RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
LISAM (LEI) v BDO
Sps Soriano, corpo
board resolution in
(mortgagee- PCIB,
property owned by
corporation)

officers, forged a
order to mortgage
now BDO) a
LISAM (a

Worst, they later made it appear that

LISAM assumed the obligation to pay
the said mortgage via Deed of
Assumption of Mortgage, with PCIBs
alleged connivance.
Action to nullify the real estate
mortgage was instituted against Sps
and PCIB.
Answer filed by Sps.
Motion to Dismiss filed by PCIB- lack of
cause of action.
RTC dismissed complaint.
Pending MR, LISAM filed motion to
admit AMENDED COMPLAINT- DENIED
by the RTC
RTC: Amended Complaint can
no longer be admitted because
the same absolutely changed
petitioners cause of action
Petition for review on certiorari to SC.

ISSUE: WON amendment changing the

cause of action is proper
SC: YES!
In Valenzuela v CA:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended
the former rule in such manner that
the phrase or that the cause of action
or defense is substantially altered was
stricken off and not retained in the new
rules. The clear import of such
amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is
that under the new rules, the
amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of
action or defense. This should only
be true, however, when despite a
substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall
serve the higher interests of substantial
justice, and prevent delay and equally
promote the laudable objective of the
rules which is to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
XXX
The courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and in order that

the real controversies between the

parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on
the merits without unnecessary delay.
This liberality is greatest in the
early stages of a lawsuit, especially
in this case where the amendment
was made before the trial of the
case, thereby giving the petitioners
all the time allowed by law to
answer and to prepare for trial.
XXX
Respondent PCIB should not complain
that admitting the amended complaint
after they pointed out a defect in the
original complaint would be unfair to
them. They should have been well
aware that due to the changes made by
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
amendments may now substantially
alter the cause of action or defense. It
should not have been a surprise to
them that petitioners would redress the
defect in the original complaint by
substantially amending the same,
which course of action is now allowed
under the new rules.
TIU v PBCOM

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
Asian Water Resources Inc. (AWRI)
failed to pay loans, secured by Surety
Agreement, despite PBCOMs several
demands.
PBCOM filed complaint for collection.
TIU et. al., representatives of AWRI,
filed Answer alleging Surety
Agreement attached is FALISFIED!
The insertion of the words in his
personality capacity were not
there when they signed the doc.
PBCOM filed Motion for Leave of Court
to Substitute the original copy of the
above doc.
It maintained that the insertion
was not a falsification, but was
made only to speak the truth of
the parties intentions.
RTC allowed substitution. MR by TIU et
al denied.
CA dismissed subsequent Petition for
Certiorari by TIU et al.
Petition for Review on Certiorari to SC.
ISSUE: WON RTC allowance of
substitution is proper
DECISION: YES!

The granting of leave to file amended

pleading is a matter particularly
addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court and that discretion is
broad, subject only to the limitations
that the amendments should not
substantially change the cause of action
or alter the theory of the case, or that
it was not made to delay the action.
Nevertheless, as enunciated in
Valenzuela, even if the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action
or defense, such amendment could still
be allowed when it is sought to serve
the higher interest of substantial
justice prevent delay and secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of actions and proceedings.
XXX
In the present case, there was no
fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM
in submitting the altered surety
agreement. In fact, the bank admitted
that it was a mistake on their part to
have submitted it in the first place
instead of the original agreement. It
also admitted that, through
inadvertence, the copy that was
attached to the complaint was the copy
wherein the words IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY were inserted to conform to

the banks standard practice. This

alteration was made without the
knowledge of the notary public.
PBCOMs counsel had no idea that what
it submitted was the altered document,
thereby necessitating the substitution
of the surety agreement with the
original thereof, in order that the case
would be judiciously resolved.
REMINGTON v CA
Remington filed a complaint for sum of
money and damages against Industrial
Steels Ltd (ISL), with Ferro Trading,
and British Steels.
Motion to Dismiss filed by both ISL and
British were denied by the RTC.
ISL filed Answer, but British filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the CA on the ff.:
a. That the complaint stated
that Remington understood
that Ferro and British are
mere suppliers of ISL but
were impleaded likewise as
party-defendants; and
b. That there was no other
reference made to it that
would constitute a valid cause
of action against British (no

