appellate review before this Court. Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Acibo aptly
explains:11redarclaw
This Court's power of review in a Rule 45 pet1t1on is limited to resolving matters pertaining to any perceived legal
errors, which the CA may have committed in issuing the assailed decision. In reviewing the legal correctness of the
CA's Rule 65 decision in a labor case, we examine the CA decision in the context that it determined, i.e., the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it and not on the basis of
whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware
that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
(Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the task at hand involves a determination of whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding
that the NLRC did not exceed its jurisdiction in refusing to grant petitioner's entreaty to reopen the case. In other
words, as long as the exercise of discretion below is based on well founded factual and legal bases,12 no abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can be imputed, and we are then justified to deny due course
both to the Rule 45 petition and the concomitant Motion for Reconsideration.
The tribunals below gave overwhelming justifications for their rulings. In contrast, the first pointespoused in the
dissenting opinion has no basis. The paraphrased proposition that "an appeal bond is not required in appeals from
decisions of the LA denying a motion to quash a writ of execution" lacks any citation sourced from a statute or case
law. Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, uniformly state
thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or
surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees. (Emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, the above rules do not limit the appeal bond requirement only to certain kinds of rulings of the LA. Rather,
these rules generally state that in case the ruling of the LA involves a monetary award, an employer's appeal may
be perfected only upon the posting of a bond. Therefore, absent any qualifying terms,13 so long as the decision of the
LA involves a monetary award, as in this case,14 that ruling can only be appealed after the employer posts a bond.
Clearly, this construction is but proper considering the avowed purpose of appeal bonds demanded by the law from
employers in labor cases. This matter was discussed by the Court in Computer Innovations Center v. NLRC,15 to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
As earlier stated, the underlying purpose of the appeal bond is to ensure that the employee has properties on
which he or she can execute upon in the event of a final, providential award. The non payment or woefully
insufficient payment of the appeal bond by the employer frustrates these ends. Respondent Cario alleges in
hisComment before this Court that petitioner Quilos and his wife have since gone abroad, and wonders aloud
whether he still would be able to collect his monetary award considering the circumstances. Petitioners, in
their Reply and Memorandum, do not aver otherwise. Indeed, such eventuality appears plausible considering that
Quilos himself did not personally verify the petition, and had in fact executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
his counsel, Atty. Bernabe B. Alabastro, authorizing the filing of cases in his name. ft does not necessarily follow that
the absence of Quilos from this country precludes the execution of the award due Cario. However, if the absence of
Quilos from this country proves to render impossible the execution of judgment in favor of Cario, then the latter's
victory may sadly be rendered pyrrhic. The appeal bond requirement precisely aims to prevent empty or
inconsequential victories by the laborer, and it is hoped that herein petitioners' refusal to post the appropriate legal
appeal bond does not frustrate the ends of justice in this case. (Emphasis supplied)
If we are to construe otherwise, then an aggrieved party may simply seek the quashal of a writ of execution, instead
of going through the normal modes of appeal, to altogether avoid paying for an appeal bond. This ruse will then
circumvent the requirement of both labor rules and jurisprudence16to post an appeal bond before contesting the LA's
grant of monetary award. Hence, the first point is not only incorrect, but also dangerous.
The second point likewise fails to justify the grant of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. This point refers to the
proper construction of Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which demands that an appeal bond
must be accompanied by a "proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond."

According to the NLRC and the CA, the bonding company's mere declaration in the Certification of Security Deposit
that the bond is fully secured17 is not tantamount to a faithful compliance with the rule, because there must first be an
accompanying assignment of the employer's bank deposit. On the other hand, the dissent sees this declaration as an
act that satisfies Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. For this reason, he opines that the NLRC
should have entertained the appeal of petitioner.
Notwithstanding this issue, the NLRC has given a well-founded reason for refusing to entertain petitioner's appeal,
namely, no appeal may be taken from an order of execution of a final and executory judgment.
An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of only in the manner provided
by law and the rules.18 Thus, a party who seeks to elevate an action must comply with the requirements of the 2011
NLRC Rules of Procedure as regards the period, grounds, venue, fees, bonds, and other requisites for a proper
appeal before the NLRC; and in Section 6, Rule VI, the aforesaid rules prohibit appeals from final and executory
decisions of the Labor Arbiter.