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
aversion of any act or
omission by British in
violation of Remingtons
right).
Remington filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint, incorporating
factual allegations constitutive of its
cause of action against British, with the
RTC.
However, CA granted British the writ of
certiorari and ordered RTC to dismiss
without prejudice the case against
British.
Petition for review on certiorari to the
SC.
ISSUE:
(1)

WON Remington can still

amend its complaint as a
matter of right (since British
has not yet filed its Answer),
notwithstanding a petition for
certiorari for the dismissal of
the case before the CA.- YES!

The right granted to the plaintiff under

procedural law to amend the complaint
before an answer has been served is
not precluded by the filing of a motion
to dismiss or any other proceeding

contesting its sufficiency. Were we to

conclude otherwise, the right to amend
a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will
be rendered nugatory and ineffectual,
since all that a defendant has to do to
foreclose this remedial right is to
challenge the adequacy of the
complaint before he files an answer.
XXX
In this case, the remedy espoused by
the appellate court in its assailed
judgment will precisely result in
multiple suits, involving the same set of
facts and to which the defendants
would likely raise the same or, at least,
related defenses. Plainly stated, we find
no practical advantage in ordering the
dismissal of the complaint against
respondent and for petitioner to refile
the same, when the latter can still
clearly amend the complaint as a
matter of right. The amendment of the
complaint would not prejudice
respondents or delay the action, as this
would, in fact, simplify the case and
expedite its disposition.
XXX
(2)

WON ISLs filing of Answer

shall bar Remingtons right to

amend the complaint as

against British. NO!
The fact that the other defendants
below has filed their answers to the
complaint does not bar petitioners
right to amend the complaint as against
respondent. Indeed, where some but
not all the defendants have answered,
the plaintiff may still amend its
complaint once, as a matter of right, in
respect to claims asserted solely
against the non-answering defendant,
but not as to claims asserted against
the other defendants.
ASEAN v CITY OF URDANETA
Taxpayer Del Castillo filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Contract against the
City of Urdaneta and a number of
contractors (including herein petitioners
APP and APPCDC).
The complaint alleged that
Urdaneta Mayor entered into
contracts for the construction of
cinemas and hotel involving
massive expenditure of public
funds.
APP and APPCDC, in their Answers,
claimed the validity of the contracts.

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
Urdaneta likewise asserted that the
contracts were properly executed in its
Answer.
However, after pre-trial, RTC upon
motion ordered that Urdaneta be
dropped as defendant and its complaint
be admitted for consolidation with Del
Castillos complaint. RTC ordered APP
and APPCDC to answer the same.
CA dismissed subsequent Petition for
Certiorari filed by APP and APPCDC.
Hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari
to SC.
ISSUE: WON Urdaneta City is estopped
to reverse admissions in its Answer
that the contracts are valid and, in its
pretrial brief, that the execution of the
contracts was in good faith.
SC: NO! (magulo to pero ito lang
related sa topic)

that it is not within the issues

raised by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended
and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action
and the ends of substantial justice will
be subserved thereby. Objections need
not even arise in this case since the
Pretrial Order dated April 1, 2002
already defined as an issue whether the
contracts are valid. Thus, what is
needed is presentation of the parties
evidence on the issue. Any evidence of
the city for or against the validity of the
contracts will be relevant and
admissible. Note also that under
Section 5, Rule 10, necessary
amendments to pleadings may be
made to cause them to conform to the
evidence.
XXX

summons in the law office of his

husband, Alfredo, in Manila.
Note: (1) Alfredo was Lourdes
lawyer; and (2) this was by
virtue of a letter written by
Lourdes stating that all
communications be addressed
to his lawyer-husbands office.
Alfredo filed his Answer, but Lourdes
did not.
Dimalanta then moved to declare
Lourdes in default.
RTC denied the motion.
On petition for certiorari, CA declared
Lourdes in default.
Hence, Petition for review on certiorari
to the SC.
ISSUE:

VALMONTE v CA
(1)

XXX
The court may allow amendment of
pleadings.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides that if evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground

Rosita Dimalanta filed a complaint for

partition of real property and
accounting of rentals against Sps
Valmonte (Lourdes and Alfredo).
Lourdes, a resident of Washington, USA
(non-resident of Phils.), was served

Whether or not the manner of

service of summons to
Lourdes was proper.

SC: NO!
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident who is not found in the
Philippines, service of summons on her

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
must be in accordance with Rule 14,
Sec 17. Such service, to be effective
outside the Philippines, must be made
either (1) by personal service (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which
case a copy of the summons and order
of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant or (3) in any
other manner which the court may
deem sufficient.
Since in the case at bar, the service of
summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of
any of the first two modes, the
question is whether the service on her
attorney, petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte, can be justified under the
third mode, namely, in any . . .
manner the court may deem sufficient.
We hold it cannot. This mode of
service, like the first two, must be
made outside the Philippines, such as
through the of summons on petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made
upon the order of the court as required
by Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a
mode deemed sufficient by the court
which in fact refused to consider the
service to be valid and on that basis

declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte

in default for her failure to file an
answer.
In the second place, service in the
attempted manner on petitioner was
not made upon prior leave of the trial
court as required also in Rule 14, 17.
As provided in 19, such leave must be
applied for by motion in writing,
supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or
some person on his behalf and setting
forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because
there was no order granting such leave,
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not
given ample time to file her Answer
which, according to the rules, shall be
not less than sixty (60) days after
notice. It must be noted that the period
to file an Answer in an action against a
resident defendant differs from the
period given in an action filed against a
nonresident defendant who is not found
in the Philippines. In the former, the
period is fifteen (15) days from service
of summons, while in the latter, it is at
least sixty (60) days from notice.

SC: NO!
XXX petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did
not appoint her husband as her
attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote
private respondents attorney that all
communications intended for her
should be addressed to her husband
who is also her lawyer at the latters
address in Manila, no power of attorney
to receive summons for her can be
inferred therefrom. In fact the letter
was written seven month before the
filing of this case below, and it appears
that it was written in connection with
the negotiations between her and her
sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta,
concerning the partition of the property
in question. As is usual in negotiations
of this kind, the exchange of
correspondence was carried on by
counsel for the parties. But the
authority given to petitioners husband
in these negotiations certainly cannot
be construed as also including an
authority to represent her in any
litigation.
EB VILLAROSA v BENITO

(2)

WON service of summons to

Lourdes lawyer-husband may
be considered proper.

EB Villarosa, a limted partnership, and

Benito executed a Deed of Sale with
Development Agreement wherein EB

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
Villa agreed to develop parcel of lands
for the construction of low-cost housing
units.
EB Villa failed to comply with the
contract.
Benito filed a Complaint for Breach of
Contract and Damages against EB.
Summons was served to EB Villarosas
Cagayan Branch. It was served upon
that Branchs Manager.
Note: (1) EB Villas principal
offices is in Davao; and (2) it
has 2 other branches in
Paranaque and in Cagayan
EB Villa filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper service of summons
and lack of jurisdiction.
MTD denied by RTC:
RTC: since the summons were
in fact received by the corpo
thru its branch manager, there
was substantial compliance with
the rule
MR to RTC:
EB Villa: Section 11, Rule 14 of
the new Rules did not liberalize
but, on the contrary, restricted
the service of summons on

persons enumerated therein;

and that the new provision is
very specific and clear in that
the word manager was
changed to general manager,
secretary to corporate
secretary, and excluding
therefrom agent and director.
MR denied. Hence, petition for certiorari
to SC.
WON: WON service of summons to EB
Villarosas Cagayan Branch Manager is
proper.
SC: NO!

service of summons upon an agent of

the corporation is no longer authorized.
XXX
The designation of persons or officers
who are authorized to accept summons
for a domestic corporation or
partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rule now states general manager
instead of only manager corporate
secretary instead of secretary and
treasurer instead of cashier. The
phrase agent, or any of its directors
is conspicuously deleted in the new
rule.

We agree with petitioner.

XXX
Earlier cases have uphold service of
summons upon a construction project
managera corporations assistant
manager ordinary clerk of a
corporation private secretary of
corporate executives retained counsel
officials who had charge or control of
the operations of the corporation, like
the assistant general manager or the
corporations Chief Finance and
Administrative Officer. In these cases,
these persons were considered as
agent within the contemplation of the
old rule. Notably, under the new Rules,

Accordingly, we rule that the service of

summons upon the branch manager of
petitioner at its branch office at
Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the
general manager at its principal office
at Davao City is improper.
Consequently, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.
NOTE: J. Regalado- old rule were
obviously ambiguous and
susceptible of broad and

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
sometimes illogical
interpretations

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an

invalid substituted service of summons.
SC: YES!

MANOTOC (Imee Marcos) v CA

Agapita Trajano seeks the enforcement
of the judgment rendered by the US
District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii
against Imelda Imee Marcos Manotoc
for the wrongful death of husband
Archimedes Trajano. (allegedly killed by
the military)
Summons was served upon one Mackey
dela Cruz, alleged caretaker of Imee, at
Alexandra Condo, Pasig City.
Imee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of invalid substituted service
and lack of jurisdiction over her person.
Imee: (1) Mackey is neither a
resident, employee nor resident;
and that (2) she is a resident of
Singapore.
Trial Court denied MTD.
On Petition for Certiorari, CA dismissed
the same.
Hence, Petition for review on certiorari
to SC.

Reqs. For Substituted Service (Sec 8

Rule 14)
1. Impossibility of Prompt Personal
Service
2. Specific Details in the Return
3. A Person of Suitable Age and
Discretion
4. A Competent Person in Charge
NOTE: may explanation bawat isa
check full case if you want (mahaba
e)
XXX
A meticulous scrutiny of the
aforementioned Return readily reveals
the absence of material data on the
serious efforts to serve the Summons
on petitioner Manotoc in person. There
is no clear valid reason cited in the
Return why those efforts proved
inadequate, to reach the conclusion
that personal service has become
impossible or unattainable outside the
generally couched phrases of on many
occasions several attempts were made
to serve the summons x x x personally,
at reasonable hours during the day, and

to no avail for the reason that the said

defendant is usually out of her place
and/or residence or premises. Wanting
in detailed information, the Return
deviates from the ruling in Domagas v.
Jensen and other related cases that the
pertinent facts and circumstances on
the efforts exerted to serve the
summons personally must be narrated
in the Return. It cannot be determined
how many times, on what specific
dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact
that the substituted service of
summons may be assailed, as in the
present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it
is imperative that the pertinent facts
and circumstances surrounding the
service of summons be described with
more particularity in the Return or
Certificate of Service.
Besides, apart from the allegation of
petitioners address in the Complaint, it
has not been shown that respondent
Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served
such summons, exerted extraordinary
efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly,
the second paragraph of the Complaint
only states that respondents were
informed, and so [they] allege about
the address and whereabouts of
petitioner. Before resorting to
substituted service, a plaintiff must

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
demonstrate an effort in good faith to
locate the defendant through more
direct means.[32] More so, in the case
in hand, when the alleged petitioners
residence or house is doubtful or has
not been clearly ascertained, it would
have been better for personal service to
have been pursued persistently.
XXX
Granting that such a general
description be considered adequate,
there is still a serious nonconformity
from the requirement that the
summons must be left with a person of
suitable age and discretion residing in
defendants house or residence. Thus,
there are two (2) requirements under
the Rules: (1) recipient must be a
person of suitable age and discretion
and (2) recipient must reside in the
house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this
case, the Sheriffs Return lacks
information as to residence, age, and
discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz,
aside from the sheriffs general
assertion that de la Cruz is the resident
caretaker of petitioner as pointed out
by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged
receptionist and telephone operator
of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr.
de la Cruz is residing with petitioner

Manotoc in the condominium unit

considering that a married woman of
her stature in society would unlikely
hire a male caretaker to reside in her
dwelling. With the petitioners allegation
that Macky de la Cruz is not her
employee, servant, or representative, it
is necessary to have additional
information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la
Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the
summons is a strong indication that he
did not have the necessary relation of
confidence with petitioner. To protect
petitioners right to due process by
being accorded proper notice of a case
against her, the substituted service of
summons must be shown to clearly
comply with the rules.
It has been stated and restated that
substituted service of summons must
faithfully and strictly comply with the
prescribed requirements and in the
circumstances authorized by the rules.
ONG v CO
Ong, British-HK national, and Co,
Filipino, were married.

Co later sought the nullity of their

marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Summons was served to Ong upon a
security officer of her townhouse in QC.
RTC rendered decision annulling
marriage.
Ong then received a subpoena ordering
her to appear before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation.
Reason: her permanent
residence visa was being
subjected to cancellation
proceedings.
Report: Her marriage with
Benjamin Co, Filipino, was
nullified.
Ong then filed a petition for annulment
of judgment before the CA on the
ground of:
Lack of Jurisdiction
She was never notified.
substituted service was
made on a security guard
of their townhouse and
not on a member of her
household.
CA denied petition.

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
CA found that there was
customary practice in Ongs
townhouse that the security
guard would first entertain
visitors and receive any
communication in behalf of the
homeowners

tries, preferably on at least two

different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts
were unsuccessful. It is only then
that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return

Hence, petition for review to the SC.

ISSUE: WON service upon a security
officer is a proper substituted service of
summons
SC: NO!
The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA
(Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the
rigorous requirements of a substituted
service of summons, to wit: xxx
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal
Service
xxx
For substituted service of summons to
be available, there must be several
attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable
period of one month which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility
of prompt service. "Several
attempts" means at least three (3)

The sheriff must describe in the Return

of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts
made to find the defendant and the
reasons behind the failure must be
clearly narrated in detail in the
Return. The date and time of the
attempts on personal service, the
inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the
occupants of the alleged residence
or house of defendant and all other
acts done, though futile, to serve
the summons on defendant must
be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and
Discretion
xxx
The sheriff must therefore determine if
the person found in the alleged

dwelling or residence of defendant is of

legal age, what the recipient's
relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be
clearly and specifically described in
the Return of Summons. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
xxx
In the case at bench, the summons in
Civil Case No. 02-030629 was issued on
July 29, 2002. In his servers
return,30 the process server resorted to
substituted service of summons on
August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the
process server immediately opted for
substituted service of summons after
only two (2) days from the issuance of
the summons.
Xxx
The servers return utterly lacks
sufficient detail of the attempts
undertaken by the process server to
personally serve the summons on
petitioner. The server simply made a
general statement that summons was
effected after several futile attempts to

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
serve the same personally. The server
did not state the specific number of
attempts made to perform the personal
service of summons the dates and the
corresponding time the attempts were
made and the underlying reason for
each unsuccessful service. He did not
explain either if there were inquiries
made to locate the petitioner, who was
the defendant in the case. These
important acts to serve the summons
on petitioner, though futile, must be
specified in the return to justify
substituted service.
The servers return did not describe in
detail the person who received the
summons, on behalf of petitioner. It
simply stated that the summons was
received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
sufficient age and discretion, the
Security Officer thereat. It did not
expound on the competence of the
security officer to receive the
summons.
Also, aside from the servers return,
respondent failed to indicate any
portion of the records which would
describe the specific attempts to
personally serve the summons.
Respondent did not even claim that
petitioner made any voluntary

appearance and actively participated in

Civil Case No. 02-0306.

Domagas filed a complaint for forcible

entry against Jensen.

Xxx
The CA likewise erred in ruling that the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty could be
applied in the case at bench. This
presumption of regularity, however, was
never intended to be applied even in
cases where there are no showing of
substantial compliance with the
requirements of the rules of procedure.
Such presumption does not apply
where it is patent that the sheriffs or
servers return is defective.31 As earlier
explained, the servers return did not
comply with the stringent requirements
of substituted service of summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements
in Manotoc were not met, the Court is
not inclined to uphold the CAs denial of
the petition for annulment of judgment
for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner because there was an
invalid substituted service of summons.
Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case
No. 02-0306 must be declared null and
void.
DOMAGAS v JENSEN

Summons was not served to Jensen

because she was in Oslo, Norway at the
time.
Oscar Layno, brother of Jensen, who
was then in Jensens house, received
said summons together with the
complaint.
MTC then ordered Jensen and all others
occupying the property to vacate the
premises and pay monthly rentals
therefor.
Since Jensen failed to appeal the
decision, a writ of execution was then
issued.
Jensen later filed a complaint before
the RTC for the annulment of judgment
rendered by MTC decision.
Js Contention: (1) she was not
served summons; (2) MTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over her
person; (3) she was a resident
of Oslo, Norway; (4) altho she
owned the house where Oscar
Layno received the summons,
the same was leased to Eduardo
Gonzales; and that (5) Oscar

RULES 10-14 asterisked (*) cases only

kupalourd
REM 1 - Brondial
never informed her of the receipt
of summons and complaint.
RTC ruled in favor of Jensen. no valid
service of summons
Appeal to CA by Domagas.
CA: (1) the complaint was one
for ejectment, which is an action
quasi in rem; (2) since the
defendant therein was
temporarily out of the country,
the summons and the
complaint should have been
served via extraterritorial
service under Section 15 in
relation to Section 16, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court
Hence, this Petition for review on
certiorari to SC:
Domagsang: the complaint for
ejectment is an action in personam
therefore substituted service in accord
with Sec 7, Rule 14 is valid.
ISSUE/S:
(1)

WON action for forcible entry

is an action in personam (in
order to determine in what
manner should summons be
served)- YES!

The ruling of the CA that the

petitioners complaint for forcible entry
of the petitioner against the respondent
in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi
in rem, is erroneous. The action of the
petitioner for forcible entry is a real
action and one in personam.

personal obligation or liability on the

defendant under Article 539 of the New
Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the
property subject of the action, restore
physical possession thereof to the
plaintiff, and pay actual damages by
way of reasonable compensation for his
use or occupation of the property.

xxx
A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the
person and is based on the jurisdiction
of the person, although it may involve
his right to, or the exercise of
ownership of, specific property, or seek
to compel him to control or dispose of it
in accordance with the mandate of the
court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibil
ity or liability directly upon the person
of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to
specifically perform some act or actions
to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.
xxx
by its very nature and purpose, an
action for unlawful detainer or forcible
entry is a real action and in personam
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a

As gleaned from the averments of the

petitioners complaint in the MTC, she
sought a writ of a preliminary
injunction from the MTC and prayed
that the said writ be made permanent.
Under its decision, the MTC ordered the
defendant therein (the respondent in
this case), to vacate the property and
pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 to
the plaintiff therein (the petitioner in
this case)
(2)

WON there was valid service

of summons- NO!

The contention of the Domagsang has

no merit.
Domagsang: (1) that since her
action of forcible entry against
the respondent was in
personam, summons may be
served on the respondent, by
substituted service, through her
brother, Oscar Layno, in
accordance with Section 7, Rule

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REM 1 - Brondial
14 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
that Oscar Layno, a person of
suitable age and discretion, was
residing in the house of the
respondent
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals,
the Court had the occasion to state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try
and decide the case. Jurisdiction over
the person of a resident defendant who
does not voluntarily appear in court can
be acquired by personal service of
summons as provided under Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he
cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in
accordance with Section 8 of said Rule.
If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to: (a) substituted
service set forth in Section 8 (2)
personal service outside the country,
with leave of court (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court or
(4) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.

In the present case, the records show

that the respondent, before and after
his marriage to Jarl Jensen on
August 23, 1987, remained a resident
of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan.

brother Oscar Layno on April 5,

1999 as evidenced by his
signature appearing in the
original summons.
Calasiao, Pangasinan, April 6,
1999.

xxx
Considering that the respondent was in
Oslo, Norway, having left the
Philippines on February 17, 1999, the
summons and complaint in Civil Case
No. 879 may only be validly served on
her through substituted service under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
xxx
The Return of Service filed by Sheriff
Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service of
summons reads:
Respectfully returned to the
court of origin the herein
summons and enclosures in the
above-entitled case, the
undersigned caused the service
on April 5, 1999. Defendant
Vivian Layno Jensen is out of the
country as per information from
her brother Oscar Layno,
however, copy of summons and
enclosures was received by her

(Sgd.)
EDUARDO J.
ABULENCIA
Junior Process Server
As gleaned from the said return, there
is no showing that as of April 5, 1999,
the house where the Sheriff found
Oscar Layno was the latters residence
or that of the respondent herein.
Neither is there any showing that the
Sheriff tried to ascertain where the
residence of the respondent was on the
said date. It turned out that the
occupant of the house was a lessor,
Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar
Layno was in the premises only to
collect the rentals from him. The
service of the summons on a
person at a place where he was a
visitor is not considered to have
been left at the residence or place
or abode, where he has another place
at which he ordinarily stays and to
which he intends to return.

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DOLE v QUILALA
All Season Farm Corp filed a complaint
against DOLE for recovery of money,
accounting and damages.
ALIAS SUMMONS was served thru
DOLEs legal assistant Marife Dela Cruz.
DOLE filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground, among others, of lack of
jurisdiction over its person due to
improper service of summons.
RTC denied the motion.
On petition for certiorari, CA likewise
denied DOLEs contentions:
CA: (1) president had known of
the service altho did not
personally receive; and (2) in
todays corpo set up, docs are
received by the corpo officers
staff
Hence, Petition for review to SC.
DOLE: (1) summons must be
served only on corpo officers
enumerated in Sec 11 Rule 14;
and (2) Dela Cruz is an
employee of DOLE Pacific, entity
separate and distinct from DOLE
(petitioner)

ALL SEASON: there was full

compliance with Sec 11 Rule 14
when Dela Cruz received
summons upon instruction of
DOLE president as indicated in
Officers Return.
ISSUE: WON service of alias summons
upon DOLE is proper for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over its person

fact does not appear in the receiving

copy of the alias summons which Marifa
Dela Cruz signed. There was no
evidence that she was authorized to
receive court processes in behalf of the
president. Considering that the service
of summons was made on a legal
assistant, not employed by herein
petitioner and who is not one of the
designated persons under Section 11,
Rule 14, the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.

SC: NO!
Well-settled is the rule that service of
summons on a domestic corporation is
restricted, limited and exclusive to the
persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
following the rule in statutory
construction that expressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Service must
therefore be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel.

ADDTL NOTE: However, under Section

20 of the same Rule, a defendants
voluntary appearance in the action is
equivalent to service of summons. As
held previously by this Court, the filing
of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration
of a default judgment, and to lift order
of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court.

In this case, it appears that on April 23,

2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal
assistant, received the alias summons.
Contrary to private respondents claim
that it was received upon instruction of
the president of the corporation as
indicated in the Officers Return, such

Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner

filed an Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Time. It was not a
conditional appearance entered to
question the regularity of the service of
summons, but an appearance
submitting to the jurisdiction of the

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court by acknowledging the receipt of
the alias summons and praying for
additional time to file responsive
pleading. Consequently, petitioner
having acknowledged the receipt of
the summons and also having
invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC
to secure affirmative relief in its
motion for additional time,
petitioner effectively submitted
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the
RTC. It is estopped now from asserting
otherwise, even before this Court.
The RTC therefore properly took
cognizance of the case against Dole
Philippines, Inc., and we agree that the
trial and the appellate courts
committed no error of law when Doles
contentions were overruled.
YU v TATAD
Judith Yu was convicted for the crime
Estafa by the RTC
Yu then filed a Motion for New Trial.
Yu received the denial of her motion on
November 3, 2005.
She then filed a notice of appeal with
the RTC on November 16, 2005,

alleging that pursuant to

Neypes v CA, she has a fresh
period of 15 days from her
receipt of the denial or until
November 18, 2005, within
which to file a notice of
appeal.
Prosecution filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal:
Contention: Neypes is
inapplicable to criminal
cases. Hence, the appeal was
belated.
Motion for Execution filed by the
Prosecution was granted by the RTC,
hence, this Petition to the SC.
ISSUE: WON the fresh period of 15
days from the order of denial of the
MR/NT within which to file an appeal,
as enunciated in Neypes v CA, applies
to criminal cases
SC: YES!
NOTE: The raison d tre for the fresh
period rule is to standardize the
appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as
to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted. Thus, the 15-day
period to appeal is no longer

interrupted by the filing of a motion for

new trial or motion for reconsideration;
litigants today need not concern
themselves with counting the balance
of the 15-day period to appeal since
the 15-day period is now counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to
appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a fresh period to
appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases
under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the
substantive law on which the Rules of
Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil
case and in a criminal case. Section 39
of BP 129 categorically states
that [t]he period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in
all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere

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debemos. When the law makes no
distinction, we (this Court) also ought
not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section
3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, though differently worded,
mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two
provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned the appeal period stops
running upon the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration and starts
to run again upon receipt of the order
denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation
that Neypes addressed in civil cases.
No reason exists why this situation in
criminal cases cannot be similarly
addressed.
Third, while the Court did not
consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal
period in criminal cases under Section
6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure since it involved a
purely civil case, it did include Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
petitions for review from the RTCs to
the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this

Court, both of which also apply to

appeals in criminal cases, as provided
by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal
taken. x x x x
(b) The appeal to
the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review under
Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided
in the last paragraph of
section 13, Rule 124, all
other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by
petition for review
on certiorari under Rule
45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to
the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and
to this Court in civil and criminal cases
are the same, no cogent reason exists
why the periods to appeal from the RTC

(in the exercise of its original

jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and
criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be treated differently.
PALILEO v PLANTERS DEVT BANK
Action for specific performance/sum of
money against Planters Development
Bank et al.
During Pre-trial, the bank manifested
its intention in settling the case but it
did not appear during the hearing.
Hence, RTC allowed ex parte
presentation of evidence by petitioners
Palileo et al and thus, rendered a
decision ordering Planters to pay
petitioners.
Planters received a copy of the RTC
decision on July 17, 2006.
Planters filed via LBC an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and New
Trial on July 31, 2006.
Note: Petitioner Palileo et als
copy of the Omnibus Motion was
likewise sent via LBC on the
same day but there was still no

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REM 1 - Brondial
LBC service in their address of
record at that time.
Planters then filed another copy of the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and New Trial this time via registered
mail. Another copy thereof was
simultaneously sent to petitioners
Palileo et al via registered mail as well.
RTC denied the Omnibus Motion on the
basis that: (nilagay ko lang yung to
pero hindi ito yung related sa topic kasi
Rule 15 pa to)
Said Motion violated Sec 5 Rule
15 (10-day setting) 10 days
after the filing, set the case for
hearing
-16 days after lang sinet for
hearing
CA initially denied the petition for
certiorari filed but thereafter reversed
itself relaxing Sec 5 of Rule 15.
Hence, Petition for certiorari before the
SC.

ISSUE: WON filing the Omnibus Motion

for Reconsideration and New Trial via
private courier, specifically LBC, is a
proper manner of filing
SC: NO!
The proceedings in the instant case
would have been greatly abbreviated if
the court a quo and the CA did not
overlook (kasi giit ng giit yang RTC at
CA na hindi nag comply sa 10-day
setting rule, e hindi naman yun ang
problema kundi yung filing via LBC) the
fact that PDBs Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial was
filed one day too late. The bank
received a copy of the trial courts June
15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006
thus, it had 15 days or up to August
1, 2006 within which to file a notice
of appeal, motion for reconsideration,
or a motion for new trial, pursuant to
the Rules of Court.32 Yet, it filed the
omnibus motion for reconsideration and
new trial only on
August 2, 2006.

Indeed, its filing or service of a copy

thereof to petitioners by courier service
cannot be trivialized. Service and filing
of pleadings by courier service is a
mode not provided in the Rules.33 This
is not to mention that PDB sent a copy
of its omnibus motion to an address or
area which was not covered by LBC
courier service at the time. Realizing its
mistake, PDB refiled and resent the
omnibus motion by registered mail,
which is the proper mode of service
under the circumstances. By then,
however, the 15-day period had expired
(yung filing via LBC did not toll the 15day period).