In this case, petitioner elevated to the NLRC an already final and executory decision of the LA. To recall, after
petitioner learned of its former counsel's negligence in filing a Position Paper before the LA, it nonetheless failed to
file a motion reconsideration to question the ruling of the LA that it illegally dismissed Games. At that point, the
Decision was already final and executory, so the LA dutifully issued a Writ of Execution. Petitioner sought the quashal
of the writ of execution and the reopening of its case only at that stage; and only after it was rebuffed by the LA did
petitioner appeal before the NLRC. Based on the timeline, therefore, the LA's adverse Decision had become final and
executory even prior to petitioner's appeal before the NLRC contesting the denial of the Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution. Consequently, the NLRC dismissed the appeal based on its clear prohibition under Section 5, Rule V of
the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.19redarclaw
The NLRC's reasoning that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is
also rooted in case law. Jurisprudence dictates that a final and executory decision of the LA can no longer be
reversed or modified.20 After all, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so
does the winning party have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.21 On this basis,
theCA did not grievously err when it concluded that the ruling of the NLRC denying petitioner's appeal was not
baseless, arbitrary, whimsical, or despotic.22redarclaw
Finally, as regards the third point pertaining to the advancement of the merits23 of the case, it may no longer be
properly considered by this Court. To adjudicate on the merits of the instant appeal would require the reopening of the
whole case, a step that all the tribunals below - the LA, the NLRC, and the CA- have already refused to take.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the reopening of a case is, by default, not allowed merely on the ground that the counsel
has been negligent in taking the required steps to protect the interest of the client, such as timely filing a pleading,
appearing during hearings, and perfecting appeals.24 An exception arises only when there is good cause and
excusable negligence on the client's part.25redarclaw
Both the explanation of the CA and the records undeniably show no good cause or excusable negligence on the part
of the client - petitioner Toyota Alabang, Inc. given the totality of the instances of the latter's own negligence in these
proceedings, viz: (1) despite being informed, during the mandatory conference hearing, of the necessity to file a
Position Paper, petitioner reneged on its duty to timely submit its Position Paper to the LA on 15 November 2007; (2)
after manifesting that it no longer had a counsel, petitioner was still absent on 11 January 2008, the date when it
could still have submitted its belated Position Paper; (3) thereafter, it altogether absented itself from all the
proceedings before the LA; (4) at no point before the LA's resolution of the case on 5 February 2008 did petitioner file
a Position Paper; and (5) after allowing the LA Decision to attain finality as a result of its non-submission of an appeal
or a motion for reconsideration, petitioner belatedly sought the quasha1 of the execution of the LA Decision granting
compensation to respondent.
Despite the overwhelming lapses mentioned above, the dissent maintains that petitioner cannot be considered
negligent by any measure. According to the dissent, petitioner could not be faulted for failing to file a position paper
because the filing of pleadings has been entrusted to its counsel. For the dissent, "given the nature and extent of its
business and operations, the petitioner could not be expected to supervise and monitor all the cases it had entrusted
to its lawyer." But, this stance is baseless as can be seen by the lack of legal citation in the dissent.
More importantly, this Court cannot give special treatment to petitioner. In our past cases, this Court already held that
the failure of the counsel to file the required position papers before the LA is not a ground to declare that petitioner
had been deprived of due process; and is not a cause to conclude that the proceedings a quo had been null and
void.26 In Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg,27 this Court thoroughly explained that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A departure from this
rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the
client's case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. The only exception would be, where
the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. In
this case, there was no such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present and argue her case
before the Labor Arbiter. She was accorded the opportunity to be heard.
We have consistently held that the requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their
claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary.28 Here, petitioner, despite being
given several chances to pass its position paper, did not at all comply. Worse, petitioner also had other instances of
negligence. Consequently, this Court cannot redo the whole proceedings of the Labor Arbiter who had already
afforded due process to the former.
Given the foregoing reasons, juxtaposed with the high threshold for resolving appellate reviews in labor cases before
this Court, we rule for the denial of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review with Urgent Prayer for Injunctive Relief filed by Toyota Alabang, Inc.
is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case. Let an Entry of Judgment be issued
in due course.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary